EVALUABILITY ASSESSMENT OF THE PEACEBUILDING, EDUCATION AND ADVOCACY PROGRAMME

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EVALUABILITY ASSESSMENT OF THE PEACEBUILDING, EDUCATION AND ADVOCACY PROGRAMME (PBEA)

PREFACE

Evaluations initiated at the end of a period of programme delivery are often undertaken amid high hopes that strong programme results will be demonstrated and that convincing lessons will be learned about factors driving success. It can be frustrating, therefore, if weaknesses in programme design and monitoring make it difficult to measure results and discern programme achievements. To pre-empt such disappointment, careful assessment can be made of "evaluation readiness": that is, the extent to which a programme and its results are likely to be amenable to systematic evaluation. If such an "evaluability assessment" is made early on, there will usually be time to amend weaknesses and strengthen programme design. This ideally leads not only to better to programme results, but also to better programme evaluation which can measure programme achievements, provide information on how and why good results were achieved, and offer lessons on programme improvement. Programme success can therefore be more easily demonstrated where programmes are "evaluation ready".

It was with this idea in mind that an evaluability assessment of the UNICEF Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy Programme (PBEA) was commissioned by the UNICEF Evaluation Office. The PBEA is a four-year (2012-2015) programme funded by the Government of the Netherlands, currently being implemented in 14 countries. The aim of the PBEA is to strengthen education policies and practices for peacebuilding. The evaluability assessment of the PBEA was not intended to assess programme results, even though it closely resembles a formative evaluation in some respects. Rather, it was intended to provide the evidence required to answer the following question: "*To what extent does the PBEA have the technical and strategic elements in place to manage effectively towards results and to credibly demonstrate such results in future evaluations?"*

Undertaken in 2013, the evaluability assessment involved extensive data collection through systematic document review and analysis, stakeholder interviews, as well as country visits. The major conclusion of the evaluability assessment was that, if viewed as a unified global programme, the PBEA faces significant challenges in terms of its "evaluation readiness". However, if viewed from a different perspective as a global approach applied to programmes in diverse country contexts, it appears that some country programmes require only a few inputs to make them evaluable, while others will require major inputs. The evaluability assessment offers advice and recommendations on how to improve the programme and bring it to the required level of evaluation readiness.

I would like to express appreciation and thanks to Terrence Jantzi for his leadership of the EA team, and to team members - Peter Bauman and Margaret Stansberry, and to Menno Wiebe who was Programme Manager on behalf of the KonTerra Group. We would also like to express our gratitude to our colleagues at UNICEF headquarters – Friedrich Affolter, Lene Leonhardsen, Anna Azaryeva, Brenda Haiplik, Isabel Candela and James Rogan. We extend our gratitude to colleagues in UNICEF Country Offices in Pakistan, Somalia and South Sudan, all partners in those countries who gave interviews and provided invaluable insights into the various programmes, and to many UNICEF colleagues who participated in the evaluability assessment in various other ways. I would also like to extend my sincere thanks to my colleagues Kathleen Letshabo (Evaluation Specialist, Education) and Tina-Tordjman-Nebe (Evaluation Specialist), who managed the evaluability assessment on behalf of the Evaluation Office.

Readers of the report may have questions and wish to learn more about the PBEA, or the evaluability assessment. If the questions or comments are about the contents, methods, findings, and recommendations of the evaluability assessment, please write to (Kathleen Letshabo, email: kletshabo@unicef.org). The PBEA Programme Manager (Friedrich Affolter, email: faffolter@unicef.org) will answer questions about the PBEA. Readers are also invited to visit the UNICEF website (unicef.org) to see the full range of tools, actions and outputs of the PBEA, as well as further information on the work of the Evaluation Office.

Colin Kirk
Director, Evaluation Office
UNICEF New York Headquarters

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

AC	Accountability Committee
ADAP	Adolescents, Development & Participation
CO	Country Office
EA	Evaluability Assessment
ECD	Early Childhood Development
EMOPS	Office of Emergency Programmes (UNICEF)
FT	Fast Track
GMR	Global Monitoring Report
GRF	Global Results Framework
GoN	Government of the Netherlands
INEE	Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies
INGO	International Nongovernmental Organization
KPI	Key Performance Indicator
M&E	Monitoring & Evaluation
MoE	Ministry of Education
OM	Operational Matrix
PBEA	Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy in Conflict-Affected Contexts Program
PBSO	Peacebuilding Support Office
PMT	Programme Management Team
RF	Results Framework
RO	Regional Office
SPAG	Strategic Partners Advisory Group
ToC	Theory of Change
ToR	Terms of Reference
TWG	Technical Working Group
UNESCO	United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
WASH	Water and Sanitation, Hygiene

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy Programme (PBEA) is a four-year (2012-2015) programme funded by the Government of the Netherlands (GoN), currently being implemented in 14 countries. The **strategic vision** of the programme is to "*strengthen resilience, social cohesion and human security in conflict-affected contexts,*" with the **strategic result** of "*strengthening policies and practices in education for peacebuilding.*" The strategic result will be achieved through five outcomes:

i.   Increase inclusion of education into peacebuilding and conflict-reduction policies, analyses, and implementation
ii.   Increase institutional capacities to supply conflict-sensitive education
iii. Increase capacity of children, parents, teachers and other duty-bearers to prevent, reduce and cope with conflict and promote peace
iv.   Increase access for children to quality, relevant, conflict-sensitive education that contributes to peace
v.   Contribute to the generation and use of evidence and knowledge on policies and programming on linkages between education, conflict and peacebuilding

A unified Global Results Framework (GRF) was developed to guide an assessment of global corporate accountabilities. Based on the general guidance of the five strategic objectives, country programs and other implementation teams are expected to develop context specific programmes and adapt the five outcome results framework to their contexts. The country programmes are expected to be integrated into the GRF via operational matrices outlining key objectives, indicators, and activities. At the global level the PBEA is managed by the Programme Management Team (PMT) housed in the Education Section (Programme Division), working closely with Office of Emergency Programmes (EMOPS) and other divisions, sections and units. The PMT provides overall leadership for the programme while implementation is carried out mainly through individual country-level programmes, and partly through selected activities commissioned from the global level.

UNICEF commissioned an evaluability assessment of the PBEA in 2013. An evaluability assessment is a systematic process used to determine if a programme has a set arrangements that would make it an evaluation feasible, and if such an evaluation would yield useful information. Even though it closely resembled a formative evaluation in some elements, the evaluability assessment of the PBEA was not intended to be an impact assessment. It was intended to provide the evidence required to answer the following question: "*To what extent does the PBEA have the technical and strategic elements in place to manage effectively towards results and to credibly demonstrate such results in future evaluations?*" Hence it was organized around eight categories of questions for investigation proposed by UNICEF. Four of the eight categories addressed technical and strategic elements of the programme (programme coherence, feasibility of results, monitoring and evaluation requirements, and attribution of and/or contribution to results). The other four categories (internal understanding of goals and accountabilities, management and governance, resource allocations, and risk management), addressed elements of programme management and governance.

The EA team employed four methods to determine the evaluability of the PBEA. First, a comprehensive document review of key foundational documents, background research publications and country-level documentation was conducted. Second, 71 interviews were carried out with global-, regional- and country-level stakeholders. Third, field visits were carried out in three selected PBEA implementing countries (Pakistan, Somalia, and South Sudan) which included an additional 61 interviews. Fourth, after formulating the findings, a member of the EA team attended the Global Annual Review Workshop (in Istanbul) to present preliminary findings and carry out a data validation exercises with representatives of each country programme, the PBEA team, and UNICEF senior leadership. The findings of the evaluability assessment are organized according the eight categories of questions mentioned above, highlighting

strengths of the programme, as well areas that required additional action to improve the programme's evaluability.

FINDINGS

Programme Coherence	
Strengths for evaluability	**Areas to improve for evaluability**
• Internal capacity building has improved since 2012. The knowledge and expertise of staff related to peacebuilding issues was enhanced by hiring of additional, qualified staff, as well as formal and informal capacity building of staff. • Indicators in the GRF and country operational matrices are technically correct for their associated activity. • Country-level programmes should be able to show **_progress towards_** targeted activities in the remaining two years on the current programme cycle.	• There are multiple interpretations regarding concepts of peacebuilding, education as a peace dividend and conflict-sensitive programming. Conflict-sensitive education is seen as an outcome by some participants instead of an approach or way to implement programs. Some respondents appear to have elevated the importance of conflict sensitivity, conflating it with peacebuilding outcomes. • The PBEA programme is taking an expansive approach to programming with greater inclusion of various cross-sectoral initiatives such as ECD, gender-based violence, life skills. While these efforts at cross-sectoral programing are laudable, the conceptual link of some of these activities to peacebuilding has not been clearly articulated. • Monitoring level indicators measuring organizational performance are technically sound. However, there are only a few indicators that track changes in the key concepts of social cohesion, resilience or human security – these need improvement.
Feasibility of Results	
Strengths for evaluability	**Areas to improve for evaluability**
• The Global Results Framework provides a broad framework for guiding programming and capturing activity and output-level achievements. • The research strategy for Outcome 5 can be used to help document lessons learned and learning in terms of achievements, as well as to test theories of change specific to the UNICEF programming environment.	• The breadth of the aspirations and the wide degree of activities may have the cumulative effect of inhibiting overall achievements. It may be more helpful to narrow programming focus over the remaining project time frame rather than keep it expansive. • Country programmes should ensure that progress towards outcomes is well documented in the time remaining; this will require a meaningful articulation of outputs that capture a feasible level of change (and not merely that an activity is completed).

M&E Effort Required	
Strengths for evaluability	**Areas to improve for evaluability**
• M&E planning has increased significantly. The GRF has undergone multiple revisions and improvements to respond to emerging issues. • Strategic and country office M&E for peacebuilding has improved since 2012. • There is a continual critical analysis and questioning of M&E processes by PBEA stakeholders with HQ and country offices asking perceptive questions about monitoring mechanisms and evaluability.	• The M&E effort required is disproportionate to the size of the programme, making M&E capacity in country offices is insufficient, especially given UNICEF staff quotas. • Only a few implementing partners (national and international) have the capacity in M&E to gather the requisite information required beyond activity level related to PBEA.

Attribution and Contribution

Strengths for evaluability	Areas to improve for evaluability
• About half of the countries are in the process of finalizing baseline studies for the PBEA programme. • Country programmes appear to be tracking necessary inputs related to measuring PBEA contributions. • A case study process is being developed as a mechanism for highlighting qualitative achievements and lessons learned not easily captured in the quantitative log frame indicators. • The specificity of PCAs allows for tracking PBEA contributions; baselines can be used to track changes in outputs and intermediate impact for Outcome 3.	• Outcomes 1 and 2 present the greatest challenges for tracking PBEA contributions. • Operational matrices (especially for Outcome 1) would benefit from adding *progress towards* indicators highlighting programme achievements • The research strategy is currently underutilized in country programmes as a mechanism for tracking PBEA contributions. • In countries baseline tools were reviewed, the tools needed further modification to be able to adequately generate meaningful evaluation data about changes in skills, knowledge, or attitudes.

Internal Understanding of Goals and Accountabilities

Strengths for evaluability	Areas to improve for evaluability
• The PBEA has developed management systems and governance structures that include numerous partners and broad cross-sectoral participation – fostering a greater sense of shared accountability for achieving global-level results. • Global annual workshops have provided a useful avenue to address ambiguities and outstanding questions that may limit collective understanding among key stakeholders	• Management of PBEA as a central programme within UNICEF's decentralized context has created some confusion and disagreement among stakeholders regarding roles and degree of autonomy. It has also led to countries expecting too much support from HQ, in some cases bypassing regional structures. • There was, a lack of alignment between the PRS and the Education Section, at the beginning, likely due to different conceptual frameworks, language, and approaches between the two sectors; more could be done to further clarify goals and accountabilities.

Management and Governance

Strengths for evaluability	Areas to improve for evaluability
• PBEA-dedicated staff provides a central organizing point for aggregating information and initiating programming. • A knowledge management system is in place at HQ that captures and centralizes information from country programmes.	• The PBEA HQ management structure with multisectoral working units and a small team of PBEA dedicated staff is best suited for internal learning, partnerships, and awareness raising at HQ. It is less suited for providing direct support to field units. • A horizontal knowledge management system which focuses on cross-country learning and awareness is required. • The lack of a documented, long-term strategy within which to embed the PBEA affects programming choices and measurement strategies; it also limits the ability to assess PBEA's outcomes and contributions to long-term impact.

Resource Allocation

Strengths for evaluability	Areas to improve for evaluability
• Overall, staff members were clear on the use of PBEA resources to achieve their specific ToC, goals and objectives. • Resource allocation criteria were clear although many preexisting activities could receive funding when justified within a PBEA operational framework. • The PBEA programme is managed as a global programme rather than as a fund from HQ.	• Short-term funding tranches and short-term PCAs with partners are impacting longer-term programming and programme design. • Time and expertise requirements for PBEA programming require higher than normal UNICEF staffing quotas – leading to shortfalls in staffing capacity.

Risk Management

Strengths for evaluability	Areas to improve for evaluability
• Risk-management components are embedded within Individual PCAs or other partner agreements. • Country offices have strong operational and financial risk-management plans	• Risk-management documentation emphasizes operational and financial elements rather than programmatic elements (conflict-sensitive programming and *Do No Harm*). • The original global risk-management plan from the proposal remains in place. At the halfway point programme, it should be reviewed and updated; countries should further review the probability and impact of key interventions within PBEA as part of their overall country risk matrix.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The PBEA has many key elements to effectively manage towards results. The programme continued to add additional elements and improvements, even as the evaluability assessment was underway. However, it is the conclusion of this evaluability assessment that *the PBEA, in its current configuration as a global programme, faces significant challenges to its evaluability*. Hence one of the major conclusions and recommendations of the evaluability assessment is to view the PBEA as a programme that has a "global approach", but being implemented from the country level where most of the decision making is situated, given the decentralized nature of UNICEF.

When assessing evaluability at the implementation level, country programmes cluster into three groups. In the first group are five countries that are yet to complete their conflict analyses, or to put a credible programme on paper – for these, the EA team did not have enough information to determine their evaluability. The second group of countries consists of four to six countries that are in the process of finalizing their conflict analyses and developing programmes based on the conflict analyses. Most of these are on "Fast Track" mode, but are far from where they need to be at the half way mark of programme

implementation. Each of the countries in the third group (three or four in number) is evaluable, albeit with inputs still required for some elements of their programmes. The evaluability assessment concluded further, that there is significant variation even within each cluster of country programmes.

Throughout the period of the evaluability assessment, different units of the PBEA programme have been adding new elements to strengthen their programmes. Many of those efforts will continue. The following is a set of recommendations for initiating adjustments considered to be the most critical for programme success and to enhance evaluability.

i. **The global PBEA team should consider reframing PBEA from a "global programme" to a programme that has a "global approach" to implementation.** The primary difference between these two approaches lies in the degree of country programme autonomy. A global approach would allow country offices to refine programmes outcomes based on their conflict analyses (rather than implement all five outcomes) and to develop additional indicators that may be more suited to measuring the contribution of the PBEA towards peacebuilding.

ii. **The PMT should developing a strategy to assist programmes to narrow the focus in each country programme, as well as strengthen the evidence for demonstrating education's contribution to peacebuilding.** Given the breadth and scope of PBEA programming and the relatively short implementation period remaining for the majority of countries, the PMT, country leadership, and PBEA country teams should explore the possibility of narrowing the focus of the programmes by prioritizing key activities for immediate action, and negotiate to carry the rest forward in the next cycle, or through regular CP programming processes.

iii. **The Evaluation Office should consider an end-of-programme evaluation strategy that assesses the contribution of the PBEA for each country programme with a subsequent evaluation synthesis of findings for global aggregation.** Aggregating the contribution of education to peacebuilding at a global level will be difficult given the diversity of interventions, broad variations in country programme profiles, the diversity of themes, and variations in country office programming and engagement. A "bottom-up" approach to evaluation will better capture this variation; it will also provide opportunity to synthesize evaluation findings.

iv. **The PMT and the Accountability Committee should clarify roles and accountabilities between the centralized PBEA programme and country offices.** The first would be to redefine the role of the PMT to focus more of their time in leadership and coordination rather than technical management. Technical backstopping can be devolved to personnel in the Regional Offices and other expertise that has been brought in through LTA arrangements, while technical supervision of programming units is devolved to the country office level where it belongs.

v. **The PMT and UNICEF senior leadership should negotiate with the donor to adjust deliverables for Category 1 country programmes to allow them to focus on establishing a quality foundation for peacebuilding programming.** Rather than rushing to achieve GRF outputs in the time remaining, new deliverables for Category 1 countries could be to complete their conflict analyses, and narrow their focus to developing a conflict-analysis informed programme with two to three outcomes, including Outcome 3 on raising awareness and developing the capacity for conflict-analysis informed programming amongst UNICEF staff and partners

vi. **The Accountability Committee should update the resource allocation criteria to reflect where country programmes are in their implementation, and what can be realistically expected in the time that is left before the end of the programme cycle.** At the midway point of the programme some countries have made significant progress towards results, but require critical infusions to increase their capacity to achieve most of their results, while others may have to scale down their original plans. Resource allocation criteria should be modified to reflect these new realities rather than remain static and based on 2011 priorities.

vii. **Country PBEA programmes should negotiate exemptions from UNICEF human resource quotas with country office leadership, at least during this cycle of the PBEA which includes piloting of new approaches to peacebuilding programming.** UNICEF's quota for human resource allocation is not commensurate with staffing needs for this type of programme, especially when there is such a strong imperative for learning. Relaxing some of the regulations around staffing quotas will be instrumental in achieving targeted results within the remaining implementation period.

1.0 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

1.1   Origins of peacebuilding: intersection of education and peacebuilding

1. Since its origin in the UN system in the early 1990s,[1] the concept of peacebuilding has evolved from a broad definition to a more refined set of priorities. The provision of basic services, including primary education, is explicitly stated as one of these priorities.[2] Education can also contribute to and benefit from the realization of the other peacebuilding priorities. For instance:
    *   Access to quality education is often a key component and measurement of basic safety and human security.
    *   Restoring schools and reconstructing education systems can increase government legitimacy and serve as a peace dividend.
    *   Civic education programmes can support political processes.
    *   Building conflict-management capacities can assist in preventing conflict and acquiring dialogue skills can help to foster reconciliation.
    *   Education can also contribute to and benefit from economic revitalization, empower women and girls and provide constructive opportunities for disenfranchised youth.
    *   Education can serve as a preventive strategy to transform accepted norms around violence, gender and power.[3]

2. The increased recognition of peacebuilding and acknowledgement of its potential linkages with education has resulted in the development of numerous Theories of Change (ToC), many of which are implicit in these peacebuilding priorities.[4]

3. In addition to linkages between peacebuilding and education, the application of conflict sensitivity analyses to the education sector has also emerged as a crucial step in programming. Conflict sensitivity analysis[5] dates back to the early 1990s when humanitarian workers recognized that regardless of their best intentions, external interventions often fueled conflict.[6] While education programmes often do strengthen connectors and promote peace, they can also reinforce existing tensions, create new divisions, entrench structural inequalities and foment negative stereotypes. As in the case of peacebuilding, there are a variety of models, tools and ToC related to conflict sensitivity. Perhaps the most widely used is *Do No Harm,*[7] which suggests that the context of

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[1] In the early 1990s, the UN Security Council recognized the post-cold war transition from interstate to intrastate conflicts, their level of intractability, frequency of relapse and the limitations of the United Nations Charter and capacity. In response, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali submitted *An Agenda for Peace, Preventative Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping* to the UN Security Council. This report defined peacebuilding as *"an action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict."* See http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/47/277.

[2] Further refining the UN's concept of peacebuilding, in 2009, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon submitted a report that identified five recurrent priorities for peacebuilding in post-conflict transitions including (1) support to basic safety and security, including mine action, protection of civilians, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, strengthening the rule of law and initiation of security sector reform; (2) support to political processes, including electoral processes, promoting inclusive dialogue and reconciliation and developing conflict-management capacity at national and subnational levels; (3) support to the provision of basic services such as water and sanitation, health and primary education and support to the safe and sustainable return and reintegration of internally displaced persons and refugees; (4) support to restoring core government functions, in particular basic public administration and public finance, at the national and subnational levels; and (5) support to economic revitalization, including employment generation and livelihoods (in agriculture and public works) particularly for youth and demobilized former combatants, as well as the rehabilitation of basic infrastructure. See UN General Assembly, *Report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict.* 11 June 2009, A/63/881-S/2009/304.

[3] Smith, A. (2011) *The Influence of Education on Conflict and Peace Building.* Background paper prepared for the Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2011: *The hidden crisis: Armed conflict and education.* UNESCO: Paris.

[4] Alan Smith also produced a detailed matrix, which provides implicit and explicit ToCs per each of the PBEA country work plans. Due to the length of this spreadsheet it was not annexed in this inception report.

[5] International Alert et al., 2004. Conflict-sensitive approaches to development, humanitarian assistance and peacebuilding: a resource pack. London: International Alert (available for download at www.conflcitsensitivity.org).

[6] Anderson, Mary B. *Do No Harm: How Aid can Support Peace - or War.* Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, February 1999.

[7] See the Do No Harm project at www.cdainc.com for a variety of publications, reports and case studies related to the topic of *Do No Harm* and *Conflict Sensitivity.*

conflict consists of dividers, tensions, connectors and capacities for peace. By conducting a conflict analysis and disaggregating the parts of an intervention, one can determine the potential impact of the intervention on the context and develop options for maximizing positive effects, while minimizing negative consequences.

4. Despite the increased recognition that education can contribute to conflict and peace, its potential remains untapped due to several factors. First, although education and other social services are recognized as a peacebuilding contributor, these services tend not to be prioritized within peacebuilding in comparison to other interventions. For instance, a review commissioned by the UN's Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) found that while inequitable provision and lack of social services is a common driver of conflict, social services and education in particular do not receive priority as compared with interventions in the security sector and political processes.[8]

5. Second, there are conceptual divisions related to the linkage between peacebuilding and education, or a consensus within the UN regarding which ToC are the most relevant for education in peacebuilding, or on what actions to prioritize within a conflict or post-conflict intervention. UNESCO's 2011 Global Monitoring Report (GMR) argues for "*early engagement and prioritization of education throughout all conflict phases*" while the World Bank's 2011 World Development Report suggests that "*security and elections be prioritized in the immediate post-conflict period with education receiving less priority until the medium term post-conflict phase.*"[9]

6. Third, there is often a conceptual ambiguity between conflict-sensitive programming and programming for peacebuilding. While conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding can support and enhance each other, they serve different purposes. Conflict-sensitive programming focuses on working *in* conflict to achieve stated programme goals. Peacebuilding programming focuses on working *on* conflict with a goal of preventing, mitigating or transforming the conflict. As a result, the two types of programming require different levels and types of analyses, programme design, and standards and indicators for measuring effectiveness and results.[10] This distinction was also highlighted in a UNICEF commissioned literature review regarding peacebuilding and the role of education.

> "… Education for peacebuilding goes beyond 'do no harm'… The literature reveals a subtle distinction between education programmes in post-conflict contexts that attempt to 'do no harm' by taking conflict analysis into account, and approaches that are more explicit about contributing to peacebuilding through post-conflict transformation. For example, a 'conflict sensitive' approach to the reconstruction of schools might simply rebuild schools in their former locations even if this means that divisions between schools remain. However, a peacebuilding analysis may diagnose the need for structural and institutional changes that involve changes to existing power relations within a society (Smith 2005, 2011)."

7. Finally, there is limited research proving the relevance and/or impact of conflict-sensitive education and programmes aimed at peacebuilding. This paucity of evidence influenced UNICEF to design a programme on education and peacebuilding, an important element of which is to conduct action research that will generate evidence-based knowledge on the relationships

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[8] McCandless, Erin. *Peace Dividends and Beyond. Prepared by the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in Cooperation with F AO, OHCHR, UNCDF, UNDP, UNEP, UNFPA, UNHCR, UNICEF, UN Women, WFP and WHO. Contributions of Administrative and Social Services to Peacebuilding*. United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), 2012. http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pbso/pdf/peace_dividends.pdf.
[9] Salm and Shubert, (2012) "Literature Review of Evaluative Approaches for Education Strategies for Peacebuilding in UNICEF and Lessons Learned from the Evaluation of the EEPCT Programme", KonTerra Group prepared for UNICEF Evaluation Office, October 2012.
[10] See Peter Woodrow & Diana Chigas. *A Distinction with a Difference: Conflict Sensitivity and Peacebuilding:* Reflecting on Peace Practice Project, CDA Collaborative Learning Projects. October 2009. http://www.cdainc.com/cdawww/pdf/article/RPP_Differentiating_Conflict_Sensitivity_and_Peacebuilding.pdf

between education, conflict and peacebuilding, as well as document evidence-based programming solutions for using the transformative power of education to bring about lasting peace in conflict-affected community.

1.2   Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy in Conflict-Affected Contexts (PBEA)

8. The Government of the Netherlands has worked with UNICEF in the development and implementation of education programmes within conflict contexts. The first such initiative – Education in Emergencies and Post Conflict Transitions (EEPCT) – provided funding for programmes implemented in 44 countries. Building on the lessons learned from the EEPCT Programme,[11] the GoN is currently partnering with UNICEF on another programme, Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy in Conflict-Affected Contexts (PBEA).

9. PBEA is a four-year (2012–2015) programme currently being implemented in 14 countries. The **strategic vision** of the programme is to "strengthen resilience, social cohesion and human security in conflict-affected contexts", with the **strategic result** of "strengthening policies and practices in education for peacebuilding". The strategic result will be achieved through five outcomes:
    i.   Increase inclusion of education into peacebuilding and conflict-reduction policies, analyses and implementation
    ii. Increase institutional capacities to supply conflict-sensitive education
    iii. Increase capacity of children, parents, teachers and other duty-bearers to prevent reduce and cope with conflict and promote peace
    iv. Increase access for children to quality, relevant conflict-sensitive education that contributes to peace
    v.   Contribute to the generation and use of evidence and knowledge on policies and programming on linkages between education, conflict and peacebuilding.

10. PBEA was developed at the global level (UNICEF, HQ) to be implemented through UNICEF Country Offices (COs), with support from Regional Offices (ROs). The programme concept, which was envisioned at the global level, delineated a Global Results Framework (GRF). All participating countries are expected to align their programmes and results frameworks to this GRF. The accountability of the global level is to assist in building capacities for successful execution of the programme, as well as provide technical programme guidance on different elements.

11. Since the initial proposal, further work was undertaken at the global level to articulate a theory of change and to refine its results framework. The PBEA's *Programme Results Framework and Monitoring and Evaluation Plan* states the following as the underlying theory of change related to PBEA's goal:
    "Education can contribute to improved governance by addressing underlying inequities that fuel conflict, providing education and employment opportunities to disenfranchised youth, empowering adolescent girls and women as actors in the peacebuilding process, imparting civic and political education and modeling democratic participation and decision making. This can be achieved through strengthening of the education sector by:
        i) Integrating peacebuilding and conflict transformation into educational policies and practices;

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[11] Novelli, Mario, and Alan Smith. *The Role of Education in Peacebuilding. A Synthesis Report of Findings from Lebanon, Nepal and Sierra Leone*. UNICEF, 2011.

ii) Increasing institutional capacities to supply conflict-sensitive education addressing triggers of conflict; and

iii) Individual capacity development of students, parents and teachers to promote peace and conflict transformation practices.

