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BASELINE REPORT

Constructing Coalitions to Reduce Human Rights Abuse by Security Forces in Northern Nigeria

Data collected in January-March 2014
Report completed in June 2014

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1. Executive Summary

Search for Common Ground-Nigeria secured an 18 month grant from the US Department of State –Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL) to carry out the project “*Constructing Coalitions to Reduce Human Rights Abuse by Security Forces in Northern Nigeria*” in Plateau and Bauchi state.

Search for Common Ground was founded in 1982 and works to transform the way the world deals with conflict away from adversarial approaches and towards collaborative problem solving. SFCG operates in 30 countries worldwide including 15 sub-Saharan African. SFCG has worked for nearly 10 years in Nigeria with offices in Abuja, Jos and Port-Harcourt. One element of the Nigeria country strategy revolves around promoting peacebuilding in areas of tension. This project falls firmly into this category, while other major projects deal with mitigating violence in Plateau State and supporting the reintegration of ex-combatants in the Niger Delta. SFCG’s toolbox includes consensus-based advocacy training, public communications training, media training and production, and the facilitation of dialogue processes. SFCG combines these tools in innovative ways to engage all levels of society.

Escalating violence in Northern Nigeria has necessitated the deployment of a heightened security presence across the region. While security forces have a mandate to maintain peace, their officers have been implicated in human rights abuse against civilians. Serious abuses include extrajudicial killing, rape, torture, arbitrary detention, extortion, and harassment. A corrosive culture of corruption has yielded gross mismanagement of funds and helped create a climate in which many soldiers are motivated more by their own economic, religious, and ethnic interests than by civic duty. Impunity for those who commit abuses leaves little disincentive to dissuade future violations. These abusive practices have eroded public confidence in the security sector, alienated security forces from the citizens they are charged to protect, and thwarted the effectiveness of their mission.

Search for Common Ground Nigeria (SFCG-N) believe it is becoming evident to key stakeholders – including within government and civil society – that the status quo is untenable and that there is an urgent need to reframe the relationship between the security sector and society. While history will not be rewritten overnight, important actions can be taken now to provide an example for a relationship shift in the future. Based on successes in Nigeria and elsewhere in Africa, SFCG is proposing a project to build coalitions and capacities among networks of civil society, the judiciary, the National Human Rights Commission, and within the security services. SFCG intends to do this as pilot projects in areas in the North Central and North East zones that are notorious for violence: Plateau State and Bauchi State. Working in these sensitive areas will help set a model and example for other areas. Employing our Common Ground Approach, we aim to bring key stakeholders together with security actors to promote meaningful dialogue and pursue collaborative solutions, as well as create a lasting and effective “Peace Architecture” to support human security and prevent abuses at all levels.

SFCG will continue to work with the Center for Advocacy, Justice and Rights (CAJR) on an ongoing project funded by the US Department of State –Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL) in Plateau State and with the Bauchi Human Rights Network (BAHRN) in Bauchi State on an 18 month project funded by DRL.

The focus of the project will be the creation of a Peace Architecture, a long-term coalition of stakeholders working to improve the situation at various levels, equipped with the tools they need to help reduce security sector human rights abuse. Opening up civil dialogues with the security actors will foster long-term connections that will be play critical roles in preventing security sector abuse in the future.

Objectives of the Project

The overall objective of the project is to strengthen engagement and advocacy processes to reduce human rights abuse by security forces in North East and North Central Nigeria. Specific objectives include:

- Objective 1: Building CSO and NHRC capacity in human rights monitoring, reporting and advocacy.
- Objective 2: Establishing a platform between the NHRC, civil society, and judiciary for effective action
- Objective 3: Improve communication and understanding between affected communities, key stakeholders, and security actors on human rights issues.

The key activities of the project will include a series of monitoring, reporting, and advocacy trainings for key civilian organs and radio programming to shift public norms and expectations of security force behavior. We will then work to develop joint strategies and coalitions. Finally, we will train security forces and organize regular dialogues and community events to promote an inclusive approach to security.

