Value for Money Investment in People to People Programming in Israel and Palestine

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Abbreviations

DFID Department for International Development
P2P   People-to-People
VfM   Value for Money

Executive Summary

METHODOLOGY

The objectives of this study are:

1. To identify the peacebuilding models, target groups, entry points, and methodologies that will have the greatest effect on key conflict dynamics at the community level in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza.
2. To conduct a cost-effectiveness analysis of selected P2P peacebuilding programmes to identify the greatest VfM for international donors.

The objectives and associated research questions were explored through a grounded theory approach that included a literature review; systems mapping to understand key conflict dynamics in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza; and qualitative and quantitative data analysis. Researchers conducted 23 qualitative interviews with representatives from 15 non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and one academic in late 2019. Researchers distributed a quantitative survey, one version in Arabic and another in Hebrew, to a representative sample of Palestinians, Israeli Arabs, and Israeli Jews through two public polling firms in order to gauge knowledge of and participation in P2P programmes. In total, 452 individuals responded to the survey, 44 (9.8%) of whom had participated in P2P peacebuilding programmes and 408 (90.2%) of whom had not.

The scope of the findings and conclusions of this study are limited by a number of factors. This study relies exclusively on a survey of academic research; qualitative interviews based on individuals' subjective impressions about their own P2P programmes, as well as self-reported findings regarding effectiveness, efficiency and impact; and public polling data, collected in Palestinian, Israeli Arab and Israeli Jewish communities, to gather respondents' knowledge of and participation in P2P peacebuilding programmes.

Surveys and interviews included two sections of questions to collect data for both objectives. For objective 1, researchers collected data on local conflict dynamics and the impact of P2P programs based on participants' experiences. Data focused on the challenges and progress observed by different types of programs that affect a range of diverse target groups in multiple sectors in multiple sectors, to capture how these programs affect change. For objective 2, data collection focused on the VfM of these programs, including how their financial costs and decisions affect how economics, effectiveness, and efficiency of their programs. Direct access to financial cost data was highly limited from participating organizations, primarily due to the sensitivity of releasing this information, as well as the inconsistent forms of documentation and reporting. Further statistical comparisons were unavailable as a result.

Therefore, the findings and conclusions should not be taken as definitive answers to the above research questions. Instead, the report is best understood as a pilot study, highlighting meaningful findings from peacebuilding professionals where further research is needed.

KEY FINDINGS

A majority of P2P programmes utilised intergroup dialogue activities as a mechanism for change, but there were key differences in how and why dialogue was used. While a large number (13 of 15) utilised some form of intergroup dialogue activities, interviewees demonstrated important divisions about whether they believed that dialogue activities should address group level conflict dynamics (occupation, a two state solution, patterns of violence, etc.) or focus on topics that are either neutral or explicitly personal. Interviewees from three organisations expressed that openly discussing conflict dynamics was essential. These organisations generally seek to empower

programme participants to take directed efforts toward political change. Interviewees from four organisations felt that focusing on neutral or personal topics created the safe space necessary for attitude change and relationship building to occur. The organisations that subscribe to this approach placed a strong emphasis on building empathy.

Another category of P2P programmes focused primarily on joint projects, sometimes in concert with intergroup dialogue. These programmes most often targeted youth or professionals to take direct action at the community or national level to address some of the consequences of the conflict, such as environmental destruction or limited access to medical services. In addition to youth and professionals, P2P programmes generally targeted children and leaders, who were recruited from the grassroots as well as positions of public and business leadership. Some interviewees perceived a bias towards targeted individuals from higher socioeconomic strata, though this could not be independently confirmed.

Across programmes, very few interviewees articulated concrete theories of change other than contact theory — that contact between groups under certain "optimal conditions" leads to improved interactions and understanding. Most did not offer rationales for how, or whether, programmes should sequence activities, or how aspects of different peacebuilding models could work together. Several expressed hope that their programmes had some level of long term impact by empowering alumni to be change agents, either locally or nationally. Many offered anecdotes when they knew this had been the case, but only a small number of organisations described designing programme activities with this change in mind.

Furthermore, the majority of interviewees did not have, or at least discuss, programme evaluation practices that measured either outcomes at the end of the programme, or impacts that were sustained or took place over the long-term. Most defined programmatic success in terms of output or observed outcomes, largely among individual programme participants. They also broadly understood

questions about efficiency in terms of effectiveness, and primarily discussed cost saving in terms of marginal cost adjustments, rather than choosing programme models known to demonstrate value for money.

