

GRANT # S-LMAQM-09-GR-526

# Governance Promotion through Conflict Management in Iraq (GPCMI)

January 2009 – December 2010

## FINAL EVALUATION: RESULTS, LESSONS LEARNED, AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE PROGRAMMING



*A NINE Network member discusses mediating a resettlement dispute in Baghdad between IDPs, the Ministry of Oil, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Military.*

**Submitted by:**  
Mercy Corps Iraq

**In partnership with the:**  
Network of Iraqi Negotiation Experts (NINE)

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## Acronyms

DRL	Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
GPCMI	Governance Promotion through Conflict Management in Iraq
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
NINE	Network of Iraqi Negotiation Experts
PDK	Democratic Party of Kurdistan
PUK	Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
TOT	Training of Trainers

## Executive Summary

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Since early 2009, Mercy Corps has supported a nationwide network of 87 Iraqi leaders who are committed to promoting good governance and reconciliation through consensus-based negotiation. With funding from the Department of State's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Mercy Corps established The Network of Iraqi Negotiation Experts (NINE), which includes Sunni and Shia, Arab and Kurd, tribal elders, religious leaders, government officials, politicians, and civil society representatives from every region of Iraq. These leaders have worked together across regional, political, and sectarian lines of division to resolve almost 130 major disputes, including tribal conflicts over land, tensions between citizens and government over services, disputes over elections, and clashes between rival factions of the Iraqi army and police.

Through training in dispute resolution, intensive mentoring and coaching, and support for the direct application of new negotiation and mediation skills, these Iraqi men and women have stepped forward and achieved remarkable results. In addition to resolving nearly 130 disputes, network members are now resolving *more* disputes and reaching agreement *more often* than before the program.

- Participants who considered themselves highly expert in negotiation increased from 27% to 54% over the life of the program. Those who expressed high confidence in their ability to resolve disputes increased from 66% to 80%.
- Participants reporting involvement in three or more dispute resolution attempts in the prior year increased from 71% to 83%.
- Network members also reported higher success rates once they did intervene; participants who reported reaching agreement more than half the time increased from 83% at program start to 98% at program end.

Most important, they are able to point to clear examples of where their interventions have led to a *measurable* reduction in violent incidents. Their efforts have struck an incredibly responsive chord with Iraqi citizens and they have received widespread press coverage in Iraq. Iraqi government authorities have also provided significant monetary and other support to agreements negotiated by network members. Finally, participants' are clearly committed to continuing their negotiation and mediation work and they have taken steps to establish a non-governmental organization, making significant cash and in-kind contributions in order to do so.

A number of factors account for these successes. Network members deserve the greatest credit. They represent a new generation of Iraqi men and women who are willing to put aside differences and take extraordinary personal risks to address the challenges facing Iraq. Another factor in the program's success is strong Iraqi ownership. Mercy Corps Iraq staff played a key role in identifying influential leaders, delivering negotiation training, and mentoring network members as they applied new skills to concrete disputes. Network members also began to take on increasing responsibility for training and for developing

negotiation materials adapted to the Iraqi context. Ultimately, the strong Iraqi 'face' of this program and the emphasis it placed on moving from training to action are the greatest reasons for the program's success.

There are also several areas where the program could be strengthened in order to achieve even greater impact. First, more robust conflict analysis and early warning systems would help network members be more systematic in identifying disputes and would help them intervene earlier, before disputes become intractable. Second, the program fell short of its goal to include 25% women, ultimately reaching only 23%. Women were among the most dynamic network members and the program should recruit more heavily from women's networks in the future. Finally, as network members took on more complex disputes, their need for expertise in areas such as land reform or commercial law also increased. Pairing network members with substantive experts and then linking them to policy debates in key areas will help these Iraqi leaders deepen their expertise and begin to address deeper structural issues that are leading to violence in Iraq.

## 1. Background and Approach

Mercy Corps implemented the two-year, \$2.5 million, *Governance Promotion through Conflict Management in Iraq* (GPCMI) program from January 2009 through the end of December 2010. Funded by a generous grant from the Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor at the United States Department of State, the goal of the program was to help influential Iraqi leaders from all 18 governorates gain the tools, skills, and support they needed to address a wide range of tensions and conflicts that – if left unaddressed – could have escalated to wider violence and threatened to derail Iraq’s fragile transition to peace and democracy.

To support this goal, the program: 1) provided Iraqi leaders at the local and provincial level with conflict management and negotiation tools and skills; 2) worked with these leaders to use their new skills to resolve concrete disputes in their communities; and 3) created a nation-wide network of Iraqi conflict management and negotiation practitioners who would continue this work into the future.

The program began in early 2009 during a period of relative stability following U.S. and Iraqi military successes. However, as Iraq made its way through several critical transitions over the next two years, there were several periods of significant uncertainty and instability. These included provincial elections in 2009, which saw the re-entry of Sunnis into political life following their boycott of 2005 elections; the July 2009 handover of security to Iraqi Forces and the subsequent withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraqi cities into military bases; the March 2010 parliamentary elections that resulted in political deadlock and left Iraq without a sitting government for eight months; and the withdrawal of U.S. combat troops in August 2010.



Although Iraq appears firmly on the path towards stability and reconciliation, each transition discussed above was accompanied by major outbreaks of violence, and tensions in Iraq are still very much on the surface. Every day disputes – over a lack of services, land ownership, or business deals gone wrong – easily flare into wider violence as they are cast in tribal, sectarian, regional, or political terms. And larger disputes – over which tribal elder can stand for political office, who holds decision-making authority in Baghdad, and whether IDPs can return to homes that have been occupied by other groups – still have the potential to seriously jeopardize Iraq’s hard won gains.

To address these challenges, Mercy Corps has supported a nationwide network of Iraqi leaders who are committed to promoting good governance and reconciliation through

consensus-based negotiation. With a presence in every governorate, the Network of Iraqi Negotiation Experts (NINE) includes men and women, Sunni and Shia, Arab and Kurd, tribal elders and religious leaders, government officials, politicians from every major party, and civil society representatives from every region of Iraq. The network's diversity, their ability to resolve concrete problems, and their willingness to put aside differences and work for the benefit of Iraqi citizens is a powerful example of the type of leadership that is poised for success in Iraq.

The program's approach was based on almost 8 years of continuous operations in Iraq and decades of experience in other transitional, conflict, and post-conflict societies. It emphasized: 1) bringing influential leaders from formal and informal governance structures together to develop relationships and learn new dispute resolution skills; 2) helping these leaders work together to resolve *concrete* disputes that were blocking forward momentum and having a direct negative impact on Iraqi citizens; 3) widely publicizing their successes in order to highlight 'bright spots' of cooperation and give people the hope and confidence they need to work together; and 4) putting Iraqis firmly in the lead.

## **2. Methodology**

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The results of this evaluation are based on data gathered through several quantitative and qualitative data collection methods. These include interviews with program staff, a baseline and endline survey, focus group discussions conducted at mid-term, an agreement database and associated agreement forms that were started mid-way through the program, and in-depth case studies on eight agreements.

**Survey Data:** The survey (Attachment 1) was administered to 70 network members at program start and 53 network members at program end. The questions were designed to collect demographic data on program participants as well as track changes in knowledge, attitudes, and behaviors related to conflict management, negotiation, and mediation. The most important questions centered on: 1) levels of knowledge about – and confidence in using – negotiation tools and techniques provided through training; 2) attitudes toward conflict and negotiation; 3) numbers of dispute resolution attempts at program start and end; and 4) negotiation and mediation success rates.

**Focus Groups:** Mercy Corps also conducted focus groups half way through the program in order to supplement the survey data and make necessary course corrections. In total, eight focus groups were held in seven locations from June 3-10, 2010. All program members were invited to participate in focus group discussions; 54 network members (64%) ultimately did so. The questions (Attachment 2) were designed to probe for more information about how participants were using tools and skills, where tools did not work, and recommendations for future programming.

**Agreement Database/Agreement Forms:** The agreement database and agreement forms were introduced mid-way through the program as it became clear that participants were beginning to resolve disputes in large numbers. All of the information in this database and associated forms (Attachment 3) was provided by program participants and verified – where

possible – by Mercy Corps staff. In future programs, Mercy Corps is exploring how to have third party verification of randomly selected agreements, in order to check for potential bias. The agreement forms also track information about: 1) numbers of violent incidents related to disputes both before and after the intervention of network members; and 2) the amount of cash or in-kind contributions provided by local government authorities or community members to the agreement. Since these forms were introduced part way through the program, information related to these two issues is illustrative, not comprehensive.

**Agreement Case Studies:** These case studies supplement the material in the agreement forms and go into much greater depth about process, interests, options, and the tools used in each case. They serve as an important source of information on what worked, what did not, how participants adapted tools to the Iraqi context, and how they worked around obstacles they encountered.

