

HRSM MENA Advancing Tolerance Program
Case Study: Early Warning and Early Response Systems

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**Search for
Common Ground**
Trust, Collaboration, Breakthroughs

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Acronyms

ABA-ROLI	American Bar Association - Rule of Law Initiative
CSO	Civil Society Organization
EWER	Early Warning and Early Response
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
GBV	Gender-Based Violence
HRSM	Human Rights Support Mechanism
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
KII	Key Informant Interview
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
REM	Religious and Ethnic Minority
STC	Southern Transitional Council
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

Executive Summary

Within the framework of a USAID-funded Human Rights Support Mechanism (HRSM) program on Advancing Tolerance in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Search for Common Ground (Search) piloted a community-led Early Warning and Early Response (EWER) system in Aden, Yemen from July 2022 to February 2023. This document outlines the successes, challenges and lessons learned during the design and implementation phases of this pilot EWER system, and provides recommendations for those interested in implementing similar initiatives.

Key Findings and Recommendations

- A longer implementation time frame allows for more opportunities to form partnerships, increase local capacities, and build trust in the initiative
- The local community should be involved in setting the objectives of the EWER system to ensure that the system is relevant and conflict sensitive
- It is important to conduct a thorough mapping of potential local partners at the outset of the initiative, to identify institutions that could host the EWER system or NGOs that could provide their expertise in implementing certain early responses
- Attempts should be made to secure the direct participation in the EWER system of members of local institutions who are as senior in standing as possible, in order to obtain the full backing and support of those structures as a whole
- It is critical to maintain constant and open communication channels with local authorities so that trust in the EWER system is built over time and their assistance can be counted on to implement early responses
- Data collection and analysis methodologies should be designed based on the local community's capacities and resources so that they can be locally-owned
- The type of data collection tools that are chosen should provide the requisite level of detail to enable the design of concrete early responses
- Early warning dissemination should be followed up with in-person engagement to better communicate on the issues at hand and how to resolve them

Introduction

Through the Human Rights Support Mechanism (HRSM) led by Freedom House, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) financed Search for Common Ground (Search), the American Bar Association-Rule of Law Initiative (ABA-ROLI) and Pact to implement a three and a half year program from October 1, 2019 to March 30, 2023 with the overall goal of identifying atrocity risks and resilience mechanisms to support religious and ethnic minority (REM) populations in Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, and Yemen. This was achieved through the following three specific objectives: 1) Conducting an atrocity risk assessment and identifying early warning and other prevention and response mechanisms for at-risk REM populations; 2) Piloting an Early Warning and Early Response (EWER) system based on recommendations for at-risk REM populations; and 3) Supporting additional atrocity prevention, response, and recovery efforts for REM populations.

As part of specific objective 2, the HRSM team designed and piloted a EWER system in Aden, Yemen from July 2022 to February 2023, with a focus on insecurity and violence. As the initiative is now concluded, Search has produced this report as a reflection of the team's experience implementing a community-led EWER system. This report was informed by the team's own internal "after action reviews" and "reflection sessions," as well as three key informant interviews with experts and practitioners. For each aspect of the system, the research team revisits the best practices that informed the pilot's design, and delineates the lessons learned during the implementation phase.

Background

Broadly speaking, EWER systems are mechanisms used to anticipate catastrophic events - including natural disasters, epidemics, famines, and conflicts - in order to preemptively respond to prevent or minimize the impact of such disasters. According to the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR), a EWER system is an "integrated system of hazard monitoring, forecasting, and prediction, disaster risk assessment, communication and preparedness activities, systems and processes that enables individuals, communities, governments, businesses, and others to take timely action to reduce disaster risks in advance of hazardous events."¹ A basic EWER system includes five main phases: 1) data collection on risk indicators, 2) data analysis to determine the level of threat of violence or disaster, 3) warning dissemination to alert the population of the threat, 4) response design and implementation to ensure the population's protection, and 5) evaluation of the system's effectiveness in view of potential improvements to be made. Search's pilot EWER system consisted of four cycles, each composed

¹ "Early Warning System," UNDRR. Accessed November 24, 2020. <https://www.undrr.org/terminology/early-warning-system>.

of the above listed steps and each cycle lasting approximately two months. The system was spearheaded by a EWER management committee made up of 19 local focal points, including 11 women and 8 men.

For the purpose of designing an effective and relevant EWER system, Search had conducted preliminary research in April 2021 into best practices and lessons learned from previous initiatives. The full report can be found [here](#). In this first report, experts and practitioners shared their knowledge on what makes a EWER successful, what pitfalls to avoid, how sustainability can be ensured, and how gender inclusiveness can be fostered. The findings and recommendations are summarized below.

Key Findings

- Community-led and community-owned EWER systems are most effective in producing sustainable impact
- Communities' capacities and resources to respond to particular identified threats should be an important factor in determining systems' location and objectives
- Accessibility and favorable social and political dynamics are critical in determining systems' success in any particular community
- Systems obtain more buy-in and are more sustainable if they operate through pre-existing security and social structures, as opposed to parallel institutions
- Potential spoilers in the community who may aim to undermine the system must be anticipated and considered
- EWER system warnings must take care to avoid creating panic, leading to preemptive attacks, or causing a "crying wolf" syndrome
- Identifying local "champions" to act as focal points is critical to establish open and transparent two-way communication between any external organization and local management teams
- The system should be as inexpensive as possible to maintain and members should participate on a voluntary basis to promote sustainability and community-ownership

Recommendations

- Determine simple, specific, and flexible objectives
- Select a location based on need and potential for impact
- Design a whole-of-society system that depends on a coalition of local supporters
- Organize inclusive evaluative committees with local communities to better understand the context and advocate for local ownership
- Operate within local social norms and gender dynamics, and use contextually-relevant tools

- Conduct regular evaluations to identify lessons learned and to improve the system over time
- Encourage women’s participation in all phases of the system, and particularly in positions of leadership

Using these recommendations, the team produced an [implementation plan](#) and manual² that informed the EWER system’s roll out. Components of these design documents will be explored and commented on throughout the report.

Designing the System

During the project’s preliminary research phase, experts highlighted that the proper design and inception of a EWER system was key to determining its success. In particular, it is important to define clear, achievable, context-specific objectives, and select an appropriate location where local stakeholders are capable and willing to participate in and take ownership of the system. While it is important to identify a location where there is a need, access and conditions favorable to building trust in the system over time are also key considerations.

Location and Target Population

The project team decided to pilot the EWER system in Aden for various reasons. First, Search has a large operational presence there unlike in other locations in Yemen, including the two other areas targeted by the “Advancing Tolerance” program, Taiz and Dhale. This allowed the implementing team to easily access local communities and build on existing structures and networks. Second, Aden has not been the site of active combat in several years, making collaboration on sensitive security issues relatively more palatable than in areas closer to the frontlines. Third, the level of resources and capacities in Aden were determined to be greater than in other areas under consideration, ensuring that the community there would perhaps be more effective in implementing impactful responses.