The target audiences for the project are:

- Governmental actors – NHRC, Security actor such as the police, the Special Joint Task Force (set up to deal with intercommunity violence) and local judges
- Non- governmental actors – CSOs involved in monitoring and advocating for human rights including groups such as Network on Police Reform in Nigeria (NOPRIN), women's rights organizations, youth groups and religious associations
- Journalist as management of information and rumors are important in conflict dynamics
- Citizens of affected communities

Objectives of the Baseline Study

In Plateau State, under the current DRL grant, SFCG and CAJR conducted a baseline study, which enabled us to identify actors from these target groups. The objectives of the baseline are:

1. To identify appropriate actors in Bauchi, map out key regional parties, issues and interests, as well as identify specific challenges and opportunities present
2. To determine the present levels of interaction, engagement, and capacity existing among regional NHRC staff, relevant CSOs, and judicial actors.
3. To inform project design, specifically tailoring each aspect of our capacity and platform-building activities to reflect the present problems and future opportunities identified in the report

The research period was between January 22 and February 1 2014. The exercise collected qualitative data via a literature review of existing reports, 40 key informant interviews (KIIs) and four Focus Group Discussions (FGDs). The baseline also involved the collection of quantitative data in Bauchi, the state capital of Bauchi state, through the collection of 419 surveys from members of the community in Bauchi State. The target groups for the baseline were security actors, community and religious leaders, women and youth leaders, civil society, the judiciary, government officials, the media and NHRC.

Key Findings

1. Violence and human rights abuses is an active part of life in Bauchi state. Within this last month, 54% of survey participants say that they witnessed 2-5 cases of violence, while 28% of total respondents said that they had heard of a violent incident at least once.
2. Violence mostly takes place in mixed-religious communities (almost 80% of respondents), and women (32%), youth (29%), and children (29%) are most affected. The most common types of incidents are believed to be rape, followed by arbitrary detention and torture.
3. Most surveyed groups perceive security forces (over 45%) to be the main perpetrators of abuses, while over 60% of security forces and women believe that it is youth. Many people are concerned about youth becoming involved with drugs and being manipulated by government officials or security forces for personal gain. With security forces, there is a strong lack of trust from the community, who see security forces as either direct perpetrators or complicit in the abuses of others. Still, most people see security forces as chiefly responsible for reducing violence.
4. There is a need to build stronger collaboration both among human rights organizations and CSO and between security and other community stakeholders who can play a role in reducing human rights violations, such as government, CSOs, and religious and community leaders.

2. Abbreviations

BAHRN	Bauchi Human Rights Network
CAJR.....	Center for Advocacy, Justice and Rights
CSO.....	Civil Society Organizations
DRL	The US Department of State- Bureau of Democracy, Human rights and Labour
FGDs.....	Focus Group Discussions
KII	Key Informant Interviews
NGOs.....	Non-Governmental Organizations
NHRC.....	National Human Rights Commission
SFCG	Search for Common Ground
US.....	United States

3. Background Information

Introduction

Nearly 15 years after Nigeria's return to democratic rule, Africa's most populous nation remains firmly divided along regional and ethno-religious lines. The federal government has responded to recurrent communal violence and terrorist attacks in the North East and North Central zones by deploying a heightened security presence. While security forces have a mandate to maintain the peace, its officers have been implicated in rampant human rights abuse against civilians.

Nigeria's enduring history of security sector human rights abuse dates back to the colonial era. British indirect rule deliberately entrenched and exploited ethnic rifts by elevating outside ethnic minorities to police indigenous majorities. Following independence, the military became heavily politicized and ethnically driven by the regime in power at the time (Anugwom, July 2001). By the time the current civilian government came to power in 1999, Nigeria had experienced more than 30 collective years of military rule. While subsequent commissions laid bare some of the past's abusive practices, the "climate of militarized fear" they found military rule created in "the psyche of ordinary citizens" endures on the checkpoint-dotted streets of Jos and Bauchi (Human Rights Violations Commission (HRVIC Report, May 2002). There is a broad recognition that change is needed, even in the direst and most tense parts of the country.

The North East zone faces its own unique host of regional challenges. The region is demographically distinct from North Central due to its clear Muslim majority, and in many ways the ethno-religious roles are reversed. Christian minorities complain of marginalization and repression at the hands of Muslim-dominated state and local governments. Severe poverty has created a climate in which extremists can easily find recruits. An illustrative report found 70 percent of North East Nigerians live on less than a dollar a day, compared to 50 and 59 percent in the South West and South East (HRW, October 2012).

Since its 2009 emergence, radical Islamist group Boko Haram has played a significant role in necessitating the military deployment. In seeking to undermine the secular state, the terrorist sect has specifically targeted security forces, as well as worshipping Christians and Muslims viewed as unsympathetic to its cause. The group's shooting and suicide bomb attacks have become more frequent and ambitious, claiming more than 1,000 lives in the past 12 months. Boko Haram has frequently targeted both North East and North Central zones, and attacks tend to inflame communal violence by sparking self-perpetuating cycles of indiscriminate reprisal attacks. The situation has been complicated by the rise of new radical Islamist groups, such as Ansaru, which reportedly executed seven foreign workers after abducting them in Bauchi State last month (BBC News, March 11 2013).