If a three level programme approach is taken at 1) the policy level, 2) the institutional level, and 3) the individual/family and community level, then the education sector will be in an improved position to take on a positive role in supporting peacebuilding in conflict-affected societies."[12]

12. The theory of change above was articulated at the global level. Each PBEA country programme is expected to contextualize their programmes and articulate its theory of change based on local conflict analyses. One of the important activities at the country level has been further refinement of the country results framework and aligning it, to the extent possible, with the Global Results Framework, as well as putting monitoring and evaluation systems and/or arrangements in place. Towards this end, an evaluability assessment was commissioned to ascertain whether reasonable programme impact pathways have been articulated and management arrangements are in place for the programme to succeed and benefit meaningfully from the end-of-programme evaluation in 2015.

1.3   Governance and Management Structure

13. UNICEF's Accountability Framework is relevant for understanding the approach taken to design and implement PBEA. The decentralized nature of UNICEF's operations and delegation of decision-making authority is well established in various management documents describing UNICEF's Accountability Framework.[13] Decentralization has been widely lauded as a strength allowing UNICEF to serve children and achieve its mandate free of centralized bureaucratic processes that can impede results.[14] The PBEA is relatively unique within this structure as it is considered a global programme with a central management unit at HQ.[15] The PBEA programme is directed from the Education Section (Programme Division) with the expectation the PBEA team will work closely with other divisions, sections and units, including PARMO and the Peacebuilding and Recovery Section in EMOPS. The programme management structure is also participatory in its design and implementation. The groups within the PBEA governance and management structure are represented in Figure 1 described below.[16]

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[12] *Programme Results Framework and Monitoring and Evaluation Plan, PBEA Programme - 2011*

[13] *Report on the Accountability System of UNICEF, Economic and Social Council*, 23 April, 2009.

[14] This challenge is borne out most recently in a 4 October 2012 memo from UNICEF's Executive Director to all staff, underlining the importance of ensuring corporate accountability for results despite UNICEF's decentralized structure.

[15] For the most recent example, see: *Programme Review & Evaluability Study (PRES) of UNICEF'S Education in Emergencies & Post-Crisis (EEPCT) Programme.* UNICEF Evaluation Office, May 2010.

[16] As pictured and described in the three-page document "Peacebuilding and Education Programme - Management Structure". No author and not dated.

FIGURE 1: PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE

14. **Programme Management Team (PMT)**. The PMT is overseen by the Associate Director for Education, while the team comprises of the Senior Education Advisor for Emergencies, a Programme Manager, a Monitoring & Evidence Building Specialist and a Knowledge Management Specialist. The PMT is responsible for overall coordination and management of the programme; it holds the daily oversight and decision-making role in operationalizing the programme. Specific responsibilities are listed in the 'Peacebuilding and Education Programme – Management Structure' and include:
    • Global work plan development and implementation
    • Operational/programme management
    • Technical leadership in close collaboration with the TWG and other expertise as needed
    • Global advocacy, global communications, annual donor review, monitoring and reporting

15. **Accountability Committee**. The Accountability Committee is scheduled to meet quarterly and as needed to provide oversight and direction to the PBEA programme. It is comprised of the director from three sections; Programme Division, PARMO and EMOPS. The three main functions that comprise the Accountability Committee's work include (1) strategic level oversight of programme performance, including delivery of strategic results and outcomes; (2) approval of allocations proposed by the PMT; and (3) oversight of results and key milestones of the programme. Tasks of the Accountability Committee include the following:
    • approving the overall programme implementation strategy, results framework and global annual work-plan
    • providing oversight of the achievement of results
    • approving allocations on the basis of unit work-plans
    • ensuring that the evaluability study, including baselines, is completed by the end of year
    • providing regular updates to the Executive Director and Deputy Executive Director (and other key stakeholders) on the progress of the programme
    • approving donor reports

16. **The Strategic Programme Advisory Group (SPAG).** The SPAG holds an advisory role, providing strategic and technical input that should inform the programme's progress towards achievement of the strategic results and overall outcomes. The SPAG is to meet quarterly to share key, strategic programme results and to discuss challenges and other relevant initiatives and potential linkages to the programme. The SPAG is chaired by the Associate Director for Education and cochaired by the Deputy Director of EMOPS. The composition of the SPAG was finalized in 2012. Internal members of

the SPAG are directors of EMOPS, Evaluation Office, Child Protection, PARMO, ECD, Supply Division, Office of Research/Innocenti and the PBEA Programme Manager. External members included representatives of PBSO, UNDP/BCPR, UNHCR, Save the Children, World Bank, Human Rights Watch, the INEE and IRC.

17. **The Technical Working Group (TWG).** The TWG is chaired by the PBEA Programme Manager and is composed of representatives of various UNICEF sections/divisions such as EMOPS, Child Protection, EDC, WASH, ADAP and C4D, among others. The purpose of the TWG is to provide ongoing technical advice and input to the overall programme, and in that regard, the Peacebuilding and Recovery Section in EMOPS' has had a more prominent role than is reflected in Figure 1.

18. **The Peacebuilding and Recovery Section (PRS) in EMOPS**: The EMOPS Peacebuilding and Recovery Section (also a TWG member) is tasked with leading on peacebuilding and recovery issues within UNICEF, including UNICEF capacity development and integration of peacebuilding into UNICEF policies, systems and programmes. PRS has been accountable for providing peacebuilding technical quality control to the PBEA at HQ and field levels, as well as advancing the PBEA in all inter-agency global and national-level policy and planning frameworks. PRS also facilitated inter-agency and non-UN partnerships at the global and CO levels, particularly with the peacebuilding community. PRS guidance and training on conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding, including conflict analysis, was the basis for PBEA staff training, which included education-specific adaptation as necessary.

19. Up to four PRS staff, including two at the senior management level supported the PBEA, with two receiving partial or full funding from the PBEA. PRS furthermore assisted in guiding and reviewing all PBEA proposals and facilitated the recruitment of peacebuilding specialists in the PBEA at global, regional and country levels. The EMOPS Director sits on the Accountability Committee, while the EMOPS Deputy Director co-chairs the SPAG. The Chief of PRS sits on the Research Strategy Reference Committee and along with PRS staff, are engaged in areas of the programme where peacebuilding expertise is required. PRS has also participated in M & E Expert Meetings, as well as Annual Review Meetings with the Government of the Netherlands.

20. **Regional Offices (ROs**). Regional Eduation Advisers and/or Peacebuliding Specialalists have an oversight role in the implementation of the programme, source and/or provide advisory technical support where needed. They participated in monthly teleconferences with the PMT in the initial stages of the programmes.

21. **Country Offices (COs).** COs are responsible for the country programme design and delivery of results and work under the guidance provided by the Country Representative and Deputy. COs are responsible for project planning, strategy development, capacity building of senior counterparts, advocacy, technical support, M&E and donor reporting among other responsibilities. COs are overseen by ROs and liaise directly with the PMT.

22. Implementation is conducted by the ROs, COs, HQ Division Units and Strategic Partners who have received funding through the PBEA. The majority of funding is at the country level, and this is where the primary implementation is carried out. Fourteen country offices received funding (Burundi, Chad, Cote D'Ivoire, DRC, Ethiopia, Liberia, Myanmar, Pakistan, Palestine, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Uganda and Yemen). Approximately 20 percent of annual funding is dedicated to the other entities listed above.

1.4 Design, Monitoring and Evaluation

23. Implementation is carried out via individual country-level programmes for the majority of PBEA funding. A unified Global Results Framework (GRF) is intended to guide an assessment of global corporate accountabilities, which are summarized below:
    - **Goal**: Strengthening the transformative potential in conflict affected contexts to support cohesive societies and human security
    - **Strategic Objective**: Strengthened policies and practices in education for peacebuilding in conflict-affected contexts
    - **Outcome 1: Policy Development** – Peacebuilding and education integrated through the increased inclusion of education into peacebuilding and conflict-reduction policies, analysis and implementation
    - **Outcome 2: Institution Building** – Increased institutional (among stakeholders including UNICEF and Ministry of Education) capacity to supply conflict-sensitive and peace education
    - **Outcome 3: Community and Individual Capacity Development** – Increased capacity of children, parents, teachers and community members to prevent, reduce and cope with conflict and promote peace
    - **Outcome 4: Access to Conflict-Sensitive Education** – Increased access to quality, relevant education that contributes to peacebuilding, including education delivered as a peace dividend
    - **Outcome 5: Knowledge, Evidence and Advocacy** – Adequate generation and use of evidence and knowledge in policies and programming on linkages between education, conflict and peacebuilding.

24. Based on the general guidance of the five strategic objectives, country programs and other implementation teams are expected to develop context-specific programmes. These country programmes are expected to be integrated into the GRF via operational matrices outlining key objectives, indicators, and activities and their relationship to the GRF. The PMT plays a role in working with country programmes to develop mechanisms for aggregating information to the global level and ensuring alignment and coherence with overall strategic outcomes.

1.5 Purpose and Approach of the EA

25. An EA is a systematic process used to determine if a programme is ready to be evaluated and if an evaluation would be feasible and useful. It also determines plausibility and measurability of the programme by examining the coherence and logic of the design, and the capacity of the management systems and governance structures to implement, monitor and measure results. An EA also identifies shared and divergent understandings, builds consensus on the desired results and/or outcomes and tightens and refines the articulation of results. All of the above helps to design appropriate evaluations and prevents wastage by avoiding premature, ill-defined and weak evaluations due to programme design failure.

26. The purpose of the EA is to determine the evaluability of PBEA as currently represented through global- and country-level results and to confirm expectations about the scope of the programme, programme results and what is realistically achievable within the remaining programme implementation time frame. The EA will recommend concrete steps to improve the programme's evaluability.

27. The EA is expected to suggest options for improving the results framework at the implementation level by sharpening definitions of indicators, identifying information and data requirements to track changes in the indicators, potential sources of information, gaps in information and ways

those gaps may be filled. The EA is also expected to review the management systems and governance structure and capacities, with particular attention to the approach, methods and capacities for M&E. In this way the EA will provide the necessary information to set the programme on the right path by building a shared understanding of the programme among key stakeholders. An important aspect of the EA will be to create the basis for reflection and learning among the programme managers and key stakeholders, resulting in greater coherence and improved management. This will enable the programme to meet the accountability requirements of UNICEF and the donors and help verify the linkage between and contribution of education in peacebuilding.

1.6   Themes and questions of the evaluability assessment

28. The evaluability assessment is not intended to be an evaluation in the sense of assessing the impact of the programme. Rather, it is intended to provide the evidence required to answer the following question: "*To what extent does the PBEA have the technical and strategic elements in place to manage effectively towards results and to credibly demonstrate such results in future evaluations?*" The assessment is organized around two categories of questions. These categories of questions fall into two main sections: first, the technical and strategic elements related to evaluability, and second, management and governance aspects of evaluability.

29. **Technical and strategic elements**
   i.   Overall programme coherence, including conceptual clarity, the programme's logic and the alignment of the theory of change and results framework.

   ii.   Feasibility of results, including the size of the overall grant, scope of the programme, resource allocation and time frame.
   iii. Required M&E effort, including data needs, sources for tracking indicators, availability of data, and data management systems and procedures for demonstrating overall results, value for money, input–output/activity–outcome linkages and to determine if conditions for program evaluation are in place to capture both learning and achievement, including baseline data.
   iv.   Attribution/contribution requirements, including baseline and input data needs for measuring attribution and contribution over time.

30. **Management and governance elements**
   v.   Internal understanding of goals and accountabilities, including the level of shared understanding of the vision, goals, objectives, expected results, accountabilities, and the means for achieving them.
   vi.   Management and governance towards results, including the nature of the agreement between the Government of Netherlands (GoN) and UNICEF; UNICEF's internal organizational structure; and the human, technical, and financial capacity to carry out the programme management function and maximize achievements.
   vii. Resource allocation processes, including their effectiveness in ensuring that PBEA is a global programme with specific goals and objectives rather than a general fund to supplement existing country programs.
   viii. Risks, external factors and unintended consequences, including the extent to which the logical framework and management structure have been designed to identify and adapt to risks and other external factors to maximize positive opportunities and minimize negative consequences.

2.0 METHODOLOGY

2.1   Data Collection

31. The EA team employed four data collection methods to determine the evaluability of the PBEA. First, a comprehensive document review and analysis was carried out, focusing on three categories of documents:
    - key foundational documents for the PBEA (including the original programme proposal to the GoN), the GRF (including the logframe and indicators), terms of reference for the governance and management of the PBEA and PMT reports to the Accountability Committee
    - background research publications regarding the linkages between education and peacebuilding, including the final evaluation of the earlier EEPCT programme and foundational work for the PBEA produced by Smith, Novelli and McCandless, among others
    - country-level documentation intended to feed into the PBEA programme, including conflict analyses documents, operational matrices (including logframes and indicators), M&E plans and PBEA annual reports

32. Annex 2 provides a bibliography and a description of available PBEA country programme documentation for EA review in Annex 3. In general, significant background literature material was made available, as well as a considerable number of organizational and governance documentation at the global level. Country-level documentation varied from country to country. The EA requested that all countries provide conflict analyses, baselines, operational matrices, annual reports and country programme snapshots for each country. Myanmar, the newest of the PBEA countries, had no available documentation, while other countries such as Pakistan, Somalia, Uganda or Sierra Leone provided considerably more documentation than requested. Gaps in documentation were supplemented where possible through interviews with PBEA related personnel in many countries. For example, few baseline reports were available, but in interviews respondents discussed their plans for country-level baselines.

33. Second, the EA team carried out interviews with an array of global-, regional- and country-level stakeholders through a series of semi-structured one-on-one key informant interviews – both in person and via Skype or telephone. A complete list of all those interviewed is found in Annex 4. Prior to the country field visit phase, the team interviewed 71 stakeholders representing the key stakeholder categories at four levels as follows:
    i.   A total of 28 interviews from UNICEF Headquarters
    ii. A total of six interviews from five Regional Offices
    iii. A total of 31 interviews from country offices; 2–4 people from 12 country offices (Yemen and Myanmar staff were not interviewed)
    iv. A total of five interviews with consultants contracted or associated with PBEA programme

34. For interviews, a single semi-structured interview guide was developed to be employed as a framework for all interviews. The guide was patterned along questions for the evaluability assessment. Prior to each specific interview, the guide was adapted to emphasize specific elements depending on the particular interviewed stakeholder's knowledge of the relevant PBEA components.

35. Most interviews were done in pairs, but in a few instances one person conducted the interviews and occasionally they were done by all three team members. The team debriefed several times

per week to compare and contrast findings and identify any outliers. The verbal debriefings helped the team to cluster PBEA countries both by status and by key themes and helped inform the overall answers to the EA questions. Analysis matrices were updated after each call, and gaps in knowledge were highlighted for emphasis in subsequent interviews and in follow-up calls to other personnel from the targeted countries.

36. Third, the EA team carried out field visits to three PBEA implementing countries (Pakistan, Somalia and South Sudan). Field visits to three country programmes were used to highlight or confirm themes identified from the interviews and data analysis. Country field visits were concise but comprehensive; assessments focused on management capacity, programme feasibility given the context, country programme staff and partner understandings of PBEA goals and aspirations, the degree of implementation carried out to date and partner capabilities for appropriate M&E data collection for the PBEA programme. Somalia was assessed from Kenya as security concerns precluded travel in-country. An emphasis was placed on examining the technical elements of the PBEA, the capacity of country programs to meet the M&E requirements for the PBEA frameworks, and the capacity of partners to gather the requisite data needed by the Global Results Framework and country programme plans. Table 1 outlines the general plan of activities and expected outputs for the country field visits. Annex 4 contains a list of all stakeholders interviewed during the country, while Annex 8 contains a summary of key findings in each country visit. An additional 61 interviews were carried out during the field visit phases.

Table 1: Field visit schedule and outputs

Days	Activity	Expected Outputs
Capital City (2 days)	Document review: • Existing conflict analyses or adaptations or modified versions of these analyses • Existing M&E system processes • Existing logframe (if different from global-level operational matrix) • Existing baselines • Existing monitoring data Interviews: • 2–3 UNICEF Staff focused on PBEA • 1–2 Government representative involved in PBEA • 1–2 Implementing partner representative	• Quality and relevance of conflict analysis from a conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding lens. • Partner understanding of the ToC • Capacity of strategic partners to support M&E • Alignment of programme documentation with programming reality • Understanding of relevance of field management system for PBEA
Field Visit (3 days)	Document Review: • Documented monitoring system processes • Existing macro- and micro-level conflict analyses used for conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding programming • Existing Baseline Data • Existing Monitoring Data Interviews: • 2–3 Implementing partner field staff • 1–2 Community and local government representatives • 1 FGD selected beneficiaries (if relevant) • Document review of existing implementing partner monitoring data and collection processes	• Alignment of programme documentation with implementation reality • Understanding of PBEA objectives • Capacity of implementing partners to manage M&E requirements • Relevance of conflict analyses to reality on the ground and alignment of ToC and M&E plans with the conflict analyses.
Debrief (1 day)	• UNICEF personnel related to PBEA programme.	• Debrief and triangulation of initial observations.

37. Fourth and finally, after the first draft was presented to the Evaluation Office, a member of the EA team attended the 2013 Global Annual Workshop in Istanbul in September. The EA presented an initial brief of the findings from the EA and then conducted data validation exercises with representatives from each of the country programme delegations. These exercises were intended to collect additional insights to fine-tune the findings and recommendations. Interviews were carried out with one to three representatives from each country office and a few senior leadership interviews from HQ. Feedback and observations from these interviews were integrated into the final report.

2.2 Data Analysis

38. Programme documents sourced from the country and global levels were analyzed according to two analysis templates: a checklist of completed processes as available to the EA team and an analysis of the different technical characteristics of programme documents (see Annex 5). This was used to develop a description of PBEA implementation status and a set of preliminary findings regarding questions related to programme coherence, indicators and M&E systems.

39. Data collected from interviews was analyzed through an analysis matrix based on the key questions of the evaluability assessment (see Annex 6). After each interview, the compiled notes were collated into the matrix. For reasons of confidentiality, the actual responses are not included in the Annex 6 template. The analysis of the qualitative information from the interview data was based on standard qualitative data analysis techniques of thematizing, clustering and in some cases comparing and contrasting responses to the same questions.[17] The EA team used an iterative process to identify emergent themes and key patterns. After an initial round of interviews, each interview transcript was analyzed. Individual thematic units in each interview transcript were coded. Thematic units were initially clustered based on the category of questions for the evaluability assessment (Annex 7 – Section 1). Thematic units that did not fit specific categories of questions were initially clustered into a miscellaneous category. These clusters were then disaggregated into subcategories or aggregated into supercategories to identify emerging patterns. This was done with both the ToR category questions and the miscellaneous categories. This aggregation and disaggregation generated a secondary set of themes identified in respondent commentary (Annex 7 – Section 2).

40. As new interview data was coded and integrated into the patterns, these emergent themes and patterns were reanalyzed and reclustered as necessary. Contradictory patterns or thematic units were noted and followed up in subsequent interviews to understand factors influencing the perceived patterns. A final set of conclusions were build based on the qualitative data.

41. The final analysis involved the triangulation of data from the four sources (programme documentation, interview analysis, country field visits and data validation reviews conducted at the Istanbul workshop with most of the PBEA country teams). The triangulation was constructed based on the categories of questions for the evaluability assessment. Contradictions were noted and subsequent clarifications sought for divergent patterns. In addition, points of alignment of themes emerging from the three sources were also noted. Based on this final-level analysis, specific challenges to evaluability were identified for each category, including whether programme objectives are clearly specified, understood by all stakeholders, measurable and plausible given the time frame for the programme.

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[17] Patton, Michael. Qualitative Research and Evaluation, 3rd Edition. SAGE Press. 2001

2.3　Limitations of the EA

42. There were several limitations in executing the methodology of the evaluability assessment. The following should be taken into account when interpreting the findings:

   i.　Most of the documents sourced from the country programmes were in draft form, with many operational matrices yet to be reviewed for adequacy of M&E arrangements. The EA team attempted to mitigate this limitation by conferring with country teams to ascertain if the information was still applicable.

   ii.　In the original proposal for the PBEA, the evaluability assessment process was conceptualized as a global-level 'light touch' evaluability assessment. The subsequent initial design was intended to focus primarily on the global level, with short field visits to two country programmes for data validation. Given the degree of variation between country programmes, generalizing from three country programmes to the additional eleven countries may have missed some salient differences. The team worked to address this limitation through comprehensive interviews with multiple staff from each country, occasionally conducting follow-up interviews where necessary.

   iii.　The design of the evaluability assessment relied heavily on interviews. Self-report interviews are always susceptible to bias. To mitigate bias, interview guides were designed only after conducting a thorough analysis of the documentation and identifying potential themes for investigation, and by interviewing a broad range of stakeholders (at country, region and HQ levels representing implementation, technical support, management and leadership functions). Follow-up interviews were conducted where there were conflicting or inconsistent reports.

   iv.　The PBEA is a 'live' programme. There has been continual updating of programme documentation and modifications of processes during the period of the evaluability assessment. Some details on the implementation status of country programmes should be ascertained and/or updated before acting upon the recommendations of the evaluability assessment.

3.0 FINDINGS ON THE EVALUABILITY OF THE PBEA

3.1 Status of the PBEA

43. The very first question of the evaluability of any programme is whether the programme is being implemented at all. In the case of the PBEA, this means ascertaining whether countries have completed their conflict analyses, whether they have developed programmes that flow from the conflict analyses and whether programme activities are being implemented. Table 2 provides a summary of the PBEA in each of the participating countries, with a detailed analysis of country programme characteristics in Annex 5.

Table 2: Summary of PBEA country status (as of July 2013)

Country	Conflict Analysis Completed	Operational Matrices Approved	M & E Arrangements in Place	Still in Fast Track Mode	Baselines Underway or Completed
Burundi	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No
Chad	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No
Cote D'Ivoire	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes
DRC	Yes	Yes	No		Not planned
Ethiopia	No	Yes	No		No
Liberia	Yes	Yes	Yes		No
Myanmar	In progress	No	No		No
Pakistan	Yes	Yes	Yes		No
Palestine	In progress	Yes	No	Yes	No
Sierra Leone	Yes	Yes	Yes		No
Somalia	In progress	Yes	No	Yes	No
South Sudan	Yes	Yes	No		No
Uganda	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes
Yemen	In progress	Yes	No		No

44. Based on the analysis, country programme status can be classified into three categories. Category 1 country programmes are those that recently initiated their conflict analyses or have not yet started and are operating either within Fast Track programming or have not yet started any programming. Five countries programmes are considered to fall in this category, and with significant programming inputs still required, their evaluability cannot be determined.

45. While their conflict analyses are yet to be finalized, Category 2 countries received considerable information from their conflict analysis to enable integration of conflict drivers into programming of ongoing activities. Four to six countries are considered to be in this category. Category 3 country programmes have completed conflict analyses and have an approved operational matrix and M&E plan with baseline studies underway or completed. Three to four countries are considered to be in this category, but even with this much progress, some inputs are required to enhance evaluability. Variability exists in country programmes within each category with some being borderline between two categories, hence the approximations in the number included in each category. The major point is, for each of the three categories, different types of actions and support are required to ensure that the programmes achieve desired results. However, it is expected that most of the country programmes will complete their conflict analyses and finalize their operational matrices by June 2014, the end of this fiscal year 2013–2014.

3.2 Technical and Strategic Aspects of Evaluability

3.2.1 Overall programme coherence

46. The evaluability assessment identified the following as strengths of the PBEA that would enhance its evaluability:

- There was a high degree of enthusiasm across all sectors for the PBEA programme, as well as considerable interest in conflict-sensitive education and establishing the linkages between education and peacebuilding programming.
- The PBEA programme has allowed UNICEF to explore new ways of designing and implementing education interventions, stimulated reflection and inspired UNICEF staff to rethink the role of UNICEF and education in their unique contexts.
- The knowledge and expertise of staff in peacebuilding has improved significantly as a result of systematic capacity building, informal exchanges of PBEA staff, as well as hiring additional qualified peacebuilding experts in EMOPS and in some programme countries. However, capacity development for peacebuilding for UNICEF staff needs to be accelerated.
- Indicators in the GRF and country operational matrices are mostly technically correct for associated activities.
- Country-level programmes should be able to show *progress towards* the completion of targeted activities in the remaining two years of the current programme cycle.

47. **Programme Coherence – Areas to improve evaluability**

- Among interviewed PBEA stakeholders, there are multiple interpretations regarding concepts of peacebuilding, education as a peace dividend and the role of conflict sensitivity. For example, conflict-sensitive education is seen as an outcome by some participants, conflating it with peacebuilding outcomes. Other respondents view it as an approach or way to implement programs.
- The PBEA programme is taking an expansive approach to programming, with greater inclusion of various cross-sectoral initiatives and/or themes such as early childhood development (ECD), gender-based violence and life skills, to mention a few. Hence some programmes are dispersed thematically as well as geographically. While efforts to integrate cross-cutting themes in the PBEA are laudable, the conceptual link to peacebuilding has, in some cases, not been clearly articulated. As a consequence, corresponding M&E and data collection arrangements have not captured this complexity.
- Specific indicators in country-level operational matrices are generally technically sound as individual indicators but are focused on monitoring level indicators and measuring organizational performance. Few indicators in any of the operational matrix drafts reviewed are focused on measuring changes in the key concepts of social cohesion, resilience or human security.
- The outcome-level indicators in most operational matrices are not well-linked conceptually to the key peacebuilding dimensions creating difficulties in systematically providing evidence for education's contributions to peacebuilding.
- Some output-level indicators (e.g., the presence of a policy) tend to be in a 'yes/no' format, which does not allow for measuring '*progress towards'* achieving particular result. Operational matrices that were reviewed by the ME expert do include 'progress towards' indicators to the extent possible. This further highlights the need for solid M&E expertise at the country-programme level.