Working within the scope of a program focused on empowering minority and marginalized communities, the project team decided that the EWER system would cover the districts of Sheikh Othman and Dar Saad within Aden, where there are large populations of Muhamasheen and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) that are more frequently targeted by violence in the community. The “Advancing Tolerance” program was already operating in these areas, and the aim was for both program components to complement and reinforce each other by building trust, relationships and enthusiasm.

² See Annex I.

However, the project team was careful to frame the EWER system as being for the benefit of all members of the community, not just minority groups. Indeed, a EWER system that only supports one group within a larger community can exacerbate tensions and create divisions between vulnerable groups and the majority population, for example, particularly as perpetrators of insecurity might feel that the initiative is taking aim at them. While it was important to target neighborhoods where there are large populations in need, therefore, it was also critical to ensure that the system was in everyone's interest in order to build trust and ward off spoilers. As a result, Search included members of the majority community within its EWER management committee, conducted interviews with a representative sample of the community, and shared early warning bulletins with a diverse array of local authorities.

Setting Objectives

According to practitioners, a EWER system's objectives should be specific yet flexible. This means that the system should be designed in a way that it can adapt to the needs of the community and the shifting local context. For instance, if it was designed to focus on certain security risks, there should be flexibility to shift to other, more pressing concerns if they are more relevant to the community. Search followed this advice by conducting several "after action reviews" and organizing discussions with the EWER management committee to determine how the activity could shift and adapt over time.

Lessons Learned

Because the EWER system's objective focused on security issues, Search's data collection tools mostly included questions on violence and threats in the community. However, the project team started to notice that details on the causes and circumstances of violence were hard to come by, particularly in open-ended key informant interviews (KIIs), because interviewees often felt uncomfortable discussing such sensitive topics in depth. Indeed, open discussion on security issues is difficult in a context in which most perpetrators come from the very security apparatuses that control the districts being targeted in Aden. The lack of detail in turn made it difficult to craft concrete, relevant early response initiatives. Furthermore, when it came time for the EWER management committee to design early response ideas based on the collected data, there regularly appeared a disconnect between the two - the data focused on security issues but the response ideas put forward by the management committee often had to do with issues related to economic hardship or the lack of social services such as water, electricity and waste removal. This again was due to an aversion for tackling more sensitive topics but also because social service needs were simply more pressing to community members than issues of insecurity.

It was therefore apparent that Search's focus on insecurity was somewhat ill-fitting in terms of the community's needs and sensitivities. In order to account for this, the project team modified

the data collection tools to remove some questions. Initially, however, the project team insisted that the management committee stay on track and focus on security issues, for example by approving only early response suggestions that were in line with this initial security-focused objective. By constraining focal points to focus on security issues, the system did not directly prioritize the community's needs. In an evaluation survey at the end of the initiative, only four out of 18 focal points said that the EWER system "addressed the communities' needs," while 12 said it only "somewhat addressed the communities' needs." Instead, the team could have worked with the focal points, especially during the EWER design phase, to identify indicators more relevant to barriers to services and social cohesion, and, once confidence in the system had been strengthened over time, later proceeded to attempt to address more sensitive issues relevant to violence. This would have given the management committee an opportunity to foster trust within the community, build relationships with relevant stakeholders, and understand how best to work within existing systems and mechanisms.

The system did, however, adapt to the community's needs to some degree as time progressed, and some of the early responses that were implemented were related to social services. And, in reality, these responses did also address security concerns, in an indirect way. For instance, one response the team implemented involved removing waste and installing trash bins in a neighborhood called Al-Sesaban. Data had indicated an uptick in disputes that sometimes escalated to physical altercations regarding excess waste overflowing areas surrounding community members' houses. In other words, issues related to social services often lead to competition over finite resources and, in the worst cases, violence within the community. As the focal points advocated for, this shift to issues related to social services perhaps allowed the EWER system to better preempt violence by targeting its root causes. At the same time, identifying concrete and manageable early responses to tackle such large, structural problems was also a challenge. As a result, it may have made it more difficult to produce tangible impact through the system's early responses, thereby frustrating community members and slowing the momentum of building trust in the initiative.

Overall, Search could have displayed more flexibility in determining the aims of the EWER system. It also could have included local authorities and management team members in the design of the system's objectives in the first place, to ensure their relevance. By more closely responding to the community's needs from the outset, the EWER system would have achieved more ownership, trust and sustainability. Alternatively, if Search preferred to retain a more direct focus on insecurity rather than issues related to limited social services, perhaps selecting a different location in Yemen would have been more relevant, such as an area closer to the frontlines of the conflict.

Securing Community Buy-In

In order to establish an effective community-led EWER system, it is important to secure the buy-in, investment and involvement of the community. In order to do this, Search organized consultations with local leaders to better understand the context and to engage in collaborative partnerships.

Consultations with the Community

As identified in the preliminary research, the first step to securing community buy-in is to conduct consultations with the population and local authorities. These discussions allow the implementing team to advocate for the system and garner the trust of the population by communicating to them the system's general objectives and expectations. These consultations also allow the team to understand the local context including local power and security dynamics, local capacities, existing structures and trusted institutions, gender and cultural norms, and the type of security risks the community faces. Indeed, these consultations help implementers better understand how the EWER system should be set up in a conflict-sensitive manner that can address the community's needs.



Photo 1: Participants during a consultation session.

Search conducted six consultations with Adeni community members, including leaders at both the neighborhood and district level. Various individuals were invited including religious, Muhamasheen and IDP leaders, and members of the Executive Unit for IDPs. These dialogues allowed the team to 1) gauge in which specific communities buy-in may be possible; 2) better assess local dynamics, trusted institutions, available resources and capacities, training needs, types of violence the communities face, and indicators or signs of the potential emergence of those threats; 3) advocate for the system and secure the approval and participation of a wide array of local leaders and stakeholders; and 4) provide an opportunity for local leaders to suggest candidates for the EWER management committee.



Photo 2: Workshop with local authorities.

Management Committee

Community-led EWER systems should be directly managed by community members to ensure the system is context-relevant and sustainable. As highlighted in the initial report on best practices, there is debate among practitioners as to whether EWER systems should be fully integrated within preexisting local institutions. On the one hand, this favors ownership and sustainability, but on the other hand these institutions may have certain weaknesses beyond the control of the project team, such as that they are not trusted by all members of the community - this is sometimes the case in Aden, where minority groups are marginalized by mainstream society. In its final assessment, Search decided to create a EWER management committee “from scratch” that was nonetheless made up of representatives of local institutions and governing structures.