**Missing Data:** In late 2008, Mercy Corps began an initiative to improve its ability to measure *real* impact in peacebuilding programs, such as increases in numbers of disputes resolved and reduction in levels of violence. The tools used to measure impact in the GPCMI are still very new and definitely a work in progress. One important missing piece of information, in addition to the independent verification of agreements discussed above, is a measure of how Iraqi citizens feel about the agreements that NINE Network members negotiate, relative to other forms of dispute resolution. An underlying assumption of the program is that perceptions of governance will improve as leaders employ problem solving techniques that address a range of interests, including the interests of less powerful groups, such as women, minorities, or people with disabilities. In future programs, it will be important to devise measures and tools that can directly test this hypothesis about the relationship between interest-based negotiation and perceptions of good governance.

### **3. Results and Recommendations**

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The following section looks at each of the three major objectives under this grant: 1) negotiation training and material development; 2) application of tools and skills to disputes and dissemination of successes to the Iraqi media; and 3) establishment of an independent, sustainable network of negotiation experts. Under each objective there is a brief description of activities, a discussion of whether the program achieved expected results, and a section on lessons learned and recommendations for future programming.

#### **Objective 1: Strengthen the capacity of influential Iraqis at the local and provincial level to address governance issues in their communities.**

Under this objective, Mercy Corps identified 87 Iraqi men and women for inclusion in the program, provided basic and advanced negotiation training, and developed a negotiation and conflict management toolkit that was tailored to the Iraqi context and translated into English, Arabic, and Kurdish. The activities under this objective were designed to help a cohort of Iraqi leaders gain the expertise, confidence, and materials they needed to tackle a wide range of disputes that threatened to disrupt Iraq's transition to peace and democracy. An important focus of the program was to bring together leaders from Iraq's formal and

informal governance structures – local government officials, political party leaders, tribal elders, religious leaders, and civil society representatives – to encourage these sometimes competitive power structures to work together to resolve issues of mutual concern.

Although the number of people trained is lower than projected at the start of the program, GPCMI achieved strong results under this objective. Survey data show that participants in the program demonstrated a significant increase in their sense of negotiation expertise and in their confidence mediating disputes. Focus group discussions, agreement forms, and in-depth case studies clearly show that participants are familiar with many of the tools and skills provided through workshops and could not only describe them, but could talk about how they used them to resolve disputes. Perhaps most important, Iraqis – both Mercy Corps Iraqi staff and members of the network – clearly took on greater ownership of the program over time, increasing their involvement in providing training and contributing extensively to the conflict management and negotiation toolkit that the NINE Network and Mercy Corps ultimately produced.

#### **A. Activities and Results**

***Basic Negotiation and Leadership Training:*** Mercy Corps held three rounds of basic training in May and June of 2009 in Baghdad, Basra, and Suleimaniyah. An additional round of basic training was held in Basra in October 2009 for individuals from governorates that had been under-represented in the first round. In total, 87 participants (22.9% women, 78.1% men, 50% local government) received basic training. The curriculum introduced basic concepts of interest-based negotiation, including problem solving, dealing with partisan perceptions, good communication skills, and how to frame messages.

For many participants, these initial workshops represented a rare opportunity for leaders from different regions and backgrounds to interact with each other. The Baghdad workshop, for example, was one of the first opportunities for leaders from the mostly Sunni eastern governorates to interact with their Shiite counterparts from the central governorates. Similarly, the workshop in Suleimaniyah brought together Sunnis and Shiites, Arabs and Kurds, and members from the rival Kurdish political parties; the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdish Democratic Party (PDK).

In focus group discussions, the vast majority of participants mentioned that this diversity represented a great strength of the program. For example, one participant from Mosul in Ninewa governorate said that before the program, “it was difficult to imagine that I might even sit with Kurdish leaders from Erbil. But after the political negotiation workshop, not only did we sit together, we even discussed sensitive issues that existed between Mosul and Erbil.” Similarly, a participant from Erbil said that, “there was a long, big gap in our relations with other areas of Iraq. The program rebuilt these relationships to where they were even stronger [than before].”

Diversity did, however, also lead to some challenges. For example, in the Suleimaniyah workshop, there were significant tensions related to whether translators should first translate into Arabic or Kurdish. Mercy Corps staff ultimately addressed this issue by



shifting to simultaneous translation. Similarly, in focus group discussions, participants noted that they were sometimes reluctant to discuss sensitive issues and conflicts in front of Iraqis from other regions and groups. The workshop in Basra, which was a more homogenous (mostly Shiite) group, was able to move much more quickly to a discussion of sensitive issues than other groups, such as leadership competition within tribes.

***Advanced Negotiation and Leadership Training:*** The same cohort of leaders moved on to two separate rounds of advanced negotiation training. The first round rolled out between October 2009 and February 2010 in Baghdad, Basra, and Suleimaniyah. The second round occurred in March and April 2010, with all sessions held in Suleimaniyah for security reasons. The curriculum covered advanced skills that would allow participants to take on tougher issues, such as coalition and consensus-building techniques. As opposed to basic training where participants were grouped based according to geographic location, these workshops mixed participants from all different geographic regions.



In addition to advanced training, in March 2010 Mercy Corps also provided a Training of Trainers (TOT) session in Suleimaniyah for 14 network members (8 Arab/6 Kurdish) who demonstrated strong facilitation skills and a clear commitment to disseminating negotiation knowledge and skills to other Iraqis (see the next section for more detail). While Mercy Corps had initially planned to conduct only one such session, an additional 14 network members requested a second TOT session. This session was co-sponsored by the Training and Teaching Facility at the University of Baghdad in July 2010.

Mercy Corps Iraq staff played a more significant role in advanced trainings, strengthening Iraqi ownership of the program. Three Mercy Corps staff received intensive training over the life of the program. They served as co-facilitators in the first round of advanced trainings (October/November 2009) and led the February 2010 training in Basra. They also co-facilitated the second round of advanced workshops (March/April 2010) and, together with network members, led the session at the University of Baghdad in July 2010. Increased leadership by Iraqis was noted with evident pride by participants in focus group discussions. "One great result [of the program] was to have Iraqi staff taking the lead in advanced negotiation training, proving their ability to do this [together with expatriate staff]". Another participant noted that, "it was a proud moment for us to see the Mercy Corps Iraq staff delivering high quality training [standing] beside US trainers. The skills have been created in Iraq now."

***Conflict Management Toolkit:*** By the end of the program, Mercy Corps and the NINE Network produced a Conflict Management and Negotiation Toolkit in three languages; English, Arabic and Kurdish. The toolkit has three main parts: 1) a description of 12 different conflict management tools (such as the seven elements tool); 2) exercises for learning the tool; and 3) case studies that document the application of different tools to disputes in the Iraqi context. In the past Mercy Corps has found that negotiation training, which often uses examples from negotiations conducted in developed countries, does not always resonate with participants grappling with difficult issues such as tribal disputes or IDP issues. By engaging network members in the development of case studies and by basing these cases on actual disputes, this toolkit is more relevant to disputes in Iraq and the broader region

than many other standard conflict management materials. The toolkit has been printed and distributed to all program participants. It has also been posted on the NINE Network website and on the network’s Facebook page (see below).

**Survey Results:** Results from the baseline and endline survey show a clear increase in participants’ sense of expertise and confidence about using negotiation skills to address disputes in their communities (see tables below). **Participants who considered themselves highly expert in negotiation increased from 27% to 54% over the life of the program. Those who expressed high confidence in their ability to resolve disputes increased from 66% to 80%.** This is an extremely strong result and, as will be discussed in much greater detail in the next section, this sense of expertise and confidence appears to have translated into greater engagement and higher success rates in dispute resolution.



Interestingly, one of Mercy Corps’ core assumptions at program start was that Iraqis would have highly zero-sum attitudes due to years of authoritarian rule and violence. Baseline data definitely show that many participants held zero-sum attitudes. For example, participants were asked to agree or disagree with the statement, “many people are so irrational that it is a waste of time trying to influence them,” an attitude that reflects a fairly zero-sum view of the world. At baseline, 51% of participants agreed with this statement, showing that a slight majority of participants held this view. One of the most intriguing results is that many participants appear to have become *more* zero-sum in their attitudes over time. In response to the same question at endline, 61% of participants agreed with this statement, an *increase* in zero-sum views from baseline to endline. Similarly,

participants who agreed with the statement “effective conflict resolution often relies on the credible threat of force” also increased from 36% to 38%, again a slight increase in zero-sum views from baseline to endline.


It is not clear what explains this outcome. Several possibilities are that: 1) the program started during a lull in fighting and as insecurity increased over the two-year program, participant’s attitudes became more zero-sum through exposure to increased numbers of attacks, such as suicide bombings; and 2) program participants were becoming more engaged in complex dispute resolution, exposing themselves to a wide array of extremely difficult individuals and situations, becoming more jaded about human nature as a result. The questions Mercy Corps used to measure attitudes are still very nascent and it will be important to continue to refine them to better track shifts from zero-sum to positive-sum

attitudes. However, it is also possible that attitudes about conflict are ultimately less important to behavior change than a sense of expertise and confidence in one’s ability to make a contribution.