As has been well documented by Anderson, Olson and Doughty [1], the preponderance of global peacebuilding work often takes the form of multiple small efforts towards change, which, *in their opinion*, do not add up to meaningful change at the level of the conflict. Based on the interviews reviewed for this pilot study, this pattern may also be true of P2P programmes in Israel/Palestine. One area where P2P programmes may have a positive long term impact is through alumni becoming change agents, though this pattern is not well studied.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. **P2P organisations should invest in research and evaluation practices that are impact focused, and donors should incentivise such investments.** Most interviewees did not discuss having thorough monitoring and evaluation practices. Of the organisations that did, the majority did not have substantial long-term data at the level of outcomes and impact. The lack of thorough monitoring and evaluation practices, as well as the lack of long-term data, made it difficult to meaningfully analyse efficiency, effectiveness, and VfM. There are a range of ways that donors may provide incentives to organisations to invest in impact focused research and evaluation practices, including financial incentives and technical support. Strengthening research and evaluation practices that are impact focused would advance efforts to build the body of evidence on the effectiveness of different P2P approaches.

2. **Donors and P2P grantee organisations should work together to more clearly identify, study, and shape models of P2P practice, comparing contact theory based programmes to those that take other approaches.** Few organisations articulated a specific theory of change beyond a general adherence to (or rejection of) contact theory. Having stronger theories of change will support organisations and donors to identify what

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[1] Mary B. Anderson, Laura Olson, and Kristin Doughty, Confronting War: Critical Lessons for Peace Practitioners. Reflecting on Peace Practice Project, Collaborative for Development Action, Cambridge, MA, 2003.
https://www.cdacollaborative.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Confronting-War-Critical-Lessons-for-Peace-Practitioners.pdf

models of action are effective and efficient over both the short and long term. Additionally, by discussing theories of change more directly with grantees, donors can support organisations to develop strong theoretical and practical approaches to their day-to-day work that are connected to long-term goals of conflict transformation.

3. **Donors should support collaborative learning between P2P grantee organisations and others in the field.** In parallel to supporting evaluation practices and clearer theories of change, donors can help P2P organisations learn from one another. Under the current conditions, few P2P organisations are likely to have the time to exchange lessons outside of their regular partners. Additionally, competition over limited funding makes many organisations cautious about sharing results and lessons learned, particularly when organisations do not achieve their intended results. By convening grantees and others in the field, such as other donors and academics, for regular discussions of lessons learned and providing opportunities for collaboration, donors can help boost organisational and field-wide efficiency, effectiveness and VfM.

4. **Donors should examine whether their funding streams equally or adequately support programmes in both Israel and Palestine, especially Gaza, as well as the impact of these patterns.** Several interviewees, particularly those that work heavily with Palestinian communities, referenced the difficulty of getting funding for programmes in the West Bank and Gaza. Many of them also stressed the importance of investing in programmes that address Palestinian's material realities, such as inadequate healthcare, lack of education, and poor job opportunities, as a means of empowering Palestinians to address conflict and have greater agency in their own lives. Such investments could have direct and indirect effects on poverty reduction within and across Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza.

Background Information

The "People-to-People" (P2P) approach to peacebuilding finds its origin in a speech pronounced by U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower on September 11th, 1956. He described a new vision of peacebuilding, with P2P programmes aiming to "build the road to enduring peace" by "creating understanding between people",[2] Within academic theory, P2P programmes are notably based on Allport's contact hypothesis,[3] according to which contact between groups under certain "optimal conditions" leads to improved interactions and understanding by reducing problems of stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination.

In Israel-Palestine, P2P programmes have especially been developed following the 1995 Oslo II Agreement, which involved the creation of a P2P programme by Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation with the support of the Government of Norway.[4] In the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, one of the most protracted conflicts of the 20th century,[5] characterized by strong dynamics of intergroup antipathy, dehumanization,[6] and rights denial,[7] contact hypothesis and the likelihood of establishing fruitful intergroup interactions have been extensively debated. These particularly unfavourable conditions, combined with the successive failures of state-centric peacebuilding efforts, have led scholars and practitioners to design and implement a range of creative P2P peacebuilding programmes. In Israel-Palestine, P2P peacebuilding efforts have embraced a variety of P2P models, focusing on different sectors and target groups, and using varied entry points for participants.

In the literature, four general P2P models have been applied to the art of building inter-group relations.