Search’s EWER management committee was comprised of 19 focal points and two local Search staff. Two additional regional Search staff provided technical and oversight support. The focal points included religious and civil society organization (CSO) leaders, and members of local non-governmental organizations (NGOs), popular committees, and local councils, which are governing structures at the district level. Search was unable to recruit police or members of the Southern Transitional Council’s (STC) Security Belt³ because of Leahy Law restrictions that apply to USAID grants.

Focal points were integrated into the EWER management committee, received training, and supported different components of the system from the data collection phase to the warning dissemination phase to the response implementation phase. They were not compensated for their work, as only their transportation costs were covered.



Photo 3: Project coordinator and project officer interviewing a potential focal point.

Lessons Learned

³ One of several armed actors loyal to the STC, and influential in many areas of Aden.

Conducting consultations with both local authorities and local community leaders was a crucial step to securing buy-in. These meetings also allowed the project team to learn more about local dynamics and what sensitivities to consider. For instance, Search was told about prevalent types of insecurity in Aden, including forced eviction, arbitrary detentions, the mismanagement of humanitarian aid, and violence perpetrated by armed militias, and, importantly, what indicators, such as an increase in the presence of weapons, might point to a rise in such issues. In addition, the team was able to discern what methodologies might be most contextually relevant, such as to use Kobo Collect instead of paper surveys, and to conduct these interviews with personal acquaintances rather than strangers for safety reasons. Finally, local leaders underlined that collecting information about security issues specific to minority groups, and asking questions about the identity of perpetrators, might agitate security forces, and to therefore only engage on those topics in a confidential manner, if at all.

While the meetings with local authorities increased the EWER system's legitimacy, focal points shared that more effort should have been made to strengthen their relationship with local authorities throughout the life of the initiative. For instance, perhaps after each data collection period, the project team could have facilitated a short round table discussion gathering both focal points and local authorities to discuss findings, share the early warning bulletins, and discuss early response ideas together - indeed, only focal points participated in response design workshops for this initiative. Greater and more frequent interactions would also have helped ensure local authorities' involvement in the implementation of early responses, which would have made these more effective and timely. Another important way this could have been done and trust could have been built in the system would have been to, where appropriate, advertise in newspapers and on the radio the work being carried out and responses being successfully implemented.

Furthermore, while the focal points were representative of their communities and held positions of leadership critical to ensuring the success of the EWER system, it was determined that the initiative would have benefited from the participation of individuals who held more senior levels in their respective institutions. This would have made it easier to secure buy-in from their organizations as a whole, thereby facilitating the mobilization of their resources, influence, and support. At the very least, a mechanism - such as the round table discussions mentioned above - should have been in place for the focal points to be able to transmit information about their work to their institution's leadership in order to secure that institution's support in a more substantial way.

Alternatively, perhaps Search could have fully integrated its EWER management committee within a local institution after all, such as within the local council or a CSO. This would perhaps

have allowed for more buy-in, ownership and sustainability. However, one reason that Search did not move forward with this idea in the first place was that the project team was unable to identify an appropriate and relevant organization for this purpose at the outset of the project. Indeed, it takes time to identify the different actors operating in any context, and to assess their capacities and willingness to conduct such work. At the conclusion of the EWER pilot, Search is now in a much better position to be able to identify such an organization - this indicates how much time it can take to evaluate how best to structure a EWER system that is as relevant and effective as it can be. Perhaps Search would also have benefited from a more extensive effort to map out actors and local dynamics at the beginning of the project.

Capacity-Building

Building local capacities is imperative for the local community to run a EWER system effectively and, eventually, autonomously. Practitioners advised the project team to first assess local capacities and then tailor training to address any gaps. These experts also identified various skills that are necessary for the community to run a EWER system efficiently including 1) identifying indicators to measure changes in the local security context, 2) collecting and analyzing data, 3) mediating disputes to directly respond to threats of violence, 4) communicating and disseminating early warnings, and 5) designing and implementing early responses.



Photo 4: Focal points participating in the EWER training.

Search organized two sets of training for the focal points responsible for managing the EWER committee. The first component covered fundamental peacebuilding concepts including conflict analysis, finding common ground, and mediation. The objective was for focal points to be better able to identify the causes and effects of violence in their communities, and to be empowered to respond to security issues themselves through dialogue. The project team then held another training geared more specifically towards EWER management. It included training on using Kobo Collect to conduct surveys, qualitative research methods, data verification, communication techniques, and response design and implementation. The trainees developed EWER data

collection tools and warning and response manuals that were later used during the system's implementation.

Lessons Learned

Many focal points noted that the skills they developed were useful. They did share, however, that a refresher training a few months into the pilot would have been beneficial because they sometimes struggled with some components of the EWER system. For instance, some participants found designing and planning responses a challenging task, and the project team noticed that some response ideas that were shared by focal points lacked detail and did not always target issues found in the data. The project team could have worked with focal points to identify those areas they were struggling with and then organized a short refresher training to address those needs.

Moreover, focal points shared that they would have benefited from additional training in awareness-raising techniques, problem-solving, and legal rights to further support their communities. This would have allowed focal points to use those skills to directly intervene in resolving community issues.

The project team also could have included in these trainings several local organizations and institutions to which focal points belonged. This would have allowed the project team to build a wider and more solid network on the ground invested in the EWER system's success. These organizations could have included the Executive Unit for IDPs which manages IDP camps in Aden, the Legal Support Unit which works to free arbitrarily detained persons, and NGOs that work on issues related to gender-based violence (GBV). Later, if the team identified risks of GBV in the community, for example, these organizations could have been mobilized to intervene.

Finally, focal points were not given many opportunities to put into practice the mediation skills on which they had been trained. This is because those issues requiring such interventions were too sensitive or dangerous to tackle, and because the type of data that was collected was often too general to be conducive to such initiatives, as will be discussed below.

Data Collection and Analysis

EWER systems are founded first and foremost on the collection of data, based on which early warnings are developed and early responses are crafted. The type of data that is collected can vary from system to system, whether it be primary or secondary, quantitative or qualitative. Quantitative data, through community surveys for example, is valuable in that it is usually based on larger, more representative sample sizes, while its closed questioning can provide straightforward statistics on a particular issue. Qualitative data, on the other hand, is helpful in

providing an understanding of the causes and consequences of the issue being observed, which is critical for designing effective early response mechanisms. Ideally, a EWER system would collect data from various sources so that findings are corroborated, particularly as in contexts of low-trust misinformation can spread wildly. Furthermore, it is important that enumerators and moderators be perceived as objective and representative of the community, and that survey respondents and KII participants be allowed to answer questions in a confidential manner and in a safe space. Finally, in any community-based EWER system, it is critical that locals both lead this process and be consulted on their perspectives, and that the collected information is later presented back to the community and validated.