The security response to the widespread violence has been heavy-handed and largely ineffective. The deployment of the Joint Military Task Force (JTF) has done little to stem the violence. SFCG and other organizations have documented a pattern of human rights abuse

perpetrated by security forces during community raids (SFCG, Oct 2012). Routinely carried out after attacks, these raids frequently involve arbitrary arrests, beatings, torture, and property damage. Security forces have also been implicated in hundreds of extrajudicial killings of suspected militants and innocent civilians. Following the 2008 crisis in Jos, Human Rights Watch documented 133 cases of unlawful killings by MOPOL and military personnel (HRW, July 2009). UN reports have also substantiated such killings, which have been counterproductive to the aim of restoring peace and order (Alton, January 2006). Boko Haram leader Mohammad Yusuf's 2009 extrajudicial execution exacerbated anti-government sentiment and lent credence to his sect's defense that it is combating government brutality.

Security forces routinely subject citizens to arbitrary and degrading punishments for minor violations, and employ the threat of death or injury to extract money from detainees and their relatives. Security forces have also been implicated in incidents of rape and gender-based violence, an issue that Amnesty International called "endemic," citing authorities' consistent failure to prevent and address it (Amnesty International, 2012).

The beleaguered Nigerian legal system offers little recourse to those who have been wronged. Given the pervasive fears of retribution by security forces and, in the case of rape victims, societal stigmatization, very few cases are ever brought against perpetrating officers. The few victims that do attempt to bring claims seldom find justice, and can often find themselves falsely accused of crimes if the defendant has power or money to bribe the police. Impunity for those who commit abuses leaves little disincentive to dissuade future violations. Detainees are often arbitrarily arrested without being informed of the grounds of charges. Nearly three-quarters of Nigeria's 54,000-person prison population is still awaiting judgment in overcrowded conditions, and many have had their stays extended through legal loopholes and a lack of representation (Amnesty International, 2008).

National and local human rights actors are ill-equipped to safeguard human rights protections. CSOs' capacity shortcomings prevent them from effectively engaging with security forces. Since its 1995 establishment, the NHRC has struggled to live up to its mandate, hampered by few resources, limited reach, and an ill-informed staff. The current administration has publicly committed to building this institution, presenting an opportunity for partnership in that process.

Despite these challenges, there are opportunities for change in Plateau and Bauchi states. Community policing units have gained considerable momentum in Bauchi State, and security and government actors have indicated willingness for change to our staff. The situation in Jos has recently improved to create a prime opportunity to reshape the public's relationship with both national and state level security actors, and the latter have expressed their intent to cooperate. The NHRC and CSOs can be equipped to advocate effectively, while security forces can be encouraged to eschew abusive practices. Citizens can come to view security sector abuse as an issue affecting all Nigerians, rather than just their ethnic group. If SFCG and partners in both states can harness opportunities in most tense regions, then there is an opportunity for broader change. SFCG welcomes the challenges of focusing on these areas in order to make an empowering example that an eventual sea change is possible and has

initiated the project ‘*Constructing Coalitions to Reduce Human Rights Abuse by Security Forces in Northern Nigeria*’

Project Overview

The ‘*Constructing Coalitions to Reduce Human Rights Abuse by Security Forces in Northern Nigeria*’ Project will undertake the training and coordinating of key stakeholders to increase their capacity to promote respect for human rights, creating human rights awareness among the general population while managing their expectations and providing government and security actors a venue for constructive dialogue with civil society and affected communities.

Peace promotion efforts are significantly more effective when actors with relevant authority and influence are connected to a wider range of activists. This process allows key actors to develop a shared vision of challenges and opportunities that is more conducive to collaboration and carries mutual benefits for both parties: local organizations gain institutional legitimacy and visibility by dealing with a well-known national organization, while national organizations gain quicker and more reliable access to information, events, and developments at the local community level.

SFCG recognize that many domestic and international observers are skeptical of the NHRC’s ability to effect meaningful change. SFCG is not proposing to work with the NHRC because the institution is effective at present, but because SFCG believes it could be in the future. The NHRC is the most likely government institution to be able to take a lead on this issue, as it has a constitutional mandate to protect human rights and the stature to present its reports before the National Assembly in Abuja, which could present a valuable future public advocacy opportunity.

SFCG has identified two prominent partners to work with. In Plateau state, SFCG is working with Center for Advocacy of Justice and Rights (CAJR), an existing partner on a current grant with the US State Department’s bureau of Democracy, Rights, and Labor. In Bauchi State, SFCG will work with the Bauchi Human Rights Network (BAHRN). This baseline in Bauchi State was conducted by the partner and SFCG staff to assess the level of awareness of human rights and justice among the population, the degree of measures in place to handle cases of human rights abuse and injustice , gaps in coalition efforts in Bauchi state to address cases of human rights violations and find ways to build coalitions and capacities among network of civil society, the judiciary, the National Human Rights Commission and within the Security services, and finally emerging risk. The methodology involved key informant interviews, surveys and focus group discussions.