In addition to an increased sense of expertise and confidence, focus group discussions, agreement forms, and in-depth case studies also show that **many participants had a solid understanding of the tools and skills provided in training**, could list many by name, could discuss their strengths and weaknesses, and were clearly using them to resolve disputes (see the following section for an in-depth discussion of how participants used the tools). One common theme among focus group discussants was that, by virtue of their position as leaders, they already had conflict management skills. What many seemed to value about the training and the interest-based negotiation tools was that they made the process of preparing for negotiations, uncovering interests, generating options, and building coalitions, more ‘orderly’, ‘systematic’, and ‘scientific’. One participant stated that, "previously we were dealing with our conflicts and disputes in a random manner and with whatever data we had immediately available. Now we are analyzing problems, preparing for negotiation, and reviewing the outcomes of negotiation sessions to evaluate the process and identify any mistakes."

## B. Lessons and Recommendations

**Participant Selection:** The diversity of network members was an important factor in the program’s success. By definition, transitional environments are places where different groups are competing over who gets to be in control of key political, social, and economic resources. Mercy Corps therefore deliberately included representatives from across a broad range of fault lines. Program participants



included 41 percent Sunni (55% Arab and 45% Kurdish), 53 percent Shiite, 3 percent Christian, and 2 percent Turkmen. Seventy eight percent of network members were men; 22 percent were women. Most important, the program brought together representatives from both formal and informal governance structures in Iraq. In many transitional societies – particularly those that are torn apart by violence – a central tension is between loyalty to an emergent and often weak modern state system and loyalty to far stronger, more traditional groups, such as tribe, religion, ethnicity, or region. Bringing these leaders together, helping them gain a shared language of dispute resolution, and providing them a safe space to rebuild relationships and discover shared interests was an important part of the program.

To identify these leaders, the program used a rigorous selection process that included a comprehensive scoring process for each candidate by all eight Mercy Corps Iraqi focal points in order to ensure a transparent process. The criteria – recognized leader, active peacemaker, willingness to use new skills to resolve existing disputes, and commitment to the program – ensured that the NINE network included highly motivated, influential Iraqis.

One recommendation is to slightly soften the second criteria, “active peacemaker”, now that there is a solid network of negotiation experts in place. Peacebuilding programs need to strike a delicate balance between including people who are committed to peace and incorporating participants who hold more hard line views about using violence to promote their interests. If there are too many peacemakers, the program is essentially preaching to the choir. Too many hardline elements and there is no room for moderate voices. While the program did include a few hardline participants in the network, as the network looks to the future and grows it will be important to recruit leaders who are influential *and* who have tended to use aggressive rhetoric and tactics in the past to promote their goals.

Another recommendation is to increase the number of religious leaders and political leaders. Although several tribal leaders also self-identified as religious leaders, this group as a whole was underrepresented. Given the very real sectarian tensions that still exist in Iraq, engaging religious leaders could lend greater legitimacy to attempts to mediate these disagreements. Similarly, politicians and political party members were under-represented. This was largely due to the fact that elections were in full swing during much of the program and it was difficult to identify who might ultimately win office. However, in future iterations of the program, the team should seek to include more sitting politicians at multiple levels given the large role many of these leaders play in contributing to political deadlock.

**Women’s Participation:** Women were among the most active members of the network. While Mercy Corps Iraq came close, they fell slightly short of their initial goal of including at least 25 percent women, ultimately reaching only 22 percent. This is partly due to the nature of dispute resolution in Iraq, which has traditionally been dominated by male elders. However, one factor that may have limited women’s participation is the fact that only one out of nine Mercy Corps Iraqi program staff was a woman. By including more female focal points in the future, Mercy Corps should be able to reach out more effectively to women’s networks, such as Al-Amal and Women Peace Builders. In addition, another recommendation is to recruit more heavily from existing Mercy Corps programs that have a strong gender focus, such as the *Supporting Effective Advocacy for Marginalized Populations* program and the *Iraqi Promotion of Women’s Rights* program.

**Quality over Quantity:** The program’s initial estimate of how many Iraqis could be directly trained (250) was too ambitious. The training sessions – while valuable and an important opportunity for face-to-face interaction – were difficult to plan and schedule due to a lengthy candidate selection process and heavy security constraints. As Mercy Corps staff weighed additional training to reach the 250 goal, they realized that it would come at the cost of their ability to provide intensive mentoring and coaching in helping participants actually *use* skills in dispute resolution. The team therefore made an early decision to scale back initial numbers and work intensively with a smaller group, particularly when it became clear that mentoring was leading to high-levels of ‘cascade training’ by Iraqi network members. Ultimately, network members provided training to 1530 additional Iraqis (see below), helping Mercy Corps far exceed its original target of 250.

Recommendations are to continue with this approach and grow the network slowly, keeping only members that are truly active and slowly adding a strategic mix of individuals from key

demographic groups, such as women and religious leaders. One recommendation for adding new members would be to tap into other negotiation training where possible, such as the one run by the United States Institute of Peace. This would allow at least some new members to participate in accelerated training, reducing the time needed for workshops and increasing the time and resources available for direct application of skills.

***Iraqi Leadership:*** Senior Mercy Corps Iraqi staff played an absolutely vital role in the program's success. They identified influential and legitimate local leaders for inclusion in the program, many of whom were not on the radar of Mercy Corps expatriate staff or part of the fairly small circle of Iraqi leaders who are comfortable interacting with international partners. In addition, due to security constraints and the difficulty of bringing in external trainers, Mercy Corps shifted to a model that provided intensive training for Iraqi staff so they could take on more responsibility for training and mentoring participants over time. This shift was a key to the program's success. The Mercy Corps Iraq team is highly motivated and many have continued to work with the NINE Network on a volunteer basis after the end of the program, providing mentoring, website maintenance, contributing to the NINE Network Facebook page, and providing help with the NGO registration process. Continuing to bring in outside expertise is important since it lends prestige, confers legitimacy, and brings a new set of eyes and options to old problems. However, given the solid cohort of Iraqi negotiation trainers now in place, future programs should put experienced Iraqi network members and Mercy Corps staff in the lead wherever possible.

## **Objective 2: Participants apply negotiation skills to improve governance and mitigate conflict at the local and national levels**

Activities under this objective were at the heart of the program. Mercy Corps staff focused on helping participants apply the skills they had learned in two ways: dispute resolution and follow-on training for other Iraqis. Mercy Corps also placed heavy emphasis on disseminating success and lessons, both within the network and to external audiences. The emphasis on disseminating successes through the Iraqi media was to help counter the pervasive negative messages Iraqis hear and to highlight examples of how many Iraqi leaders are in fact putting their differences aside to build a better future.


The results of activities under this objective were extraordinary. Participants in the network used new tools and skills to resolve nearly 130 disputes. Network members are now resolving more disputes and reaching agreement more often than before the program. Most important, they are able to point to clear examples of where their interventions have led to a *measurable* reduction in violent incidents. Their efforts have struck an incredibly responsive chord with Iraqi citizens and with the Iraq press, resulting in dozens of interviews on their dispute resolution successes and their training initiatives. Their efforts have also garnered significant support from Iraqi authorities and businesses in the form of monetary and other contributions in support of negotiated agreements.

### **A. Activities and Results**

Activities are divided into three broad sections; 1) dispute resolution and negotiated agreements; 2) Iraqi-led training; and 3) dissemination of successes to the Iraqi media.

### 1. Dispute Resolution and Agreements:

GPCMI program participants have resolved almost 130 disputes to date. Detailed agreement forms on 13 of these disputes are in Attachment 3. The complete database of agreements is available on request. These disputes cover an extraordinary range, from tribal disputes over land and water, to disputes between local communities and



government authorities over road construction, to an armed clash between the Iraqi army and police over control of a key access road. The chart above shows a rough breakdown of dispute by primary type, although most conflicts had multiple dimensions and are not easily slotted into one category. Land disputes, for example, often had a governance dimension as communities and local government authorities clashed over who owned the land for planned development projects, such as roads or schools.

Survey data show a clear increase in the *number* of times network members became involved in negotiation or mediation attempts; **participants reporting involvement in three or more dispute resolution attempts in the prior year increased from 71% to 83%**. Network members also reported higher *success rates* once they did intervene; **participants who reported reaching agreement more than half the time increased from 83% at program start to 98% at program end**.

In addition, **participants also appear to have taken on more complex disputes over time**, with a shift from small domestic or criminal disputes (e.g. car accidents between individuals or family disputes over housing) to larger, more complex, multi-stakeholder disputes involving issues such as tribal competition over land or political disputes over leadership of trade unions.