Table 3: Programme coherence summary

Guiding Questions	Summary
Are the country program activities linked to specific conflict drivers and a clear theory of change?	Twelve of the 14 participating country programmes have identified specific conflict drivers, and there exists documentation at HQ summarizing all identified conflict drivers. Country programme operational matrices list key conflict drivers for each outcome and present a theory of change that is intended to connect the activities to the conflict drivers. For most country-level operational matrices, each outcome lists at least one theory of change (some countries list more than one). Although the linkages between conflict drivers, theories of change, peacebuilding concepts targeted by the PBEA (social cohesion, resilience or human security) can be implied from the described theory of change, linkages need to be strengthened.
How clear is the PBEA's internal programme logic and logical framework?	The global-level PBEA programme logic outlines the intended theory of change for the PBEA programme. While this is clear, certain key factors have created internal confusion among country programme stakeholders regarding the programme logic: • Even though key concepts are described in the technical guidance note produced by EMOPS, there are still multiple and competing understandings of peacebuilding, education for peacebuilding, social cohesion, resiliency and human security. For instance, conflict sensitivity is described as an outcome in some country programmes, while others perceive it to be an approach or a way to implement programmes. • The global framework cites three key peacebuilding concepts: social cohesion, resilience and human security. However, these are not clearly conceptualized in programme documentation. • Country programmes target different aspects of these three key dimensions – although social cohesion appears to be the most commonly targeted. Furthermore, within many country programmes, the operational matrices target contain multiple peacebuilding dimensions (social cohesion, resilience, human security) under different strategic outcomes creating the impression of a lack of a coherent whole to country-level programming. • The programme contains an expansive design allowing the incorporation of a wide range of cross-sectoral themes (such as ECD, gender-based violence and life skills) within the range of the PBEA implementation, providing a very broad and sometimes not well-aligned range of options for activities.
How SMART are the objectives and the indicators of PBEA?	The indicators that are present in most of the country-level operational matrices are measurable and related to the objectives. However, these indicators are primarily focused on activity and output levels.
How closely aligned are inputs, outputs, outcomes, and impact?	For all country programming, activity and output levels within the operational matrices are aligned and are appropriately located within the five global outcomes. However, the operation matrices generally lack a clear alignment to outcome and impact-level effects related to the three key peacebuilding dimensions.
To what extent doindicators represent a necessary and sufficient set of performance markers for measuring achievement of results?	There has been significant emphasis on developing monitoring indicators, which measure organizational performance (often termed 'results' by many stakeholders). However, the set of indicators as a whole is not sufficient to provide evidence of contribution to change in social cohesion, resilience and human security due to the absence of outcome and impact-level indicators related to these key concepts.

48. ***Ambiguity of key concepts of 'conflict sensitivity' and 'peacebuilding' affected programme coherence.*** There is considerable variance in definitions among implementers and stakeholders at all levels regarding the difference between conflict sensitivity, conflict-sensitive education and peacebuilding. Comparative definitions were developed as part of the technical guidance note from EMOPS;[18] in addition there are contract documents that delineate certain terminologies within the programme. Nevertheless it was apparent that programme participants still use multiple and competing understandings of these core concepts, in spite of these resources.

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[18] UNICEF Technical Note on Conflict Sensitivity and Peacebuilding, June 2012

49. For example, in the Global Results Framework, Strategic Outcome 1 uses the term *peacebuilding,* while Strategic Outcome 2 cites *conflict-sensitive education*. As described in the GRF, it appears that there is an intention to link Outcome 1 and 2 (policy development and institutional capacity building). However, when peacebuilding is understood as distinct from conflict sensitivity, this linkage disappears. Outcome 3 and 4 also demonstrate this dynamic. Outcome 3 appearing to be oriented more towards peacebuilding (although vaguely defined) while Outcome 4 is focused on conflict sensitivity. These conceptual ambiguities could create confusion in a final evaluation over the exact focus of the programming approaches. There should be clarity on whether the end-of-programme evaluation should assess the success of UNICEF in implementing conflict-sensitive education activities (*e.g., Do No Harm*) or success of UNICEF in affecting peacebuilding outcomes. This clarity is also required in developing baselines, defining indicators and in order to measure and evaluate changes in indicators across these dimensions.

50. **Several theories of change were developed at the country level, but none of them provided clear linkages between social cohesion, human security, resilience and peacebuilding.** The original programme proposal describes the global theory of change for the PBEA programme as presented in Table 4 below.

Table 4: Programme logic according to Global Results Framework (GRF)

1	**IF** UNICEF increases the inclusion of education into peacebuilding and conflict-reduction policies and implementation; **and**
2	**IF** UNICEF increases its institutional capacity to provide conflict-sensitive and peacebuilding programming; **and**
3	**IF** UNICEF increases the capacity of children, parents, teachers and other duty-bearers to prevent, reduce and cope with conflict and promote peace; **and**
4	**IF** UNICEF increases access to quality, relevant, conflict-sensitive education; **and**
5	**IF** UNICEF contributes to the generation and use of evidence and knowledge in policies and programming related to education, conflict, and peacebuilding,
RESULT	**THEN** there will be strengthened policies and practices in education and peacebuilding; **and**
	IF policies and practices in education and peacebuilding are strengthened;
GOAL	**THEN** there will be strengthened resilience, social cohesion and human security.

51. While the theory of change is intended to present an integrated approach across the five outcomes to achieve the targeted result and the subsequent goals, outcomes appear to be treated as independent sets of activities rather than holistic contributions to an integrated theory of change in 10 of the 14 country programmes. Operational matrices in 10 country programmes included one or more theories of change for each individual outcome as indicated in Annex 5 (Section 3). Only three country programmes had documentation citing a general theory of change for all the activities. A more pressing problem is that theories of change cited for the various outcomes often targeted different key peacebuilding concepts (or none at all). Only two countries had a single peacebuilding concept that cross-cut all five outcomes. Table 5 provides a listing of the targeted key peacebuilding concept for each outcome as deduced from country programmes documents by the EA team.

Table 5: Country Programme Outcome Theories of Change and Link to Peacebuilding Concept

Country	Outcome 1	Outcome 2	Outcome 3	Outcome 4
Burundi	Not well linked to peacebuilding dimensions	Not well linked to peacebuilding dimensions	Social Cohesion and Resilience both	Social Cohesion
Chad	Human Security	Human Security	Resilience	Not well linked to peacebuilding dimensions
Cote D'Ivoire	Social Cohesion	Social Cohesion	Resilience	Social Cohesion
DRC	Social Cohesion	Human Security	Social Cohesion and Resilience	No clear connection to peacebuilding dimensions
Ethiopia	Social Cohesion	No clear connection to peacebuilding dimensions	Social Cohesion	Social Cohesion
Liberia	Human Security and Resilience	No clear connection to peacebuilding dimensions	Social Cohesion	No clear connection to peacebuilding dimensions
Myanmar	*No Operational Matrix developed yet, but proposal appears to be focusing on social cohesion*			
Pakistan	Social Cohesion	Social Cohesion	Social Cohesion	Social Cohesion
Palestine	Social Cohesion	Social Cohesion	Social Cohesion	Social Cohesion
Sierra Leone	Social Cohesion	Not explicitly linked to any of three concepts (targets increased trust in schools)	Resilience	Resilience
Somalia	None Listed	No clear connection to peacebuilding dimensions (targets increased trust in government)	Resilience	None
South Sudan	Human Security	Resilience	Human Security	Resilience
Uganda	Social Cohesion and Resilience	Resilience	Social Cohesion and Resilience	No clear connection to peacebuilding concepts (targets increased trust in school and state)
Yemen	*No Operational Matrix develop yet, but proposal appears to be focusing on resilience*			

52. Except for two occasions when operational matrices did list indicators that could potentially be related to measuring one of the key peacebuilding concepts in the programme, the evaluability assessment did not find any programme documentation that conceptualized social cohesion, human security or resilience or that operationalized these concepts in sufficient detail to construct measurable outcome-level indicators.

53. ***Explicit links between key conflict drivers and overall theory of change will enhance programme coherence.*** PBEA programming is supposed mitigate conflict drivers identified by the conflict analysis. Nine of the 14 participating countries had completed their conflict analyses by July 2013, with all but one in progress. However, eight country programmes had not developed their programmes or their finalized operational matrix. In practice, many of the country programme operational matrices had tentatively identified conflict drivers as part of the development of their 'Fast Track' proposals, and while conflict drivers were often not explicitly listed, they could be inferred from the described theory of change.

54. While the activities could be justified against an identified conflict driver, some evaluability concerns persisted. First and as observed during one country visit, the conflict drivers were very general or combined multiple concepts, with the result that activities could be justified easily without having chosen most logical programming solution to address the implied driver. Second,

each outcome was aligned to a very specific and often small scale set of activities, so that while there could be a logical connection between some activities and a particular outcome, the collection of activities were not necessarily logically sufficient to impact the targeted outcome condition.

55. Third, while the activities were linked to drivers (or at least were justifiable given the driver), the articulation of different drivers targeting different peacebuilding concepts across the five programme outcomes created a lack of programming coherence as a whole. As a result, while individual country outcomes may appear aligned, the outcomes within a country programme are often disconnected from each other. Strengthening programme documentation to make explicit links between key conflict drivers and an overall theory of change will enhance programme coherence. For the remaining programmes that are yet to finalize their programmes, providing a model of how to prioritize from numerous conflict drivers and develop programme activities based on the key conflict drivers would be a more efficient way to proceed.

56. ***Expansive programming affected programme coherence and evaluability.*** In both the 2012 and 2013 Global Annual workshops, the PBEA team promoted expansion of PBEA programming in country offices to include cross-sectoral work (e.g., early childhood development, gender-based violence, disabilities). Some of these themes have proved to have very little or no direct relationship to conflict drivers or structural conflict issues. Because of the degree of variation and this expansive reach of the programme, the link to peacebuilding outcomes is at best, tenuous. This in turn presents challenges to evaluability.

57. **Monitoring indicators have been well articulated; the same is not true for evaluation indicators (outcome- or impact-level indicators).** Country programme activities, according to the operational matrices, were generally technically appropriate, and there did not appear to be any technical issues related to specific individual activities and their corresponding indicators. However, an analysis of the ***collection*** of indicators as a whole suggests that there is a misalignment between the intent of the programme to provide evidence for education's contribution to social cohesion, resilience and human security and what is actually being measured. Programme accountability measures are an attempt to track the number of activities implemented and the quality of this implementation. These are usually activity and output indicators (changes in knowledge, abilities or attitudes; development of policies; and so forth). Measures for understanding the impact of the programme are typically the focus of evaluations. These indicators are generally found at the outcome level (individual behavior change, policy implementation) or goal level (social change).

58. In the majority of the operational matrices, the primary focus was on monitoring process and output indicators intended to measure organizational performance. In a few cases there were indicators regarding the extent to which education is integrated into peacebuilding policies and stakeholders' attitudes and perceptions of their own ability to cope with conflict. Neither the development and/or implementation of policies are themselves peacebuilding *outcome*-level indicators, unless it can be proven that the implementation of policies or these new attitudes and perceptions had an effect on the social context (for example, increased social cohesion and improved resilience) – another issue that affects evaluability.

3.2.2   Feasibility of Results

59. The evaluability assessment identified the following as strengths of the PBEA that would enhance its evaluability:
    - The Global Results Framework (GRF) provides a broad framework for guiding programming and capturing activity- and output-level achievements.
    - UNICEF's internal capacity building on education and peacebuilding is considered to be an important programme contribution, and this can be captured in Outcome 2 of the operational matrices.
    - The research strategy for Outcome 5 can be used to help document lessons learned and learning in terms of achievements, as well as to prove theories of change specific to the UNICEF programming environment.

60. **Feasibility of Results – Areas to improve evaluability**
    - Country programmes should not be discouraged from measuring more significant changes - such as skill and behavior changes of partners and beneficiaries, but a realistic time frame should be adopted.
    - The breadth of the aspirations and the wide degree of activities may have the cumulative effect of inhibiting overall achievements. It may be more helpful to narrow programming focus over the remaining project time frame rather than keep it expansive.
    - Country programmes should ensure that progress towards outcomes is well documented in the time remaining; this will require a meaningful articulation of outputs that capture a feasible level of change (and not merely that an activity is completed).
    - To ensure feasibility, a review of the ratio of funding between HQ and active countries may be required with reallocation as needed.
    - Category 1 countries are unlikely to achieve much beyond completing their conflict analyses, staffing and basic training. Assuming the programme will continue on beyond the 2015 close (through the current or other donors), expectations for Category 1 countries could be modified to improve alignment with the time remaining. This will improve feasibility of achieving results and evaluability.

Table 6: Feasibility of Results Summary

Guiding Questions	Summary
How realistic are the global results in light of the overall grant for PBEA, the scope of the programme and resources allocated?	From the global perspective, the PBEA is considered a big project with high levels of funding. However, for almost all of the country programmes, the PBEA programme is considered a limited funded project (3.5–5.5 million USD/country/year) with ambitious aspirations in terms of scope and impact. Countries have taken different responses to this contradiction with a majority developing stand-alone programming (8) with a minority using an embedded approach (3). Three countries have not yet begun programming.
How feasible is the achievement of the strategic results within the remaining time frame?	The term 'results' is used in different ways within the PBEA. If 'results' is intended to mean the accomplishment of specific activities in the country programme work plans, then it should be possible to accomplish 'results' (work plan activities) within the remaining project time. If, however, 'results' is intended to mean affecting changes in social cohesion, resilience or human security, these types of high-level changes are not likely to be seen within the remaining programming period. Within the current configuration of country-level operational matrices and GFR, only output-level results will be demonstrable. Capacity building, relationship building, trainings and improved school infrastructure are feasible achievements. However, in many countries, the geographical scope and the number of activities may be to too broad given limited management and monitoring resources and the time remaining. For country programmes targeting more significant change such as behavior change of partners and end-users, behavior change is not feasible in 18 months or less.

61. ***The scope of the PBEA is not realistic in most country programmes if measured against funding levels, M&E effort required, and the available resources***. During initial design of the programme, participating countries were allocated a predetermined amount between 3.5 and 5.5 million USD/year per country. Within this allocations framework, country programmes were asked to design a programme that could demonstrate education's contributions to peacebuilding. With the exception of one interviewee, the majority of informants reported that the amount of funding was small, in proportion to the scope of the programme. So, while the PBEA funding is considered to be a big program – nearly USD50 million per year, it is a small component with a small funding envelope in most country programmes relative to the overall Country Programme (CP), especially in this collection of countries, the majority of which have some kind of humanitarian programming.

62. In response to this expansive mandate and limited budget, country programmes generally took one of two different approaches: either to embed the funding into existing country-level programming by augmenting funding to ongoing activities (e.g., DRC, Uganda) or develop a smaller scale PBEA dedicated programme with new staff hired to be key focal points for the programme (e.g., Pakistan, South Sudan). The two approaches have different strengths and weaknesses. The first approach allowed for rapid implementation of PBEA activities but faces challenges with measuring PBEA contribution's to social cohesion, resilience and human security. The second approach allowed for better contribution measurements but often at the expense of longer start up. For countries taking the latter approach, the expenditure rates were initially quite low during programme roll out. For the entire PBEA programme, after the second 2013 tranche, 22 percent of funds are committed, 36 percent are spent and 42 percent remain unspent. However, funding disbursement and funds utilization have all increased in the past fiscal year.

63. **Output-level results will be achieved; much more time will be required to demonstrate conclusive evidence linking education and peacebuilding.** Country-level respondents all confidently stated that in spite of programming startup delays and suboptimal programming interventions, they perceived the programme to have made significant achievements—especially in terms of contributing to increasing awareness and understanding of conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding among UNICEF staff, developing greater contextual understanding via the conflict analyses and providing opportunity for new forms of engagement. Many respondents agreed that it was unrealistic to expect that changes in the key peacebuilding concepts could be achieved in a short time period and that expectations for the programme in terms of demonstrating evidence for the linkages between education and peacebuilding should be modest. More importantly, there seems to be no system for understanding which activities would be more effective, and hence some activities should be set as pilots.

64. Consequently, whether the results can be considered feasible depends largely on *which* results and *which* expectations are being used to measure the programme. It is the consideration of the evaluability assessment that given the resources and effort involved, numerous programme achievements should be visible. These may have to be captured in output, qualitative reviews or more nuanced '*progress towards*' indicators. However, it is unlikely that the PBEA programme will be able to demonstrate conclusive evidence linking education and peacebuilding in the remaining time frame. Table 7 highlights likely feasible results given the resources and time remaining.

Table 7: Feasibility of results at country programme level, by outcome

Outcome	Typical Activities	Likelihood of achieving desired outputs	Likelihood of achieving desired outcomes or impact
Increase inclusion of education into peacebuilding and conflict-reduction policies, analyses and implementation	Awareness raising, relationship building, and policy development with government partners feasible.	Some governments have begun to integrate social cohesion or peacebuilding concepts into their education sector policies. However, transforming the perception of the role of education in peacebuilding processes likely not feasible by end of FY15	Unlikely to be able to show how policies have affected social cohesion in remaining time. However, likely that some evidence can be gathered for conflict-sensitive decision making in education policies
Increase institutional capacities to supply conflict sensitive education	UNICEF: Very likely to achieve greater awareness and understanding of role of education in peacebuilding by FY15. Partners: Curriculum reform likely most achievable	UNICEF: structures likely to be in place for greater integration of peacebuilding and education. Partners: Curriculum rollout likely and some small advances in targeted schools in teachers' capacity for conflict-sensitive education. However, less likely that national-scale capacity building of teachers will be possible by FY15	UNICEF: Unlikely that UNICEF will be considered by other UN partners as a key resource for peacebuilding by FY15. Partners: Unlikely that linkages between new curriculum and teaching methods and changes in violence, social cohesion or resilience will be demonstrable by FY15
Increase capacity of children, parents, teachers and other duty-bearers to prevent reduce and cope with conflict and promote peace	Generally focuses on life skills programming and peer mediation programming – very likely to be able to have achieved targeted activities by FY 15	Likely that changes in children and adult capacity (awareness and knowledge increases via training) for peer mediation and life skills can be achieved but will require significant measurement methods for results to be meaningful.	Changes in children's resilience could be achieved (although not currently being measured). Measurable and attributable reductions in violence or increases social cohesion of adults is unlikely
Increase access for children to quality, relevant, conflict-sensitive education that contributes to peace	Enhanced access to educational infrastructure likely achievable by FY15	Likely that some degree of measurement related to retention and enrollment could be achieved	Less likely to be able to demonstrate linkages between enrollment and retention and changes to social cohesion, resilience or human security.
Contribute to the generation and use of evidence and knowledge on policies and programming on linkages between education, conflict and peacebuilding	Defining research focus, contracting researchers and universities and articulating conceptual linkage between research and PBEA programming all likely achievable	Sponsorship of case study research and small-scale investigations on the correlation between education and peacebuilding likely achievable by FY15	Research process that can provide evidence of current PBEA activities contributing to social cohesion, human security or resilience less likely achievable by FY 15 because the research process has not yet been articulated to capture these PBEA specific impacts.

65. Although most countries have all five outcomes described in their operational matrices, some outcomes receive de facto priority simply because of insufficient implementation capacity to address all outcomes equally. In one country, the primary focus was on Outcome 2 activities (even though all five objectives were integrated into the work plan). In a second country, the primary focus was on Outcome 3 activities and the third country prioritized Outcome 4. Given resource and presumably capacity constraints, countries have naturally prioritized outcomes. To ensure the intent of the global programme remains, some guidance is required in assisting country programmes to narrow their programming focus. This will help countries to sharpen their focus on the key conflict drivers, as well as the key elements of the global approach.

3.2.3 Required M&E Effort

66. The evaluability assessment identified the following elements in monitoring and evaluation that would enhance the evaluability of the PBEA:
    - M&E planning has increased significantly. In the 2012 global annual workshop, most participants reportedly had a bare minimum conceptualization of the program and its evaluation requirements. By the 2013 workshop, most country office participants had a better grasp of the nature, purpose and scope of the program, and many had taken significant steps towards designing and implementing relevant country-level monitoring mechanisms. The GRF has undergone multiple revisions and improvements to respond to emerging issues.
    - Global and country office M&E support has improved since 2012. UNICEF has contracted Search for Common Ground to provide technical assistance on peacebuilding M&E requirements, while most Regional Offices have contracted support personnel to provide programming and M&E assistance to PBEA programmes. Some country offices have also hired additional M&E staff.
    - There is a continual critical analysis and questioning of M&E processes by PBEA stakeholders with HQ and country offices reflecting on their practice and asking questions about monitoring mechanisms and evaluability. These dialogues are constructive and can only influence the design and implementation of innovative global and country office monitoring systems for the PBEA and UNICEF positively.

67. **Monitoring and evaluation effort – areas to improve for evaluability**
    - Stakeholders expressed different understandings regarding what results are expected and what types of change to measure. This has led to an M&E system perceived as complex and extensive, which presents challenges for integrating PBEA requirements into preexisting M&E systems at country level.
    - There is significant investment in monitoring information in the M&E system but more investment in indicators that reflect the key peacebuilding concepts used in the programme is required.
    - The M&E effort required for the size of the programme within country offices, combined with standard UNICEF staff quotas, creates a lack of sufficient M&E capacity in peacebuilding M&E capacity.
    - The country visits revealed the reality that only a few implementing partners (national and international) have the capacity in M&E to gather the requisite information required beyond activity level related to PBEA.

Table 8: Summary of findings on required M&E effort

Guiding Questions	Summary
What specific data does each programming unit need to gather to document credible evidence? At what frequency and through what means of verification?	Data should be collected for activity-level performance, output-level results and outcome- and goal-level changes in social cohesion, resilience or human security. Also, including intermediate-level indicators would be help in assessing progress against milestones. Activity-level data should be gathered semi-annually; output-level data can probably be obtained annually. Outcome- and goal-level data related to social cohesion, resilience and human security only need to be obtained in baseline and end-of-cycle measurements as these are slower change indicators.
What is the current availability of this data and what additional effort is required to ensure that the data is available?	By and large, countries did not have approved M&E plans. For the countries that had an M&E plan in place there was a thorough system for data collection at the activity and output levels, including data collection frequency and means of verification. However, information related to outcome- and goal-level changes in social cohesions, resilience or human security was not being collected.

The most sophisticated country programme M&E systems do have a few potential outcome-level indicators, but these need to be linked more explicitly to the key concepts (see earlier comments in Programme coherence).

Considerable effort is being invested this year in developing the M&E systems in these country programmes; respondents believe that by the end of this fiscal year, most country programmes should have a system in place to gather the requisite data. |
| **What data on input-output/activity-outcome linkages will be necessary to demonstrate overall value for money and the cost effectiveness of the specific interventions?** | In the current configuration of the operational matrices in all countries, it is not possible to demonstrate overall value for money or the cost effectiveness of specific interventions. In order to do so, there needs to be a more specific linkage between peacebuilding or conflict sensitivity *outcome* type of indicators (not currently present in operational matrices) and the specific PBEA activities. |

68. ***M&E requirements for this programme are much greater than the relative funding size would dictate for a typical programme in UNICEF.*** Not all countries have finalized their M&E plans, but from M&E plans made available for the evaluability assessment, there appears to be a thorough system in place documenting how the necessary information will be gathered. In fact, it appears that at the current status of country programmes, all of the countries should be able to report on activity level, while about a third of the countries have systems for gathering output-level data. Only a couple of countries have systems for gathering data that may be connected to social cohesion, resilience or human security, and only a few countries have indicators that could be considered intermediate, 'progress towards' outcomes related to social cohesions, resilience and human security. However, perceptions of field staff and others at HQ suggest that the level of effort required for a credible M&E system for the PBEA is not commensurate with the amount of funding or the size of the programme within the country portfolios.

69. ***Approximately 30 percent of the country programmes and partners have the capacity to manage the higher level data requirements.*** While a labour-intensive M&E system may be necessary for demonstrating the evidence that education can contribute to peacebuilding, interview informants expressed doubt about the DME capacity at the country level to manage the data collection and analysis required for PBEA. Country field visits confirmed these trends. In one country programme, the EA were shown a set of national-level data developed through secondary parties. However, country programme PBEA personnel could not explain how this data was going to be used for analysis, which indicators it was intended to measure or how these indicators would be linked to PBEA activities. Another country was utilizing third-party monitoring approaches.

However, country programme personnel could not verify third-party monitoring performance, nor were they able to give clear explanations regarding what third parties were monitoring or whether they were monitoring through a conflict-sensitivity lens or measuring peacebuilding outcomes. In the absence of this type of structured guidance, it appeared that third parties were primarily focused on gathering activity process and completion indicators (e.g., number of activities, number of participants).

70. While the traditional indicator systems will contribute valuable information, it may be appropriate to consider alternative approaches to gathering insights into programme success. Options may include (1) reducing the number of indicators to be measured and reorienting a more manageable set of indicators on peacebuilding and conflict sensitivity, (2) clarifying what types of change is expected; and, (3) developing a complementary measurement approach through case studies or multiple case studies across a range of countries covering similar themes – a system that was used by the CDA to develop the original *Do No Harm* principles. These options are not mutually exclusive but serve to illustrate possible mechanisms for addressing a fundamental constraint – that the current M&E system targets monitoring indicators but provides less information on evaluation indicators.

3.2.4   Attribution and Contribution Requirements

71. The evaluability assessment identified the following elements that would enhance UNICEF's ability to trace PBEA's contributions to peacebuilding and to the evaluability of the programme:
    - About half of the countries are in the process of finalizing baseline studies for the PBEA programme.
    - Country programmes appear to be tracking necessary inputs related to measuring PBEA contributions.
    - A case study process is being developed as a mechanism for highlighting qualitative achievements and lessons learned not easily captured in quantitative logframe indicators.
    - Because of the type of interventions and the change expected for Outcome 3, baselines can be more easily used to track changes in outputs and outcomes and the specificity of PCAs allows for tracking PBEA contributions.

72. **Contribution and Attribution – Challenges for evaluability**
    - Outcomes 1 and 2 present the greatest challenges for tracking PBEA contributions, due in part to a lack of clear definitions, agreed upon objective measures and baselines. These are further compounded by the number of myriad partners involved at this level.
    - Operational matrices (especially for Outcome 1) would benefit from adding *progress towards* indicators highlighting programme achievements.
    - The research strategy is currently underutilized in country programmes as a mechanism for tracking PBEA contributions.
    - Respondents in interviews could not articulate the strategic intent of case study selection, leading to the appearance of an ad hoc approach focused on organizational performance and learning rather than addressing challenges of tracking PBEA contributions to local and national changes.
    - In countries where baseline tools were reviewed, many of the baseline surveys had poorly constructed survey questions (leading, double-barreled, or unclear) and numerous questions related to a topic but with no clear guidelines for interpreting or compiling the individual results in a meaningful way. Further modification of the tools is required in order to generate meaningful evaluation data on changes in skills, knowledge or attitudes.

- There were no baselines related to measuring the long-term changes in social cohesion, resilience or human security. It will be difficult to track PBEA contributions to changes in these concepts without actually measuring whether changes have occurred in social cohesion, resilience or human security.

Table 9: Attribution and Contribution Summary

Guiding Questions	Summary
What baseline data needs to be gathered as the basis for measuring PBEA's contribution over time?	Baseline data related to tracking changes in skills, attitudes and knowledge and to tracking changes to the key peacebuilding concepts will be necessary to measure PBEA's contributions over time.
	Outcome 1 and Outcome 2 present the greatest challenges to tracking PBEA contributions due to multiple challenges related to insufficient definitions, measures and understanding of what comprises success. Outcome 3 is less challenging because of implementation approach usually taken via PCAs with specific partners. The case study strategy and the research strategy could be important mechanisms for tracking PBEA contributions over time.
	Most countries have not finalized their plan for collecting baseline data. In two country programmes, the baselines were sufficiently focused to provide measurements of PBEA contributions to output-level results. However, no reviewed baselines are systematically tracking long-term changes in the key peacebuilding concepts related to areas of PBEA intervention.
	Data to capture PBEA contribution needs to focus on developing incremental or 'progress towards' indicators that target specific programming achievements (such as relationship building, awareness raising and attitude changes) – especially for Outcome 1.
What specific input data does each programming unit need to gather to demonstrate changes associated with PBEA's contribution?	Country programmes appear to be tracking activity-level results in the four outcomes targeting implementation. However, the data is often not systematically organized. Only two country programmes reported having a finalized indicator tracking table.
	The case study strategy and the research strategy could be important additional mechanisms for tracking PBEA contributions over time, although they are currently underutilized for this purpose.