The baseline study will act as the bedrock upon which SFCG/BAHRN can build the project, specifically tailoring each aspect of SFCG and BAHRN’s capacity and platform building activities based on the report’s findings. The project will complement work already underway by SFCG in northern Nigeria.

This project is critical for the creation of a Peace Architecture, a long-term coalition of stakeholders working to improve the situation at various levels, and who are equipped with the tools they need to help reduce security sector human rights abuse. Opening up civil dialogues with the security actors will foster long-term connections that will be play critical roles in preventing security sector abuse in the future.

4. Methodology

A qualitative/quantitative methodology, based on key informants' interviews/surveys and FGDs, was used to conduct this baseline study.

SFCG used a qualitative/quantitative methodology to conduct this baseline study. The tools used were key informant interviews (KII), surveys and focus group discussions (FGDs). A total of 40 KIIs were conducted among the most influential people in the following categories;

<u>Categories</u>	<u>Women</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Total</u>
Security personnel	1	4	5
Judiciary	2	3	5
Civil society organisations	4	3	7
NHRC	-	1	1
Government	-	4	4
Religious and Community leaders	-	5	5
Media	-	3	3
Women/Women Rights organisations	5	-	5
Youths	-	5	5
Total	12	26	40

See Annex 1 for a full list of people interviewed

The key informant interviews were articulated around semi-structured open-ended questions. Questions were asked about the current security situation in the area, level of human rights awareness, level of interaction, and engagement and capacity of existing regional NHRC staff. They also addressed relevant CSO measures taken to tackle cases of human rights abuse and local perceptions of security personnel on human rights abuse.

The full interview protocol is found in Annex 2. Responses to these questions are covered in the findings section. An important caveat to the interview methodology is that twice as many men were interviewed as women, suggesting a male bias that is also reflected in the rest of the data collection activities.

The baseline survey target was 385 but SFCG was able to conduct 419 surveys. 171 were conducted among females while 248 were conducted among the males, meaning that there is a slight male bias in the survey data.

Categories	# Females	# Males	# Total surveys
Youth	72	75	147
Civil society	24	36	60
Security personnel	10	29	39
judiciary	18	24	42
Religious & Community leaders	-	80	80
Women/Women Leaders	49	2	51
Total	171	248	419

The women, youth, and CSO representatives were randomly selected in the areas where data collection took place. Some of the religious leaders interviewed were women, but for the purposes of this report they will be analyzed as part of the religious and community leaders group. Community leaders are ward or district heads, while religious leaders are those with a leadership position in either a Muslim or Christian religious center. Finally, the security officials were also randomly selected, but they were based in the city center, where it was easier to find security personnel who would consent to being surveyed without their commander's permission.

The surveys were conducted in a total of 31 communities in 8 local government areas (LGAs) in Bauchi state. The criteria for the selection were based on proximity to Bauchi town and areas that had some cases of human rights abuses. The LGA and Communities are;

LGA	Communities in the LGA's
1. Bauchi Town	Yelwa Kagadama, Railway, Tanshi, GRA, Winti Dada, Bakaro, Kobi, Kofar Dumi, Gundun, and Gwalameii.
2. Tafawa Balewa	Maryam, Dunga, Rafin, Gimba, Bununu, Jumbir
3. Toro	Magama, Rinji, Rinzem, Toro Town, Tilden Fulani, Narabi
4. Alkaleri	Metropolis
5. Ganjuwa	Metropolis and Kafin Madaki
6. Dass	Bununu center, Dott, Bun Dott
7. Kirfi	Badara and the metropolis

8. Bogoro	Metropolis
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Four FGDs were conducted, one each with CSOs/Security, Media/Judiciary, Women Leaders, and Youth Leaders. Each FGD contained 6-8 participants for a total of 30 people.

Data Collection Ethics

As part of efforts to ensure good data collection ethics while interviewing, the questions were conducted in the interviewee's choice location and the questions were asked in English and Hausa language based on the level of understanding of the interviewee. Respondents were also informed of the right to stop any interview if they found it offensive or a threat to them and to not answer any question. It was also emphasized that the interview was voluntary as stated in the informed consent we issued (see Annex 3). For the FGDs, a central location was chosen and participants were given more information on the purpose of the baseline and its intended use. Participants were also paid transport reimbursement to cover the cost of their getting to the venue of the FGD. SFCG and partners made sure everyone in the group was free to express their views on the questions asked without letting on person dominate the whole conversation.