Most important, many of the disputes addressed by network members had either the threat of violence or actual violence attached to them. Through network member efforts, there has been a clear **reduction in violent incidents or threats of violence related to many individual disputes**. For example, one agreement negotiated by Christian and Muslim network members resolved a religious conflict between Christians and Shiites in Mosul that had previously led to 4 fatalities and 2 riots, resulting in significant property damage. The fact that network members were able to resolve violent disputes at a time when ambient violence was increasing in Iraq is a truly remarkable achievement. The examples below illustrate the range and complexity of disputes that were addressed by network members.

**IDP Disputes:** While there were relatively few IDP disputes (approximately 6 out of 130), these were among the most emotionally charged disputes, were often related to past violence, and had the potential to reignite old tensions and escalate. For example, one dispute occurred in al-Nahrawan, a district outside of Baghdad which had a mixed Sunni and Shia population. In 2003, sectarian violence began to escalate as young Sunnis, often

without the approval of their tribal elders, joined militant groups and began attacking Shiites. Shiites responded by joining the Mahdi Army and counter-attacking. By 2006 the Shiites had the upper hand, most Sunnis had been pushed out of the area, and their property was taken over by poor Shiites.

In September 2009, the Sunni tribe approached a NINE network member (and head of the city council), for assistance. The mediator first held discussions with Shiite communities to gauge their receptivity to allowing Sunnis to return. Initial reactions were extremely negative. Many Shiites had lost family members during the sectarian violence and several Shiite militants tried to block any deal that would allow Sunnis to return. The first meeting the negotiator held between Sunnis and Shiites in City Hall was very contentious, dominated by extremist factions on both sides, and ended without any agreement. He therefore began to build a coalition of moderate leaders – the sub-district mayor, the police chief, the head of local Iraqi Army Battalion, and other tribal leaders – who could outflank hardline elements. He called for a second round of meetings in early 2010, but first had the city's Military Brigade issue an order that it would arrest anyone suspected of trying to disrupt negotiations. He also excluded hard-line factions from the second meeting, only allowing them to rejoin discussions once more moderate factions had reached preliminary agreement.

The final agreement had the following terms: 1) Sunnis could return to the city; 2) the families that occupied their houses agreed to leave and return to their original homes within a two-month timeframe; 3) people accused of crimes related to sectarian violence would be turned over to the security forces by each community; 4) the government would provide electricity, water, and sewage to all members of the city; and 5) the two groups would establish a committee with representatives from both sides to ensure that the agreement was enforced. To date, this agreement is still in force, and a dispute that had led to over 100 casualties in the past has been resolved, with active participation by a local government official trained through the program.

*Land/Water Disputes:* Out of 130 disputes, 39 were directly linked to competition over land and water. Often, these disputes took on a tribal dimension as different groups competed over agricultural land or access to rivers and irrigation systems. Some disputes dated to the fall of the Ba'athist regime when insecurity and unclear title led to multiple claims of ownership. Other disputes were fueled by development, as municipalities sought to gain access to land for projects such as roads or schools. And in one interesting case, a dispute occurred between two municipalities who were fighting over the same piece of land because they both wanted the tax revenue.

In Anbar, for example, a prominent tribal leader and NINE Network member successfully resolved a land conflict between the Abu Ghanim and Abu Jabbar tribes that dated back 25 years. Both tribes had left their land following floods in 1987. The Abu Jabbar returned first, occupying both their land and 20 acres along a river and strategic road that belonged to the Abu Ghanim. Since then, multiple mediation efforts have failed and both sides have repeatedly threatened the use of force. In January 2010, this tribal leader learned of the conflict and approached the Anbar provincial government, which agreed to establish a

mediation team headed by the network member that included representatives from Tribal Affairs, the Directorate of Agriculture, and the Land Directorate. After 4 months of negotiations using many of the tools learned through training, the negotiator convinced the parties to end their decades old conflict. The terms of the final agreement were that: 1) the Albu Jabbar would return the bulk of the land to the Albu Ghanim tribe, but could keep land where they had built houses or made agricultural improvements; and 2) in exchange the Albu Ghanim could use an irrigation canal that had been restored by the Albu Jabbar tribe without charge and were guaranteed access to both the road and river.

*Political/Governance Disputes:* Roughly 36 of 130 disputes were related to political competition or issues related to governance. Participants in the network helped to resolve disputes between the PUK and PDK over control of labor unions in Dahuk; between the Mayor of Baghdad, the Governor of Baghdad, and the head of the Baghdad Provincial Council over unclear mandates and authorities; between a tribal council and the Iraqi army over ownership of a building; and between tribes competing over who could stand as the candidate for parliamentary elections.

In one particularly compelling case, a conflict erupted between the Iraqi military and the police over control of check points along a key access road that led to important government buildings in Baqubah City, Diyala. The Army believed they were more capable of providing security and also wanted to control the road in order to secure access for military convoys passing through the area. The police claimed that protecting city streets fell within their law enforcement mandate. The relationship between the Army and Police deteriorated to the point where gun fights were taking place between the two sides, resulting in multiple injuries. One of the network's most active members facilitated discussions between the two sides and helped them come to an agreement where they ultimately developed a joint security plan.

*Economic Disputes:* Out of 130 disputes, 23 were economic or commercial disputes, ranging from disputes between business partners over investing, to local government-vendor disputes over the allocation of market stalls, to disputes between farmers and central ministries over agreements to purchase crops.

In one case, a major conflict erupted between the Ministry of Trade and wheat farmers in Salah-al-Din governorate when the Ministry refused to buy the farmers' excess wheat crop. Previously, even if farmers had grown more than the amount they officially registered with the Department of Agriculture, the Ministry of Trade had always purchased the excess. However, in 2009, they refused to do so with no advance warning, leading to huge financial losses for farmers in the region. Farmers began to stage protests in front of stores, the local branch of the Ministry of Trade, and the headquarters of the Directorate of Agriculture.

A GPCMI participant who closely connected to the Farmer's Societies Association in Salah-al-Din and a member of the central tribal council in the governorate, stepped in to mediate. After three months of negotiations where he used the seven element tool and the options development tool, the parties ultimately agreed to: 1) form a committee with representatives from the Ministry of Agriculture, Federation of Agricultural Associations,



and Ministry of Trade to check quantities from each farmer and prevent cheating; 2) the Ministry would buy the full wheat crop from the farmers in the current year; 3) the farmers would be required to record the full amount planted in the following year; and 4) the government will not accept any additional quantities not registered with the Ministry of Agriculture the following year.

**2. Iraqi-led Negotiation Training:** In addition to dispute resolution, many network members have shown remarkable enthusiasm for transferring negotiation skills to other Iraqis. Over the course of the program, over 35 network members have led 58 local workshops for a total of 1530 people in all 18 governorates. Over half of the people who attended these workshops were government officials or elected representatives. By emphasizing and supporting Iraq-led training rather than direct training by expatriate trainers, Mercy Corps ultimately reached more than six times the original number anticipated.



*A NINE network member provides basic negotiation training to the Iraq Army Battalion based in Baquba.*

For example, one network member provided training to members of the Iraqi Military from 5th Army Battalion based in Baquba. She was contacted by the military and asked to deliver basic negotiation training to 29 military personnel, from the rank of master sergeant to major. The training was conducted at the military base and all of the costs for the workshop, including transportation and logistics, were covered by the military. This was the first workshop on negotiation for military personnel in the area and it was so well received that this participant received requests to conduct similar workshops for a wider audience within the Iraqi Army.

Another workshop of note took place in Mosul for newly elected parliament members from Ninewa, provincial council members, and local government officials. It was designed and implemented following a request from the provincial council to GPCMI participants based in Ninewa. The activity was co-funded by the provincial council and was the first negotiation training for Ninewa government officials. The response was extremely positive and the Ninewa PC requested that Mercy Corps, together with NINE Network members, hold a follow-on workshop. NINE Network members are still in communication with the Parliamentary member who requested the follow-up training to schedule a time.

Finally, one network participant conducted a workshop for 20 members of a youth group in Qadisiya in August 2010. The workshop focused on problem solving, trust building and a basic introduction to interest based negotiation skills. One young participant, Hussein, said, "Now I know that there are tools that can help us address our problems and conflicts." This was the first negotiation workshop for youth in the area and it was covered by five national television channels.

**3. Documentation and Dissemination of Successes:** The negotiation and mediation efforts of NINE Network members struck an incredibly responsive chord among Iraqis and received widespread media attention. In total, NINE Network members gave 16 in-depth interviews to Iraqi media on their efforts. Dozens of other media outlets covered their follow-on training or gave them air time to discuss what they had learned (a list of links to Arabic language interviews are in Attachment 4)

For example, in January 2010, two female program participants conducted a series of radio talk shows with Kurdistan Democracy radio, one of the most prominent radio stations in the Kurdistan Region. They talked about the conflict management and negotiation skills they had acquired and how the tools could be used to resolve a range of local, national, and international conflicts. The recorded radio show was broadcast for three days and received positive feedback from audience members. As a follow-up, both members are planning to have regular interactive sessions on the station where radio listeners can call-in and consult about how to use negotiation techniques to resolve their problems.