In Search's EWER system, the focal points conducted approximately 120 community perception surveys and 24 KIIs per cycle, on such topics as verbal abuse, physical violence, sexual harassment, humanitarian aid, forced eviction, and arbitrary arrests. The surveys were administered in the target communities and focused on the number of cases - and the circumstances - of various types of violence respondents were aware of over the preceding month. KIIs involved a diverse array of local leaders who were prompted to provide more detail on these and other security issues in the community, as well as their causes and potential mitigation measures.



Photo 5: Focal point conducting a survey using Kobo Collect.

Both qualitative and quantitative data was analyzed by the Search project team rather than the focal points. Once the information was processed, it was presented back to the focal points and validated during workshops. During these workshops, responses were also designed to tackle the identified threats.

Lessons Learned

During response workshops and through internal discussions, it was deemed that the data collection tools being used were perhaps insufficient. Community surveys, in particular, only measured general perceptions of security rather than provide information on specific incidents. While perception surveys can be useful in certain contexts, particularly to monitor changing trends over time, in Aden they proved less so because the security situation is relatively stable. Indeed, the project team found that the community surveys were producing similar findings from one cycle to the next, particularly as data was collected at short, six week intervals. This ultimately made it more challenging for focal points to devise relevant early responses each cycle to mitigate emerging issues because the data was so general and repetitive. Surveys did not need to be conducted on such a frequent basis in Aden, and they perhaps would have been more relevant in an area of the country with more unstable and dynamic security conditions.

To respond to these concerns, in the last cycle of the EWER system, focal points supplemented the survey and the KIIs with “incident reports,” through which they collected information related to a specific dispute in the community. This objective was to make the collected data more specific and actionable, and composed of information related to new, emerging threats or disputes.

Search had initially chosen to conduct perception surveys because the team was concerned that information on specific disputes might put the enumerators at risk or might make respondents uncomfortable, and because these sorts of detailed reports would be difficult and time-consuming to verify. So in ultimately deciding to adopt incident reports, Search made sure to only approach respondents who signaled being comfortable with this process, and enumerators avoided asking questions about perpetrators to ensure their own safety. Contacts of other individuals involved or knowledgeable about the situation were collected to later corroborate the details in case mediation was to be considered.

In addition, focal points could have been included more in the process of analyzing data. The project team managed this itself because of time and communication constraints. Indeed, to save time, focal points were asked to collect data for the next cycle while response implementation for the previous cycle - managed by the project team - was still ongoing. This ill-advised rush to complete as many cycles as possible within the short project timeframe limited focal points’ availability to work on all aspects of the system, while also leading focal points and community leaders to feel like the data they had collected had not actually been used before they were asked to collect more. The project team also directly managed the data interpretation phase because, significantly, the focal points had not been trained on quantitative data analysis, using Stata or Excel for example. As it would have been difficult to find the time to include such content in the

initial trainings, the takeaway may be that, again, perhaps the use of community surveys was not appropriate, not only for the reasons stated previously, but also because it cut out the local community from the data analysis phase of the EWER system. This did not favor community ownership and sustainability. In other words, Search should have opted for data collection tools and processes for which the community already had some means and resources to adopt on their own. In fact, with regards to data collection, EWER experts had warned about introducing new technology that locals might not fully master, and it is Search's conclusion that this also should apply with regards to the process of data analysis. Alternatively, perhaps Search could have enlisted the assistance and collaboration of local universities to manage the process of data interpretation.

Lastly, the project team could have done more to ensure quality assurance and data verification, primarily by inviting local authorities to response workshops during which findings were validated by participants.

Warning Dissemination

Once data is analyzed, EWER system implementers must determine which risks merit early warnings and how to communicate them. Warnings must avoid creating panic in the community, and thus should be shared only with relevant actors and be formulated in a calm and clear manner. It is also important to include in these warnings specific responses that the community can adopt to counter the identified threats, although expectations must also be managed to avoid having the system be perceived as ineffective.

Search produced four early warning bulletins, one per cycle, that summarized the main security and social instability issues in the community.⁴ Each bulletin included information on the most pressing risks, their level of urgency, and recommendations for addressing each threat.

The team produced two versions of the bulletin. An English version was shared with the donor, USAID. A second version in Arabic was disseminated in hard copy to the local community including CSO and religious leaders, and in soft copy to INGOs located in Aden. Focal points also shared this bulletin with their networks, especially on WhatsApp groups. For conflict sensitivity reasons, this latter version of the bulletin excluded some information such as on arbitrary arrests, in order to avoid raising suspicions among security actors that the EWER system might expose some of their abuses.

Lessons Learned

⁴ See Annex II for an example.

The warning bulletins increased local actors' awareness of the types of insecurities present in the community. Search's practice of mapping out relevant bulletin recipients was particularly useful. However, as far as the project team knows, these actors did not often make use of the information that was shared with them, and Search received little feedback on these bulletins. As the bulletin was about eight pages in length, perhaps it could have been shortened to ensure wider readership. It also would have been useful to organize workshops with various actors, particularly INGOs that have more financial resources, to discuss ways in which they could potentially carry out some of the recommendations contained within these bulletins. While Search was invited to monthly Protection Cluster meetings, the time devoted to sharing EWER findings was insufficient.

Furthermore, it was the project team that produced the warning bulletins rather than the focal points. It would have been more sustainable to involve them in the process of preparing the bulletins. In addition, more effort could have been made to identify other ways and mediums by which to disseminate warnings that would have complemented the bulletins. For instance, short memos with information on a particular threat such as GBV could have been posted at organizations that focus on the specific issue in question.

Response Design and Implementation

A common issue in the EWER field generally-speaking is a weak link between the early warning and early response components of the system. This essentially can do more harm than good as communities are warned about risks that they are unable to thwart, either because they are not guided in how to do so or because they are not equipped to do so. To avoid this scenario, it is important that the community focus and collect data on those threats which the community has the resources and abilities to preempt. In addition, community members should be empowered to devise the responses to be implemented, and these responses should attempt to build on pre-existing mechanisms and efforts so that they are longer-lasting and more locally-rooted.



Photo 6: Focal points participating in the response workshop for the second EWER cycle.

The project team held response design workshops every cycle after data was collected and analyzed. During these workshops, the data was first validated by focal points and then categorized by level of urgency. Focal points were then asked to work together to fill out a response template that allowed them to expand on how the committee could respond to the observed risks.⁵ Approximately eight response ideas were developed during each workshop, with two eventually validated by the project team for implementation.