Timing

Interviews were held in the place selected by the interviewee and lasted approximately 45 minutes. The KIIs were conducted from January 23- 28 2014 with a break on the 26, making it a total of 5 days for data collection. KIIs were conducted by Sarah Bentu-Ladan and Emmanella Atsen staff at Search for Common Ground, and from BAHRN there was Boxer Ishaku, Ayuba Musa Mahmood, Genesis D. Basu and Ibrahim Babangida. The team met in Bauchi on January 22 and 23, 2014 before the commencement of the baseline to review the questions, map the areas to be covered for the Surveys with the survey assistants and who to target for the KIIs and FGDs. The team reviewed the possible risks associated with the study, and reviewed the interview ethics, which included not making any promises on which the project and organizations cannot deliver. The team met again during the exercise on January 25, 2014 for a debriefing exercise to know how each team was doing and alter some contacts for the interviews as some of the contacts were unavailable and the last meeting was on January 31, 2014 for a debriefing session to discuss the key findings in the field in Bauchi. The results of that activity and the interviews were compiled by Sarah Bentu-Ladan with the assistance of Kyendi Daniel the intern. The process was supported by SFCG's West Africa Institutional Learning Team (ILT), Charline Burton. The FGDs were conducted from January 23-28 2014 with a break on the 26 making it a total of 5 days by the field assistants. All survey forms were submitted on January 29, to SFCG. The team of researchers from SFCG and BAHRN were involved conducting the FGDS and taking notes. The FGDs lasted two days January 29-30 2014 at the DECK Centre.

Limitations

1. There were errors in the survey design, such as confusing or vague questions, and possibly on implementation that have influenced the overall validity of the data and

created contradictions between quantitative and qualitative data. This is true, for example, on the question about the effectiveness of security bodies and the question about who takes action to respond to violent incidents. It is also important to note that the survey data represents the opinions of various stakeholder groups, but do not actually represent public opinion or direct data about security incidences and responses. As a result, the overall survey findings, which form the backbone of this baseline report, are not robust. The conclusions presented in this report should be seen as tentative and deserving of further investigation rather than statistically significant, accurate findings.


2. The inability of the partner BAHRN to book interviews far ahead of time and to give letters informing participants of the project and of the aim of the baseline caused the research team extra difficulty in security interviews. Some key stakeholders were not met with due to additional issues with time constraint. The voice of the Military and the State Secret Service which are both very active members of the security arm were not captured in the baseline, and having an interview with them would have provided the baseline with more useful information on security actors involvement in human rights abuse and their insight on how to change the current challenges.
3. Selection of the participants in the youth FGD was faulty, as the target was to get key youth leaders from the communities. Instead, the youths invited were more along personal basis and not the target group, though they were familiar with the general issue discussed. As a result, the FGD data for the youth will be interpreted as from youth in the general population rather than a group of informed, active youth leaders.
4. The research team for BAHRN was inconsistent. BAHRN had three researchers, of which only one was a staff of BAHRN the other two were volunteers with other commitments which made it difficult for them to be actively involved all through the baseline, but SFCG was able to work well with the team available. Having staff of BAHRN would have made it possible for more commitment rather than have change in research which led to bringing the new team member up to speed. Also having consistent staff of BAHRN would have made it possible for delegation of the booking of interview appointments ahead of time in the absence of the Program Manager.
5. BAHRN did not submit the notes for any of the 8 KIIs it conducted. This report therefore contains only the interview data from the notes of the 32 interviews conducted by SFCG. There is a possibility that the 8 interview notes could have contained important data which would have been useful for the baseline report.

5. Findings

The Nature of Violence

Frequency of Violence


Data indicates that an overwhelming majority of the respondents believe cases of violence did occur in Bauchi state over the last month. Over 60 percent of the security officials and CSOs responded yes to the question “have there been cases of violence in Bauchi State over the last month?” whereas around 50 percent of youth and women gave a positive response. With regard to the number of cases within the last month, **Within this last month, 54% of survey participants say that they witnessed 2-5 cases of violence, while 28% of total respondents said that they had heard of a violent incident at least once.**



Together, these two charts suggest that violence is indeed pervasive and well known about within the Bauchi area among a variety of stakeholder groups.

Frequency of Human Rights Abuses

After being asked about the frequency of violence, survey respondents were asked about whether human rights abuses occurred during this period. The purpose of this question was to help assess if survey respondents knew what human rights abuses were and if they associated them with the violence occurring in Bauchi, or if instead they perceived the ongoing violence as somehow normal or permissible. **The survey results indicated that over 80% of respondents saw the ongoing violence as human rights abuses.** Interestingly, every one of the respondent groups showed between 79 and 88 percent acknowledgement that human rights abuses occurred, including the security officials (81%). This suggests that most population groups have heard of human rights and strongly associate the ongoing violence with human rights abuses.