Finally, the wrap-up conference in Suleimaniyah that brought all participants together and included over 30 prominent guests was covered by more than 12 satellite channels, local TV channels, radio stations, newspapers, magazines, and web news media. In many of the interviews, GPCMI participants stressed the importance of continuing to implement this type of program widely throughout Iraq. The also discussed how the tools could help many Iraqis, but particularly politicians, work more effectively with Iraq's diverse cultural and social groups.



A program participant is interviewed at the Final Conference by Fayha'a Satellite Channel to talk about the impact and future of conflict management skills in Iraq.

#### **B. Lessons and Recommendations:**

**Increase Substantive Expertise and Specialization:** As participants in the network started taking on more complex disputes, their need for more in-depth expertise in areas such as electoral law, educational policies, or land reform policies also increased. This also speaks to the need – identified by a wide range of network participants – to increase their legitimacy in the eyes of some Iraqis who questioned the authority of network members to engage in dispute resolution. In addition, a deeper exploration of key substantive issues, in partnership with experts from other countries, would expose network members to a broader range of options from other parts of the world that have grappled with similar problems. For example, in Guatemala, there are several very successful land conflict mediation programs that would have valuable lessons to share with network members.

Given that many network members are local government officials or participated in March 2010 elections, Mercy Corps received a number of requests for negotiation skills specifically tailored to elections-related disputes, political deadlock, and political competition. Mercy Corps responded by adding a session on political negotiation for 11 network members in

Baghdad. The training was delivered by a pro bono negotiation expert. This session received mixed reviews. Although participants were exposed to more negotiation tools, what they really seemed to be looking for was advice from other politicians who had navigated similar waters. A strong recommendation for future programming is to pair negotiation experts with substantive experts – both international and Iraqi – in areas that are linked to the most pressing categories of disputes.

***Engage in Policy Debates:*** Another clear theme from focus group discussions is that – not surprisingly – the tools did not work everywhere. One key obstacle identified by a number of participants was political interference. For example, one network member tried to mediate a tribal conflict over grazing and water rights, but was blocked by representatives of the PDK. Other participants simply ran into obstacles from rigid, centralized government structures, many of which have competing mandates and authorities.

Some participants were able to come up with a partial fix to these challenges. For example, one network member in Baghdad arranged regular coordination meetings between the Baghdad governor, Baghdad provincial council, and Baghdad City Mayor in order to open lines of communication and establish a forum for resolving jurisdictional disputes. However, the frequency with which network members encountered this challenge speaks to the need to develop stronger skills for negotiating ‘up’ and ‘across’ within bureaucracies. In addition, in future programs, there should be a much stronger link to policy debates about institutional reform. As Iraqi network members gain credibility in certain areas, such as educational or land reform, their ability to speak with authority on needed reforms will increase. Ensuring that they have access to these debates will strengthen the impact of future programs.

***Information Collection and Dissemination of Successes:*** One big challenge the program faced was finding enough time to collect detailed information about negotiation and mediation attempts. Network members are extremely busy; they are tribal leaders, local government officials, parliamentary members, university professors, and heads of civil society groups. It often took multiple interviews to get necessary information and there are still large gaps in the agreement database and agreement forms. Continuing to collect robust information on agreements is critical to sustaining media interest. It is also important to the growth and professionalization of the network.

Several recommendations that flow from this are: 1) ensure that in future programs a full time staff member is dedicated to collecting information and using it strategically to build the network’s revenue base (see below) and to position effectively with the Iraqi media; 2) coordinate with mediation organizations in other countries to develop streamlined tracking systems for disputes; and 3) bring Iraqi university partners – both faculty and student interns – into the data collection process. This will not only serve network interests, it will contribute to the growth of a body of Iraqi academic research on dispute resolution.

***Link negotiation to development:*** Negotiation is an important first step, but it is not always enough. Unless negotiated agreements also address underlying causes of violence and are viable from the perspective of the groups they affect, tensions can easily re-emerge. This is

one of the most important lessons peacebuilding organizations have learned in conflict and post-conflict environments. For example, if leaders reach an agreement to remove an illegal settlement that is interfering with oil exploration, the people who are relocated will need assistance to rebuild their lives in a new location.

Iraqi authorities and businesses put significant resources behind a number of negotiated agreements, by paying for irrigation channels, for example, or by providing additional land to parties in a land dispute. In one case, the local government in Kirkuk provided \$3.4 million to relocate over 400 IDP families from the central stadium to new homes. However, this type of support did not happen in all cases, either because local actors were unable or unwilling to provide resources. It is possible that some agreements negotiated by GPCMI participants will unravel because the people they affect are not able to live with the outcome. In the future, the program should seek to link negotiation attempts more directly with large development initiatives operating in the same area. It should also have a small contingency fund to address these types of needs if local governments or communities are unable to find needed development resources.

**Objective 3: Establish a network of Iraqi negotiation experts that can function as an independent and effective body**

Activities under this objective were designed to help establish a national, sustainable network of Iraqi negotiation experts that stayed in regular contact through a website and an informal early warning system. The goal was to encourage these leaders to share their experiences, turn to each other for support, and continue to work together to resolve Iraq's many challenges. In addition, through a series of university partnerships, it was hoped that leaders in the network would carry their work forward by reaching out to a new generation of Iraqi university students. While the program took significant steps in this direction, this is an area where there is still the most work to be done.

Moving from a collection of individuals to a truly national network has taken – and will continue to take – a significant amount of time. Network members have started the process of establishing an independent organization, the *Negotiation and Conflict Management Center*, and have made significant cash and in-kind contributions toward this end. Many participants regularly visit the website, post their successes and challenges, and stay in email, SMS, and phone contact. They have also established a very active Facebook group. However, all of these efforts are extremely nascent and it is not clear that they will survive into the future without continued support and more robust systems in place for raising funds and organizing activities.

**A. Activities and Results**

***Establish an Independent Sustainable Network of Negotiators:*** The final program conference held in Suleimaniyah on 5 December 2010, brought the entire network together with more than 20 distinguished guests representing the Iraqi Parliament, the Office of the Prime Minister of the Kurdistan Regional Government, Provincial Council members, and representatives from Baghdad and Suleimaniyah Universities. More than 12 media outlets, including satellite channels, radio stations, newspapers and web news attended.



*GPCMI participants collect and record donations for NGO registration costs at the final conference.*

At the final conference, Mercy Corps raised the issue of sustainability with NINE Network members. Participants discussed a range of options, including coordination with local and central government authorities and other international organizations to continue their work. They also made plans to establish an NGO, the *Negotiation and Conflict Management Center*, that will carry their work forward. They elected five participants to lead the process and contributed 2,000,000 IQD towards registration costs. Participants also contributed significant in-kind support,

such as completing all necessary legal work to register the NGO; providing a rent-free office for the first year of operations; contributing funds for the second year's rent; and covering all printing and publication costs for a year. Finally, parliamentary members in attendance pledged to encourage broader parliamentary awareness and support for the program.

Since the conference, the five elected network members have prepared a document outlining the structure and internal systems for the NGO and have sent it to the full network for review. Plans are underway to hold a general meeting – if funding can be secured – to elect executive and administrative committees for the NGO. In addition, participants have asked that Mercy Corps continue to stay engaged, help facilitate meetings with key governorate officials, and help them approach international organizations and donors for support. Mercy Corps staff are operating on a volunteer basis in order to accommodate these requests.

***Create an ICT Portal for Mentoring and Networking:*** Mercy Corps worked with the Union of Arab ICT Associations to establish a website ([www.nine-iq.net](http://www.nine-iq.net)) that helps network members stay in regular contact with each other, share successes, discuss challenges, and disseminate information on their work to a broader audience. The website has been operational since June and is published in English, Arabic, and Kurdish. In addition to their website, the NINE Network has established a very active Facebook Group (Network of Iraqi Negotiation Experts) that has 106 members who discuss negotiation training, dispute resolution, and the current situation in the Arab world from a negotiation viewpoint.

***Institutionalize an Early Warning and Crisis Response System:*** The type of early warning system envisioned at program start-up was a very simple cell phone or email list where network members could track disputes in their region, reach out to each other for support, and then have the most appropriate member or group of members respond. Given sensitivities among many of the members about data collection in Iraq, this ultimately did not happen. Most disputes were identified by network members themselves or were brought to their attention by Mercy Corps staff. The desire to create a system was not

abandoned, but it was shelved until network members had established necessary levels of trust with each other and with Mercy Corps to reintroduce the idea.