73. The implied logic in the two guiding questions for this section is that if the PBEA programme is tracking changes to outputs and outcome-level indicators (via an initial baseline and subsequent measurements) and if the PBEA is tracking inputs (activities) related to the PBEA programme, then the PBEA programme will be able to show contributions over time. A more detailed analysis of the individual outcomes within this logic is located in Annex 9. In summary, Outcome 1 and 2 present the greatest degree of difficulty for tracking PBEA contributions to outcome indicators or peacebuilding concepts. Country programmes appear to be tracking activity-level results – although the data is often not systematically organized (only two country programmes reported having a finalized Indicator Tracking Table, for example). Output-level baselines are primarily found for Outcome 3 initiatives but are less common for the other three outcomes (not including the research objective in Outcome 5). The baseline tools reviewed for output-level indicators (knowledge, skills, attitudes, etc.) could be improved to generate better data for evaluation related to these concepts.

74. Because of the implementation approach normally adopted by country programmes, Outcome 3 indicators are most feasible for tracking contributions. The research strategy and case study strategy could be important mechanisms for tracking contributions (especially for Outcomes 1 and 2) but are currently underutilized for this purpose. The case study strategy was announced at the 2013 Global Annual Workshop, but more work is required to focus the case study strategy on

addressing contribution challenges in Outcome 1 and 2. Table 10 below summarizes the common patterns found in country programmes related to feasibility of tracking PBEA contributions.

Table 10: Country programme status for tracking PBEA contributions

	Outcome 1	Outcome 2	Outcome 3	Outcome 4
Focus	Increase inclusion of education into peacebuilding and conflict-reduction policies, analyses and implementation	Increase institutional capacities	Increase capacity of stakeholders to cope with violence and promote peace	Increase access for children to quality, relevant and conflict-sensitive education that contributes to peace
General Programming Thrust	Two main approaches: 1) MoE sector plans include some element of peacebuilding and 2) Education sector included in national peacebuilding initiatives	Generally focused on partner capacity building and usually targets curriculum reform and teacher training	General focus is on life skills, peer-mediation, youth mobilization and psycho–social support. Usually through PCAs with local nongovernmental partners	Educational infrastructure development and the implementation of child-friendly school approaches
Degree of difficulty for tracking contributions	High – multiple actors and UNICEF small voice	Medium-High – some other actors present	Low – relatively easy to track partner contributions and PCAs can include baseline components	Medium-Low – relatively easy to track contributions of local partners; more difficult to track government sector
Typical measurements necessary to track activities	# of conflict analyses completed # of capacity-building events # of participants	# of teacher trainings # of participants # of curriculum changes # of other capacity-building efforts # of participants	# of trainings on life skills, psychosocial and/or emotional learning, etc. # of participants	# of educational infrastructure improvements # of CFS capacity building # of participants
Typical output baseline data necessary to track for GRF reporting	None necessary – KPI is related to number of policies implemented. However, would be good to track changes in awareness, capacity or attitudes as part of tracking progress towards policy implementation	KPI is related to # of individuals trained. Would be important to track initial knowledge and skills on conflict-sensitive education among trained stakeholders	Changes in capacity or skills of participating individuals related to life skills, psycho-social state, etc.	Changes in enrollment, retention and dropouts[19] Changes in capacity for implementing CFS
Typical baseline data needed to track contributions to peacebuilding	Changes in social cohesion, resilience or human security indicators	Changes in social cohesion, resilience or human security in areas where curriculum and trainings implemented	Changes in social cohesion, resilience or human security in areas where local partners are carrying out implementation	Changes in social cohesion, resilience or human security in areas where educational infrastructure improved or where CFS implemented

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[19] Education results such as enrolment are often placed at outcome level in UNICEF logframes. However, if one purpose of the programme is to provide evidence for education's contribution to peacebuilding, then education results are not sufficient measures. The mere presence of increased enrolment is not in itself an indicator of social cohesion or human security (although it may be an indicator that increased social cohesion or improved human security has occurred).

3.3   Management and Governance Aspects to Evaluability

3.3.1   Understanding of PBEA Goals and accountabilities among UNICEF staff

75. The evaluability assessment identified the following elements that would enhance understanding of PBEA goals and accountabilities within UNICEF:

- UNICEF nurtures an open and positive relationship with the PBEA donor. Representatives of the GoN exhibit a great deal of understanding, flexibility and support for fostering a learning environment within the PBEA.
- The PBEA has developed management systems and governance structures that include numerous partners and broad cross-sectoral participation – fostering a greater sense of shared accountability for achieving global-level results.
- Global annual workshops are used address ambiguities and outstanding questions that may limit collective understanding among PBEA implementing staff in UNICEF.

76. **Internal Understanding – Areas to improve for evaluability**

- Management of PBEA as a central programme within UNICEF's decentralized context has created some confusion and disagreement among stakeholders regarding roles and degree of autonomy. It has also led to countries expecting too much support from HQ, in some cases bypassing regional structures.
- There appeared to be, particularly at the beginning, a lack of integration between the Peacebuilding and Recovery Section (EMOPS) and the Education Section. Some of this is likely due to different conceptual frameworks, language and approaches between the two sections; more could be done to further clarify roles and accountabilities.
- There is variation in understanding among stakeholders regarding whether the programme should emphasize cross-sectoral or education-specific foci.

Table 11: Understanding of PBEA Goals and accountabilities

Guiding Questions	Summary
How effectively has the process followed to date fostered a shared understanding of targeted results and the means of achieving them?	Stakeholders articulated the purpose of the programme in different ways: as a peacebuilding programme, as a programme to promote conflict sensitivity in education and as an education programme that may contribute to peacebuilding – illustrating that a shared understanding of the purpose of the PBEA programme does not exist. The centralized programme does not take full advantage of UNICEF's decentralized structure and has created some confusion amongst stakeholders regarding roles and the degree of autonomy for country programmes.
How clearly has the program logic been communicated to programming units and how well have they been understood?	Stakeholders interviewed across all countries and HQ articulate the programme logic differently.
What improvements, if any, should be made to enhance the understanding of programme goals and accountabilities for the rest of the project cycle?	Participation at the global annual workshop of PBEA teams from Country Offices, support personnel from Regional Offices, and key HQ staff provided an opportunity in clarify roles, accountabilities and programme goals. The PMT needs to continue to use the Global Workshop and other forum to communicate the programme goals and objectives. This should be coupled with basic training and awareness raising amongst new staff. Finally, the PMT along with senior field and HQ leadership should review and communicate the roles and responsibilities in the programme to ensure improved awareness of accountabilities. Ideally these roles and responsibilities will be modified in line with the recommendations of the EA. One element still missing is the inclusion of key country programme senior leadership beyond the education sector in these PBEA discussions.

77. Managing a centralized programme within UNICEF's decentralized context appears to be the most significant challenge when it comes to understanding of goals and accountabilities. Staff interviewed from HQ, regional and country offices expressed confusion, disagreement or mixed opinions regarding the degree of country programme autonomy allowed. Some country programme staff reported that they were not sure which issues required consultation or clearance with HQ, while others reported that HQ had to approve small decisions such as the selection of output indicators for country programmes. Still, others noted that the directives regarding country autonomy and HQ roles tended to change over time.

78. In a similar vein, there were mixed opinions between HQ and country management regarding roles. Some field senior leadership expressed their disapproval at having the PBEA team at HQ acting as direct technical supervisors to country staff. At the same time, HQ staff noted that they perceived themselves to be much less influential and noted that country programmes have enormous autonomy. While the global annual workshop does provide a good avenue for clarifying many of these ambiguities, the participation of key country-level stakeholders such as Deputy Representatives and Education Chiefs is low. Also, the degree of involvement in the initial planning and communication has tended to vary widely across countries. Participation in global meetings of many more country staff in leadership positions would help reduce ambiguities in accountabilities within country programmes.

79. EMOPS has worked to provide peacebuilding technical assistance from the outset of the programme. This includes developing guidance and conducting training and orientation sessions on peacebuilding and conflict sensitivity and ensuring that senior advisors were available to support the programme at all levels – HQ, region and country. The Education Section has allocated resources to contract additional peacebuilding personnel to support the programme. Personnel from EMOPS and Education have worked together at various stages of the programme, during the design phase with countries, in various management and governance meetings such as SPAG and in providing input to the Accountability Committee. However interviewees noted a need for more alignment of peacebuilding and education concepts.

80. Finally, some within the PBEA programme advocate for multisectoral engagements to achieve sustainable peacebuilding effects, while others appear to be advocating for focusing on targeted education specific interventions as a means to better show the link between education activities and peacebuilding effects. While both approaches can be justified, their mutual inclusion in country office programming combined with differing understandings of the programme purpose or intent may limit the evaluability of PBEA as a global programme.

3.3.2 Management and Governance Towards Results

81. The evaluability assessment made the following observations regarding management towards results:
    - Dedicated PBEA staff provides a central organizing point for aggregating information and initiating programming.
    - Some country programmes have peacebuilding expertise leading to responsive and focused peacebuilding support.
    - A knowledge management system is in place at HQ that captures and centralizes information from country programmes.

82. **Governance and Management – Areas to improve for evaluability**
   • The PBEA HQ management structure, with its multi-sectoral working units and a small team of dedicated staff, is best suited for internal learning, partnerships and awareness raising at HQ. It is less suited for providing direct support to country programmes.
   • Small numbers of dedicated staff in country offices are required to assume multiple responsibilities with insufficient time and resources to accomplish all expectations.
   • The absence of a horizontal knowledge management system across countries has limited cross-country learning and awareness.
   • The lack of a documented, long-term strategy within which to embed the PBEA programme affects PBEA approaches and measurement strategies and limits the ability to assess PBEA's contributions to outcomes and long-term impact.

Table 12: Management and Governance Summary

Guiding Questions	Summary
Is there adequate capacity to carry out the programme management function?	The PBEA has developed and mobilized significant governance arrangements to support strategic oversight, risk management, implementation and learning. Overall the presence of the various management and governance groups (AC, SPAG, TWG, etc.) have been instrumental in promoting awareness of the PBEA and the importance of addressing peacebuilding; they have also served as forums to raise awareness of the PBEA at HQ. These arrangements also provide good support the PMT. A majority of countries appear to have the management capacity to oversee the programme although the emphasis on all countries using all five outcomes has created some challenges for addressing all elements well. A few countries reported that they did not have sufficient capacity to address the scale and geographic scope of the programme.
How sufficient are the governance arrangements for maximizing the likelihood of programme success?	PBEA structures at UNICEF headquarters are in many ways designed to enhance awareness raising and advocacy within and outside of the UNICEF structure. However, these structures do not appear to be designed to directly support country-level programming. The focus of the evaluability assessment has been on what country-level PBEA programmes can achieve, yet many of the governance arrangements are not always relevant to the field-level implementation focus. The current, hands-on support from the PMT was designed to help countries during the startup phase. However, given the current structures and resources in place, it may no longer be the most efficient management strategy given the decentralized nature of the organization.
To what degree does the organizational and policy structure contribute to or inhibit the development and design of new approaches?	Three factors appear to have had significant influence of development and design of new programming approaches: • The autonomous programming cycles of country offices creates challenges for rolling out a global programme as different country offices are in different points of their programme cycles. • The development of a centralized management structure within a decentralized programme structure took time to negotiate and develop buy-in from key programme stakeholders. • Human resource processes that require a work plan prior to contracting inhibited the rapid integration of new personnel into the programme.
How sufficiently have key aspects of programme management (communications, risk analysis, dedicated programme management resources, etc.) been undertaken to maximize the likelihood of success?	Many positive programme elements are in place and can enhance programme success; these include the communication resources and strategy, the initial risk-management approach and dedicated programme management. Additional effort to refine the knowledge management system, update risk-management approach and develop a long-term strategic vision for peacebuilding within which to embed the PBEA could enhance the likelihood of programme success.

How clearly have internal programme accountabilities been identified in line with both the corporate nature of the agreement with GoN and the decentralized structure of UNICEF?	In general, country programmes appreciate the global support but are unclear on or disagree with the perceived centralized decision making of the PMT. The PMT, as noted earlier, felt that they had no power and could only advise countries. These mutually exclusive interpretations have led to some uncertainty over the demarcation of roles, responsibilities and accountabilities. Given the number of resources (new RO personnel, new consultant agreements, etc.), it may be worthwhile to now consider defining a more strategic role for the PMT rather than the direct management and technical support provided to date. The EMOPS / PBEA relationship had benefits but also produced challenges in that PMT holds overall programme management responsibility and education expertise, while EMOPS/PRS holds peacebuilding expertise. It would be helpful to clearly agree on responsibilities and accountabilities of both parties to facilitate a smooth intersectoral partnership.

83. *Governance and Management Structures*: The PBEA has developed and mobilized significant governance arrangements to support strategic oversight, risk management, implementation and learning. The SPAG, TWG, AC and the PMT provide support from HQ along with the recently formed the Research Advisory Group. Overall the presence of these groups has helped promote awareness of the PBEA and stress the importance of addressing peacebuilding and has worked to support the PMT in their quest to provide support to ROs and COs. These groups have also served as forums to raise awareness on what each unit is doing to support PBEA where countries are in implementation and share challenges to date.

84. HQ structures are in many ways designed to enhance awareness raising and advocacy within and outside of the UNICEF structure. However, in terms of direct support for country-level programming, there appears to be an imbalance between the HQ structures and the field. Many countries interviewed were not fully aware of the activities of these HQ groups or how they were relevant to their implementation.

85. In addition, the technical approach taken by the PMT in terms of country support may not be the most efficient or effective for global-level leadership. The PMT is spending considerable time travelling to each country (dividing up the 14 countries across the three main team members). Hands-on support from an HQ team, although highly appreciated by several countries, may not be an efficient nor sustainable model for a small management unit in HQ, particularly given the decentralized nature of the organization. Country programmes also noted that depending on the specific focal point from the PMT, they would tend to receive only certain types of support. They felt that they did not have access to the range of expertise currently available and recommended a more holistic approach with all PMT staff.

86. The direct technical management approach appears to have been taken to compensate for gaps in support and technical expertise in the initial phases of the programme. However, with the recent addition of Regional Office support personnel to PBEA programme coupled with the inclusion of technical expertise in peacebuilding and M&E from targeted long-term consultants (such as Search for Common Ground), the structures may now be in place to allow the PMT to assume more of a leadership and coordination role.

87. *Communications and knowledge management*: There appeared to be sufficient attention paid to formal communications (and subsequently to managing reputational risk) particularly at the HQ level and within some country programmes such as Pakistan. The communication team was able to describe several capacity-building measures undertaken at both global and field levels to support advocacy and the mitigation of reputational risk.

88. While it appears that significant amounts of information and lessons learned are being collected at the HQ level by the PMT, this information is not yet turned into knowledge and made easily available to countries. A majority of country programme personnel interviewed expressed a desire for more access to the learning generated. The global annual workshop did provide such a space, but staff expressed a desire for more ongoing information exchange to supplement the annual workshops. Some respondents suggested more webinars could be useful but acknowledged that this was a not a comprehensive solution.

89. ***Need to situate PBEA in a long-term vision and/or strategy***: A number of key players and stakeholders in the peacebuilding and education communities, and in the donor community acknowledge that organizational capacity building for peacebuilding is a longer term process than can be afforded by four-year time frame of the PBEA. GoN representatives accept that it is reasonable to think of the PBEA as laying down a strong foundation for programming to mitigate and/or alleviate the effects of conflict, and to work incrementally towards peacebuilding. It is highly unlikely that short-term and micro-level focus on one sector will construct the same level of organizational capacity as a longer term strategic programme that focuses on structural inequities and other forms of vulnerability, even though it may be implemented in a series of funding phases. Hence UNICEF's current effort at articulating an overarching strategy for risk-informed resilience programming, which includes peacebuilding, disaster risk reduction (DRR), Social Protection and Climate Change Adaptation, among others, is a welcome and useful framework for informing programming choices within the PBEA. While this type of strategic vision may not be necessary for a specific evaluation of a single-cycle programme, its potential value to PBEA's evaluability is that it will be possible to show progress towards a larger and longer term organizational goal.

3.3.3 Resource Allocation Processes

90. The evaluability assessment made the following observations of resource allocation in the PBEA:
   - Overall, staff was clear on the use of PBEA resources to achieve their specific ToC, goals and objectives.
   - Resource allocation criteria were clear, although many preexisting activities receive funding when justified within a PBEA operational framework.
   - The PBEA programme is perceived to be managed as a global programme rather than as a fund.

91. **Resource Allocation – Areas to improve for evaluability**
   - Short-term funding tranches and short-term PCAs with partners are impacting longer term programming and programme design.
   - Time and expertise requirements for PBEA programming may be higher than normal UNICEF staffing quotas – leading to shortfalls in staffing capacity.
   - Resource allocation criteria could now be updated to focus on critical programming needs and the likelihood of success given the relatively short-time remaining in the programme.
   - The resource allocation criteria should be revised to take into account where country programmes are in their implementation (based on the categorization in described in Section 3.1), and what can be realistically expected of different programmes in the time that is left before the end of the programme cycle.

Table 13: Summary of findings on allocation of resource allocation processes

Guiding Questions	Summary
How effectively has the resource allocation process managed in keeping the nature of the PBEA as a global programme as opposed to a fund?	Within HQ, the PBEA resource allocation process appears to be managed accordingly as a global programme. Many countries described specific objectives and activities to be achieved through dedicated PBEA resources.
How clearly have these distinctions between a programme and a fund been communicated to and understood by programming units?	Programming units do understand that the PBEA is a global programme. The majority of countries have a dedicated PBEA programme; very few respondents thought that PBEA was managed as a fund, but even these programmes were able to describe specific rationale targeted with PBEA resources (indicating that it has not been used as a fund).
What improvements should be made to enhance the clarity and transparency of the allocation processes and to ensure that they are results oriented?	Programme stakeholders have varied understandings of the resource allocation processes and criteria. Allocations appear to be based on initial reviews combined with completion of key deliverables. The resource allocation processes have supported a results-oriented process; the process could be improved by focusing on critical programming needs and the likelihood of success given the limited time remaining.
What alternative models might be employed to achieve targeted results given the resources available?	Many country programmes used short-term PCAs (6–12 month) for establishing partner agreements. Country programme staff felt that these short-term agreements created challenges for long-term peacebuilding planning with partners or from taking longer term strategic commitments that might be in the best interests of the programme. The time and expertise requirements for PBEA programming may be higher than 'normal' UNICEF staffing quotas – leading to shortfalls in staffing capacity in many country programmes.

92. PBEA is managed as a global programme with specific goals and objectives developed at both global and field levels. In general, implementing staff were clear on the use of PBEA resources to achieve their specific theory of change, goals and objectives.

93. However, three areas were noted for improvement: First, there is variation among countries as to the best way to apply PBEA resources; some programmes are funding ongoing activities within a larger country programming, while others are funding a new set of activities related to education and peacebuilding. These two approaches contain significantly different implications for being able to track education contributions to peacebuilding.

94. Second, PBEA countries did not appear to have a complete design document for the PBEA programme with a corresponding detailed implementation plan and detailed budget, signalling perhaps that detailed design documents were not required for PBEA programming. It appears that some country programmes dividing the original allocation into the time remaining, rather than tying resource allocation to the actual pace of implementation. This has resulted in underspending. Evaluability is threatened if as a result of underinvestment, critical interventions are not being implemented (i.e., fidelity of implementation becomes low) or M&E systems are not put in place.

95. Furthermore, the initial resource allocation amounts to countries were based on criteria relevant for the initial phases of the programme such as alignment with overall strategic result, contribution to all five outcomes or adherence to key programming principles. However, at the midpoint of the programme, these criteria may no longer be the most appropriate criteria for determining allocation amounts. New criteria should reflect programming needs critical to the success of the programme to maximize accomplishments in the remaining time frame.

96. Third, country programme stakeholders, particularly relatively new staff, were not aware of the allocation processes and criteria, while others expressed uncertainty regarding the size of their allocations. Respondents also noted that because of short-term funding tranches, cooperative agreements with partners could only be sustained for 6–12 months in most cases, which resulted in unnecessary inefficiencies when partners moved on to other activities.

3.3.4 Risks, external factors and unintended consequences

97. The evaluability assessment identified the following elements that would enable PBEA staff to mitigate risk and negative unintended consequences:
    - Staff and partner selection in country programmes are based on contextual knowledge, experience and existing relationships, which helps to mitigate risk.
    - Programmatic risk management is discussed and analysed among staff as part of routine operations.
    - Risk-management components are embedded within individual PCAs or other partner agreements.
    - Country offices develop operational and financial risk-management plans as part of their normal business.

98. **Risks and External Factors – Areas to improve for evaluability**
    - Management structures have been put in place in response to risks identified in the proposal, but the risk matrix has not been reviewed or updated since its inception. While country operations may have plans to manage external risks, it was not clear how PBEA programming was operationalizing programmatic risks at the global level.
    - Risk-management documentation emphasizes operational and financial elements rather than programmatic elements (conflict sensitivity and *Do No Harm*).
    - Systems are not in place to prove whether conflict sensitivity has successfully addressed or mitigated a conflict driver (or enhanced it).

Table 14: Risks, External Factors and Unintended Consequences Summary

Guiding Questions	Summary
To what extent are risk and external factors taken into account in the logical framework and/or cohesive risk-management plan?	All participating countries have country-level risk-management plans, but only a few have a risk-management plan specifically for PBEA. The risk-management documentation at country levels emphasizes operational and financial elements more than programmatic risks. Most country offices did not have a risk management plan for programmatic risk based on conflict sensitivity and *Do No Harm* principles.
Is the programme planning and implementation flexible enough to maximize unintended consequences and minimize unintended negative consequences	In general, the centralization of PBEA management is unintentionally limiting flexibility of the field to adapt to circumstances. Country programme templates and processes do not adequately identify or capture unintended consequences. The programme, with its emphasis on the GRF, five outcomes set design and implementation steps (i.e., conflict analysis, operational matrix, etc.), combined with HQ directives on the scope and scale of the programme, may be inadvertently limiting field programming flexibility.

99. *Risk Management*: There appears to be an overall country-level risk-management programme for all countries as a normal part of UNICEF country operations, but it is not clear if each PBEA programme considers the country-level plan in their individual programmes. Each country is varied in how it has set up its management structure, but in general and with the support of the

education chief and regional advisors, PBEA field management teams are able to adapt to risks and external factors.

100. Key risks were outlined in the proposal to the donor (section 10, p. 45–46) covered standard categories such as operational, financial, reputational, developmental and political risks. Mechanisms were identified in this matrix and implemented to manage these key risks. These have included additional M&E capacity, additional management capacity, several advisory and working groups, use of the new financial system (VISION) and mechanisms to manage reputation risk such as increased communications capacity at HQ, regional and country levels. However, there is a need to update risk matrices periodically and document the risk-management efforts.

101. At the country level, most of the country programmes interviewed do have some sort of country-level risk-management plan, including a risk-management component required in PCAs as part of the agreement with partners. However, these appear to be focused primarily on operational and financial elements. Programmatic risk related to PBEA programming as embodied in *Do No Harm* principles is not integrated into a formal documentation system, even though there is significant practical experience in managing risks. For example, country programme staff and partner selection is usually done based on contextual knowledge, experience and existing relationships in order to minimize programmatic risks. In addition, programmatic risk management is discussed and analyzed routinely among the staff as part of their programme operations. Still, many country programme staff do not appear to have conflict sensitivity expertise or have had training in *Do No Harm* principles, even though the PBEA did sponsor conflict sensitivity training at the beginning of the project, but staff turnover has meant that new staff have not had access to these trainings.

102. ***Unintended Consequences***:   The centralized nature of PBEA has unintentionally limited the flexibility of the field in documenting their adaptations to their circumstances. Country interviews indicate that in many of the countries, staff are supporting flexible and responsive programming and are thinking about unintended consequences. However, the programme documentation (operational matrices and log frames) do not have a good way of capturing these unintended consequences. It is important to note that unintended consequences could be positive, for example:

> *"The UNICEF (PBEA) programme has allowed us to reach out to the State and target counties we did not have a relationship prior to this. They operated independently of the national level. Thanks to UNICEF we are now working together and are able to help them take services all the way down to the field."*
> *National Ministry Official commenting on UNICEF PBEA partnership.*

103. While supporting strengthened relationships amongst government departments or even supporting government legitimacy was not part of this country's operational matrix, this could be an important example that would not have necessarily been picked up by the formal M&E system.

104. It is also not clear whether programmes have the flexibility to significantly alter programming approaches to minimize negative unintended consequences; many staff interviewed felt that the proscriptive approach taken by the global programme, and the limited time frame meant that they could not easily alter their programming.

4.0 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4.1 Conclusions

105. The PBEA programme does have many key elements in place to effectively manage towards results; new programme elements and improvements were being added even as the evaluability assessment was underway. It is the conclusion of this evaluability assessment, however, that *the PBEA, in its current configuration as a global programme, will face significant challenges to evaluability.* But determining the evaluability of the programme from a 'global' standpoint as if the PBEA was one programme being implemented in several homogenous settings could result in missing critical developments and lessons manifested at the country level. Hence, one of the activities of the evaluability assessment was to conduct field visits to a sample of three implementing countries, with the purpose of validating the findings observed from the document review of the country programmes and interviews with key personnel.

106. In one of the three country programmes visited, conflict analysis activities had been initiated and estimated to require major inputs over the next few months before completion. For this and four other country programmes in a similar position, conflict analyses were still far from completion or not yet started in one case; a conflict-analysis informed programme was not yet in place, which means that programmes were still operating in the 'Fast Track' mode. **The evaluability of these programmes could not be determined.** In another country that was visited, the conflict analysis process was near completion, having yielded enough information for serious programming to begin but requiring a significant amount of inputs to reach the level where programming should be at midpoint of the implementation period. This programme was characterized as a Category 2 country programme, with four to six country programmes falling into the same category. For this set of programmes **'major' inputs in all technical elements are required to make the programme evaluable**.

107. In the last country programme that the EA team observed closely, the conflict analysis was completed, a conflict-analysis-informed programme was in place (by and large) and implementation was under way. The assessment in Table 15 is based on this country. According to this example, the programme requires major inputs to improve the credibility of data, while **a number of additional 'manageable' technical inputs are required to make the programme evaluable.** From the interviews with country teams, three to four country programmes are estimated to be in a similar position (Category 3 countries), illustrating the reality that even for country programmes that have made the most progress in implementation, there may be a few critical inputs required.