Details on the implemented responses can be found below:

Response	Description	Location	Urgency	Time Needed
Install Solar Lamps to Prevent Crime at Night	Public lighting can deter robberies and assaults happening in the dark.	Abdul Qawi/Al-Sharqiyah	Medium	1 month
Organize Dialogues between IDPs and the Executive Unit for IDPs	IDPs live in fear that they will be evicted. Sometimes misinformation stirs tension within the IDP community.	Hosh Dirham	High	1 month
Provide Training on Risk Management and Conflict Resolution to the Executive Unit for IDPs	IDPs are frustrated by insufficient food and cash distribution, and inaccurate beneficiary lists. These trainings were specifically requested by the Executive Unit for IDPs and helped its staff better manage at times contentious relations with IDPs.	Hosh Dirham	Medium	1 month
Training and Workshop for Teachers to Address Sexual Abuse in Schools	Students are sometimes abused in schools by adults or older students. Shame and fear of reprisals prevent many from reporting these incidents, and many drop out of school as a result. Therefore, the team increased the support students receive by training teachers on ways to identify abuse and provide care.	Al-Sharqiyah	High	1 month

⁵ See Annex III.

Training on GBV for the Legal Support Unit	GBV is common in the community. The Legal Support Unit requested training to improve how they manage GBV cases and how they assist survivors.	All	Medium	1 month
Waste Removal to Prevent Disputes between Neighbors and the Spread of Disease	Neighbors sometimes fight over excess waste overflowing the area surrounding their houses. The response involved the removal of waste and the placement of trash containers in the neighborhood.	Al-Sesaban	Low	1 month
Removal of Electric Wires	Downed and faulty power lines frequently injure members of the community.	Abdul Qawi and Al-Sesaban	Medium	1 month

Lessons Learned

The eight responses implemented during the pilot directly or indirectly addressed risks of violence and insecurity, and greatly benefited the local community. The diversity and representativeness of the focal points allowed the team to address a wide array of issues that affect various groups, including Muhamasheen and women specifically. However, there are several lessons to be learned regarding the response design and implementation process. First, Search struggled at times to identify concrete and simple early responses to the threats observed in the community. This is largely due to issues already discussed in the “Setting Objectives” section and elsewhere, such as the fact that several types of insecurity were too sensitive to work on or discuss in a detailed way, that the survey data was repetitive and general, and that many of the response ideas designed by focal points related to difficult to resolve structural problems such as unemployment and social services delivery. There was also a sense that if there were an easy fix to the identified issues then they would have already been resolved, which points to the reality that many of the observed issues in Aden are longstanding and entrenched. Again, a security-focused EWER of this nature may have been better suited to a more volatile, unstable context with a constant flux of newly emerging threats and security problems.

Second, response idea templates submitted by focal points often lacked detail, and therefore made it difficult to analyze whether the proposed initiatives were viable or not. This required the team to follow up with additional field visits to gather missing information regarding the exact needs, costs, or required permissions for proposed responses. This in turn delayed the process of selecting which response ideas to move forward with, since an informed decision was difficult

to make. Greater training on response design could have been considered, or perhaps response workshops were too short.

Third, more effort could have been made to mobilize other actors to implement early responses that Search did not have the budget or capacity to oversee itself. This would have made the EWER system more impactful, more inclusive and more flexible to respond to a diverse array of threats. Indeed, Search, as a peacebuilding organization, did not necessarily have the expertise or authority to respond to each security issue that was identified, and therefore bringing in diverse partners would have allowed the system to benefit from their areas of expertise.

Fourth, Search faced delays in implementing some responses, particularly those involving infrastructure initiatives, which was highly problematic given that these responses were often intended to solve or preempt urgent issues. Indeed, securing permissions from authorities and procuring the necessary materials was time-consuming. As mentioned previously, local authorities could have been more fully included in the EWER process in order to circumvent these delays.

In an attempt to address these last two issues, Search over time relied more heavily on local governance structures to implement early responses in order to speed up the process, and also to foster community ownership and sustainability. For example, Search mobilized the “Clean Unit” to remove waste and the “Electricity Office” to remove electric wires in al-Sesaban. The idea was for these institutions to undertake the type of action that they are nominally responsible for in the first place but had hitherto often failed to assume, with Search providing guidance or procuring the necessary materials to assist them. However, while the waste removal response was implemented swiftly and efficiently, the electric wire response dragged on because workers at the Electricity Office demanded remuneration that the latter did not have the means to provide.

Finally, Search at times had to contend with the frustration of members of the community who had been left out of the response initiatives. For example, in setting up solar lamps, the project team could only target certain streets but did not have the means to cover entire neighborhoods or districts. Search attempted to diversify the areas in which it intervened in a bid to adopt as egalitarian an approach as possible.



Photo 7: Participants from the Legal Support Unit receive certificates after their participation in a training on GBV.

Evaluating the System

By conducting regular evaluations to assess its effectiveness, those managing a EWER system can identify areas of improvement and learn from past experiences. In addition to this, evaluations play a crucial role in building trust and increasing community engagement. By demonstrating the system's positive impact in the local community, and adapting it where necessary, confidence and buy-in is enhanced.

Both focal points and the overall project team had several opportunities to evaluate the system throughout the duration of the initiative. During each response design workshop, focal points provided feedback on the data collection tools and methodology, as well as on the warning bulletins. During these workshops, the project team also shared progress being made on the implementation of early responses, which the focal points were also able to react to. Moreover, the project team conducted internal reflection sessions to brainstorm strategies for enhancing different phases of the system and addressing any difficulties encountered.

Sustainability

While the objectives of the pilot EWER system did not necessarily include ensuring its sustainability over time, Search nonetheless made significant efforts in this regard. The hope was to promote the sustainability of the system itself, as well as the sustainability of some of the responses that were implemented. Regarding the former, practitioners had advised the project team to consider three factors from the outset of the initiative. First, the EWER system must be given a significant amount of time to achieve its intended results and be fully integrated in the

community. Indeed, it not only takes time to build trust and develop local capacities to run the system, but it also takes time to determine whether the system has had a positive impact and whether there are any lessons learned that can be taken into account. Second, local ownership of every component of the system ensures that the community is able to maintain the system after the external organization withdraws and no longer provides oversight. This is why building on existing structures and involving locals in all processes, from data collection to response implementation, is imperative. Finally, EWER systems should be as simple and cost-effective as possible. Simple systems facilitate local ownership and make it easier for the community to continue running it once a supporting partner such as Search has passed on the torch.