In September 2010, Mercy Corps restarted the discussion by bringing a member of the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative's Crisis Mapping Unit, Dr. Brian Sorenson, out to Iraq to explore potential options and discuss the feasibility of different systems with network members. At this time, members seemed much more open to discussing a potential early warning system. The most interesting option was a slightly modified Ushahidi-type system, where cell phones could be distributed to trusted local organizations, which would then be responsible for reporting on different types of disputes in each province. Dispute data would then be plotted on a map and made available to network members for response. The recommendation was that, over time as issues relating to data security and verification were worked out, network members could share this system with other organizations, including local government officials. Unfortunately, the grant ended in December 2010 and no follow-on funding was secured, so this system was not put into place.

***Establish University Training Programs:*** Mercy Corps developed strong relationships with several universities in Iraq, including the University of Baghdad, Suleimaniyah University, and Basra University. Many of the negotiation workshops were held at different universities and during these sessions, GPCMI participants were asked to lead trainings for professors and students. For example, at the TOT session in March 2010, participants led a short course for professors and local government officials at the University of Suleimaniyah. Similarly, Mercy Corps Iraq staff and GPCMI participants taught a negotiation course for 5 lecturers and 40 students at the Training Faculty at the University of Baghdad. In the final evaluation of the course, one lecturer noted that the skills and techniques delivered by the GPCMI participants were very practical in the Iraqi context. Another participant said, "We should have had this training five years ago!"

The original goal of this activity was to have an interest-based negotiation course established as part of the official university curriculum. However, due to a complex approval mechanism that involved multiple ministries, Mercy Corps shifted focus to short courses and tutorials in training centers as the best mechanism for institutionalizing negotiation training in the Iraqi university system. Several NINE Network members who are university professors are now teaching the skills in their classes. Finally, at the final conference, two deans from the University of Baghdad expressed the desire to develop a partnership with the NINE Network and explore how to support negotiation training for students. While these are important developments, there is still a long way to go towards the goal of deeply embedding these tools and skills in university curriculums.

## **B. Lessons and Recommendations:**

***Increase Opportunities for Face-to-Face Interaction:*** One of the biggest benefits of the program was the chance for participants to meet with other leaders who were struggling with similar issues from around Iraq. For some, this was the first time in decades they had been able to sit down with people from other parts of the country. After the first round of basic training, Mercy Corps observed increased interaction between the members of the

network. They began contacting each other to discuss similar issues and share experiences. Some visited each other's provinces in order to help conduct training workshops. Some even worked on dispute resolution cases together. For example, two participants, one from Salah ad Din and one from Anbar, successfully worked together to resolve a tribal conflict over a piece of land that fell along the border of the two governorates.

These examples, however, appear to have been the exception rather than the rule. In focus group discussions, many participants noted that the only time they were able to interact with other network members was during the training workshops. In future programs more time and attention should be devoted to activities that bring smaller numbers of participants together more frequently, for example, to co-facilitate negotiation training for other Iraqis or to receive more in-depth substantive training. In particular, more attention should be given to bringing participants together in groups of two or three to work on joint dispute resolution.

**Conflict Mapping/Early Warning:** The program would have benefited from more rigorous conflict analysis and early warning. While early training workshops had conflict mapping sessions, these primarily focused on analyzing individual disputes that network members knew about and brought to the sessions. More rigorous early warning and conflict analysis would have allowed network members to survey a range of disputes in their provinces and strategically deploy network members to those that best fit their skill sets. It would have allowed them to pick 'low hanging fruit' and resolve a larger number of less intractable disputes, thereby increasing their experience and the number of Iraqi citizens who benefitted from their mediation efforts.

One of the reasons these systems may not have developed as fully as hoped – in addition to the need to establish trust discussed above – is that conflict analysis and early warning skills largely fall outside the competence of network members and expatriate negotiation trainers. These are skills that are often better suited to university researchers, local court systems, or local NGOs that specialize in particular substantive areas, such as land reform or IDP resettlement. In future programs, the NINE Network should consider developing partnerships with these types of groups so that they can be more strategic about how and when to intervene in violent disputes. These types of partnerships would also increase the legitimacy of network member interventions, as other institutions begin to tap into their services and advocate on their behalf.

**Sustainability:** The NINE Network has achieved remarkable results and they have taken several important steps towards becoming a sustainable institution. However, they are not there yet. The initial donations that individual network members made are an extraordinary symbol of commitment; however they are not enough to sustain the organization into the future. Nor are they enough to support a robust set of activities, such as continued training, dispute resolution, or peer-to-peer interaction. Over the next few years, members will need to explore funding options, such as membership dues, an expanded membership base, and fee for service mechanisms. This last option has proven to be particularly sensitive since many members – such as tribal elders, local government officials, and religious leaders – are expected to resolve disputes for free by virtue of their position. Network members will

need to think carefully about how to balance these obligations with the many opportunities that exist for raising revenue, for example, by working to resolve corporate disputes, by establishing partnerships with local government bodies, or by building relationships with international organizations that could benefit from their services.

#### **4. Conclusion**

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The *Governance Promotion through Conflict Management in Iraq* (GPCMI) program implemented by Mercy Corps from January 2009 through December 2010 clearly achieved a number of significant results, including nearly 130 disputes resolved, a measurable reduction in violent incidents, an increase in the number of disputes resolved, an increase in negotiation and mediation success rates, and over 1500 Iraqis trained in negotiation skills. Local government authorities contributed significant support to the efforts of NINE Network members and their work was extensively covered by the Iraqi press.

In addition to these successes, it is also important to note that these results would not have been visible without several important innovations in measurement. While the data collection tools are still a work in progress, they represent an important step forward. The most critical missing piece at the moment is the lack of a measure for whether perceptions of governance have improved as a result of NINE Network member efforts. However, this early experiment in measuring impact has clearly yielded dividends. While the program cannot say that *everyone* used tools delivered in training, it absolutely can say that many network members did. While the program cannot say it is responsible for an overall reduction in violence – and in fact it is clear that there were several episodes of significant violence over the life of the program – it can claim that network members addressed nearly 130 disputes, many of which had led to violence in the past and do not now do so. From this finding, it is plausible to claim that – absent the efforts of network members – levels of violence would have been higher in Iraq.

The program also led to a number of important lessons and yielded a range of recommendations that can and should inform future programming. This same basic model could certainly be replicated to other contexts, particularly in the Middle East where many countries are struggling with difficult questions about leadership and transition. The NINE Network members are an important, authentic local resource that could easily be deployed in places like Egypt, Yemen, and Jordan. The model could also be usefully extended to other parts of the world, such as Southern Sudan, which is moving through its own difficult and sometimes violent transition. In fact, Mercy Corps is already implementing a program that uses this same basic approach in north and central Somalia, bringing together clan elders, religious leaders, private sector actors, and local government officials.

Ultimately, the most important lesson from this program is that – given the right tools, skills, and support – many leaders in transitional and war-torn societies are eager to put aside political, sectarian, and ethnic differences in order to work together to resolve common challenges. The grant from the Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor at the United States Department of State allowed a new generation of Iraqi leaders to do so, improving the lives of countless Iraqi citizens as a result.





