Conflict Snapshot

AUGUST 2023

This conflict snapshot report offers insight into both offline and online conflict trends in Sudan throughout August. It encompasses instances of violence and their repercussions on various population groups, infrastructure, essential services, as well as offline and online polarization dynamics. The data draws from 40 responses gathered by embedded observers, reflecting the perspectives of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), host communities, and service providers in regions including Gadarif, Kassala, Blue Nile, West, and South Kordofan. Additionally, public social media data from Facebook has been analyzed. The report also identifies emerging risks and opportunities, alongside providing actionable recommendations.

Key Trends

Conflict Dynamics & Affected Groups
In South Kordofan State, the month of August witnessed a surge in confrontations between the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-North) and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). This escalation stemmed from a breach of the cease-fire agreement by both the SPLM-North and SAF. The SPLM-North launched offensives on multiple areas, previously under SAF control, in the vicinity of Kadugli city, including Talo, Dolka, Elahimer, and Abu Sharan.

One particularly grave incident unfolded when the SPLM-North attacked Kadugli city, resulting in casualties, although precise figures are not available. Our estimates indicate approximately 17 fatalities and 54 injuries among civilians. The attack on the city originated from the eastern neighborhoods, specifically Talo, Al-Koz, Hajaralmak, and Al-Qardud. This assault also saw reports of property looting and the abduction of several citizens to unknown destinations.

The repercussions of these attacks have been severe, leading to the displacement of numerous individuals to the western neighborhoods of the city, with many taking shelter in schools. Others have been forced to flee to West Kordofan State. Notably, a follow-up question raised with conflict monitors in the State revealed that local initiatives to alleviate the conflict between SAF and SPLM-North have had limited success, with only one initiative by community leaders being attempted but ultimately unsuccessful.

In West Kordofan, persistent clashes between SAF and RSF have disrupted various parts of the state. These conflicts have severed the national road between Elbied and Elfula, resulting in soaring prices and unaffordability of essential food items. The state has also been receiving a significant influx of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) from Khartoum, El-Obeid, Darfur, and South Kordofan, with an estimated total of 46,520 IDPs currently residing in the state, as per statistics from the Sudanese Red Crescent.
The native administration, in collaboration with RSF, successfully secured relief materials from Madani for West Kordofan. Additionally, RSF has taken steps to dismantle more than 15 checkpoints where citizens were previously subject to collection fees along the road connecting Al-Fula and Abu Zabad.

Tragically, SAF pursued and looted a vehicle occupied by two individuals, subsequently fatally shooting them. This incident prompted the families of the deceased to stage a large-scale demonstration to voice their grievances. During these protests, a group of lawbreakers seized the opportunity and attacked the police station and police headquarters in Al-Fula, leading to the deaths of two police officers and widespread looting and destruction in the market and other institutions.

In Gadarif State, there has been a noticeable uptick in arms and drug trade in the state during this period. In addition, both Gadarif and Kassala States, serving as host communities for IDPs, confront a myriad of challenges. These encompass elevated prices of goods and rents, scarcity of essential items, restricted employment opportunities, a prolonged government salary backlog of five months, child labor, and an increase in begging. However, it’s worth noting that this situation has also generated new job and marketing opportunities for some families, particularly in sectors like handicrafts and ready-made food production such as bread and pastries.

IDPs have reported significant repercussions of the political conflict on the local landscape, including the dispersal of families across various regions. Accommodation centers often separate fathers, mothers, and children, leading to uncertainties in educational opportunities and job prospects. High housing costs, property losses, and limited access to public health services, particularly for individuals with chronic illnesses, have compounded their challenges. Additionally, there have been reports of harassment and abuse.

The data reveals that armed groups, specifically SAF and RSF, constitute the primary actors in the clashes, accounting for 95% of the incidents across various states, including Khartoum, West Kordofan, Gadarif, and Kassala. In South Kordofan and Blue Nile, SAF and SPLM-North are specified as the armed groups involved, while a smaller percentage, 5%, is attributed to "Others," such as "lawbreakers."

The data also illustrates that certain demographic groups are disproportionately affected by the clashes across states.
Collective Polarization

Respondents expressed mostly optimistic sentiments with regards to feeling dehumanized on the basis of their identity. Most respondents (53%) disagreed that they felt dehumanized because of their identity. 24% of respondents were neutral to the notion, while 13% and 9% respectively agreed or strongly agreed with the notion of feeling dehumanized based on their identity. Interestingly, no respondents "strongly disagreed" with the idea either.