Lessons Learned

Promoting the sustainability of an eight-month pilot EWER system was a challenging task, but the implementing team strove to do so, with moderate success: in an evaluation survey at the end of the initiative, 13 out of 17 focal points said that the system was “somewhat sustainable.” First, as previously mentioned, the team attempted, with mixed results, to involve local governance structures on the one hand and NGOs and international institutions on the other when implementing responses. This included the “Clean Unit,” the Executive Unit for IDPs, and the “Electricity Office” on the government side, and the Legal Support Unit and UN agencies in the latter category. However, local structures often lacked the financial means to take on many of the tasks and early responses that were proposed, while INGOs and UN agencies did not appear interested or flexible enough to partner on ad hoc initiatives of this nature. In addition, at the outset of the EWER system, Search did not always know who these relevant actors were - it was only over time that this understanding came about and attempts to build relationships with these potential partners were made.

Hence, Search could have better mapped out potential partners at the outset of the project. It could also have included the above entities in the EWER process in more realistic and simple ways, such as inviting their members to response workshops to present the data to them, rather than trying with short notice to hand over to them large responsibilities they were unable to assume. A longer project timeline would also have allowed focal points to build more such relationships, including with CSOs, and security and judicial authorities. In the end, these relationships are necessary to finance the implementation of early responses, which the community does not have the means to do on its own.

Second, as mentioned previously, focal points should have been directly involved in the data collection, warning dissemination, and response implementation phases of the system. This could have been achieved by providing additional training and resources on these elements if necessary - for instance on fundraising, project proposal writing, and data analysis - and

simplifying the EWER system process by avoiding the need for technically challenging quantitative data analysis, for example. This approach may have enabled focal points to gradually take over full management of the system and would have favored the durability of the EWER management committee itself, but unfortunately here again the short project timeframe made this a difficult prospect.

Finally, the project team strove to take into consideration the sustainability of the implemented early responses themselves. During response workshops, focal points discussed the requisite steps needed to ensure the durability of the initiatives related to solar lamps, waste removal, and electric wire removal. Based on this, the project team prepared short sustainability plans for the focal points to adopt and carry out over time as leaders in their communities.

Recommendations

Based on the project team's experience implementing a EWER system as well as the team's preliminary research, the following practices are recommended for designing and implementing a community-led EWER system.

- Involve the local community in determining the objectives and focus of the EWER system from its outset to ensure it is relevant to their needs and that it is conflict sensitive; this will enhance community ownership and ensure responses are actionable
- Select an emergency context to establish a EWER system focusing on insecurity, as it is more relevant to conduct regular data collection and more realistic to identify quick, simple solutions to emerging threats in such dynamic settings compared to areas that are plagued by longstanding, entrenched issues
- Maintain constant and open communication channels with local authorities so that trust in the EWER system is built over time and their assistance can be counted on to implement early responses; in particular, data findings should be presented to them through workshops and their input should be gathered during the design of early responses
- Consider, where appropriate, publicizing in the media the successful implementation of early responses to breed trust in and enthusiasm for the EWER system
- Attempt to secure the direct participation in the EWER system of members of local institutions who are as senior in standing as possible, in order to obtain the full backing and support of those structures as a whole; alternatively, plan a process whereby more junior members who participate in the EWER system can inform their supervisors about the work at hand in a systematic way
- Conduct a thorough mapping of potential local partners at the outset of the initiative, to identify institutions that could host the EWER system or NGOs that could provide their expertise in implementing certain early responses
- Set a timeframe of at least one year for the establishment of a community-based EWER system, in order to allow for time to form partnerships, increase local capacities, and build trust in the initiative

- Ensure that the data collection tools that are used provide the requisite level of detail with which to design concrete early responses; this may require conducting “incident reports” on specific disputes in the community rather than perception surveys
- Design a data collection and analysis strategy that the local community has the capacities and resources to manage itself; outsourcing quantitative data analysis to a third party, for example, can limit local ownership of these processes, and therefore calls for different types of data collection tools to be used instead
- Disseminate early warnings that are concise and to the point, and that omit information that could be seen as sensitive to certain actors
- Follow up this warning dissemination with workshops that include relevant local actors during which the content of the warnings can be presented and their urgency underlined

Annex I: EWER Manual⁶

This manual will serve to guide the EWER committee as it manages the EWER system. Each cycle of the EWER system will last 8 weeks, as follows.

Data Collection (weeks 1-3)

The first step in the EWER cycle will be to create, translate, upload and pilot a survey questionnaire and a KII guide that focus on indicators of violence that affect all members of the community. The content of the tools may be modified every month based on the previous month's results, and newer versions of the survey may therefore be uploaded into Kobo every month.

These surveys and interviews will:

- not focus on specific incidents
- not focus on perpetrators
- not ask questions that are too direct
- not ask for personally-identifiable information
- be preceded by obtaining informed consent
- use simple language
- be conducted in Sheikh Othman (al-Sesaban and Abdul Kowi) and Dar Sad (al-Sharqia and Hosh Derhim)
- KIIs will be recorded on smartphones if permission is given, and transcribed later
- surveys will be sent to the server as soon as possible

There are five focal points per neighborhood. One of the focal points will supervise the work of the other four individuals. S/he and one of the other four individuals will also conduct 3 KIIs each during the data collection period (for a total of 24). The three other individuals will conduct 10 surveys each during the data collection period (for a total of about 120 surveys). Roles should be divided up so that there is gender balance. Those with the most experience using Kobo should be selected as survey enumerators. While we allow three weeks for this process to unfold, it is encouraged to collect all data as soon as possible.

- observers should collect data from people they know and trust due to sensitivities
- observers should collect data in a private setting; it is preferable that they not be publicly known as observers

⁶ Note: Over the course of the pilot, some of the methodology and targets evolved.

-observers should be given letters explaining their roles and responsibilities that they can share with interviewees if necessary

-KI informants will be determined by the observer in collaboration with the project manager and project officer, and include members of CSOs, aqel al-harat, community committees, hospitals, media, police stations, the local council, human rights offices that are linked to the human rights ministry, and local humanitarian actors to track incidents of violence

In addition, the committee will obtain daily security reports from the local councils of each district, compiled through their hotlines.

The project manager and project officer will conduct 15 survey call-backs, and verify the quality of KIIs by listening to recordings. The Search team will also analyze survey data for any inconsistencies. Unreliable data will be removed and instructions for performance improvement will be communicated to the observers if necessary.

All data will be safely secured by the project manager and project officer.

Data Validation/Analysis (week 4)

As data is collected and quality control measures are deployed, the Search team will analyze 1. Survey data, 2. KII data, 3. Hotline reports and 4. Social media trends (through Talkwalker). Data will first again be checked for quality. Then specific threats that appear via at least two of the above sources of information will be noted down. In addition, particular attention will be paid to see if any indicators are trending upwards compared to the previous month's data. Finally, this list of threats will be presented and validated (or not) by the EWER committee during its first monthly meeting. All data will be shared with the EWER committee itself beforehand (in a secure manner). While a final list of validated threats will be compiled in week 4, it will be important for data to be evaluated as it comes in so that more urgent threats can be addressed as soon as possible rather than waiting until the end of the month. In addition, focal points should know that if there are particularly urgent threats they think should be addressed immediately, that they should communicate this in the team's WhatsApp group so the EWER team can look at the data and confirm this.