11	<p>What are the key measures of success in negotiations? (Make only three choices)?</p> <p><i>Please tick(v) the 3 most key measures of success</i></p>	<p>(1) Extract more concessions than you give <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>(2) Push them beyond their bottom line <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>(3) Force them to back down <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>(4) Inflict on them more pain than you sustain <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>(5) Get as much as you can/maximize value for you <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>(6) Get any deal above your bottom line <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>(7) Avoid internal criticism <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>(8) Ensure they are happy even if you are not <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>(9) Avoid confrontation <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>(10) Have a fair process <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>(11) Have the other side's interests considered <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>(12) Have your interests met well, irrespective of what the other side gets <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>(13) Other (specify) _____ <input type="checkbox"/></p>																				
12	<p>Do you meet regularly with other community/traditional or religious leaders to discuss issues related to conflict management and sharing of information?</p>	<p>(1) Yes <input type="checkbox"/> (2) No <input type="checkbox"/></p>																				
13	<p>Are you currently affiliated with any group/institution/committee that deals with conflict and conflict resolution?</p>	<p>(1) No, I'm practicing on my own <input type="checkbox"/> (4) Yes, at the provincial level <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>(2) Yes, at the community level <input type="checkbox"/> (5) Yes, at the national level <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>(3) Yes, at the district level <input type="checkbox"/> (6) Other, specify _____ <input type="checkbox"/></p>																				
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15	<p>On a scale from 1 to 10, please evaluate your need for more negotiation knowledge and skills (1 is no need, 10 is most need)</p>	<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>1</th><th>2</th><th>3</th><th>4</th><th>5</th><th>6</th><th>7</th><th>8</th><th>9</th><th>10</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td><td><input type="checkbox"/></td><td><input type="checkbox"/></td><td><input type="checkbox"/></td><td><input type="checkbox"/></td><td><input type="checkbox"/></td><td><input type="checkbox"/></td><td><input type="checkbox"/></td><td><input type="checkbox"/></td><td><input type="checkbox"/></td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
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16	<p>Please evaluate current level of confidence when you negotiate or seek to resolve conflict on a scale from 1 to 10 (1 is the extremely unsure of self, 10 is the extremely confident)</p>	<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>1</th><th>2</th><th>3</th><th>4</th><th>5</th><th>6</th><th>7</th><th>8</th><th>9</th><th>10</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td><td><input type="checkbox"/></td><td><input type="checkbox"/></td><td><input type="checkbox"/></td><td><input type="checkbox"/></td><td><input type="checkbox"/></td><td><input type="checkbox"/></td><td><input type="checkbox"/></td><td><input type="checkbox"/></td><td><input type="checkbox"/></td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
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<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>													
<b>D CONFLICTS AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT – GENERAL CONTEXT</b>																						
17	<p>What types of conflict/ dispute usually occur in your community?</p> <p><i>Please tick (v) all that apply</i></p>	<p>(1) Over resources (land, water and their distribution) <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>(2) Over property rights <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>(3) Over religious differences <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>(4) Over political power <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>(5) Over authority within tribe/clan <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>(1) Other, specify _____ <input type="checkbox"/></p>																				
18	<p>Where do community members usually go to or consult with when confronted with conflict situations where they need someone to mediate?</p> <p><i>Please tick (v) all that apply</i></p>	<p>(1) Community leaders (tribal sheikh/person of influence) <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>(2) Religious leaders <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>(3) Local government official <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>(4) Formal civil court <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>(5) Police, Military or security personnel <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>(6) Academics or intellectual leaders <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>(7) Party leaders <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>(8) Other, specify _____ <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>(9) N/A <input type="checkbox"/></p>																				
19	<p>Do people usually abide by the ruling of the traditional/local mediator/arbitrator?</p>	<p>(1) Yes, most of the times <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>(2) Yes, in some cases <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>(3) It depends on the nature of conflict <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>(4) It depends on who is the mediator <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>(5) It depends on the process <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>(6) It depends on the ruling <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>(7) Other, specify _____ <input type="checkbox"/></p>																				
20	<p>If people were not happy with the ruling, what do they usually do?</p>	<p>(1) Accept the ruling and do nothing <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>(2) Reject the ruling and seek other opinion <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>(3) Resort to violence <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>(4) Other, specify _____ <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>(5) N/A <input type="checkbox"/></p>																				
21	<p>In addition to traditional leadership, who else should be involved in conflict management?</p> <p><i>Please tick (v) all that apply</i></p>	<p>(1) Government officials <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>(2) Formal civil court <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>(3) Party leaders <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>(4) Police, military, or security personnel <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>(5) Other, specify _____ <input type="checkbox"/></p>																				

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
22	Please evaluate the current level of security in your governorate on a scale from 1 to 10 (1 is the least secure, 10 is the most secure)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
3	Over the last 12 months, the number of conflicts that turned into violent confrontation in your community have...	(1) Decreased significantly						<input type="checkbox"/>				
		(2) Decreased						<input type="checkbox"/>				
		(3) Stayed the same						<input type="checkbox"/>				
		(4) Increased						<input type="checkbox"/>				
		(5) Increased significantly						<input type="checkbox"/>				
E	<b>CONFLICT MANAGEMENT – PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE</b>											
24	Have you ever been involved in real life conflict?	(1) Yes					<input type="checkbox"/>	(2) No			<input type="checkbox"/>	
25	What type of conflict management situations/cases you were involved in during the past 12 months? <i>Please tick (v) all that apply</i>	(1) Over resources (land, water and their distribution)						<input type="checkbox"/>				
		(2) Over property rights						<input type="checkbox"/>				
		(3) Over religious differences						<input type="checkbox"/>				
		(4) Over political power						<input type="checkbox"/>				
		(5) Over authority within tribe/clan						<input type="checkbox"/>				
		(6) Other, specify _____						<input type="checkbox"/>				
26	How many times have you been involved in conflict management processes during the past 12 months?	(1) Once				<input type="checkbox"/>	(3) Three or more times		<input type="checkbox"/>			
		(2) Two times				<input type="checkbox"/>	(4) N/A		<input type="checkbox"/>			
27	How many of those cases resulted in an agreement?	(1) All of the cases				<input type="checkbox"/>	(3) Less than half of the cases		<input type="checkbox"/>			
		(2) More than half of the cases				<input type="checkbox"/>	(4) None of the cases		<input type="checkbox"/>			
28	What was your role in these conflicts?	(1) Acted as principal/participant/negotiator						<input type="checkbox"/>				
		(2) Advised negotiators						<input type="checkbox"/>				
		(3) Participated as a member of the negotiating team						<input type="checkbox"/>				
		(4) Observed negotiations						<input type="checkbox"/>				
		(5) Served as convenor, mediator or facilitator						<input type="checkbox"/>				
		(6) Served as arbitrator or judge						<input type="checkbox"/>				
		(7) Other (specify) _____						<input type="checkbox"/>				
29	What types of non violence methods/approach have you used to resolve conflict?	(1) Traditional, non Sharia based						<input type="checkbox"/>				
		(2) Sharia based						<input type="checkbox"/>				
		(3) Other, specify _____						<input type="checkbox"/>				
30	Do these methods ever fail?	(1) Yes					<input type="checkbox"/>	(2) No			<input type="checkbox"/>	
31	What are the most important shortcomings in current methods of conflict management? <i>Please tick (v) all that apply</i>	(1) Lack of skilled, trained personnel						<input type="checkbox"/>				
		(2) Political intransigence						<input type="checkbox"/>				
		(3) Insufficient preparation time						<input type="checkbox"/>				
		(4) Parties don't trust the process to be fair						<input type="checkbox"/>				
		(5) Fear of corruption/undue influence						<input type="checkbox"/>				
		(6) Lack of access to professional conflict management expertise						<input type="checkbox"/>				
		(7) Other (specify) _____						<input type="checkbox"/>				
32	Would you be willing to use new methods based on consensus building negotiation approaches?	(1) Yes					<input type="checkbox"/>	(2) No			<input type="checkbox"/>	
33	When you consider past negotiations in which you have been involved, do you feel that the negotiation process was effective?	(4) Yes, highly				<input type="checkbox"/>	(6) Not really		<input type="checkbox"/>			
		(5) Yes, somewhat				<input type="checkbox"/>	(7) Not at all		<input type="checkbox"/>			
								(8) N/A	<input type="checkbox"/>			
34	What might have helped make the process more effective? (More than one choice possible) <i>Please tick (v) all that apply</i>	(1) Better preparation				<input type="checkbox"/>	(5) Third party facilitator		<input type="checkbox"/>			
		(2) Better skills in our side				<input type="checkbox"/>	(6) Using a mediator		<input type="checkbox"/>			
		(3) Better skills on the other side				<input type="checkbox"/>	(7) Less interference by others who were not directly involved		<input type="checkbox"/>			
		(4) Timing of the process				<input type="checkbox"/>	(8) Other, specify _____		<input type="checkbox"/>			
35	When confronted with difficult conflict situations or disputes, do you consult or seek advice from other leaders or people that have more experience in resolving	(1) Yes					<input type="checkbox"/>	(2) No			<input type="checkbox"/>	

36	If yes, whom do you consult with when confronted with difficult conflict situation?	(1) Community leaders (tribal sheikh/person of influence)	<input type="checkbox"/>								
		(2) Religious leaders	<input type="checkbox"/>								
		(3) Local government official	<input type="checkbox"/>								
		(4) Formal civil court	<input type="checkbox"/>								
		(5) Police, Military or security personnel	<input type="checkbox"/>								
		(6) Academics or intellectual leaders	<input type="checkbox"/>								
		(7) Party leaders	<input type="checkbox"/>								
		(8) Other, specify _____	<input type="checkbox"/>								
		(9) N/A	<input type="checkbox"/>								
<b>F ATTITUDES TOWARDS CONFLICTS AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT ISSUES</b>											
	Please rank your agreement or disagreement with the following statements on a scale from 1 – 10, with 1 strongly agree and 10 strongly disagree	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
37	Conflict resolution usually leads to winners and losers	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
38	Conflict resolution usually favours the powerful party	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
39	Conflict resolution usually involves painful compromises	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
40	The outcome of a conflict mediation process is binding and should always be respected	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
41	In some cases, use of force can be an effective method for resolving conflict	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
42	Conflict resolution will usually result in unmet expectation/demands	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
43	Many people are so irrational that attempting to influence them is a waste of time	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
44	The best way to resolve conflicts is to look at each side's position and split the difference evenly	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
45	It is usually helpful to wait to see what approach the other side takes to the conflict before taking your own approach	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
46	Effective conflict resolution often depends on a credible threat of force	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
47	Trust among parties to conflict is absolutely necessary for successful conflict management	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
48	Careful attention to process will have a major impact on the likelihood of getting to a negotiated or mediated settlement	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
49	Keeping your emotions under control and undetectable is an important part of being a good negotiator	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
50	Trust building among parties to conflict depends on the following factors (More than one choice is possible)	(1) How much risk is involved	<input type="checkbox"/>								
		(2) How much relative power parties have	<input type="checkbox"/>								
		(3) How secure parties feel	<input type="checkbox"/>								
		(4) How many similarities they share	<input type="checkbox"/>								
		(5) How well aligned their interests are	<input type="checkbox"/>								
		(6) How predictable and trustworthy parties are	<input type="checkbox"/>								
		(7) How efficient communication is	<input type="checkbox"/>								
		(8) All of the above	<input type="checkbox"/>								
		(9) Other, please specify _____	<input type="checkbox"/>								