Table 15: Evaluability ratings based on one country (exemplifying Category 3 countries)

	PBEA coherent and evaluable	Requires <u>a few manageable inputs</u> to make it coherent and evaluable	Requires <u>major inputs</u> to make it coherent and evaluable	PBEA is completely incoherent and non-evaluable
Programme Coherence				
a. Activities linked to conflict drivers		X		
b. Objectives, Inputs, outputs, outcomes aligned	X			
c. Sufficient and necessary set of performance markers		X		
Feasibility of Results				
a. Overall grant adequate		X		
b. Program scope reasonable		X		

c. Program time frame reasonable	X			
Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) effort				
a. Indicators are adequate		X		
b. Data is available and credible			X	
c. M&E systems are adequate		X		
d. Sufficient and necessary set of performance markers		X		
Attribution and/or contribution				
a. Baselines are in place		X		
b. UNICEF's contribution will be traceable		X		

108. One of the major conclusions of the evaluability assessment that came about as a result of observing the PBEA at the country level is to move away from a conception of a 'global programme', and instead view the PBEA as a programme that has a 'global approach' but being implemented from the country level where most of the decision making is situated. The PBEA is already a highly contextualized programme, hence the conception of a 'global approach', and will take full advantage of UNICEF's decentralized nature as some of the programme decisions are devolved away from the PMT to the country level and promote country ownership of the programmes, as well as alter the perception of a lack of flexibility in PBEA implementation. This conclusion is also consistent with the proposal to adopt a 'bottom-up' approach to the final programme evaluation; that is, design an evaluation that is targeted at the discrete programming units (the country programmes) and present major findings as an evaluation synthesis of the PBEA.

4.1.1   Technical and Strategic Elements

Programme Coherence

109. Overall, programme implementers understand the concepts of peacebuilding, peace education and conflict sensitivity differently, leading to conceptual ambiguities that manifested themselves in programming. Attempts to clarify these ambiguities were made by issuing technical guidance and discussing concepts in training workshops, and while some progress was made, additional work on bringing conceptual clarity and operationalization of these key concepts is required. In addition, implementers and others such as managers understand the intent of the programme differently – some articulating it as a peacebuilding programme, some articulating it as an education programme and some articulating it as a conflict-sensitivity programme, probably reflecting the reality of their programmes on the ground. While these categories may not be mutually exclusive, it would be desirable to have the same understanding of the 'intent' of the programme and acknowledge any deviations/variations from the intent that have come about in aligning programmes with conflict analyses findings.

110. *Programme activities linked to conflict drivers*: At the country level, conflict drivers were intended to be integrated into the operational matrices pending the completion of the country conflict analysis and identification of specific drivers with which to work. Category 3 country programmes had completed their conflict analyses by mid-2013, while a number of the Category 2 country programmes were able to identify conflict drivers and begin programming and implementation. Even with that progress, eight country programmes need to develop or finalize their operational matrix.

111. *Alignment of objective, inputs, outputs and outcomes:* The general objectives are broad enough that almost all outputs and inputs are justifiable within each broad objective. However, two major constraints are found in most country documentation – first, most country programme tended to take on a very specific and small-scale theme within the larger objective, so that while there is a logical justification for a specific type of activity within an outcome, the range of

activities within each outcome is not sufficient to logically affect the outcome condition. Second, the objectives, inputs, outputs and outcomes were aligned within a particular outcome, but there was often misalignment between outcomes, with each outcome focusing on a different type of issue without a sense of a coherent programming whole.

112. *A sufficient and necessary set of performance makers exists:* Based country programme documentation and field visits, indicators were generally focused on activity and output types of achievements – reflective of organizational performance and useful markers for accountability. However, outcome and goal-level indicators reflecting changes in key peacebuilding concepts were largely absent. The few operational matrices which benefitted from a thorough review by the PMT did include outcome-level indicators, but programme documentation did not explicitly document how these indicators were conceptually linked to peacebuilding (in this case, the concept of social cohesion).

Feasibility of Results

113. *Overall adequacy of PBEA grant:* From the perspective of the global programme, this is a large grant with considerable funding, and five distinct but adaptable global outcomes are reasonable. However, at the scale of the country programmes, the individual grant allocations are considered very small and their disparate allocation across the five outcomes creates challenges for hiring staff dedicated to the programme, as well as to carry out all five outcomes. In dealing with these realities, countries tended to take a de facto prioritization approach by focusing on one or two of the outcomes and the human and financial resources required to implement activities associated with those outcomes, rather than distributing the resources and effort equally across all five outcomes. Evaluability could be improved if this de facto situation was made more explicit in country programme documentation.

114. *Reasonableness of programme scope:* The PBEA programme is taking an expansive approach to programming with greater inclusion of various cross-sectoral initiatives in areas such as early childhood education, gender equality and life skills. The geographical diversity and thematic expansiveness of the PBEA programming presents challenges in providing clear, focused evidence of education contributions to peacebuilding. This expansive approach can create an impression of lack of coherency, hence there is a need to define the parameters for what does and does not constitute education for peacebuilding so as to generate a more focused approach to PBEA goals.

115. *Reasonableness of programme time frames:* The programme time frame is sufficient to allow for the initiation of activities in country programmes, even though there is variation between the five outcomes. However, the desired changes in using education to bring about peace (operationalized as social cohesion, resilience or human security) will take a long time before they are realized. Hence the development of achievable intermediate-level indicators (related to peacebuilding) could help provide evidence of education contributions to peacebuilding without measuring actual social cohesion, resilience or human security concepts. More importantly, programme implementation is at variable stages with less than two years remaining in the PBEA cycle. Drawing from lessons from the past two years, it would be advisable to scale down on deliverables for country programmes that are classified as Category 3 by this evaluability assessment and instead propose a more manageable set of results.

<u>Monitoring and Evaluation Effort</u>

116. *Adequacy of indicators*: The indicators at the global level are oriented towards activity-level performance (number of individuals trained, number of participants in programmes, etc.). The GRF has been viewed as a document for providing information to the donor on organizational activities, and in this sense the indicators are adequate. The same is true in four country programmes with approved M&E plans – indicators related to activity-level performance and output-level indicators are also adequate. However, the outcome-level indicators are not adequate for measuring changes to social cohesion, resilience or human security. The outcome-level indicators in almost all of the operational matrices are primarily output-level indicators placed at the wrong level. The most sophisticated country programme M&E systems do have a few potential to record and measure progress on outcome-level indicators, but these need to be linked more explicitly to the key concepts.

117. *Availability and credibility of data:* Data for activity-level measurements is being recorded and compiled, even though data for output (changes in skills, knowledge and attitudes) and outcome level are generally not available. At the global level, data is only being compiled for activity-level performance – and this information is credible – but this will not be sufficient for providing evidence of education's contributions to peacebuilding without additional M&E data.

118. *Adequacy of M&E systems:* For what is needed for global-level reporting, the global-level M&E system is potentially adequate, especially with the new relationship with Search for Common Ground as an M&E resource. However, M&E systems at country levels are generally not adequate. Based on a review of programme documentation, about 30 percent of participating countries appeared to have sufficient M&E capacity to build evidence of education contributions to peacebuilding.

<u>Attribution and/or Contribution</u>

119. *Availability of baselines*: No baseline data was shared with the EA, but based on interviews, two countries have gathered baseline data (although no baseline reports are yet finalized). These baselines are focused primarily on the key output-level indicators (attitudes, knowledge or skills) and usually relating to Outcome 3 interventions. No countries appear to have successfully developed tools to measure social cohesion, resilience or human security nor any of the key objectives for Outcomes 1 and 2 (education sector involvement in peacebuilding, relationship of education sector to other peacebuilding units, etc.). The baseline tools that were reviewed suggest that although some output-level data is being collected, the tools could be improved significantly to provide better connection to the measurement of the key peacebuilding concepts.

120. *Traceability of UNICEF's contribution*: The diversity and breadth of programming approaches requires clear articulation of the programme theory of change and systematic tracing of UNICEF's contribution in each programming context. The degree of ability to track PBEA contribution varies between programme outcomes. Outcomes 1 and 2 are the most challenging for tracking contribution, while Outcome 3 is likely the most feasible given typical implementation approaches. The case study strategy and the research strategy will be very important resources for tracking contributions in Outcome 1 and 2 and understanding impact for Outcome 1, 2 and 4. If developed well, case studies can provide a good mechanism for capturing programme achievements not easily reflected in a country operational matrix. However, the emphasis of the case studies is currently on monitoring-level information (organizational performance). Multicountry, multithemed case studies can enhance learning if organized case around specific issues regarding what works in education for peacebuilding. These would constitute critical evidence that can be used in an evaluation.

4.1.2   Governance and Management Elements for Evaluability

121. These elements are less oriented towards evaluability and more oriented towards implementation. However, the following four elements are important consideration for evaluability:

   i. The centralized structure of the PBEA within the decentralized nature of UNICEF has created some confusion regarding roles and responsibilities that still exist even two years into the programme. The time and energy required to work through these misunderstandings can distract organizational focus and impede rapid implementation.

   ii. HQ level staff (both the PMT and EMOPS) assumed a more direct technical supervision than is sustainable with a small staff and a large number of country programmes. The finalization of Regional Office support personnel for PBEA and the acquisition of long-term agreements with key external peacebuilding resources (such as Search for Common Ground) provides an opportunity for HQ management staff to shift from a direct technical management role and assume more of a leadership and coordination role.

   iii. A knowledge management programme exists at HQ for capturing country learning. However, the horizontal knowledge management system is still a work in progress.

   iv. Risk-management plans have strong operational and financial elements. Within PBEA, greater attention to conflict sensitivity and ways to monitor and maximize conflict sensitivity is needed. More documentation on conflict sensitivity (programmatic risk management) could be included to enhance the opportunity to monitor changing conflict dynamics and how to mitigate or leverage such changes. A conflict-sensitivity plan could also enhance the capacity of the programme to capture positive and negative unintended consequences in PBEA programming.

4.2   Summary

122. The evaluability assessment has highlighted the progress that has been used in bringing the PBEA from a proposal on paper to actual implementation. Many of the setbacks that were experienced are a manifestation of complexity in development programming and the reality that peacebuilding programming usually occurs in a contested political space; for instance, conducting a 'conflict analysis' in a country context where an important constituency may be questioning the very existence of a conflict. Be that as it may, there are a number of additional actions that can be undertaken to enhance evaluability, beginning from acknowledging that countries are at different places in implementation, adjusting expectations and scaling down deliverables in some programming contexts, as well as providing the necessary support to ensure that programmes use the remaining time efficiently. Categorizing country programmes as summarized in Figure 2, according to what they have been able to achieve so far is not a commentary on the selection of the programming solutions, a measure quality of the programmes or deliverables. Neither does it imply homogeneity within the three categories; rather, it is an attempt to present a framework under which support to country programmes can be structured.

Figure 2: Evaluability of country programmes, by category

Category 1	Category 2	Category 3
• 4–5 country programmes	• 4–6 country programmes	• 3–4 country programmes
• Conflict analysis still underway	• Conflict analysis mostly completed	• Completed conflict analysis
• Major inputs required to complete conflict analysis over next few months	• Sufficient information for programme design	• Programming based on conflict analysis
		• Technical and governance elements in place
• Implementation underway, by mostly on 'Fact Track' mode	• Implementation underway	• Implementation underway
Evaluability cannot be determined	***Requires major inputs in all technical elements to enhance evaluability***	***Requires manageable inputs to enhance evaluability***

123. Regardless of category, all country programmes required additional inputs to enhance evaluability. One of the Category 1 country programmes need to initiate their conflict analysis, while others needed to accelerate its completion. In both cases, country programmes are yet to commence programming based on the conflict drivers. These basic programme design steps can be challenging in fluid conflict and post-conflict environments that are targeted by the PBEA and more so in an environment where some of the work has to be achieved through partnerships. This calls into question the issues of what is reasonable to expect from these countries in the 18 months or so of implementation time that is remaining.

124. Most of the Category 2 country programmes need (1) to go beyond capturing what activities were completed, (2) to refine their articulation of the type of change expected as a result of their programmes and (3) to align to the time remaining in the programme. With a better understanding of the types of change that are feasible, the country team needs to ensure activities are necessary and sufficient to achieve the change that is articulated. They also need to design instruments for baselines, and initiate data collection. Another challenge for both Category 1 and 2 programmes is to ensure that countries have sufficient management and M&E resources and support to the implementing partners to safeguard the accuracy and quality of the data that is collected. Finally, most all countries could improve the way they capture country-level project design. Comprehensive project design documentation that adequately describes the role of all implementing partners will provide critical information during the end of programme evaluation phase.

4.3   Recommendations

125. Throughout the period of the evaluability assessment, different units of the PBEA programme have been adding new elements to strengthen their programmes, as well as address or mitigate challenges to evaluability; many of those efforts will continue. The following is a set of recommendations for initiating adjustments considered to be the most critical for programme success and to enhance evaluability.

126. **Strategic and Technical Recommendations**

1. The global PBEA team should consider reframing PBEA from a 'global programme' to a programme that has a 'global approach' to implementation. The primary difference between these two approaches lies in the degree of country programme autonomy. A global approach would allow country offices to refine programmes outcomes based on their conflict analyses (rather than implement all five outcomes) and to develop additional indicators that may be more suited to measuring the contribution of the PBEA towards peacebuilding.

2. The PMT should develop a strategy to assist country programmes to narrow their focus on key conflict drivers, as well as strengthen the evidence for demonstrating education's contribution to peacebuilding. Given the breadth and scope of PBEA programming and the relatively short implementation period remaining for the majority of countries, the PMT, country leadership and PBEA country teams should explore the possibility of narrowing the focus of the programmes by prioritizing key activities for immediate action and negotiate to carry the rest forward in the next cycle or through regular CP programming processes.

3. The Evaluation Office should consider an end-of-programme evaluation strategy that assesses the contribution of the PBEA for each country programme with a subsequent evaluation synthesis of findings for global aggregation. Aggregating the contribution of education to peacebuilding at a global level will be difficult given the diversity of interventions, broad variations in country programme profiles, the diversity of themes and variations in country office programming and engagement. A 'bottom-up' approach to evaluation will better capture this variation; it will also provide opportunity to synthesize evaluation findings.

127. **Governance and Management Recommendations**

4. The PMT and the Accountability Committee should clarify roles and accountabilities between the centralized PBEA programme and country offices. The first would be to redefine the role of the PMT to focus more of their time in leadership and coordination rather than technical management. Technical backstopping can be devolved to personnel in the Regional Offices and other expertise that has been brought in through LTA arrangements, while technical supervision of programming units is devolved to the country office level where it belongs.

5. The PMT and UNICEF senior leadership should negotiate with the donor to adjust deliverables for Category 1 country programmes to allow them to focus on establishing a quality foundation for peacebuilding programming. Rather than rushing to achieve GRF outputs in the time remaining, new deliverables for Category 1 countries could be to complete their conflict analyses and narrow their focus to developing a conflict-analysis informed programme with two to three outcomes, including Outcome 3 on raising awareness and developing the capacity for conflict-analysis informed programming amongst UNICEF staff and partners.

6. The Accountability Committee should update resource allocation criteria to reflect where country programmes are in their implementation and what can be realistically expected in the time that is left before the end of the programme cycle. At the midway point of the programme, some countries have made significant progress towards results but require critical infusions to increase their capacity to achieve most of their results, while others may have to scale down their original plans. Resource allocation criteria should be modified to reflect these new realities rather than remain static and based on 2011 priorities.

7. Country PBEA programmes should negotiate exemptions from UNICEF human resource quotas with country office leadership, at least during this cycle of the PBEA, which includes piloting of new approaches to peacebuilding programming. UNICEF's quota for human resource allocation is not commensurate with staffing needs for this type of programme, especially when there is such a strong imperative for learning. Relaxing some of the regulations around staffing quotas will be instrumental in achieving targeted results within the remaining implementation period.

ANNEXES

Annex 1: Terms of Reference

Title	Terms of reference for the evaluability assessment (EA) of the Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy Programme (PBEA)
Purpose	To conduct an EA to determine the evaluability of PBEA, and recommend concrete steps to improve the programme's overall implementation and evaluability.
Reference	RfPS-USA-2013-501621
EA Timeline	16 April 2013 through 31 July 2013
Reporting to	Evaluation Specialist, Evaluation Office

I.   **Background**

UNICEF Evaluation Office (New York) plans to commission an evaluability assessment of the Peacebuilding Education and Advocacy Programme (PBEA). An evaluability assessment (EA) is an exercise to determine the overall readiness of the programme to be evaluated. Initially developed by Wholey (1979), an EA seeks to gain information from important documents and input from stakeholders on the objectives of the program, how it is being implemented, and gauge the likelihood of achieving intended programme outcomes. EA has also proved useful in establishing a reasonable program theory to ascertain whether or not there is a plausible path to attain specified outcomes.[20]

Typically conducted at the earlier stages of the programme, EAs have proved particularly useful for large programmes in which programme results (and how they will be achieved and measured) may not be articulated well, and where management responsibilities are diffuse. Thus, EA helps to set a programme on the right path by building a shared understanding about its goals among key stakeholders; the causal links between the goals, inputs, outputs/activities, and outcomes; and, indicators of success and data needs. It thus serves as a tool to assess the strategic and technical soundness of the programme, as well as programme management tool. The Peacebuilding Education and Advocacy Programme (PBEA), a four-year programme funded by the Government of the Netherlands, will undergo an evaluability assessment.

The proposal document for PBEA embodies an agreement between UNICEF, the Government of the Netherlands, and national governments of countries that agreed to participate in the programme. The **strategic vision** of the programme is to "strengthen resilience, social cohesion and human security in conflict-affected contexts", with the **strategic result** of "strengthening policies and practices in education for peacebuilding".[21]

Achievement of the strategic result will be brought about by focusing on five key outcomes:
1) Increase inclusion of education into peacebuilding and conflict-reduction policies, analyses and implementation;
2) Increase institutional capacities to supply conflict-sensitive and peace education;
3) Increase capacity of children, parents, teachers and other duty-bearers to prevent reduce and cope with conflict and promote peace;
4) Increase access for children to quality, relevant, conflict-sensitive education that contributes to peace; and,

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[20] Wholey, J. S. (1987). Evaluability assessment: Developing program theory. In L. Bickman (Ed.), *Using program theory in evaluation*. New Directions for Program Evaluation, No. 33. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

[21] UNICEF Education Section, "Proposal on Peacebuilding and Education" presented to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of the Netherlands, New York, October 2011

5) Contribute to the generation and use of evidence and knowledge on policies and programming on linkages between education, conflict and peacebuilding.

The theory of change that is implied in the programme document is that if evidence-based conflict-sensitive peacebuilding education is widely available and accessible, then children, their parents and communities will be more equipped to avoid, resolve and eventually transform conflicts, which in turn will contribute towards a more peaceful society. A core element of the programme is action-research, which is meant to feed back into policies, analyses and institutional capacities at the global and national levels. Hence one of the outcomes of PBEA is to implement a knowledge management strategy, which includes research, systematic monitoring and evaluation, as well as compile evidence of the relationships implied in the programme ToC.

II.   Rationale for an evaluability assessment

As previously indicated, EA is useful as a programming and management tool, instrumental in bringing program implementers and other stakeholders to a shared understanding of the targeted results, the program logic, and ensuring that the necessary monitoring and arrangements are in place. Being a large and complex programme in a new field of work with many conceptual, policy and programmatic issues that affect UNICEF functioning at CO, RO and HQ as well as counterpart levels, PBEA is a suitable candidate for an evaluability assessment.

The overall results framework for PBEA and was generated at UNICEF headquarters in collaboration with relevant technical sections, led by the Education Section and EMOPS. While all PBEA participating units are accountable for the overall results framework, it was generated prior to the conflict analyses which are supposed to be the basis for programming in each participating country. Fortunately, key outcomes as currently defined are broad and not yet time bound so that country offices are able to adapt them to local conditions. Nevertheless, the EA needs to ascertain that programme elements and specified results at the country level are consistent with global results, and that individual country-level results can be reasonably aggregated into the Global Results Framework. Also, since the fundamental links between education and peacebuilding are still not proven, the programme approach needs to be open for experimentation with new methods or activities, and adaptations of existing programme approaches. Finding the right balance between flexibility and adherence to a results-based programme approach will be one of a number of issues that the EA will attempt to adjudicate.

III.   Purpose of EA and its use

The purpose of the EA is to determine the evaluability of PBEA as currently represented through global and country-level results and to confirm or adjust expectations about the scope of the programme, results, and what is realistically achievable within the remaining programme time frame. The EA will recommend concrete steps to improve the programme's evaluability.

The EA is expected to help sharpen the programme's logic as embodied in the results framework, sharpen the definitions of indicators, identify the information and data requirements to track changes in the indicators, identify the potential sources of information, identify likely gaps in information and suggest ways in which those gaps may be filled. The EA is also expected to review the management aspects of the programme by assessing the management structure and capacities, with particular attention to the approach, methods and capacities for monitoring and evaluation. In this way the EA will help set the programme on the right path by building shared understanding of the programme among key stakeholders. The EA is also expected to facilitate reflection and learning among the programme managers and key stakeholders, leading to increased programme coherence and improved management. This will enable the programme to

meet the accountability requirements of UNICEF and the donors but also to help verify the important contribution of education in peacebuilding.

The key users of the recommendations of the EA within UNICEF will be the PBEA management team, participating divisions and country office management teams, and the Evaluation Office. In their ongoing interaction UNICEF and the donor (the Government of the Netherlands) are expected to use the findings to reexamine accountabilities and consider any adjustments.

IV.   **Scope**

This assessment will explore the evaluability of PBEA and provide a comprehensive and evidence-based answer an overarching question, namely, ***to what extent does the PBEA have the technical and strategic elements in place to manage effectively towards results, and to credibly demonstrate such results in future evaluations?***

Technical and strategic aspects of the PBEA to be investigated will include reviewing the theory of change, ensuring that the results framework is coherent with the theory of change, reviewing and refining outcome indicators, identifying information needed to track indicators and information sources, as well as assessing the feasibility of achieving meaningful results within the programme time frame. The EA will also investigate management and governance aspects, namely to determine the extent to which there is a shared corporate effort to coalesce around the PBEA programme goals and accountabilities, and to examine whether governance and management arrangements as constituted will maximize the likelihood of achieving the desired outcomes. The assessment will be organized around criteria/elements as suggested below.

Technical and strategic aspects of evaluability

Overall programme coherence. How clear is PBEA's internal programme logic and logical framework? How SMART[22] are the objectives and the indicators of PBEA? How closely aligned are inputs, outputs, outcomes and impact? To what extent do the present indicators represent a necessary and sufficient set of performance markers for measuring whether results have been achieved? If not, what further or alternative indicators need to be tracked? How can the programme design be strengthened for greater coherence[23]?

Feasibility of results. How realistic are the global results in light of the overall grant for PBEA, the scope of the programme, and resources allocated to all programming units, including country-level programme interventions?

M&E effort required to demonstrate results. What specific data does each programming unit need to gather in order to document credible evidence? At what frequency and through what means of verification? What is the current availability of this data, and what additional effort is required to ensure that data is available[24]? What data on input-output/activity-outcome linkages will be necessary to demonstrate overall value for money and the cost-effectiveness of specific interventions?

Attribution/contribution requirements. What baseline data needs to be gathered as the basis for measuring PBEA's contribution over time? What specific input data does each programming unit need to gather in order to demonstrate changes associated with PBEA's contribution, as opposed to other funding sources that help achieve each targeted result?

Management and governance aspects of evaluability

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[22] The acronym stands for **S**pecific, **M**easurable, **A**chievable, **R**ealistic, and **T**ime-bound. The EA should also make pronouncement on whether the indictors are universally applicable, and whether they can be aggregated for use at the global level.

[23] The programme theory of change is implied, but not spelled out in the programme proposal, hence the EA should ensure that the linkages among the key outcomes be better articulated to enable subsequent testing of their causal interrelationships?

[24] Data availability will vary considerably from country to country, hence the two country field visits are meant to expose the main information gaps and to determine the national capacity to undertake the necessary surveys and studies to fill those gaps.

Internal understanding of PBEA goals and accountabilities. How effectively has the process followed to date fostered a shared understanding of targeted results and the means of achieving them? How clearly has the programme logic been communicated to programming units and how well have they been understood? What improvements, if any, should be made to improve understanding of programme goals and accountabilities in Year 2 and beyond?

Management and Governance towards results. Is there adequate capacity to carry out the programme management function (human, technical, and financial resources)[25]? How sufficient are the governance arrangements for maximizing the likelihood of programme success[26]? How sufficiently have key aspects of programme management (e.g., communications strategy, risk analysis, dedicated programme management resources) been undertaken so as to maximize the likelihood of success? How clearly have internal programme accountabilities been identified in line with both the corporate nature of the agreement between UNICEF and the Government of the Netherlands, and the decentralized structure of UNICEF?

Resource allocation processes. How effectively has the resource allocation process managed in keeping with the nature of PBEA as a global programme as opposed to a fund? How clearly have these distinctions between a programme and a fund (and their stakes) been communicated to and understood by programming units? Looking in Year 2 and beyond, what improvements, if any, should be made to enhance the clarity and transparency of allocation processes, and to ensure that it is results oriented? What alternative models, if any, might be employed to achieve targeted results in better ways, given the resources available?

Risks, external factors and unintended consequences. To what extent are risk and external factors taken into account in the logical framework and/or a cohesive risk-management plan? Is programme planning and implementation flexible enough to maximize positive unintended consequences, or to mitigate unintended negative consequences?

Additional questions about the origin and design of the programme were explored in a recent literature review[27] included in Appendix A as background reading. The EA team should consider these closely. Some of the questions that may inform the team's understanding of the program include: What assumptions was the PBEA programme design and selection of participating countries based on? Do the assumptions hold in the current programming context? Were other alternatives to the results-based programming approach such as a process-based approach or research-based approaches considered? How can the flexibility for research and experimentation on new methods or alternative processes be accommodated within the results-based approach?

One of the most challenging aspects is the absence of baseline information, either from before the conflict or in the post-conflict situation. The programme proposal calls for baseline studies to be done after the evaluability study by an external agency to "develop the programme indicators and identify appropriately contextualized targets and milestones for the achievement of results." Ideally this would be done before the EA, but, if it is done later, the EA team may need to be creative in helping suggest ways to generate retrospective baseline information.

That being the case, it should be noted that the EA is not an evaluation. It will not aim to provide management with prescriptive expert recommendations on what the specific contents of the

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[25] The PBEA management team comprises of the programme manager, knowledge management officer and a monitoring evaluation officer. The EA should examine if the management system is adequate and suggest improvement if required

[26] Structures for stakeholder coordination include the Programme Advisory Group (composed of UNICEF offices and divisions noted above plus key external implementing agency partners such as PBSO and UNDP-BCPR), Strategic Partners Advisory Group (SPAG) and the Global Non-thematic Allocation Committee that reviews and approves allocations within the programme.

[27] Salm and Shubert, "Literature Review of Evaluative Approaches for Education Strategies for Peacebuilding in UNICEF and Lessons Learned from the Evaluation of the EEPCT Programme", KonTerra Group prepared for UNICEF Evaluation Office, October 2012

programme log frame should be. Rather, it will be a forward-looking exercise, intended to help management and programme experts to refine PBEA's implementation strategy, and to reach agreement on elements of programming around which there are ambiguities. Towards this end, it will be necessary for the EA team to examine key outputs and processes of PBEA to date, so as to validate them or suggest potential alternatives.

V.   **Methodology**

We suggest executing the EA in three stages: a desk-based review of programme documents, processes, and activities undertaken to date; global-level consultations (possibly interviews, focus groups and participatory workshops); and, country-level consultations (possibly interviews, focus groups and participatory workshops). However, the EA team may expand and/or vary this methodology to ensure that it provides for an objective, systematic and rigorous assessment.