Threats that are validated by the committee during this meeting will then be rated by its members on an "urgency" scale: very urgent (imminent threat for which a response must be deployed within 48 hours), urgent (threat for which a response must be deployed within 10 days), less urgent (threat for which a response must be deployed within three weeks). This will not be the only criteria for selecting responses (see below) but it will be an important assessment to make to inform the selection process.

In addition, for each type of threat we are examining, we should determine a threshold number of reported cases that would lead us to conclude that a response is necessary.

Response Design (week 5-6)

In the second monthly meeting, responses to those threats that were validated in the first meeting will be discussed and selected. At the end of the meeting, 3 responses per district (these can address the same threat, or different threats), or 6 total, should be selected based on the following criteria. The responses should:

- be implementable within 48 hours, 10 days or three weeks, depending on the urgency level of the threat the intervention would be responding to; this means that the type of response must be informed by how rapidly it can be implemented (using the below criteria)
- respond to an observed and validated threat/need that would have a large negative impact on the community
- respond to an observed and validated threat/need that is likely to materialize
- respond to an issue affecting all/most members of society that everyone has an interest in resolving, and not focus on an issue specific to one group of people
- focus on general security issues, not specific disputes (otherwise it becomes more sensitive and difficult to ascertain the facts)
- be specific
- consider ways to prevent the threat (by eliminating its causes) and/or ways to mitigate its impact/consequences (if eliminating its causes is not possible)
- be inexpensive and make use of local resources and capacities as much as possible; responses that cost under \$2000 will require less paperwork and will be faster to implement
- require as few authorizations as possible (to be discussed with authorities who make up the committee)
- be technically easy and straightforward to implement, or not require the recruitment of third parties
- benefit both men and women
- plan for and avoid unintended negative consequences

Warning Dissemination (week 5-6)

The second monthly meeting (week 5) will also provide an opportunity for the EWER committee to discuss how warnings should be disseminated for each of the proposed responses, if eventually implemented. During this meeting, the EWER committee will need to decide:

- who to communicate these warnings to; it is not recommended to warn the entire community for fear of creating panic or causing unintended consequences

- how to word the language in these warnings; language intended to avoid panic is critical
- when to communicate these warnings; it is important to communicate before a threat materializes but to also take the time to confirm the data first
- how frequently to communicate these warnings
- how to communicate these warnings; this will depend on the recipients of the information; the use of bulletins (see below) or SMS may be considered
- whether warnings related to threats for which the committee is not implementing a response would be beneficial as well or not: this could be worthwhile if the institutions that are warned can reasonably be expected to be able to implement a response and be able to afford to do so, and to do so in a conflict sensitive way.

Once the responses have been selected at the end of week 6, and as the EWER committee proceeds with implementation, its members will be able to disseminate warnings about those threats the interventions are designed to respond to.

The EWERS committee will be responsible for producing a one-page bulletin encapsulating these validated threats they are tied to, as well as response recommendations. This bulletin can be shared with relevant parties as part of the warning dissemination process. They will then have an opportunity to pass on warnings to their constituents if they so choose (being cognizant of conflict sensitivity issues).

Relevant parties with whom to share the bulletins: community committees, peace committees, local councils, police stations, CSOs, mosque leaders, CIVIC, UNDP, Protection Cluster (and their partners), NRC, INTERSOS, DRC, ACTED (in camps), STC military leaders

Response Implementation (week 7-8 at most)

In preparing to implement suggested responses, the EWER committee will also need to determine:


- where exactly the proposed interventions will take place
- what permissions are needed (and later obtain them)
- a budget (and later obtain the necessary funds)
- what local resources and capacities can be leveraged
- which individuals/institutions may need to assist in the implementation, such as mediators or the local council
- how to make the response sustainable, if possible
- whether this response can be made public and tied to the EWER system or not, depending on sensitivities/response type

The EWER committee will need to submit a short document for each of the 6 proposed responses by the end of week 6 at the latest, explaining how the response meets the above selection criteria and how the committee has considered the above implementation steps.


Search, along with the committee, will then select two responses total (one per district) to implement during weeks 7 and 8 (at the latest).

Annex II: Example of Warning Bulletin

Advancing Tolerance in MENA – Yemen



USAID
FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE



**Search for
Common Ground**
Trust, Collaboration, Breakthrough

HRSM Advancing Tolerance in MENA Program

YEMEN

Early Warning Monthly Bulletin

Aden, Yemen
October 2022

(Award PoC):


Sophien Ben Achour
Chief of Party
Search for Common Ground
sben-achour@sfcg.org

(EWERS/Bulletin PoC)

Edward Sloan
Research & Assessment Manager
Search for Common Ground
esloan@sfcg.org

I. Introduction

Search for Common Ground (Search), in collaboration with local authorities and community leaders, launched in June 2022 an Early Warning and Early Response System (EWERS) in Aden. The EWERS covers the neighborhoods of Abdul Kowi and al-Sesaban in the district of Sheikh Othman and the neighborhoods of al-Sharqia and Hosh Dirham in the district of Dar Saad. This warning bulletin summarizes the most significant types of incidents that were identified during the month of October 2022 through 130 community perception surveys and 24 key informant interviews.



The truce between the Republic of Yemen Government and Ansar Allah expired on October 2, 2022 and has not been extended, although negotiations are ongoing. After a period of relative calm, there are concerns that the conflict might ramp up in the coming weeks and months – there have been reports that Ansar Allah launched attacks in Lahj, Taiz, and Dhale in late October. In addition, the Southern Transitional Council (STC) has continued its expansion in Shabwa and Abyan, and more recently Hadramout.

II. Risk Summary


- For most types of insecurity, the situation has remained largely the same compared to September, with a slight increase in cases of theft and a decrease in land/home evictions
- Disputes over resources and social services like water access, electricity, and sewage/waste removal remain a common driver of tension
 - Governmental bodies responsible for providing these services often avoid the districts of Dar Saad and Sheikh Othman due to stigmatization and the perception that residents cannot afford them
- The rate of sexual abuse of children and child labor are very high
- Muhamasheen and IDPs are much more likely to be victims of violence than the majority population, except in relation to theft/looting.