Having established that human rights abuses are a frequent occurrence in Bauchi state, respondents were then asked to identify what type of human rights violations were the most common. The data below shows that respondents believe that rape is the most common case of human rights abuse that exists in Bauchi. Participants from across all six categories stated that rape cases are rampant in Bauchi, and the women's FGD shared two examples of rape or sexual violence that they had heard of happening recently. Rape is followed by arbitrary detention and torture, which according to those who took the survey are also pervasive in the area.

Given the high instances of rape, gender sensitivity issues are likely to be of strong importance during the project. It may be especially difficult to talk to victims, given the likely stigma attached to being a victim of sexual violence. Finally, SFCG may wish to use this data to encourage security forces to receive training on sexual based violence issues- both on not acting as perpetrators and how to respond appropriately to victims. In turn, SFCG may wish to encourage CSOs and other groups who work on the civilian side to promote awareness and improved dialogue about the issue of sexual violence in their community.

Secondly, while rape can be perpetrated by anyone, it can also be inferred from the data that Bauchi residents are gravely concerned with arbitrary detention and torture. One youth in the youth FGD shared that he/she had heard of a recent case of arbitrary arrest where a group of youth were arrested even before it was known that they were involved in violence. To address this problem, the project will not only need to enhance the awareness of the security personnel to properly treat the people, but also raise the awareness of the local population about their rights as a citizen.

“There are a lot [of incidences] such as thuggery, arrest, rape of girls as young as 5 year by people like police men, there are a lot of cases of rape some girls don’t want to talk and some parent also don’t want to talk about rape. The people who commit the cases of rape do not get persecuted, the people in the area are the ones who report the case and take them to the raper.” - **Mariyam Illiya**



* Respondents had the option of choosing multiple answers.


In sum, most respondents from all survey groups are aware that violence has occurred in their area in the last month, and most people have heard of between 2 and 5 cases. The survey respondents overwhelmingly connect these incidents with human rights

violations, of which they believe that rape is the most prominent, followed by torture and arbitrary arrests.

Victims and Perpetrators of Violence


Victims

Given the strong tensions between herder/Muslim and pastoralist/Christian communities in Northern Nigeria, it was next important to identify which groups were the primary victims of the human rights abuses that occur so frequently. The data was very clear on this issue—**nearly 80 percent of the survey participants believed that mixed religion communities were mostly affected by human rights abuses.** This suggests that communities with religious minorities are more prone to falling into violence than unmixed communities, and that the project should target human rights dialogue in these areas, rather than in villages primarily settled by only one religious group.



* Respondents had the option of choosing multiple answers.

Survey respondents were also asked to identify which sub-groups within each community were most targeted by violence. According to the data, women, followed by youth and children are the most vulnerable group in Bauchi. 32 percent of those surveyed stated that women are mostly affected by human rights abuses while 29 percent maintained that youth and children are impacted the most.



This makes sense given that in conflict contexts women, youth, and children are particularly vulnerable to violence, especially sexual violence, such as the high rate of rape believed to exist in the community. * Respondents had the option of choosing multiple answers.

Participants from the interviews and the women and youth focus groups shared ways in which they felt that women and girls are exposed to human rights abuses:

“A woman struggles to feed her family while the husband only brings little. Women are vulnerable as some men do not care about the wellbeing of their wives and children she as a woman had to advocate for the women in her community to stand their ground and ensure they are taken care of.” –FGD Women

“Women are most affected because men violate women’s right and when they go to report the cases they are told the man is the head and they ignore the woman cases.” –FGD Youth

“Women are not given the freedom to vote, or campaigning, their freedom is limited, money for registration is often higher than women can afford, they cannot participate in politics effectively.” –Zulehatu Mallam


“Rape cases are hardly reported and difficult to prove as a medical exam needs to be taken within a short period of time and these are some of the challenges the judicial system is facing as people don’t report so its hard to document.” –FGD Media, Judiciary, and NHRC

“Rape and the victims are tender aged girls rapped by elderly men who rape girls as young as five years old” –Salamatu Aba, NIPR

Others shared examples of the way that children and youth are vulnerable in Bauchi, and the frequency with which security forces fail to appropriately respond to the situation. For example, one participant in the media focus group shared that there had been a recent case where a 6 month year old child was flogged by her father for crying, and while the man was arrested and apologized there has been no further action on the case. The same FGD also shared an example of a 6 year old boy having his genitals cut off and then his parents disappeared. These two examples and the survey data suggest that the general environment of lawlessness and lack of understanding about how to cope with frustration/anger creates a situation of intense vulnerability for children.