Desk-based review: First, the EA team will conduct broad background reading of past evaluations and evaluability assessments of similar programmes, narrow the focus on key PBEA documents, and refine the EA approach. This initial reading will culminate into an inception report, which will stipulate the assessment frames and assessment instruments. The second part of the desk-based review will be a more in-depth analysis of the PBEA proposal, the programme logic as presented in the results framework, and analysis of the fit between country-level proposals and the global proposal. The participating countries are due to the varying country contexts, at different stages in their programming process. These contextual differences will be taken consideration in elaborating the evaluability study.

Global consultations: The first step for global consultations will be to identify stakeholders at this level and assess their roles in planning and implementation of the programme. The Education Section manages the programme but works with many others including:
   o   UNICEF sections participating in the TWG;[28]
   o   Strategic multilateral partners: (UN Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE);
   o   Government of the Netherlands; and,
   o   Where applicable if necessary, bilateral organizations supporting peacebuilding such as DFID, GIZ, EC and USAID and international NGOs supporting

The EA team will conduct structured interviews and focus group discussions with the PBEA management team, the TWG, and other governance structures of the PBEA (e.g., SPAG). Based on the cumulate findings of the desk review, interviews and focus group discussions, the EA team will prepare a report of preliminary findings on both the technical and management aspects of the programme at the global level and tentative recommendations for improvement.

Country-level consultations: The EA team will visit two countries to review both the technical and management aspects of the programme at the country level. Countries selected will have completed their conflict analysis prior to the visit. However, it would be instructive to select countries that are different stages of preparing their programme interventions. A particular focus will be on capacities for monitoring and evaluation, the relevance and evaluability of the results framework at country level and outcome and output indicators. The EA team should carefully review the sources and reliability of information, determine what gaps there may be in the information required and suggest studies or surveys needed to fill the gaps. At the end of each country visit the EA team will collaborate with the country office to organize a stakeholders'

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[28] The Technical Working Group has membership from Child Protection, Early Child Development, Adolescents, Disabilities, EMOPS, Supply Division, Communications and the Evaluation Office

workshop. The purpose of the workshop will be to solicit feedback on preliminary findings and recommendations from both the country and global findings.

VI.   Risk management and ethical issues

The most critical risk is that programming may not have progressed to the point that it is able to generate specific results frameworks and indicators that at the time the EA is conducted. Furthermore, governments and stakeholders in some countries may be averse to rigorous conflict analyses-based programming and results measurement. An effort should be made by UNICEF (Evaluation Office and PBEA) to ensure that the EA team gets as complete a picture as possible about the implementation status of the PBEA in each programming unit. This will enable careful selection of EA sites such that maximum learning can be derived.

Measurement bias is possible risk in this programming environment. Since peacebuilding is primarily focused on building relationships and trust, which involves "*creating space, developing relationships, persevering in spite of overwhelming pessimism, and being flexible to respond to emerging opportunities*" indicators that measure relationships, trust and "adaptive and dynamic processes" are required, as opposed to project-related measures that use discrete indicators (Lederach 1997:131). Similarly, and results-oriented measures often have unrealistic expectations about time that it should take for results to take hold. The effects can be mitigated, partly by acknowledging the complex nature of the effects that PBEA seeks to produce, opening up the programme space for experimentation with new approaches and setting realistic goals/expectations on what is achievable.

Related to measurement bias, peacebuilding infrastructure needs to be responsive to changing conflict conditions, with reporting mechanisms that emphasize transparency, comprehensiveness and uniformity. However, this may conflict with the need for sensitivity, confidentiality and trust building, these being crucial ingredients for building social relationships. While some peacebuilding efforts emphasize work with key individuals, the EA should determine if there is the right balance between individual capacity and capacity development at the institutional level.

At the field level, a number of ethical issues arise with research on vulnerable and marginalized populations. These include recognition that certain populations, such as those living in armed conflict or post-conflict environments are particularly vulnerable. Even getting informed consent may be challenging. Data collection during the EA should be sufficiently nuanced, with data collectors are experienced, speak local languages and are experienced in working with vulnerable populations.

VII.   The EA team, management and governance arrangements

A team of two evaluation professionals/practitioners with extensive experience in planning, monitoring and evaluating international development programmes will be assembled. The team should offer the following additional range of skills and experience between themselves:
- Have some programming experience in peacebuilding programmes and the use of education for building peace and social cohesion;
- Have extensive practice in evaluating programmes with education and peacebuilding content and demonstrable experience in working with vulnerable populations in conflict affected countries;
- Demonstrate expertise/experience in developing results frameworks, tools or guides for monitoring and evaluation;
- Be fully acquainted with results-based management orientation and practices and able to prepare products in the UN style; and,
- Have excellent language and communication and report writing skills, in English.

- The roles of the two members of the team will be such that one will lead on the management aspects of the EA, which requires familiarity with UNICEF's programming and management systems, while the other with experience in conducting evaluability assessment will lead on technical evaluative aspects. The team will be responsible for the following:
  - Development of a work plan for executing the consultancy;
  - Regular progress reporting of progress and results to the Evaluation Specialist in the Evaluation Office; and,
  - Production of deliverables as shown in the table below and in accordance with contractual requirements.
- The EA managed by the Evaluation Specialist in UNICEF's Evaluation Office. The Evaluation Specialist will have overall responsibility to
  - coordinate, direct and supervise all activities of the consultancy;
  - guide all phases of execution;
  - consult with Education Section and the Technical Working Group of the Education and Peacebuilding Programme, as well as other internal review processes; and
  - approve all deliverables.
- In the case of an EA team with two persons, they will be required to work on the EA full time throughout the duration of the EA (approximately 14 weeks). However, if an EA team of 3 persons or more is offered, the team leader will be required to work full time, while inputs by other members may require less time. In either case, the level of effort should be indicated for all team members.
- Participation of present and former UNICEF staff and consultants: All current UNICEF staff may be involved only as informants or in other specific roles (e.g., member of the steering committee). They may not be EA team members. Former UNICEF staff or consultants that have worked on BEGE programming may be members of the EA team if they meet technical qualifications for skills. However, any prior involvement with UNICEF should be specifically noted in the technical proposal in order to work around any possible conflicts of interest.

VIII. **Time frame and deliverables**

The EA should be completed within four months (April – July, 2013) with a final report submitted by the end of July 2013. Expected deliverables are as follows:

- An inception report following the initial desk review which outlines the EA process, a brief note on the document analysis methodology and instruments for interviews with different constituencies of stakeholders and an outline of the final report, including proposed annexes;

- The zero draft of the report, including finding and recommendations on the programme from global level perspectives and a reading of the country level documents;

- For each country, a brief with main findings and recommendations to facilitate presentation to national implementers *(to be shared only with the Evaluation Manager for information)*;

- The first and complete draft of the EA report that includes findings validated at the country level, recommendations and all annexes;

- The second and final draft of the EA report, duly reviewed for quality and conforming to the UNICEF publishing/GEROS[29] standards; and PowerPoint presentation for the final report.

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[29]UNICEF has instituted the Global Evaluation Report Oversight System (GEROS), a system where final evaluation reports are quality-assessed by an external independent company against UNICEF/UNEG standards for evaluation reports. The EA team is expected reflect on and conform to these standards, found at:

Activity	Deliverable	Time Frame
Consultant recruitment	Contract issued to consultants	15 Mar – 15 Apr
Initial desk review and briefing by EO and PBEA management team	Inception Report	16 Apr – 03 May
Comprehensive desk-based document analysis	Note on review process and interview frames	04 May – 24 May
Focus group discussion with EO and PBEA management team; stakeholder interviews; preparation and reporting of initial findings	Draft report and recommendations on global level programme	25 May – 14 June
Field visits to two country offices for EA of country level programmes	Presentation of findings and recommendations for national implementers	15 June - 28 June
Preparation of the full draft of the report	Revised draft report and recommendations with country reports annexed.	28 June - 05 July
Stakeholder workshops followed by consultation with PBEA management team	Presentation of findings and recommendations at Stakeholder Workshop	08 July – 12 July
Preparation of revised final report and recommendations	Final report and recommendations with country and workshop reports annexed	12 July – 19 July
Dissemination of final report and recommendations	PowerPoint presentation	22 July – 31 July

IX. **Submission guidelines (to be read with RFPS-USA-2013-501621)**

As stipulated in Section VII above, we estimate that the EA can be duly executed by a team of two evaluators/consultants with the right mix of skills and expertise. However, bidders reserve the right to vary the team size, with proper justification for allocation of work and cost. To that end, this contract may be offered to a team of individuals, or an institution, under institutional arrangements. This section presents guidelines for submission for both routes.

Individual submissions

EA Team's expertise and experience: Bidders are required to submit recent copies of their CVs/resumes, highlighting the expertise and experience required for conducting this evaluability assessment. Bidders are further required to provide a minimum of two (2) references from clients for whom evaluability assessments, evaluations, or related projects of a similar scope of were carried out. Reference information should be organized as follows:

- Name and description of client company/organization
- Names of senior individuals in the client companies who were involved projects (referred to) who are knowledgeable
- Scope and scale of projects
- Services provided to client
- UNICEF may contact referees for feedback on services provided to them by bidders.

Institutional submissions

Background Information: Bidders are required provide to background information about their institutions as follows:

- Date and country of incorporation
- Summary of corporate structure and business areas
- Corporate directions and experience
- Location of offices or agents relevant to this proposal
- Number and type of employees
- Financial statements of the two most recent financial years

Institutional expertise and experience: Bidders are required to provide a minimum of two (2) references from clients for whom evaluability assessments, evaluations, or related projects of a similar scope of were carried out. Reference information should be organized as follows:

- Name and description of client company/organization
- Names of senior individuals in the client companies who were involved in projects (referred to) who are knowledgeable
- Scope and scale of projects
- Services provided to client

UNICEF may contact referees for feedback on services provided to them by bidders.

Technical Proposal

General issues:

- The technical proposal should emphasize the conceptual thinking and methods proposed for the EA and should minimize repeating information stated in the terms of reference.
- The methodology should stipulate, as clearly as possible, question that will be explored at the different levels, global, regional and country level.
- There is no minimum or maximum length for the technical proposal. However, sufficient detail and clarity are required.
- The proposal should stipulate the level of effort to be committed by the different team members in each phase (inception, consultation, reporting). The same information should be featured in the financial proposal, associated cost data.
- Bidders may be asked to provide additional information at the proposal assessment stage.

Specific requirements: In addition to whatever other approaches and methods are proposed, the following specific items **must be** present in the bidding documents:

- Presentation of a work plan in three phases (inception, consultation and reporting), with details on the overall design and data gathering methods to be used.
- Details of team members' relevant qualifications and the basic information about the organization submitting the bid.
- The intended participation of any former UNICEF staff (see paragraph 28 above for details).
- The level of effort for all team members in both the technical (without price) and financial proposals (with costs).
- Requirements and/or assurances (e.g., nonuse of child labour) must also accompany the submission package.

While all contents of the technical proposal are important, special attention will be paid to the composition and strength of the proposed EA team, as well as the rigour of the proposed methodology. These two elements account for 70 percent of the points awarded for the technical proposal as indicated in Section B4.1 (p.9) of the RFPS document. The proposed work plan, proposer's

capacity and sample report will account for the remaining 30 percent.
Cost Proposal

General issues
- Bidders must submit a firm-fixed price bid[30], in **US Dollars.**
- The quotation will not subject to revision unless officially invited to resubmit by UNICEF.
- All prices/rates quoted must be exclusive of all taxes as UNICEF is a tax-exempt organization
- Bidders will suggest a payment schedule, linked unambiguously to contract milestones.
- Invoicing and payment will be effected by bank transfer, in US Dollars.

Budget categories and details

The budget should be presented in three categories: personnel costs, project costs and overhead costs (in the case of institutional submissions). Subheadings within the categories may be done at bidder's discretion.

- <u>Personnel Costs</u>: These should include classification (i.e., job title/function) and rates for team members; duration of work for each. This information may be contained within a table showing expected level of effort per team member, by phase. The level of effort must be visible in both the technical and the financial proposals, albeit without associated cost in the technical proposal.

- <u>EA costs</u>: These should include cost of travel, including subsistence allowances, travel by air, train, road, etc., telecommunication and miscellaneous expenses. While, the final selection of sites will be effected after the desk-review, bidders can use Sierra Leone and Pakistan as the two destinations for in-country consultations in order to permit bid comparison. Travel to selected destinations will be on a cost-reimbursable basis. **This is the sole budget component that will be charged this way; other elements will be firm-fixed price**.

- <u>Overhead costs:</u> In the case of institutional contracts, general and administrative costs should include institutional overhead and fee/profit over and above overhead. Otherwise, the cost proposal must include detailed item-wise quotations, based on the terms of reference and other relevant documents. Travel costs and subsistence rates (lodging, food, local transport and incidentals) will be based on the lower of the rates proposed by the bidder or the official and prevailing United Nations rates. Bidders are encouraged to submit economical travel and subsistence costs. If information on prevailing UN rates is required, please submit a question as described in the RFP guidelines. Experience has shown that bidders often submit data using their own cost rubrics and not according to the three categories described next. This is <u>acceptable</u> as long as UNICEF can recluster the figures into the three headings.

Awarding the contract and payment

UNICEF will award the contract after considering both technical and cost factors, on the principle of best value-for-money. Payment will be made only upon UNICEF's acceptance of the work performed in accordance with agreed schedule of payment and/or contract milestones. The terms of payment are **net 30 days, after receipt of invoice and acceptance of work.** Where the need arises, earlier payment may be negotiated between UNICEF and the contracted institution, on the terms indicated in the RFP.

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[30] All costs will be fixed, except for travel to selected destinations, which will be on a cost-reimbursable basis.

Appendix A: Suggested background reading

- Salm and Shubert, (2012) "Literature Review of Evaluative Approaches for Education Strategies for Peacebuilding in UNICEF and Lessons Learned from the Evaluation of the EEPCT Programme", KonTerra Group prepared for UNICEF Evaluation Office, October 2012
- UNICEF (2011). Proposal on Peacebuilding and Education presented by the Education Section to Government of Netherlands.
- UNICEF (2012). Education in Emergencies and Post-Crisis Transition: Final Synthesis Report to the Government of the Netherlands and the European Commission.
- UNICEF (2010) Progress Evaluation of the UNICEF Education in Emergencies and Post-Crisis Transition Programme (EEPCT). (Also known as the PREV).
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Annex 3: PBEA Documentation Made Available to EA

A. Global-Level Documentation

Category	Descriptions
Background Literature Review	84 publications
EEPCT Reports	44 publications
Technical documents	Project Proposal Global Results Framework PBEA Global M&E Plan Analysis of Drivers of conflict Trends in conflict drivers Global Research Strategy Key Performance Indicator Document
Organizational Documents	Presentations from Global Workshop (various) SPAG Meeting Minutes (various) Organizational Governance Structure terms of reference TWG Workplans (various) Lists of contacts

B. Country and Regional Level Documents Made Available to the EA

Country	Conflict Analysis	Baseline	Operational Matrix (Draft)	Annual Report	Snapshot	Other
Burundi			x	x	x	Adolescents and violence report
Chad			x	x	X	Programme Strategy, Theory of Change
Cote D'voire	x		x	x	X	
DRC	x		x	x	X	
Ethiopia			x	x	x	
Liberia	x		x	x	X	
Myanmar						
Pakistan	x		x	x	X	Meeting notes, youth conference notes, Programme strategy, Research strategy
Palestine			x	x	x	Programme strategy
Sierra Leone	x		x	x	x	M&E plan
Somalia	x	In draft form - plan	x	x	x	Stakeholder Analysis Workshop, Meeting notes, Consultant reports
South Sudan	x		x	x	x	Conference notes, meetings notes, Consultant reports
Uganda	x	x	x	x	x	M&E Plan
Yemen	x		x	x	x	
EAPRO			X			
ESARO			X			Programme Proposal
ROSA			X			
WACRO			X			

Annex 4: Stakeholders Consulted

GLOBAL		
Name	**Title**	**Category/Duty Station**
Louise Anton	Head of the Education and Research Division	Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Sanne Lowenhardt	1st Secretary	Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Charles de Vries	Senior Policy Advisor, Social Development Department	Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Christian Salazar	Programme Director	OIC
Jordan Naidoo	Sr. Advisor, Education	Education
Josephine Bourne	Associate Director Education Section, Programme Division	Accountability Committee
Mr. Elhadj As Sy	PARMO	Accountability Committee
Brenda Haiplik	Senior Education Advisor – Emergencies	UNICEF Education Section
Friedrich Affolter	PBEA Manager	PBEA Team
Anya Azaryeva	Education Specialist PBEA (Knowledge Management)	PBEA Team
Lene Leonhardsen	Education Specialist PBEA (Monitoring)	PBEA Team
Colin Kirk	Evaluation Director	Evaluation Office
Tina Tordjman-NEBE	Evaluation Specialist,	Evaluation Office
Pieter Bult	Senior Advisor	Government Relations, PARMO
Anita Ernstorfer	Co-Director, RPP Program, CDA	Former peacebuilding specialist, EMOPS
Isabel Candela	N/A	Former peacebuilding specialist, EMOPS
James Rogan	Chief, Peacebuilding & Recovery	EMOPS/TWG
Francesca Moneti	Sr. Child Protection Specialist)	Social Norms & Gender Equality (TWG)
Pierett (Pi) James	Communications	TWG
Shimali Senanayake	Communications Officer, Media Relations,	Division of Communication (TWG)
Juliet Young	Consultant (ADAP)	TWG
Takae Ishizuka	Consultant, Education Sector Climate Change Adaptation	TWG
Miriam Poulsson Kramer	TWG member (ADAP)	TWG
Erin McCandless	Adjunct Faculty: New School, Graduate Programme in International Affairs	Consultant
Mario Novelli	PBEA Consultant, Professor in the Political Economy of Education, Programme Leader International Doctorate in Education	Consultant
Alan Smith	UNESCO Chair, University of Ulster	Consultant
Sidonia Gabriel	Peacebuilding Advisor	Swisspeace

Country Interviews		
Baldeh, Cecilia	Chief of Education	DRC
Sayaka Usui	Gender Specialist	DRC
Arnaud Houndeganme	M&E Officer	DRC
Carolin Waldchen	Education Specialist	Cote D'Ivoire
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Bernard Batidzirai	Education Officer	Liberia
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Lucinda Ramos	Education Specialist	Pakistan
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Regional		
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Dorothee Klaus	Regional Chief, Programme & Planning	ESARO
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Lieke Van de Wiel	Regional Educ. Advisor	MENA
Yumiko Yokozeki	Regional Educ. Advisor	WCARO
Phuong T. Nguyen	Peacebuilding & Education Specialist	SE Asia
South Sudan Country Visit		
Simon Mphisa	Chief of Education	UNICEF
Thelma Majela	PBEA Project Manager	UNICEF
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Jairus Ligoo	Youth & Adolescent Development Specialist Youth LEAD Programme	UNICEF
Pelucy Ntambirweki	Deputy Country Representative	UNICEF
Fatimah Ibrahim	Protection - GBV/Social Norms Project	UNICEF
Ferdinand Von Habsburg	Peacebuilding Advisor	Consultant
Mette Nordstrand	Chief of Education	USSC
Marlene Renders	Peacebuilding Specialist	USSC
Mohamed Moallim Ahmed	Project Coordinator, Schools Association for Formal Education (SAFE)	Local Partner

Aden Nur Mohamed	Education Coordinator, (Peacebuilding Programme, Himilo Relief and Development Association (HIRDA)	Local Partner
Amilu Chilingulo	Head of Education, Central South Somalia	Mogadishu/Galkayo
Sedow Hussein	Education Officer, focal point for the PBEA programme, Central South Somalia	Galkayo
Silje Heitmann	GBV Specialist	Protection
Maki Mizuno-Shaw	UNV Education Specialist	USSC
Pakistan Country Visit		
Euphrates Gobina	Chief, Education	UNICEF
Hassan Siddique	Social Cohesion and Education Specialist	UNICEF
Maria Duncan	Social Cohesion and Education Officer	UNICEF
Iftikhar Durrani	Advisor to Chief Minister on Media Policy, Information and Management	Government of Pakistan
Sameena Imtiaz	Executive Director	PEAD
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Gillian McFarland	Child Protection Officer	UNICEF
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Iqbal Jatoi	Country Director	Right to Play
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Raffat Khaqan	M&E Coordinator	Right to Play
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Annex 5: Country Programme Document Review and Synthesis

This annex contains a synthesis of key elements elicited from a review of the country programme documentation. This annex contains three sections. Section 1 is a matrix summarizing the key characteristics of country programming based on the country programme snapshots and operational matrices. Section 2 is a summary of the analysis of indicators and logical framework alignment based on the operational matrices current as of July 2013. Section 3 is a compilation of all theories of change for all country programmes and the respective targeted peacebuilding dimension based on July 2013 operational matrices.

Section 1: Country Typology Matrix: The purpose of this matrix was to assist the EA team to select countries for field visits based on an objective analysis of key criteria including the level of embeddedness in existing or other programming, implementation status, and activities related to the global outcomes. However, the matrix also serves the purpose of highlighting key programming approaches in each country.

Country	Embedded or stand-alone	Implementation Status (beginning, midway, advanced)	Global Outcomes / Activities
1. Burundi	**Unclear** • Fast-tracked to focus on reintegration of Burundian refugees from Tanzania. • Linked with other UNICEF priorities including MTR review, nutrition programming (food security), research and innovation work across UNICEF Programming for adolescents and early childhood development	**Midway - fast-track** **Beginning country-level programming** • Development of the lifecycle approach to conflict analysis selected for Burundi country programme required time and caused some delays in development longer term PBEA proposal, beyond 2013. • CA training complete • CA in progress • 2012 Annual Report complete • 2013 work plan complete • No M&E plan	**Outcomes 2,3,4,5** • Formation of child-protection committees • Training government social workers in psychosocial support • Training teachers in psychosocial support, prevention of violence in schools and peace education • Dialogues with communities focused on integration of returnees into education system. • Registering child returnees • Psycho–social and peace education module available • Train teachers on EDC • Life skills and income generation training • Formation of clubs • Learning spaces for out-of-school adolescents • School, latrine and water point construction • School kits distributed • ECD centres established and ECD kits distributed
2. Chad	**Unclear (small % of total country budget)** • Unclear whether programming will be embedded. Although it appears that Output 1	**Beginning** • CA training complete but major challenges, identified	**Outcomes 1-5 Limited scope** • Policy-level work

	will complement the ongoing work planned under the GPE funded – PREBAT programme (50 million), which makes it hard for the country team to focus on PBEA, which is only 1.6 million in first year. • Programming is expected to be linked with the ten-year Plan Décenal pour le Développement de l'Education et l'Alphabétisation) ; RESEN (Rapport d'Etat du Système Educatif National) ; • The implementation of the project (Projet de Revitalisation de l'Education au Tchad) cofunded by GPE and EAC ("Educate A Child initiative" from Qatar Fund) from 2013 to 2015; Child Protection Programming.	during the conceptualization and operationalization stage of conflict analysis, included developing expertise on a CA approach in UNICEF Chad country offices, as well as identification of an appropriate partner to operationalize the conflict analysis process. • CA in-progress	• Institutional capacity building and training in conflict analysis
3. Cote D'Ivoire	**Embedded & Stand Alone** • PBEA linked to UNICEF/Child Protection, which is engaging with the MoE to address alarming levels of violence and conflict in Ivorian schools. These efforts have laid the groundwork for PBEA initiatives at school level by promoting meaningful dialogue on the role of education in promoting or curbing violence and abuse; • Providing a policy framework, which PBEA can feed into, i.e. the development of a strategy on protecting children against violence in schools, which includes action aimed at promoting tolerance and nonviolent behavior, conflict resolution and social cohesion. • UNICEF is supporting the Government of Cote d'Ivoire to improve basic social services delivery throughout the country, including in conflict-affected regions. • Social service delivery, in particular education services, will be enhanced through the PBEA's peacebuilding approach and promote social	**Midway** • CA training complete • CA complete • 2013–2015 Work-plan complete • 2012 Annual Report Complete • No M&E plan	**Outcomes 1–5** • Providing support to the National Commission on Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation (CDVR) to: Integrate education considerations on the agenda of the CDVR; Raise awareness on CDVR goals and processes among children and youth (integration of CDVR issues in education); Include children, youth and education stakeholders in CDVR processes; • Mainstreaming conflict sensitivity, DRR and peacebuilding in education policy, sector processes and dialogue at national, regional and local level. • Capacity building of key education stakeholders to provide child-friendly, conflict-sensitive education that promotes social cohesion and peace • Promoting equitable access to basic (formal and nonformal) education and ECD services among the most vulnerable children and women in high-risk areas • Research initiatives to strengthen the status of schools as zones of peace (increased evidence base for the role of education in peacebuilding and related programming).

			cohesion between various groups and communities affected by the crisis.		
4. DRC	**Embedded & Stand alone** • PBEA helped inform the new UNICEF DRC country programme. • Support to RESEN process (Education Sectori Diagnostic) through UNICEF/UNESCO/Pole de Dakar partnership	**Advanced** • CA training complete • CA complete • 2013–2015 work-plan complete • 2012 fast-track programme complete • 2012 Annual Report complete	**Outcomes 1–5** • Policy-level work • Capacity building and training of education actors • Dialogue • Mediation Committees • Curriculum / materials for life skills training developed • Adolescent peace initiatives • Communication strategy • CFS-related activities • Classroom construction and rehabilitation • Research/documentation of good practices
5. OPT	**Embedded** • UNICEF oPt 2011–2013 CPAP • SitAn developed concurrently with the Country Assessment and UNDAF • Child Protection, • Adolescents Participation • Early Childhood Development	**Beginning** • 2013–1015 work plan complete • 2012 Accelerated Programme Complete • 2012 Annual Report complete	**Outcomes 2,3,5 Limited scope** • Capacity building • Training • Nonviolence promotion • Adolescent-led community based initiatives • Research
6. Ethiopia	**Unclear** • Linkages with UNDAF 8.3; PCR 203: (2012-2015) Equitable access to general education created and retention facilitated for out of school girls and boys, vulnerable children in selected woredas and those affected by emergencies (2012–2015) • PCR308 IR 004 EIE preparedness and response • PCR 308 IR 004 DRM/DRR in education • UN Joint Programme on Enhancing Public Service Delivery in the Developing Regional States (2010–2015)	**Beginning** • CA training complete • 2012 Annual Report Complete	**Outcomes 1–5 limited scope** • Policy-level work • Capacity building for Government • Training for teachers • Improved education services • Guidance and counseling manual developed
7. Liberia	**Embedded but unclear**	**Advanced** • CA Training complete	**Outcomes 1–5** • Capacity building