G		LEARNING EXPECTATIONS	
51	<p>Are there particular skills that you think might help you better manage conflicts? (More than one choice possible)</p> <p><i>Please tick (v) all that apply</i></p>	<p>(1) Communication <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>(2) Interest exploration <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>(3) Relationship development and mapping <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>(4) Conflict analysis <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>(5) Multi-party negotiations <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>(6) Option generation <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>(7) Commitment management <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>(8) Coalition-building <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>(9) Other (please specify) _____ <input type="checkbox"/></p>	
52	<p>How do you plan to use conflict management skills that you may further develop? (More than one choice possible)</p>	<p>(1) As a trainer/educator <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>(2) As a negotiator <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>(3) As an advisor <input type="checkbox"/></p>	<p>(4) As a mediator/facilitator <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>(5) As an arbitrator/judge <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>(6) Other (Specify) _____ <input type="checkbox"/></p>
53	<p>How will you know if this skills development program is successful? (More than one choice possible)</p>	<p>(1) You will acquire new knowledge about negotiation process <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>(2) You will acquire new behavioral skills in negotiation <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>(3) You will acquire new knowledge about conflict management process <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>(4) You will acquire new behavioral skills in conflict management <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>(5) You will meet new people and make new friends <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>(6) You will have a stronger sense of team &amp; colleagues with shared skills base <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>(7) You will expand your network/ get to know people from different backgrounds <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>(8) You will be managing conflicts with more positive outcomes <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>(9) Other (please specify) _____ <input type="checkbox"/></p>	



## Attachment 2: Focus Group Questions

TOPIC	GUIDING QUESTIONS
<p><b>Interest Based Negotiation (IBN):</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Changes in attitudes towards IBN</li> <li>2. Changes in preference for using IBN</li> <li>3. Sustainability of IBN approaches</li> <li>4. Impact of IBN in the community</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. If you compare yourself before you participated in the program and now, what are the essential changes that you've personally experienced related to the way you respond to conflict?</li> <li>2. If you compare the first time you joined the program and now, do you observed any changes in how the community that you interact with regularly deals with conflict?</li> <li>3. What types of dispute(s) have you responded to?</li> <li>4. For participants who've used IBN skills in real life negotiation: How sustainable is your intervention? Are the agreements still honored and followed by the conflicting parties and why? Have you seen any of your agreements experience setbacks or break down?</li> <li>5. Do you have any types of conflicts that you are more comfortable/confident responding to? What are they and why? How much of this confidence is driven by your experience with the program.</li> </ol>
<p><b>Recommendations</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Future implementation</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Do you have any plans personally or collectively as NINE Network members to continue applying IBN skills after the program?</li> <li>2. Do you have any suggestion for Mercy Corps should we implement similar program in the future?</li> </ol>

## Attachment 3: Example Agreement Form

Negotiation/Dispute Resolution Form				
<b>A. Administrative Information</b>				
1. Dispute/Agreement #	AN04			
2. MC Focal Point	Coordinator Name			
<b>B. Dispute Information</b>				
1. Province	Anbar	4. Primary Dispute Type	Land/Water	
2. District/City	Al-Khalidiya District	5. Secondary Dispute Type	Economic	
3. Stakeholders	C-C	6. Early Warning System		
<b>C. Agreement Information</b>				
1. Primary Negotiator	Negotiator Name	Agreement Status	Verbal Agreement	
2. Secondary Negotiator		Agreement Length*	68	days
3. Negotiation Start	13-Mar-10			
4. Negotiation End	30-May-10	*End date/Update date	6-Aug-10	
<b>D. Impact</b>				
Incidents Before	armed fights, 1 injury	Beneficiaries	Direct	Indirect
Incidents After	0	Male	100	500
Local Match	cost of digging watercourses	Female	80	400
<b>E. Narrative</b>				
1. Description of the Conflict/Problem				
<p>Two clans from the same tribe lived on a piece of land that was 90 dunam (22 acres). Previously, the relationship between these two clans had been friendly. However, they had a conflict over a water source that started in Clan A's land that was used to irrigate both clans' land. Clan A refused to let the water pass through their land because it left saline sediments and sludge that damaged their land. Clan A had access to a second water source next to their land that did not leave deposits and wanted use it to irrigate both lands. Clan B rejected this because the second water course was narrower and at a lower elevation, which made it difficult to irrigate their land. The dispute led to armed clashes in which one person was injured. Because of the dispute the authorities ordered Clan B to stop using all of its land and CLan A to stop using half of its land. This issue went unresolved for 3 years. Officials and tribal elders attempted to resolve the conflict several times but failed because the two parties would not communicate.</p>				
2. Role of the Negotiator				
<p>The negotiator is head of the Farmer's Association in Anbar and head of the Agrarian Conflict Resolution Committee. The governor also issued a letter authorizing him to solve the conflict. His positions and the governor's letter helped both parties see the negotiator as legitimate and neutral.</p>				
3. Description of the Tools Used in the Process				
<p>The negotiator used the seven elements tool.</p>				
4. Description of the Negotiation Process				
<p>The Negotiator first worked with each party individually to understand its position. Clan A's main interest was to switch over to the second water source to stop the damage to their land. He also learned that Clan A had tried to pay Clan B to leave, suggesting that they wanted to take all of the land. The other clan wanted to have enough water to irrigate their lands without worrying that it would be cut off. He then brought both parties together to discuss the issue. The losses of both parties in the past three years helped the mediator convince them that they needed to communicate.</p>				
5. Key Terms of the Negotiated Agreement				
<p>1. Dig a new water source near the current water project on the left side of the clan A's land. This water source will extend through the land of Clan A and then go inside the land of Clan B. From the clan B's land it will run alongside both clans' lands. This way each party can use the water. 2. Each party will bear the cost of digging within their land. 3. The length of the water course is longer on Party B's land. An official statement was issued through the conflict resolution committee about the agreement After the reaching the agreement, a tribal sheikh held a banquet in honor of the two clans and invited prominent figures in the region, thus showing support for the agreement and strengthening it.</p>				



## **Attachment 4: Local, National, and International Press Coverage**

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1. [http://www.ninanews.com/arabic/News\\_Details.asp?ar95\\_VQ=FDMIIG](http://www.ninanews.com/arabic/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FDMIIG) Basra Training 10<sup>th</sup> Oct. 2010
2. <http://nasiriyahnews.com/news.php?action=view&id=487> – Di qar 25<sup>th</sup> May 2010
3. <http://rmiraq.com/news/areas/8829.html> Di qar 25th May 2010
4. [http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2009/11/09/iraq\\_lates\\_t\\_crucible\\_for\\_harvard\\_mediation/?page=full](http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2009/11/09/iraq_lates_t_crucible_for_harvard_mediation/?page=full)
5. <http://www.al-dingratih.com/vb/showthread.php?t=2853> Jan. 2011 Prime Minister meets some Political Science Academics – Ihsan Alshimary is one of our participants
6. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IHVOeMcJaHs> an interview with Dr. Ihsan Al-Shimary about the political situation in Iraq and the Arab surrounding Countries.
7. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2BfNRT7fBok> An interview with Ihsan Al-Shimary about the US Troop withdrawal from Iraq.
8. [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PEOZw74\\_ohE&feature=related](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PEOZw74_ohE&feature=related) an interview with Dr. Ihsan about the Corruption in Iraq.
9. <http://www.iragingos.org/ArticleShow.aspx?ID=114> Mohammed Al-Rubaey visit to the PWDs NGOs network
10. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1ebjzfMLsHg> a call with Mohammed Al-Rubaey by a Satellite Channel.
11. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VwnPdfmVyGY&feature=related> an interview with Mohammed Al-Rubaey about the Project Strategic Planning.
12. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EHewVDr-IY0> Madeeha Al-Mosawi is called Mother Teresa by Karada people. In 2009
13. [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uY\\_3IOI4VA0](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uY_3IOI4VA0) an interview with Madeeha AlMosawy about the unemployment problem in Iraq. In August 2010