Data from conflict monitors shows a bifurcated perspective on the justification of violence in certain situations. 41% of respondents indicated that violence to protect one’s livelihood is often justified, and 32% indicated it is never justified, while about 27% said violence to protect one's livelihood was either sometimes or seldom justified. The data shows a similar, but less drastic partner among respondents when asked whether violence is justifiable to defend their community. This seems to point to an inclination to protect the individual or the collective. These attitudes toward violence were similarly reflected in online spaces as well.

Looking at the data derived from the online space, we observed an increase in hate speech. Throughout the month of August, a total of 13.9k posts were classified as hate speech, generating approximately 452k comments. Notably, these hate speech posts exhibited a high level of engagement, with an average of 32 comments per post, indicating active discussions around these divisive narratives. Additionally, the 42% "love" emoji rate on these posts suggests a strong emotional resonance with a significant portion of the audience. This high level of "love" emoji interactions serves as an indicator of the posts' impact and their potential to galvanize like-minded individuals.

In August, we observed an ongoing trend that the top accounts associated with hate speech are primarily news-related platforms. This is consistent with the well-observed trend of high posting frequency among these accounts. This implies a role of news sources in fueling conflict and promoting dehumanization. Furthermore, the existence of contradictory reports within these platforms signals a worrisome presence of misinformation and disinformation.

The majority of hate speech and incitement to violence content online can be traced back to accounts supporting either SAF or RSF, underscoring the persistent influence that the conflict parties have on social media platforms as each actively promotes their respective narrative. The primary targets of hate speech also continue to be SAF and RSF, as indicated by the recurring presence of specific terms such as 

الجيش, الجنجويد, الدعم السريع, الدعامة, قوات, الكيزان, الكووز, قوات مسلحة, حمديتي, فلول النظام, البرهان (the army, Janjaweed, Rapid Support, Daa’m, Kahet (Forces of Freedom and Change), Kizan, Kooz, Hamedti, Diglo, al Burhan).

The number of posts labeled as “incitement” total 2k posts and 52k comments, while solidarity continues to be minimally represented online, with a total of 682 posts identified. These posts, which actively promote unity, and call for empathy and cohesion, play a crucial role in mitigating the harmful impacts of divisive narratives, potentially fostering dialogue and understanding among different factions and communities.
Basic Services & Accessibility

The incidents of clashes most commonly create economic disruptions and the displacement of people. These clashes of course lead to loss of life and injury. Monitors report the destruction of vital infrastructure. Clashes according to many monitors have the tendency to create mistrust and division within communities.

The data indicates that in some states, there are locations that have become inaccessible due to clashes between SAF and RSF. In Khartoum, South Kordofan, and the Blue Nile State, these include markets, hospitals, and government institutions. Additionally, several neighborhoods and villages are currently inaccessible due to battles that occurred in August. In South Kordofan these include Tulu, parts of Al-Koz, and parts of Hajar Al-Mak, while in Kadugli some eastern neighborhoods, and some villages along the road between Kadugli and Dilling, are inaccessible. There are also restrictions on accessing the national road between Elobied and El Fula due to fees imposed by people living along the road, as well as cases of looting and robbery. Conversely, respondents from Gadarif and Kassala have reported that no areas have become inaccessible due to the ongoing conflict. Accessibility is generally contingent on the severity and duration of clashes in different regions and fluctuates as the situation evolves.

Risks and Opportunities

In August, the main risks identified pertain to the increase of hate speech, incitement to violence, as well as mis/disinformation going on social media, including by news platforms. The displacement, economic hardships, thefts, and unemployment due to the war context also pose a risk to people’s livelihood and to the social fabric. There are opportunities to amplify narratives of solidarity and peaceful coexistence, and to prevent the spread of mis/disinformation on social media platforms. There is also an opportunity to create space for the mobilization of diverse leaders and groups across tribal lines to address key issues pertaining to livelihoods and strengthen social cohesion.

Recommendations

- **Collaborate with news pages for responsible reporting including on social media**: to tackle the concerning trend where a large fraction of content circulated by news pages contains derogatory language, it is crucial to collaborate with these pages to cultivate a more responsible and respectful discourse. Demonstrating responsible reporting through a few could potentially influence a broader spectrum of news pages to follow suit, fostering a healthier social media environment.
- **Promote citizen journalism in peripheral states**: recognizing the discrepancy between real-time events and their representation on social media, supporting citizen-led journalism and educating the public on mis/disinformation to share grounded and well-reported news would bring an added value.
- **Establish a civil coalition comprising youth and native administrations** to work collaboratively towards ending the hostilities, and initiate dialogues to elucidate the importance of coexistence with others and building on common interests to prevent the escalation of conflicts.
- **Provide immediate assistance to IDPs**, including provisions for protection, food, and shelter. Conflict observers’ context and local region-specific knowledge should be leveraged to share potential solutions about the provision of essential services to the local communities.