	• Youth Empowerment and Social Cohesion: PBEA will provide robust training and bridge funding for the National Youth Service Programme (NYSP), a GoL priority programme that has identified and filled gaps with relation to adolescent and youth empowerment (Child Protection) • HIV/AIDS and Adolescent Girls: PBEA coordination, partnerships and outputs will assist with improving the Joint Programme for Adolescent Girls (JPAG) that is currently administered by UNICEF in Gbarpolu and Montserrado counties (Child Survival)	• CA complete • 2013–2015 work-plan complete • M&E Operationalization plan complete • 2012 Accelerated Programme complete • 2012 Annual Report Complete • M&E plan complete	• Policy work • National volunteer programme for schools • Training modules revised • After-school programming • Communication/advocacy strategy
8. Myanmar	N/A	N/A	N/A
9. Sierra Leone	**Unclear** • Child-Friendly Schooling (CFS) • Teacher Education-Child centred Teaching techniques, Emerging Issues) • Curriculum reform • Teachers' Code of conduct/out of school children • Promoting alternative forms of discipline • Gender/girls Education	**Advanced** • CA Training Complete • CA Complete • 2013–2015 Work plan in process • 2012 Accelerated Prog complete • 2012 Annual Report Complete • M&E plan complete	**Outcomes 1–5** • Policy-level work • Curriculum reform and Syllabi • Teacher training • CFS • CFS/promoting alternative forms of discipline • Access to quality education • Research
10. Pakistan	**Embedded & Stand Alone** • Strong support to subnational governance (decentralization) for SC&R, such as Education Sector Plans (Incl. GPE) and community-owned interventions. • Addressing OOSC and creating alternative opportunities for learning • Every Child in School Campaign - creating demand for education • Polio Plus – SCR analysis informing Polio Plus programme and community based school readiness packages	**Midway to Advanced** • CA training complete • CA complete • 2013–2015 work plan complete • 2012 Accelerated Prog complete • 2012 Annual Report Complete • M&E Operational Plan not complete	**Outcomes 1–5 subdivided into categories** • Policy-level work • Capacity building • Education materials • Research • Access to quality education

	• Child Protection and linkages with CP committees • Gender, greater understanding of masculinities and how they affect SCR • Disaster Risk Reduction • Adolescents: Shift to include adolescents more in UNICEF programming; vulnerability of adolescents to militancy, abuse and crime make them a target for certain Programme interventions. • Urbanization: Shift to include urban children compliments Programme due to the vulnerability of children and youth in urban areas to conflict; there will be Programme focus in slums of Karachi and Quetta.		
11. Somalia	**Unclear** • Go2School Initiative as an overall umbrella • Resilience building at community level - • Education authorities capacity development • Gender-based violence and social norms • Global Partnership for Education (GPE)	**Beginning** • CA Training Partially Complete • 2013 draft work plan Complete • 2012 Accelerated Programme Ongoing • 2012 Annual Report Complete	**Outcomes 2,3,4,5** • Training in CA and CS • Policy-level work • Peace promotion activities • Access to quality education • Research
12. South Sudan	**Embedded** • They have a lot of other funding (i.e., Global Partnership for Education (36 US million)- three years; USAID (SADDLE) Programme 25 Mil USD over four years; Qatar fund; plus PBEA which is only about 2 million USD. • Child Protection UNICEF section - a linkage has been established with the GBV research programme • YouthLEAD – Convergence on life skills focusing on peace education and livelihood programming for adolescents • UNICEF Advisory Board constitutes representation from various sections	**Beginning** • CA in process • 2013–2015 Work plan completed • CA training Complete • 2012 Annual Report Complete	**Outcomes 1,2,3,5** • Policy-level work • Capacity building and training of teachers and government • Peacebuilding initiatives with youth • Research

	• UNICEF – Communication for Development (C4D) section using Radio Programme to promote Life Skills and Peacebuilding anchored on Child-to-Child methodological programming. • HIV and AIDS section – Convergence in the area of life skills development for reduction of vulnerabilities and behavior change		
13. Uganda	**Embedded & Stand alone** • UNICEF Resilience Agenda • Youth and Livelihoods Programming • Technology for Development (T4D) programming • MDGs—especially education • Zero Violence against Children (VAC) campaign • Linkage with gender and PB work being supported by PBF • Education in Emergencies	**Advanced** • CA training complete • CA complete • 2012 Accelerated programme complete • 2012 Annual report complete • 2013–15 work plan complete • M&E plan complete	**Outcomes 1–5 plus 2 additional** • Policy-level work • Print and disseminate info • Capacity building and training • Youth-focused Peacebuilding initiatives • EDC centres • Research
14. Yemen	**Stand alone** • Support to the Government of Yemen in a two-year transition • Child-friendly schools programme • Global Partnership for Education supported education sector plan	**Beginning** • CA complete • 2012 Annual Report Complete • 2013–15 annual report in progress • M&E Operational Plan in progress • CA Training not complete	**Outcomes 1,3,4,5** • Policy-level work • Advocacy • Capacity building and training of teachers, parents, government • Curriculum development • Access to quality education • Research

Section 2: Operational Matrix Indicator and Logframe Analysis. The following analysis highlights country programme compliance pertaining to ToR questions targeting indicators and alignment of inputs, outputs, objectives and indicators.

Country	Logical Sequence (Objectives to Activities)	Availability and alignment of Indicators at each level	Indicators are measurable	Indicators reflect realistic change in time period involved	Degree of M&E effort required appropriate for size of project	Indicators are able to measure cost effectiveness of programme	Baseline – possible in time frame	Do country-level logframes and activities align with the Global Results Framework?	Possible 'Progress Towards' Indicators
Cote D'Ivoire	There is a logical sequence *within* each objective; however, there is less logical connection *between* the objectives	Yes	Yes	Output level yes. Outcome level not present	No	No	Yes	Within country level operational matrix – yes. However, interviews suggest that country programme may be focused differently from as expressed in OM	Not used
DRC	There is a logical sequence *within* each objective; however, there is less logical connection *between* the objectives	Yes	Yes	Output level yes. Outcome level not present	No	No	Yes	Within country-level operational matrix – However, interviews suggest that country programme may be focused differently from as expressed in OM	Not used
Ethiopia	There is a logical sequence *within* each objective; however, there is less logical connection *between* the objectives	Yes	Yes	Output level yes. Outcome level not present	No	No	Yes	Yes	Not used
Liberia	There is a logical sequence *within* each objective; however, there is less logical connection *between* the objectives	Yes	Yes	Output level yes. Outcome level not present	No	No	Yes	Within country level operational matrix – yes. However, interviews suggest that country programme may be focused differently from as expressed in OM	Not used
Myanmar	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

Country	Logical Sequence (Objectives to Activities)	Availability and alignment of Indicators at each level	Indicators are measurable	Indicators reflect realistic change in time period involved	Degree of M&E effort required appropriate for size of project	Indicators are able to measure cost effectiveness of programme	Baseline – possible in time frame	Do country level logframes and activities align with the Global Results Framework?	Possible 'Progress Towards' Indicators
OPT	There is a logical sequence *within* each objective; however, there is less logical connection *between* the objectives	Yes	Yes		No	No	Yes	Within country level operational matrix – yes. However, interviews suggest that country programme may be focused differently from as expressed in OM	Not used
Pakistan	There is a logical sequence *within* each objective; however, there is less logical connection *between* the objectives	Yes	Yes	Output level yes. Outcome level not present	No	No	Yes	Within country level operational matrix – yes. However, interviews suggest that country programme may be focused differently from as expressed in OM	Not used
Sierra Leone	There is a logical sequence *within* each objective; however, there is less logical connection *between* the objectives	Yes	Yes	Output level yes. Outcome level not present	No	No	Yes	Yes	Not used
Somalia	There is a logical sequence *within* each objective; however, there is less logical connection *between* the objectives	Yes	Yes	Output level yes. Outcome level not present	No	No		Yes	Not used
South Sudan	There is a logical sequence *within* each objective; however, there is less logical connection *between* the objectives	Yes	Yes	Output level yes. Outcome level not present	No	No	Yes	Yes	Not used

Country	Logical Sequence (Objectives to Activities)	Availability and alignment of Indicators at each level	Indicators are measurable	Indicators reflect realistic change in time period involved	Degree of M&E effort required appropriate for size of project	Indicators are able to measure cost effectiveness of programme	Baseline – possible in time frame	Do country level logframes and activities align with the Global Results Framework?	Possible 'Progress Towards' Indicators
Uganda	There is a logical sequence *within* each objective; however, there is less logical connection *between* the objectives	Yes	Yes	Output level yes. Outcome level not present	No	No	Yes	Within country level operational matrix – yes. However, interviews suggest that country programme may be focused differently from as expressed in OM	Not used
Yemen	There is a logical sequence *within* each objective; however, there is less logical connection *between* the objectives	Yes	Yes	Output level yes. Outcome level not present	No	No	Yes	Yes	Not used
Global Level	There is a logical sequence *within* each objective; however, there is less logical connection *between* the objectives	Yes	Yes	Output level yes. Outcome level not present	No	No	Yes	N/A	Not used

Section 3: ToC in country programme Operational Matrices and targeted dimension of social cohesion, resilience, or peacebuilding

In the country operational matrices (as of June 2013), the majority of the country programmes articulate a specific theory of change for each outcome. The following table describes each outcome theory of change for the participating countries and to which (if any) peacebuilding concept it is linked. It should be noted that 10 of the operational matrices shared are still considered drafts by the PMT because conflict analyses have not been finalized for those country programmes.

Country	O	Stated Theory of Change	Peacebuilding Dimension
Burundi	1	No Outcome 1 ToC listed	None
	2	No Outcome 2 ToC listed	None
	3	If stakeholders have strengthened capacity to create protective environment for children and to promote peaceful integration of refugees, then stakeholder will play in active role in preventing conflict and in promoting peaceful cohabitation	Social Cohesion
		If adolescents are trained on life skills and income generation activities then adolescents are less likely to be recruited by extremist groups and are able to cope with conflict	Resilience
		If teachers and social workers have strengthened capacity in psychosocial support, then they will be able to appropriate refer children to service providers and then returnees children will be better integrated through trauma therapy	Social Cohesion
	4	If schools have adequate infrastructure to accommodate influx of refugee children and children in host communities, then returnee children will enroll in school and then there will be integration of returnee children without extending additional pressure on host communities which will lead to reduced tensions between host communities and returnees.	Social Cohesion
	5	No Outcome 5 ToC listed	None
Chad	1	If government engages in policy dialogue on peacebuilding issues then good governance and transparency will be promoted and conflict-reduction strategies adopted	Human Security
	2	If duty-bearers are trained in themes of tolerance, environmental protection and social cohesion, then they will adopt good management of resources practices and resolve conflict in nonviolent ways	Not well linked to any of the three dimensions, but social cohesion cited as a theme for training. Most likely connection to human security or resilience

	3	If conflict-sensitive education is delivered in a participative manner then children and adults will adopt nonviolent attitudes		Not well linked to any of the three dimensions, but resilience (coping) most likely connection
	4	No Outcome 4 ToC listed		None
	5	No Outcome 5 ToC listed		None
Cote D'Ivoire	1	If conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding are integrated into education sector plans and if education is integrated into peacebuilding and conflict-reduction processes, then education is less likely to be manipulated and abused and education's transformative potential can be more effectively realized		No specific connection to any of the three peacebuilding concepts. Most likely might be social cohesion
	2	If there is enhanced understanding and capacity among MoE to integrate conflict sensitivity, disaster risk-reduction and peacebuilding into the education system, then children can benefit from bias-free conflict-sensitive and risk-informed education		No specific connection to any of the three peacebuilding concepts. Most likely might be social cohesion
	3	If schools provide a protective, depoliticized and child-friendly learning environment that equips students with knowledge about CDVR, nonviolence and life-skills development, then they will be less likely to engage in anti-social behavior and be less vulnerable to manipulation		Resilience
	4	If basic education services ensure equitable access to conflict-sensitive education including for the most vulnerable children in the most disadvantaged areas, then resentment, discontent and tensions will be reduced		Social cohesion
	5	If UNICEF collects evidence on good governance and quality programming, then UNICEF programmes are better prepared to support social cohesion and peacebuilding		Logically inconsistent
DRC	1	If the critical role of children in youth in peacebuilding is recognized, then education is prioritized within national peacebuilding and conflict transformation policies and processes …. and the education system delivers more equitable and conflict-sensitive education service…. then government is better able to integrate the excluded and marginalized groups….Then the marginalized citizens feel included/taken care of, they increases their sense of confidence and positive contribution to state-society relations.		Social Cohesion
	2	If the capacity of institutions (education and others) is strengthened in transparent management, accountability and Human Security		
	3	If social learning is accompanied by collaborative processes that systematically break isolation and division while enhancing relationship building, then strong social relationships as a central ingredient for peacebuilding and community resilience will emerge.		Social Cohesion and Resilience both mentioned
	4	If the learning environment is made safe and protective and if the curriculum is adapted to the needs of the children and teachers are well trained, qualified and motivated, then children will remain in school even when new emergencies arise.		No clear connection to any of three peacebuilding dimensions
	5	If research and development of new methodologies for evaluation of impact of education on peacebuilding are effective, then UNICEF will contribute to generating evidence that will feed into policy and practice to strengthen the role of education in peacebuilding.		No clear connection to any of three peacebuilding dimensions

Ethiopia	1	If school-communities that are prone to various emergencies (conflict, drought, etc.) acknowledge hazards and develop emergency response plans through interactions between students and communities, this will contribute positively towards increased social cohesion and peacebuilding efforts		Social Cohesion
	2	If UNICEF programme officers and education officials/experts have heightened awareness of drivers of inequalities and are capacitated to conduct and integrate context analyses into relevant sector plans and policies then Regional DRR and Sector plans respond to contextual factors.		No clear connection to any of three peacebuilding dimensions
	3	If teachers, parents, children and community members have conflict-resolution skills and have developed sensitivity to diversity they will have greater affinity for peaceful resolution of conflict and become more accommodating to differences among different tribes/clans		Social Cohesion
	4	If equal opportunities of ECCE and basic education services provision is offered to the different ethnic groups in the DRSs, then tensions among different groups will be reduced and key education indicators will show steady improvement which will ultimately result in creating peace, security and stability.		Social Cohesion
	5	If good quality evidence, including context analyses, is systematically generated in the DRSs, then increasingly equity-based policies and programming will reduce marginalization of selected communities and contribute to increase levels of peace, security and social cohesion		Social Cohesion – but logically inconsistent
Liberia	1	ToC: Country level 1.1 If Youth Empowerment, Social Cohesion and Transformative Education are integrated in and implemented under the reconciliation roadmap then it is ensured that conflicts related to education service delivery and to youth exclusion from participation and issues related to unemployment are integrated in the peacebuilding agenda of Liberia and visible at national level. Funding is allocated to prevent conflicts related to this area.	Human Security	
		Country level 1.2 If the curricula are reviewed and approved all schools are sensitized and enabled to start delivering conflict-sensitive education. If nonformal training tools are developed and/or updated to enhance peacebuilding, leadership and conflict-management skills, individuals will be better equipped to deliver these skills and learning opportunities to communities.	Resilience	
	2	If National Volunteers, a joint intervention of MoYS, MoE and PBO/MIA, deliver services in the sectors of education, youth development and public administration in nine counties, the youth volunteers will adopt a positive attitude towards government institutions.		Not a clear connection to any of the three peacebuilding concepts
		Their presence in schools will contribute towards better school management, implementation of lesson plans and improved efficiency within the education system at the decentralized (county) level.		
		Their presence at youth centres will improve management, service delivery and learning opportunities in the youth development sector at all levels. As the schools become more efficient, Liberian citizens, in targeted areas gain trust in the state capacity to deliver equitable services.		

		Additionally, the benefits of engaging youth are two-way, institutions benefit from their engagement as the youth are employed and they contribute meaningfully to the society.	
	3	If young people serve as Junior National Volunteers and are engaged in peacebuilding and conflict resolution in local communities, JNV will become agents for nonviolent behavior and role models for other youth. Through their activities for peacebuilding and social cohesion they become accepted and trusted members of the community. As a consequence, the peacebuilding training for community representatives and peacebuilding committees at community and district level is highly effective and members of these committees solve conflicts through mediation and dialogue after the trainings.	Social cohesion mentioned frequently, but key elements appear to be related to resilience or reduction of violence
	4	If CFS standards are applied in 54 targeted schools and early childhood development is assured, the quality of the education service delivery in targeted schools will be increased and learning achievements of children in targeted schools are improved. If reliable education policies and institutions are being established that guarantee equitable access to education services and job opportunities, then a future perspective for the youth and their parents can be created and risks for new violence decreased. If existing gaps are addressed in the education system, then more holistic education opportunities will be realized that will transform into educated and productive citizens increasing social, political and economic stability and human development.	Human Security (Reduction of violence)
	5	If the voices are given to populations affected by the war, the communities will provide the required evidence to advocate in the defense of Liberian values that will be taken into account in the decision making process . If research-actions are developed and evidence provided to decision makers at each level, Transformative Education agenda will foster reconciliation and nonviolent problem-solving skills. If there is sufficient social mobilization based on adequate evidence with regard to PB and education results, then an environment of good governance within the PB and education sector, including transparency and accountability, can be developed. If adequate communication strategies are developed, then citizens will know about programme interventions and impact, which will lead to greater trust and increase positive perceptions about government's ability to deliver to citizens	No clear connection to one of three peacebuilding dimensions, but most likely is resilience (nonviolent coping mechanisms)
Myanmar		No OM yet developed	Proposal appears to be focusing on social cohesion
Pakistan	1	If education policies, plans and strategies are not conflict sensitive and instigate tension between groups then they can contribute to and fuel conflict. If policies, plans and strategies promote cultures of non-discrimination, nonviolence and social cohesion through textbooks, teaching methods, inclusive education environments and community engagement through SMCs/PTCs/PTAs/TIJs, then there will be increased contribution of the education system to building positive social relations between children, youth and teachers in schools and community members.	Social Cohesion
	2	If Provincial Education Departments provide education that supports peace and addresses issues that may have fuelled conflict, such as discriminatory textbooks and teaching techniques that promote rote learning and a hidden curricula that promotes a negative picture of 'the other', then education will contribute to	

		children's ability to think critically and the positive transformation of relationships and social change and will promote respect for diversity while developing a common identity.	
	3	If youth are given the space to constructively participate in a dialogue process where they are encouraged to discover, dream, design and deliver in their own lives and with each other, then they will learn to respect diversity while forming a common identity, build trust amongst one another and share experiences that enable them to become more active and confident members of society. If youth are brought together from different backgrounds to interact, play, create and learn together, then they are less likely to continue to see each other in a negative light and will bridge divisions through finding areas of commonality in order to constructively participate and engage with each other. If communities feel they have a constructive and contextually-appropriate dispute resolution mechanism they can turn to that produces consultative resolutions and decisions that are widely recognized within the community, then they are more likely to utilize such mechanisms instead of turn to more violent or unsatisfactory means of resolution, which will mean less violence and impunity.	Social Cohesion
	4	If schools are used as entry points for intercultural communication and positive interaction patterns are facilitated through learning and classroom interaction, then this will allow for recognition of similarities that unite them and schools will be a vehicle for promotion of social cohesion, transformation of values, attitudes and behaviors that encourage critical thinking, promoting respect for diversity and creating collective identity. If youth are provided with skills to gain employment, civic education and nonviolent ways to express themselves amongst their peers and community members then economic exclusion will be reduced resulting in increased economic awareness, engagement and participation decreasing frustration, likelihood of youth being recruited by armed groups or utilizing violent methods to express themselves. If youth are empowered, then they will constitute a positive force in the community promoting values of a peaceful society.	Social Cohesion
	5	If evidence on how education contributes to SCR is available and disseminated to academics, donors, government and other key stakeholders, then there will be a greater emphasis on social cohesion in education-related programming and vice versa.	Social Cohesion
Palestine	1	If government and civil society provides civil and capacity development opportunities for adolescents, then adolescents will participate more effectively in community as a sustainable alternative to violence	Social Cohesion
	2		
	3		
	4		
	5		

Sierra Leone	1	By taking into account the findings from the conflict analysis when preparing the new Poverty Reduction Strategy, Education Sector Plan and other key education strategies, there is a political commitment to conflict-sensitive education sector. Educational institutions can be held accountable for conflict-sensitive delivery of services. Assuming adequate resources and capacities are put in place to render the education sector more conflict-sensitive and responsive to the needs of communities as well as individuals; this will ultimately contribute to the reduction of intertribal and geographical tensions and increase social cohesion.	Social Cohesion
	2	If schools and communities are strengthened on and apply CFS standards, then enrolment will be higher because of better access and the encouragement of parents and community members. Additionally, a conducive learning environment is in place. The children and the parents are motivated to ensure continuous school enrolment into secondary schools and when the children grow up they are motivated to become responsible citizens. The increased engagement of the SMCs and mothers clubs improves the relationship between the communities and the schools and thus trust of the community into schools is enhanced.	Not explicitly linked to any of three concepts (targets increased trust in schools)
	3	If communities become aware of the negative consequences of corporal punishment and there is a wider acceptance of using alternative forms of discipline, then corporal punishment will be reduced significantly and the school environment becomes safe, the children are confident to go to school and violence at a broader community level is reduced; children will learn to use constructive ways of engagement with their peers, family and community members which will continue into adulthood to resolve and prevent conflict.	Most likely resilience
	4	If quality education at primary level is ensured and CA and conflict resolution is integrated into teacher training, then children's attitudes and values towards each other become peaceful. If trained teachers apply a child centered teaching technique and they teach reading, numeracy and other skills in schools, children's knowledge and skills will improve.	Not clearly articulated connection, but most likely is resilience
	5	If research on social norms, parenting practices (of children, parents and community members) and on the economic and educational needs of adolescents is carried out with a peace lens, resulting recommendations will guide the development of equitable and inclusive education policies and programmes. The social norms and parenting research will inform the development of an evidenced based ECD strategy	Not clearly connected to any of three dimensions
Somalia	1	No Outcome 1 ToC listed	None
	2	If Ministry officials are better equipped and skilled to provide conflict-sensitive education then this will lead to increased trust building and legitimacy of government	No clear connection to one of three peacebuilding dimensions (targets trust in government)
	3	If resilience of stakeholders is strengthened then they will be better able to cope with conflict and other stresses…	Resilience
	4	No Outcome 4 ToC listed	None
	5	If caretakers are empowered to raise caring of nonviolent optimally functioning children, then number of violence prone children and youth reduced	Resilience

South Sudan	1	Weak governance characterized by divided political vision, limited policies and legislation and weak local capacity to provide security and equitable services. In addition, Lack of conflict sensitivity Low levels of awareness/capacity in conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding amongst national counterparts, UN and NGOs have contributed to increased conflict. If peacebuilding is mainstreamed into education policy, curriculum and legislative frameworks, then Government will more readily consider using conflict-sensitive approaches to planning, budgeting in delivering equitable education to the citizens of South Sudan and will more effectively use education as a tool for nation-building.	Human Security
	2	Outcome 2 interventions are based on the assumptions that if life skills/peacebuilding knowledge and skills are effectively inculcated among teachers/educators, then they are more likely to become positive agents of change in their lives, communities and career If schools offer life skills and peace education in classroom as well as through extracurricular activities, then the level of trauma and other effects of war and conflict that are acting as barriers to teaching and learning would be significantly reduced and school attendance and performance would increase; and if girls can receive life skills interventions with increased presence of role models focusing on esteem, confidence and identity development, then the level of teenage pregnancy will go down and many will be motivated to pursue their education.	Resilience
	3	Absence of basic development at all levels driven by inequity, perceptions of marginalization, incomplete decentralization process and austerity reducing opportunities for growth through education and other social services Negative socio-cultural trends Presence of certain ingrained factors such as cattle raiding, theft, early marriages, elopement, age sets further exacerbate cyclical conflicts Lack of livelihoods minimal economic diversification (95% reliance on oil), poor infrastructure, few local opportunities and lack of relevant education increases tensions over small pools of money and jobs—exacerbated by youth bulge. Trauma Widespread trauma (as a result of decades of war and ongoing conflict) underpins growing levels of anger, limited capacity or willingness to manage tensions and/or conflict and lack of objectivity in defining solutions and creates stereotyping, hate speech and social breakdown Pressure of Returnees Increasing social, cultural and economic pressure in rural and particularly urban areas (especially impacting on schools and local communities) caused by large numbers of returnees increase likelihood of inter- and intracommunal tensions and conflict. If life skills/peacebuilding programmes are made more accessible to youth, children, their parents, cattle camp populations and communities through direct participation, then they will be more likely to make informed life and career decisions and also engage in productive livelihood initiatives within their communities.	Human Security
	4	Presence of certain ingrained factors such as cattle raiding, theft, early marriages, elopement, age sets further exacerbate cyclical conflicts. Poverty, absence of basic development at all levels driven by inequity, perceptions of marginalization, incomplete decentralization process and austerity reducing opportunities for	Resilience

		growth through education and other social services. If girls can receive life skills interventions with increased presence of role models focusing on esteem, confidence and identity development, then many will be motivated to pursue their education, which will also increase intergenerational acceptance of girls' education and contribute to overall inclusiveness and tolerance.	
	5	Weak governance characterized by divided political vision, limited policies and legislation and weak local capacity to provide security and equitable services. If lessons are learnt from the conflict sensitive programming, this will facilitate generation of knowledge and will also influence policy and practice to improve quality of teaching and learning and therefore more resources will be invested nationally and internationally into education.	No clear connection to any of the three peacebuilding concepts
Uganda	1	If national policies, plans and strategies that promote cultures of nonviolence, social cohesion and encourage the change of social norms that condones violence are being implemented in schools then they can support the breaking of cycles of violence and contribute to building positive social relations between children, youth and teachers in schools. If policies, plans and strategies ensure equitable distribution of resources in terms of teacher distribution, availability of infrastructure and access to education then tensions between regions and districts decrease leading to reduced vulnerability to conflict.	Social Cohesion and Resilience
	2	If MoES institutions provide education that supports social cohesion and peacebuilding and addresses issues that may have fuelled conflict, such as unequal access to services, VAC in school, inability to access school due to lack of opportunity, then education will contribute to positive transformation of relationships and social change.

If children and youth are provided with mechanisms that can support them in channeling complaints related to violence to appropriate instances such as the police and the court, while providing a supporting and conducive environment for talking about VAC, then this will have a deterrent function and lead to a decrease of the societal acceptance of VAC and prevent future acts of VAC. This will then break the intergenerational cycle of violence that leads to trauma, anxiety, depression and emotional isolation that makes a society more prone to experience an eruption or continuation of existing conflicts.

: To demonstrate that the **Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development (MoGLSD)** (institution) and the **Ministry of Education and Sports (MoES)** have demonstrated increased capacity to report, prevent and address VAC cases the National Child Helpline will demonstrate increase in number of VAC calls that are being referred and MoGLSD will provide office space and MoGLSD and MoES Inter Sectoral Committee minutes will be available monthly. | First ToC no clear connection to one of three peacebuilding concepts.