Perpetrators

Survey respondents overwhelmingly identified (by over 45% each) security forces and youth as the primary perpetrators of human rights abuses in Bauchi. Interestingly the survey data showed that youth, community and religious leaders and CSOs mostly consider security personnel as the perpetrators of violence whereas women and security officials believe that youth commit violence. This indicates that there are several parties that commit and beget violence, but that women are more likely to observe or experience violence from youth, and other groups are more likely to observe or experience violence from security officials.



Regarding security, one key informant from within the government stated that, “The actions of the police have not shown respect for human rights, as they have been behind cases of abuse, beatings and torture so how can we call the police a friend?” Many other interviewees echoed this sentiment, accusing police of either committing abuses or standing idle while they occurred. However, one security official interviewed acknowledge the dilemma facing many security officials in doing their jobs, “the challenge is there is conflict of interest between security ways and human rights, human rights is currently working on banning torture and yet there are instances where torture is the only way to get information so this is a challenge there is need to find a meeting point on some of the principles of human rights and the implementation of security activities.” This suggests that security official may not have adequate training, and that efforts to educate security forces on how to perform their jobs without torture or arbitrary arrest may be impactful.

Regarding youth, both the women’s FGD and one interviewee suggested that politicians and security forces frequently manipulate youth, through drugs and other means, to commit acts of thuggery that provide political gain. Another participant said such youth commit home break-ins with the passive agreement of security, or that they are able to bribe their way out of an arrest. This data indicates that it is extremely important to make sure that youth are involved heavily in the project, as they are both a main category of victims and perpetrators. It is also clear that police/security forces are widely seen as either the direct perpetrator in violence, crime, and human rights violations, or that they are otherwise in tacit support of others who commit such violations.


* Respondents had the option of choosing multiple answers.

Responses to Violence

Given the high rates of violence in Bauchi, SFCG also wanted to examine what responses are most common to these incidents, and by whom. A quick look at the graph shows that people believe that approximately half of the cases were reported to security personnel while 25 percent of the cases were referred to court. Furthermore, 15 percent of the respondents opined that ‘nothing’ was done to address these cases. This indicates that majority of the people rely on security officials for tackling the cases of violence. However, there is conflicting information with the interview data, which suggests a

“When cases of abuse happen, people will talk about it within the 3-4 days but give it 10 days it will start to go down and eventually the cases will die down. [I have] personally not witnessed a real action taken against a culprit” –Habiba Mohammed of FOMWAN

general environment of either apathy, mistrust, or a general reluctance to report crime. One person in the media, judiciary, and NHRC FGD shared that it is generally difficult to know which cases have occurred as people don’t report because they believe nothing will be done about it. Others are afraid because they fear that they cannot afford to go to court. Two similar examples were shared involving women being raped and the media letting the case die quietly. Despite the slightly different information presented in the interview and survey data, there is still a large percentage of cases that do not get reported or documented by official authorities. This corroborates the information shared above about a general lack of trust in security officials.




* Respondents had the option of choosing multiple answers.

When asked which organizations work to tackle human rights violations in Bauchi, it was clear that very few people are aware of any ongoing efforts. Around 25 percent of those surveyed knew that Legal Aid Council, CSO and NHRC are working to tackle cases of human rights violations in Bauchi. Surprisingly, 7 percent of the respondents did not know about any of these organizations. This general lack of awareness suggests that it would be valuable for the project to focus on helping existing human rights actors to raise their profile and become more known within the community. Summarized one participant from the media, judiciary, and NHCR focus


group, **“A lot of people don’t even know that there are CSOs and the NHRC in Bauchi, so there is need to create awareness. Of the activities of such organizations in the area of monitoring, advocacy and reporting, the media should be involved in trainings not just the coverage but they should be part of those who are to be empowered and taught how to report cases of human rights . That way they can also work together.”**

One other pertinent issue raised in the qualitative data collection was the connection between the lack of a National Human Rights Office branch locally and a lack of government support for CSOs working on human rights issue. This was raised in three separate key informant interviews. One participant in particular shared that, *“The NHRC has no state offices as and long as there are no state offices then it will continue to be distant from the people as people do not have access then it is an abuse. There is need for them to be at the senatorial level and not just be in the FCT and it will help them see what they do. For instance NAPTIP operates at zonal level and it is far from people it should be in every state if truly they want to address the cases of human rights they need to disintegrate and meet people at the grass roots. As it takes too long for cases sent to them to be handled and they seem to be unable to handle the number of cases that gets to them.”*



* Respondents had the option of choosing multiple answers


Finally, when it comes to suggestions about how to improve responses to human rights violations, around 54 percent of the participants suggested that to mitigate cases of human rights abuse, human rights awareness need to be increased. It is important to note that while the survey question asks about “prosecution”, this was used as a general term to reference response to violent incidents. The data shows that survey participants believe that many Bauchi citizens are not equipped with the essential knowledge of human rights and are not familiar with organizations addressing human rights cases. The project may consider working with human rights and security actors in some sort of joint advocacy and awareness campaign in different communities affected by violence.