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1. Indicators of Insecurity

- Weapons:** The presence of weapons were highlighted as a continued risk to insecurity in target neighborhoods. 17% of respondents said there was a very high presence of weapons in their neighborhood over the last month, including 37% of respondents in Abdul Kowi
- Narcotics:** 27% of respondents said there was a very high presence of drugs in their neighborhood over the last month, including 71% of respondents in al-Sesaban
- Child Labor:** The issue of child labor continues to serve as a key concern in target neighborhoods. 53% of respondents said there was a very high presence of child labor over the previous month, including 73% of respondents in al-Sharqia
- Electrical Fires:** 42% of respondents said electrical wires cause fires and injuries very often in their communities, including 96% of respondents in al-Sesaban and 91% in Abdul Kowi
- Water Access:** 52% of respondents said fights at water distribution points happen very often, including 97% of respondents in Hosh Dirham
 - Respondents noted that there should be a reduction in the severity of this issue over the coming months as the weather becomes less hot
- Sewage Removal:** 71% of respondents said fights over sewage/waste disposal happen very often, including 93% of respondents in al-Sharqia
 - Respondents explained that community members blame each other for sewage overflow
- Impunity:** While 67% of respondents overall said they would report a crime to local authorities in case they were victimized, 59% said they would not in al-Sesaban
 - Only 25% said a criminal is likely to face justice for his or her actions, including 10% of respondents in al-Sharqia and 13% in Hosh Dirham
- Humanitarian Aid:** 54% of respondents said there was a very low degree of fairness in the distribution of humanitarian aid over the last month, including 96% of respondents in al-Sesaban
 - 46% of respondents said INGOs were not perceived well by the community over the last month
 - While there are many obstacles to improving the effectiveness of aid, INGOs and UN agencies could reduce tensions by more directly communicating with and being accountable to IDPs




Ongoing Trend Monitoring

2. Sexual Abuse

Urgency Rating: High

- 57% of survey respondents have heard of 1 or 2 cases of sexual and gender-based violence in their neighborhood over the last month
 - 64% said that women were among the victims; 18% said men were among the victims
 - 64% said that boys under 18 years old were among the victims; 60% said girls under 18 years old were among the victims
- 40% of respondents said Muhamasheen were the most commonly targeted group of these types of attacks
 - 28% who said that members of the majority community were most commonly the victims
- In Hosh Dirham, where there is a larger concentration of IDPs from the north, 68% of respondents said IDPs were the most commonly targeted group of these types of attacks
 - 32% who said that members of the majority community were most commonly the victims
- It is common for victims to be shamed, blamed or judged when this type of attack occurs
 - This can make it difficult for girls to get married in the future
 - As a result, victims and their families rarely make a complaint to the police or the authorities when this happens so that it does not become public knowledge
 - Victims are sometimes forced to marry their perpetrators
- Although a sensitive topic to discuss openly, respondents have also noted an increase in prostitution and sex trafficking in their neighborhoods during the month of October



Recommendations



Train and empower social workers in schools to better detect abuse and provide confidential psychosocial care



Train teachers and school staff on safeguarding and child protection, and on a trauma-informed approach to sexual assault reporting and response




Strengthen mechanisms for awareness for survivors on their legal rights and advocate for the establishment of confidential reporting mechanisms



Include discussions that address key issues through mosque sermons and school morning announcements

3. Home/Land Eviction

Urgency Rating: High



- 17% of survey respondents have heard of more than 6 cases of home or land eviction in their neighborhood over the last month
 - 34% have heard of more than 6 cases in Abdul Kowi, all of which targeted Muhamasheen
 - 29% have heard of more than 6 cases in Hosh Dirham, a 19% decrease since September,¹ 97% of which targeted IDPs

Recommendations



Support local associations in their efforts to support evicted families in relocating, or to provide compensation assistance



Strengthen awareness & technical support for Muhamasheen communities on issues related to their legal rights and social services.

- Example: Assist Muhamasheen in obtaining property documentation and/or IDs that can protect them from eviction



Enable local authorities to constructively engage with Muhamasheen on issues related to land ownership and urban management through dialogues or town halls

- Integrate relocation and compensation support schemes for marginalized populations into governance assistance programs to local authorities

¹ Because of the nature of the EWERS process, sample sizes are not statistically significant.

6. Theft/Looting

Urgency Rating: Medium

- 33% of survey respondents have heard of 1 or 2 cases of theft or looting in their neighborhood over the last month, an increase of 14% since September
 - 42% have heard of 3 or 4 cases in Hosh Dirham and 68% have heard of more than 6 cases in al-Sesaban
 - Many thefts occur on al-Fateh and al-Safa streets in al-Sesaban
 - Thieves tend to target car batteries, electricity cables and water pumps
- Unlike other security threats, Muhamasheen are not perceived as more vulnerable to theft than the majority population
 - However, in Hosh Dirham, 84% of respondents said IDPs were most commonly targeted.

Recommendations



Install public solar lighting (focus on high crime areas) to deter crime occurring at night. This can be coupled with the installation of low cost but resistant security cameras.



Support neighborhood watches that already exist in Abdul Kowi & support neighborhood reporting mechanisms for instances of theft to police.



Strengthen security and access to IDP camps and areas through collaboration with the IDP executive unit.

7. Verbal Harassment

Urgency Rating: Medium

- 63% of survey respondents have heard of more than 6 cases of verbal harassment in their neighborhood over the last month
 - 83% have heard of more than 6 cases in al-Sharqia
- In Abdul Kowi, 59% of respondents said Muhamasheen were the most commonly targeted group of these abuses, against 14% who said that members of the majority community were most commonly the victims
 - Muhamasheen children are often abused in schools by both other children and teachers, and/or neglected and marginalized compared to children of the majority population
- In Hosh Dirham, 74% of respondents said IDPs were the most commonly targeted group of these abuses, against 23% who said that members of the majority community were most commonly the victims
- Street beggars (often women and children) are also physically and verbally abused
 - Children are sometimes recruited to beg in exchange for a portion of the profits given to their families

Recommendations



Promote anti-harassment messages through mosque sermons and in schools.



Integrate related issues during school morning announcements in schools & in training curricula for teachers.



Photos above depict the installation of public lighting in the Abdul Kowi neighborhood as one of the 'response' initiatives developed by focal points after the last round of EWERS consultations in Aden.

Annex III: Response Design Template

Name of the response	
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<p>What is the specific problem (include victims, location, frequency) that this response plans to address?</p>	
<p>Warning: Who should be warned about this threat? Through what mechanism?</p>	
<p>What is the level or urgency for this threat/response and why?</p>	
<p>Describe the response in as much detail as possible (including location, beneficiaries, duration)</p>	
<p>List the specific steps necessary to implement this response</p>	
<p>What exact resources are needed to implement these</p>	

steps (and where will these resources come from)?	
How long will it take to launch this response?	
Who will be responsible for implementing this response (and contact information)?	
Total cost (please describe how this was calculated)	
From whom do we need permission (if anyone) to implement these steps?	
Are there any potential conflict or gender sensitivity considerations to note?	
Should this response be made public? Why or why not?	