Resilience

No clear connection to three peacebuilding concepts |
| | 3 | If schools are used as platforms for bridging community divisions (ethnic/tribal, religious, or otherwise) and become incubators for positive interaction and cooperation through sports, community dialogues and arts, then this has the ability to unite communities around common interests, goals, and values. This will also make schools a vehicle for promotion of social cohesion, transformation of values, attitudes and behaviors | Social Cohesion |

		that encourage nonviolent ways of dealing with conflict and creates an opportunity for constructive engagement and dialogue around issues that divide the community. If youth are provided with skills to gain employment, civic education and mechanisms to express themselves where they feel heard by their leaders, then perceptions of political and economic exclusion will be reduced. This will result in increased political and economic awareness, engagement and participation decreasing frustration and the likelihood of youth utilizing violent methods to express themselves. If youth are empowered with tools for social and economic engagement, then they will break down ageist barriers and contribute positively to their communities, reducing the chances of armed or violent engagement.	Resilience
	4	If conflict-sensitive education that promotes peace is delivered equitably as a peace dividend in parts of Uganda that are recovering from conflict, then grievances and perceptions of neglect, which have historically fuelled conflict in that region, will be reduced. Building up education provision in conflict-affected areas offers a means to build state legitimacy and gives people a sense of normalcy and the understanding that working to maintain peace is worthwhile. Ensuring that these schools are conflict sensitive provides an opportunity to empower teachers and administrators to discuss grievances and find productive outlets for issues raised in the community. Simultaneously a conflict-sensitive curriculum considers historical grievances and competing perspectives and provides an opportunity for students to constructively engage in and debate these questions.	No clear connection to any of three peacebuilding concepts (targeting increased trust in state and in schools)
	5	Because peacebuilding is somewhat new to UNICEF, it will be valuable to institutional learning as well as effective programme implementation to ensure that activities are evidence-based and sensitive to ongoing fluctuations in stability. If a programme has an active learning methodology that continuously aims to address gaps in knowledge and gather learning from other sources and that are translated and fed back into practice, then interventions will be informed and more effective. Working with local institutions will ensure that research capacity is built and sustained beyond the life of the programme	No clear connection to any of three peacebuilding concepts
Yemen	1	No OM yet developed	No OM yet developed, but proposal appears to be focusing on coping skills (resilience).
	2		
	3		
	4		
	5		

Annex 6: Interview Analysis Template

The following template illustrated the key questions to be analyzed from respondent interviews.

TOR Categories	Notes from Interviews
Technical and Strategic Elements	
Programme coherence	
How clear is PBEA's internal programme logic? *How SMART are objectives and indicators?* *How closely aligned are inputs, outputs, outcomes and impact?* *To what extent do the present indicators represent a necessary and sufficient set of performance markers for measuring whether results have been achieved? –* *What alternative indicators need to be tracked?* *How can programme design be strengthened for greater coherence*	
Feasibility of results	
How realistic are the global results in light of the overall grant for PBEA, the scope of the programme and the resources allocated to all programming units, including country-level programme interventions?	
M&E effort required	
What specific data does each programming unit need to gather in order to document credible evidence? *At what frequency and through what means of verification? What is the current availability of this data?* *What additional effort is required to ensure that the data is available?* *What data on input-output/activity-outcome linkages will be necessary to demonstrate overall value for money and the cost effectiveness of specific interventions?*	
Attribution/Contribution requirements	
What baseline data needs to be gathered as the basis for measuring PBEA's contribution over time? *What specific input data does each programming unit need to gather in order to demonstrate changes associated with PBEA's contribution, as opposed to other funding sources that help achieve targeted results?*	
Management and Governance Aspects	
Internal understanding of PBEA goals and accountabilities	
How effectively has the process followed to date fostered a shared understanding of targeted results and the means of achieving them? *How clearly has the programme logic been communicated to programming units and how well have they been understood?* *What improvements, if any, should be made to improve understanding of programme goals and accountabilities in Year 2 and beyond?*	
Management and governance towards results	
Is there adequate capacity to carry out the programme management function (human, technical and financial resources)? *How sufficient are the governance arrangements for maximizing the likelihood of programme success?* *How sufficiently have key aspects of the programme management been undertaken so as to maximize the likelihood of success?* *How clearly have internal programme accountabilities been identified?*	
Resource allocation processes	
How effectively has the resource allocation process managed in keeping with the nature of PBEA as a global programme, as opposed to a fund? *How clearly have these distinctions between programme and fund been communicated and understood by programming units?* *What improvements, if any, should be made to enhance the clarity and transparency of allocation processes and to ensure that it is results oriented?*	

What alternative models, if any, might be employed to achieve the targeted results in better ways?	
Risks, external factors and unintended consequences	
To what extent are risk and external factors taken into account in the logical framework? *Is programme planning and implementation flexible enough to maximize positive unintended consequences or to mitigate negative unintended consequences?*	

Annex 7: Key Emergent Themes – Stakeholder Interviews

Section 1: ToR Themes

- **Overall programme coherence,** including the programme's logic and the alignment of the ToC and the RF.
    - How clear is the PBEA's internal programme logic and logical framework?
    - How SMART are the objectives and the indicators of PBEA?
    - How closely aligned are inputs, outputs, outcomes and impact?
    - To what extent do the present indicators represent a necessary and sufficient set of performance markers for measuring whether results have been achieved?
    - How can programme design be strengthened for greater coherence?

- **Feasibility of results,** including the size of the overall size of the grant, scope of the programme, allocation of resources and time frame of the programme.
    - How realistic are the global results in light of the overall grant for PBEA, the scope of the programme and resources allocated to all programming units including country-level programme interventions?

- **Required M&E effort,** including information needs, sources for tracking indicators, availability of information, data management systems and procedures necessary for demonstrating overall results, value for money, input-output/activity-outcome linkages and to determine if conditions for programme evaluation are in place to capture both learning and achievement including baseline data.
    - What specific data does each programming unit need to gather in order to document credible evidence?
    - At what frequency and through what means of verification?
    - What is the current availability of this data, and what additional effort is required to ensure that the data is available?
    - What data on input-output/activity-outcome linkages will be necessary to demonstrate overall value for money and the cost-effectiveness of the specific interventions?

- **Attribution/contribution requirements,** including baseline and input data needs for measuring attribution and contribution over time.
    - What baseline data needs to be gathered as the basis for measuring PBEA's contribution over time?
    - What specific input data does each programming unit need to gather in order to demonstrate changes associated with PBEA's contribution, as opposed to other funding sources that help achieve each targeted result?

- **Internal understanding of PBEA goals and accountabilities,** including the level of shared understanding of the vision, goals, objectives, expected results and accountabilities and the means for achieving them.

    o How effectively has the process followed to date fostered a shared understanding of targeted results and the means of achieving them?

    o How clearly has the programme logic been communicated to programming units, and how well have they been understood?

    o What improvements, if any, should be made to improve understanding of programme goals and accountabilities for the rest of the project cycle?

- **Management and governance towards results,** including the nature of the agreement between UNICEF and the Government of the Netherlands; UNICEF's decentralized organizational structure; and the human, technical and financial capacity to carry out the programme management function and maximize achievements.

    o Is there adequate capacity (human, technical and financial) to carry out the programme management function?

    o How sufficient are the governance arrangements for maximizing the likelihood of programme success?

    o How sufficiently have key aspects of programme management (communications, risk analysis, dedicated programme management resources, etc.) been undertaken so as to maximize the likelihood of success?

    o How clearly has UNICEF, within its decentralized structure, identified internal programme accountabilities in line with the corporate nature of the agreement between UNICEF and the Government of the Netherlands?

- **Resource allocation processes,** including their effectiveness in ensuring that PBEA is a global programme with a specific ToC, goals and objectives, rather than a general fund to supplement existing country programs.

    o How effectively has the resource allocation process managed in keeping the nature of the PBEA as a global programme, as opposed to a fund?

    o How clearly have these distinctions between a programme and a fund been communicated to and understood by programming units?

    o What improvements should be made to enhance the clarity and transparency of the allocation processes and to ensure that they are results oriented?

    o What alternative models might be employed to achieve targeted results given the resources available?

- **Risks, external factors and unintended consequences,** including the extent to which the logical framework and management structure have been designed to identify and adapt to risks and other external factors to maximize positive opportunities and minimize negative consequences.

    o To what extent are risk and external factors taken into account in the logical framework and/or cohesive risk-management plan?

o   Is the programme planning and implementation flexible enough to maximize positive unintended consequences and minimize unintended negative consequences?

Section 2: Emergent Themes

Peacebuilding or Education: This theme is related to the ToR elements of Internal Understanding of PBEA goals as well as Programme Coherence and Assumptions. Key questions relevant to this emergent theme include:
- Is there a common primary lens through which stakeholders are interpreting PBEA?

    o   This is related to the ToR element of Internal Understanding of PBEA Goals and Accountabilities as well as the overall programme coherence and assumptions. Key questions include:

- Is there consensus on whether PBEA is a peacebuilding programme that uses education as a tool, or is it a conflict-sensitive education programme that may contribute to peacebuilding?

    o   From an EA perspective, this theme helps to determine whether the identified objectives and indicators capture the perceived intended achievements as understood by all stakeholders. It also clarifies whether there is a clear and shared understanding among all stakeholders regarding the intended strategic role of the programme within UNICEF and beyond.

- Does the Results Framework (RF) measure effectiveness from an education lens or from a peacebuilding lens?

    o   If objectives and indicators are designed to measure programme effectiveness from an education perspective an evaluation may not show peacebuilding outcomes and impacts and therefore the evaluation results may not be relevant for learning about conflict-sensitive education and peacebuilding.

Ambitious Goals and Realistic Programming: This theme is related to the ToR element of Feasibility of Results and to Programme Coherence (indicators).
- Is it possible to achieve the objectives and outcomes within the allotted time frame and resource restrictions?

    o   The literature on Peacebuilding suggests that it is nonlinear process, which takes significant time and resources. If PBEA's goals are too ambitious, then it is unlikely that the measurement of programming activities, outcomes and impacts will show change even if there has actually been considerable progress.

    o   Would intermediate objectives and indicators better capture this progress?

Learning vs. Results-Based: This relates to the element of Internal Understanding of PBEA Goals and Accountabilities as well as Programme Coherence.
- Is PBEA primarily a pilot programme focused on learning, or is it a programme focused on achieving results?

    o   There appears to be different understandings of this focus among the various stakeholders. How this question is answered shapes the programme design implementation and monitoring. It also informs approaches to measurement and evaluation.

Usefulness: This emergent theme appeared to be related to the overall EA question – Will a final evaluation credibly demonstrate the results of the programme?

- Will the PBEA final evaluation reflect, highlight and validate learning and achievement?

    o There seems to be concern that variability in country contexts and programmes will inhibit the potential of an evaluation of the Global Results Framework to capture what is interesting and useful at the country and local level.

Programming Approaches: This theme relates to Programme Coherence, Attribution/Contribution issues and Management/Governance processes. Key questions raised in conversations with stakeholders included:

- How many of the PBEA programme activities are taken from a predetermined menu, and how many are designed based on the context?

    o It will be difficult to measure progress towards achieving PBEA's goals and objectives if activities cannot be differentiated from general UNICEF practices.

- How much capacity and flexibility does UNICEF have to modify core activities based on changes in local contexts?

- To what extent has the PBEA project generated completely new programing approaches in country contexts, and how easily has UNICEF been able employ these approaches?

- To what degree have UNICEF programme personnel reconciled the need for a broad conflict analysis, which assesses the extent to which drivers of conflict are education related with the need for a conflict analysis that is education specific and locally contextualized to design a strategic and measurable peacebuilding programmes?

Comprehensiveness of the Theory of Change: This theme relates to the ToR elements involving Programme Coherence and Management/Governance. UNICEF country programmes have significant autonomy in designing and implementing their own interventions. As a consequence, peacebuilding and education initiatives may vary considerably between countries. Therefore, the EA team will need to balance the level of effort in examining global programme coherence with country level efforts as well as understanding the degree of variation between and among country programme approaches.

- How aligned are individual country Results Frameworks with the Global Results Framework?

    o If the individual country results framework differs too much from the global results framework, it will create difficulties in evaluating the global objectives based on specific country-level indicators and activities.

- The global PBEA theory of change is predicated on five objectives. How much is the global results framework's theory of change compromised if the countries do not adopt all five objectives?

    o It appears that only about 50 percent of the PBEA countries have adopted all objectives, and even in these, many are quite limited in scope.

- How much variation exists among country programs in RFs, activities and indicators?

    o If there is too much variation, it may be difficult to capture the range of impact and progress through a traditional global evaluation approach

Time frame: These emergent themes relate to the ToR element of Management/Governance.

- To what degree does the organizational and policy structure of the organization inhibit the development and design of new approaches within a specific programming period?

- Is the length of time of the funding period sufficient to achieve and sustain results?

Learning Lessons or Repeating Mistakes: The current PBEA project stems from the preceding Education in Emergencies and Post Conflict Transition project (EEPCT). A theme in the ToR and stakeholder conversations related to assuring that the lessons learned in the EEPCT evaluation process were integrated into current PBEA programming. The EEPCT recommendations are primarily related to the ToR elements of management, resource allocation processes and risks, external factors and unintended consequences.

- To what degree have EEPCT lessons been operationalized in the PBEA project, especially in the following dimensions?
    - dedicated programme management
    - increased M&E capacity
    - increased emphasis on research and learning
    - enhanced field participation in informing country selection goals
    - more developed local M&E plans with subsequent human and financial capacity
    - documentation of design processes
    - developing baselines
    - integrating the cross-border, regional nature of conflict into programming and drawing on UNICEF regional capacity to support assessment, analysis and design.

Annex 8: Country Visit Summaries

The following table highlights the key findings and patterns from the three country programmes that received field visits. The findings are organized into nine categories that roughly follow the ToR categories relevant for field visit triangulation:

Assessment Areas	Country A	Country B	Country C
Background	Country recently finished FT programming which emphasized traditional education programming with some conflict sensitivity. CA almost finished Country doing PBEA programme design now. PBEA is moving to PME unit and will be headed by PB Advisor. PBEA programme expected to be multisectoral; will not sit in education.	Not a Fast Track country. Solid foundation established; Partners at national level are ready; partners at field level being socialized to programme; many programme inputs are ready (e.g., curriculum, training packages). M&E advisor recently arrived; team lacking access to PB expertise.	Country began with Fast Track programming which was heavily influenced by existing understandings of conflict drivers. CA is finished and baselines are being finalized. Partners have been selected and have strong peacebuilding credentials. Staffing is quite high with a peacebuilding M&E advisor as well as a separate peacebuilding advisor at country office.
Programme Coherence	The FT programme internal logic is not fully clear from a PBEA point of view; it does not capture any significant change (access, availability, utilization, awareness, perception, skills, etc.); and the indicators are largely focused on counting activities. However, management noted that the PBEA programme would be significantly different.	Programme is coherent but needs greater attention to measuring changing, including at the outcome level (in process). Lack of differentiation between peace, peacebuilding, peace education and conflict sensitivity. PBEA funding also supports other sectoral initiatives, but the two programmes do not work together.	Programme is coherent but needs greater attention to measuring change at the outcome level (in process). There is a clear understanding of the difference between peacebuilding and peace education, and programme is linked to a specific dimension of peacebuilding.

Assessment Areas	Country A	Country B	Country C
Feasibility of Results	PBEA programme not designed yet. However, considering the amount of time remaining and the amount of time it takes to recruit and capacitate staff and the difficulties of the operational environment, it seems unlikely that the PBEA programme will achieve significant results that prove or disprove or provide a foundation for understanding the linkages between education and peacebuilding. Operating environment is challenging. Monitoring, although using some innovative methods, is difficult to verify. Programme may be able to establish a strong foundation with time remaining and achieve some outputs.	Programme is feasible but needs to address a few things: Solid foundation in place, but behavior change not likely by late 2015. It is a positive and solid value for money that programme is being implementing in several States rather than only focusing on only one. It is not clear if targets take into account things that may limit progress (e.g., rainy season, insecurity, staff turn-over, R&R, holidays, availability of cattle camp beneficiaries)). Areas doing life-skills only (which is only once a week) may not be necessary and sufficient to foster change; may want to consider a BCC campaign or other add-ons but the programme has resource constraints.	Programme is feasible and should be able to achieve targeted activities. Some potential for short-term behavior change. Programme has taken the approach of piloting a series of small projects throughout the country, with the expectation of subsequent scale up of these most successful approaches.
M&E Effort Including Attribution and Contribution	FT programme was not measuring change – only counting activities that occurred. None of the FT measures examined conflict sensitivity. The new PBEA logframe will need to clarify how the significant data (see baseline data sources) will be used and how EMIS will support the M&E process While there is a lack of M&E capacity in the programme, recruitment for the new M&E position will begin shortly.	More attention needed but is in progress; need to build on innovations and in-country capacity; capacity building of government to do M&E progressing. Greater attention needed to monitor quality of implementation, particularly given use of cascade model. Need sustained capacity to manage the M&E processes throughout LoP or it will be a threat to evaluability.	Good M&E capacity and well-developed M&E system including a detailed indicator tracking table. Only addition to be evaluation-level indicators related to the key peacebuilding concept.

Management & Governance:	Country A	Country B	Country C
Internal Understanding of Goals and Accountabilities	Everyone interviewed sees the potential connection between education and peacebuilding; however, there is a lack of internal understanding or even a constructive debate about how best to get there. Management noted that the programme globally is limited by a lack of examples or even solid discussion on programming options to draw from.	There is solid internal understanding of the programme, but not all agree education alone will make a difference. Appeared that UNICEF staff, partners and government (national and local) were on the same page and excited about the program.	Solid internal understanding of the programme but are attempting to integrate more cross-sectoral engagement in the programming. Appeared that UNICEF staff and partners had a shared understanding of the programme and were excited about the opportunities.
Management and Governance Capacity	Management structure is influx at the regional and country level -– it will be important to clarify this as soon as possible, ideally before the conflict analysis is complete so that everyone is on the same page during programme design, M&E design and implementation. It is unclear what everyone's role will be with these new structures (country and region). It is important the roles, responsibilities, lines of communication and accountabilities be clearly defined as soon as possible.	There are dedicated resources for management functions. New staff coming on board – this will help; team would benefit from access to PB expertise. Given access issues more capacity at the field level may be necessary and given the cascade model more supervision at the field level may be needed; this will require additional resources.	Good management and governance capacity at this time.
Resource Allocation	Global resource allocation process has had a negative impact; team felt rushed to put the FT programme in place; in current fiscal year, they feel that PBEA programming is being threatened; they do not know if they have an overall allocation or a firm budget to work with; Senior Management noted that short-term funding prevented long-term planning. Management was clear on the global programme and is examining ways to develop country-level PBEA programme that builds on in-country capacity and	HQ global allocation process is short term; this is negatively impacting longer term planning; greater attention in country to budgeting linked to detailed implementation plans needed. Different layers of country management were very clear on the global programme and need for separate management, monitoring and measurement systems. Programme builds on previous capacity in country including that of partners.	Biggest issue has been with allocating resources to partners as they country programme has to use short-term PCAs which can inhibit long-term planning.

Assessment Areas	Country A	Country B	Country C
	experience. Team is building separate management and M&E systems to ensure contribution to global programme can be identified and managed – but programme design was still in process.		
Ethical, Access & Security Issues to Limit Access	Security situation limits access Significant attention is needed to ensure programming is conflict sensitive. Programming in cleared areas could cause additional clan/sub-clan issues. A strong beneficiary communications plan may be needed.	Nothing too apparent – except concerns about access during rainy season given limited roads. The final evaluation should be scheduled during the school year and not during rainy season – which provides a small window of opportunity.	Some regions are very difficult to access due to security limitations. As much data on outcomes that can be collected prior to final evaluation, the better to mitigate the need for outsiders to travel to high-risk regions.

Assessment Areas	Country A	Country B	Country C
Attention to Risk Management & Unintended Consequences	Management reported that there is a full risk-management plan and it is used to inform programming. The FT programme did not include a system to capture unintended consequences (positive or negative). It does not appear that a risk analysis was conducted to determine the potential impact of a 6–9 month fast-track programming (i.e., if the programme covered teachers' salaries what happens after the funds ends or when salaries are not harmonized?). It was not clear how inputs were provided in a conflict-sensitive way given access issues which could have negative unintended consequences. Some suggested that all of the above could have had negative implications.	Not fully clear how PBEA has operationalized a country-level risk-management plan, although there were many good examples provided as to how risk is being mitigated. Monitoring system needs to find a way to identify and capture unintended consequences (some positive consequences noted during field trip that would not have been picked up by draft M&E system). Partners may need more training in conflict sensitivity and DNH. Local government in one state expressed concerns about sustainability.	Strong financial and operational risk-management. Less strong programmatic risk-management in documentation although practical use of risk analysis is common in office. Conflict sensitivity is not a strong theme in programming (emphasizing peacebuilding) but a conflict sensitivity analysis could be a good part of a programmatic risk-management approach.

Annex 9: PBEA Contributions to Peacebuilding

Outcome 1: Increase inclusion of education into peacebuilding and conflict-reduction policies, analyses and implementation.

General Programming Thrust: Although there is considerable variation among country programmes regarding specificities, the most common two main approaches within this outcome are (1) seeking to have MoE sector plans include some element related to key peacebuilding concepts and (2) seeking to have the education sector included in conflict analyses and national reconciliation. Successes are tracked via variations on the indicator "number of policies and plans adopted with…" Country work plans detail a wide range of activities dedicated towards the development of these plans.

Contribution Challenges: Tracking contributions of the PBEA to changes in policy will be challenging. Country programmes can point to governments adopting policies such as the example in one country where the Ministry of Education adopted the enhancement of social cohesion as a major focus of the MoE annual work plan. However, there are many actors working with government sectors, many of whom are considerably larger and more influential than UNICEF or the PBEA programme. The challenge is then to demonstrate the connection between the PBEA programmed activities and the subsequent adoption of policies. This probably needs to occur in two steps: The first step is to track the completion or noncompletion of targeted activities in the country PBEA work plans for Outcome 1. The second step would be to develop targeted case study approaches that seek to articulate the role and process by which government sectors adopted policies and PBEA's relationship to these processes.

The second contribution challenge relates to the link the contributions to peacebuilding from the adoption of these education policies to respond to the question of whether the inclusion of education in these policies (or the inclusion of peacebuilding concepts into education) led to changes in social cohesion, resilience or human security. The challenge at this level is to develop indicators (perhaps intermediate indicators as well) and develop baselines related to these concepts and to develop a measurement strategy related to tracking the effect of these policies over time. This type of national-level measurement is likely well beyond the scope of the M&E capacity of PBEA and national governments, but the research strategy could play an important role in tracking this contribution over time.

Country Programme Status: Country programmes reviewed appear to be tracking activity-level elements and the number of policies adopted; however, data is not yet well systematized in a majority of country programmes. Only two countries reported having developed a complete indicator tracking table for activity, output and outcome-level indicators. Country programmes had been including small case studies in reporting, but a global case study strategy is just now being rolled out for FY13. In all countries, it does not appear that the research strategies are yet developed for tracking contributions to either PBEA's role in policy development or to tracking long-term changes in social cohesion, resilience or human security as a result of these policy changes.

Outcome 2: Increase institutional capacities to supply conflict-sensitive education.

General Programming Thrust: Most of the country programme operational matrices emphasize increasing partner institutional capacities rather than UNICEF capacities. Within this outcome, a common approach involves targeting curriculum reform to include elements related to key peacebuilding concepts (such as social cohesion, tolerance and life skills) and to train teachers on the principles of conflict-sensitive education.

Contribution Challenges: Challenges to tracking PBEA contributions to curriculum reform and to teacher capacity building are similar to Outcome 1 but to somewhat less of a degree. There are still multiple actors involved in curriculum reform and teacher capacity building, but it is somewhat easier to disaggregate individual actor contributions to these changes. Relevant approaches for this Outcome mirror Outcome 1 – tracking activity completions, developing a case study strategy that articulates the role and process by which curriculum reform occurred or to understand PBEA contributions to teacher capacity building and then developing an approach to track changes in social cohesion, resilience or human security in areas where the curriculum and teaching is being applied. Again, this latter type of tracking may be beyond the scope of the PBEA or government M&E systems, but the research strategy could be a key resource for articulating this contribution.

Country Programme Status: Country programmes are tracking activity-level results (number of trainings, participants, etc.). Baselines have not yet been done on current stakeholder capacity for conflict-sensitive education. Country programmes had been including small case studies in reporting, but a global case study strategy is just now being rolled out for FY13. In all countries, it does not appear that the research strategies are yet developed to track contributions to either PBEA's role in curriculum reform or capacity building or to track long-term changes in social cohesion, resilience or human security as a result of these curriculum changes.

Outcome 3: Increase capacity of children, parents, teachers and duty-bearers to cope with conflict and promote peace.

General Programming Thrust: Common approaches among the country programmes related to this outcome include activities targeting like-skills training, peer mediation approaches and psycho–social support. Most of these activities are carried out with nongovernmental partners and are based on specific Programme Cooperative Agreements (PCAs).

Contribution Challenges: Tracking PBEA contributions in this outcome tends to be more manageable than the first two outcomes. Specific PCAs with local partners usually include a baseline measurement requirement, and partner implementation scope can be tracked more easily through programme documentation. As such, it is more likely to be able to track contributions within the existing PBEA M&E system through the development of specific baseline measurements targeting changes in knowledge, skills and attitudes, as well as tracking specific activities implemented. PBEA should be able to fairly confidently articulate which elements of their support contributed to these changes. There still remains the greater challenge of tracking the contributions of these changes in skills, knowledge or attitudes to changes in social cohesion, resilience or human security. However, the more limited scope of implementing partner programming in this outcome suggests that this could be done via additional baseline surveys of key concepts, rather than needing to draw on the research strategy for complementing existing M&E.

Country Programme Status: In at least four countries reviewed, PCAs have been developed with local partners, and baseline requirements are included in these PCAs targeting changes in output-level indicators (changes in knowledge, skills or attitudes). However, baseline tools reviewed by the EA still need considerable improvements in survey construction in order to generate usable evaluation information.

Outcome 4: Increase access for children to quality, relevant conflict-sensitive education that contributes to peace.

General Programming Thrust: Key initiatives adopted within this outcome relate to educational infrastructure development and the promotion of child-friendly school models. The former is often in collaboration with MoE, sector while the latter is carried out in some country programmes via MoE and in other country programmes via PCAs with local partners.

Contribution Challenges: Tracking PBEA contributions to this outcome should not present as much challenge as Outcomes 1 and 2. Activity implementation can be collated, and key measurements tend to focus on rates of enrollment, retention and drop outs. At this level, educational system M&E should be sufficient provided that it is possible to disaggregate this data to track changes in these rates in areas that have received educational infrastructure support or capacity building in CFS. Where PCAs were developed with local partners, tracking changes in CFS output indicators through interviews and baselines is usually included. The greater challenge relates to tracking the contribution of the establishment of this infrastructure and models to changes in social cohesion, resilience or human security. When implementation is done with local nongovernmental partners, PCAs can add a baseline measurement process tracking these peacebuilding concepts within the implementation scope of the local partner. However, it may be more difficult to track the contributions to these peacebuilding concepts when implemented through national governmental strategies. The research strategy could be an important resource for understanding these contributions that may lie beyond the scope of the M&E capacity of government and/or PBEA.

Country Programme Status: Activity-level tracking appears to be well documented. Country programmes are collecting national-level data on enrollment, retention and drop outs. However, in reviewed countries, this data needed to be further disaggregated if it was to be used to show changes in these indicators as a result of PBEA targeted activities. PCAs do include some basic baseline data on models and practices, but more is needed to be done regarding inclusion of measuring key peacebuilding concepts in baselines. The current country research strategies are not being used to measure these long-term changes related to educational infrastructure development.