The qualitative data also has some valuable suggestions for addressing violent conflict. Four separate key informant interviewees spoke about the overall lack of coordination between security, government, CSOs, and the human rights community, arguing that such collaboration would improve capacity and collaboration in addressing violence and human rights abuse cases.


Security

When asked who was responsible for bringing violence under control, 61 percent of the survey participants maintained that security personnel were responsible for bringing violence under control while 25 percent said that community leaders controlled cases of violence. Interestingly, 9 percent of the respondents believe that religious leaders should control the violent cases and 5 percent stated that civil society did the same. This suggests that people overwhelmingly look to security personnel to address violence issues, but overall do not believe that religious leaders and civil society have an obligation around this issue. It may therefore be in the best interest of the project to facilitate conversations around the roles/responsibilities of non-security bodies to promote a whole-of-community based approach to reducing violence. ⁱ




* Respondents had the option of choosing multiple answers.

When survey respondents were then asked about their level of satisfaction with security, around 70 percent of the respondents were ‘satisfied’ and ‘fairly satisfied’ with security agents during and after conflict. This finding strongly contradicts almost all of the qualitative data, which indicates a dissatisfaction and a distrust of the police. However, errors in quantitative data collection may be the reason for this gap; SFCG staff believe that there may have been surveyor errors on this question or alternatively survey respondents were afraid of security personnel repercussions for not answering positively, and that the qualitative data better reflects the local reality.





Survey respondents were then asked more specifically to what degree they felt that security forces respected human rights in the Bauchi state. Interestingly, nearly 60% of respondents indicated “no”, and all groups other than security (less than 30%) believed by 50% or more that security forces did not respect human rights. This data is contradictory of the survey data above, and further strengthens the likelihood that the qualitative data accurately diagnoses a deficit of trust and satisfaction between community members and security/police officials.



Human Rights Actors

All groups surveyed are aware of a coalition of human rights actors in Bauchi. 70 percent of the survey participants maintained that there is a coalition or network of human rights actors in Bauchi states. For example, a woman in the women’s FGD identified the BAHRN and several of its member organizations. This suggests that it is not necessary for SFCG to work to create a coalition of human rights actors, but instead that there is an existing network or platform to engage for dialogue and capacity building.

The second chart below shows the survey data when respondents were asked to rate the effectiveness of the human rights actors. While almost all groups scored the human rights actors as “good” by at least 60 percent, this may be contradictory of data presented above, where respondents were asked to identify which actors in Bauchi were working on human rights and less than 30% of respondents were able to identify a human rights organizations. The reason for this contradiction is unclear, but SFCG staff suggests that it may be because BAHRN selected the surveyors, who may have wished to create a positive representation of the organization and have altered the answers of survey participants. However, there is no evidence that this has actually occurred. This issue of effectiveness from both security and human rights actors needs further clarification.



6. Recommendations and Conclusions

Reviewing all of the baseline data, the following are the main conclusions of the baseline report:

1. Violence and human rights abuses is an active part of life in Bauchi state. Within this last month, 54% of survey participants say that they witnessed 2-5 cases of violence, while 28% of total respondents said that they had heard of a violent incident at least once.
2. Violence mostly takes place in mixed-religious communities (almost 80% of respondents), and women (32%), youth (29%), and children (29%) are most affected. The most common types of incidents are believed to be rape, followed by arbitrary detention and torture.
3. Most surveyed groups perceive security forces (over 45%) to be the main perpetrators of abuses, while over 60% of security forces and women believe that it is youth. Many people are concerned about youth becoming involved with drugs and being manipulated by government officials or security forces for personal gain. With security forces, there is a strong lack of trust from the community, who see security forces as either direct perpetrators or complicit in the abuses of others. Still, most people see security forces as chiefly responsible for reducing violence.
4. There is a need to build stronger collaboration both among human rights organizations and CSO and between security and other community stakeholders who can play a role in reducing human rights violations, such as government, CSOs, and religious and community leaders.

As a result, the following recommendations are made:

1. Work to sensitize security officials about the needs of women, children, and youth as victims of crime, particularly with relation to instances of sexual violence. Investigate whether special sensitivity training or code of conduct work is needed for security officials.
 2. Work with BAHRN to strengthen their coalition building efforts, and conduct targeted outreach to security officials in the Bauchi area.
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