[2]Ike Eisenhower Foundation, "The People to People programme." Available at https://www.dwightdeisenhower.com/399/People-to-People-programme.
[3]G.W. Allport, The nature of prejudice. Cambridge, MA: Perseus Books, 1954.
[4]Lena C. Endresen, "Contact and Cooperation: The Israeli-Palestinian People-to-People Program," Fafo Institute for Applied Social Science, 2001, p. 8. https://www.fafo.no/images/pub/2001/659.pdf
[5]A. Shlaim, The Middle East: The origins of Arab–Israeli wars. In N. Woods (Ed.), Explaining international relations since 1945. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1996, pp. 219–240.
[6]I. Maoz, and C. McCauley, "Threat, dehumanization and support for retaliatory-aggressive policies in asymmetric conflict." Journal of Conflict Resolution 52(1) (2008): 93–116.
[7]H.C. Kelman, "Israelis and Palestinians: Psychological prerequisites for mutual acceptance." International Security 3 (1978): 162–186.

- The "Coexistence Model", which originated in the United States in the 1980s and draws on the contact hypothesis, tries to promote mutual understanding and tolerance between Jews and Arabs,[8] largely through fostering positive intergroup attitudes and reducing stereotypes.[9]

- The "Joint Projects Model" purports that cooperative projects undertaken by Jews and Arabs would reduce hostility between groups and lead to cooperation that could transcend identity conflict.[10]

- The "Confrontational Model" was developed in the 1990s as an alternative to the Coexistence and Joint Projects model, after criticism that these models did not address discriminations toward Palestinians. In this model, Palestinians are framed as a weaker minority group that needs to be empowered to confront Jewish/Israeli communities, seen to be dominant and oppressive. This model focuses on direct discussion of identity, power inequities, discrimination, and civic affairs.[11]

- The "Narrative Model" arose in the late 1990s and seeks to combine aspects of the Coexistence Model and the Confrontational Model by creating spaces for story-telling in which participants can address political and collective tensions.[12]

While there is some evidence in the literature related to the impact of dialogue, education, and leadership programmes, and their capacity to "enhance the motivation and capacity of participants to become 'agents of change' in their communities".[13] there is overall only limited data documenting the impact of the variety of existing P2P peacebuilding programmes in Israel and Palestine. Similarly, while some aggregate cost, data has

been collected on the basis of donors and government expenditures,[14] specific data on costs at the project or programme level is lacking.

As evidence for both impact and costs of P2P programmes is needed for international donors to evaluate the VfM of programmes, this study identifies lessons learned about the impact and cost-effectiveness of P2P peacebuilding programmes which have been implemented in Israel and Palestine by a range of organisations since the year 2000.

[8]Ifat Maoz, "Does contact work in protracted asymmetrical conflict? Appraising 20 years of reconciliation-aimed encounters between Israeli Jews and Palestinians." Journal of Peace Research 48(1) (2011): 118

[9]Allport, The nature of prejudice.

[10]Muzafer Sherif, In Common Predicament: Social Psychology of Intergroup Conflict and Cooperation. Boston, MA: Houghton-Mifflin, 1966.

[11]For detailed discussion, see (1) Halabi and Sonnenschein, 'The Jewish-Palestinian encounter'; (2) Ifat Maoz, "Coexistence is in the eye of the beholder: Evaluating intergroup encounter interventions between Jews and Arabs in Israel." Journal of Social Issues 60 (2004): 437-452; and (3) Nava Sonnenschein, Rabah Halabi and Ariela Friedman, "Legitimization of national identity and the change in power relationships in workshops dealing with the Israeli/Palestinian Conflict." In: Eugene Weiner (ed.), The Handbook of Interethnic Coexistence. New York: Continuum (an Abraham Fund publication), 1998, pp. 600-614

[12]Dan Bar-On, (ed), Bridging the Gap: Storytelling as a Way to Work Through Political and Collective Hostilities. Hamburg: edition Korber-Stiftung, 2000.

[13]Ned Lazarus, A Future for Israeli-Palestinian Peacebuilding. Britain Israel Communications and Research Centre (BICOM), 2017, p. 40. http://www.bicom.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/A-future-for-Israeli-Palestinian-peacebuilding-FINAL.pdf

[14]Shira Herzog and Avivit Hai, "The Power of Possibility: The Role of People-to-People Programs in the Current Israeli-Palestinian Reality," Freidrich Ebert Stiftung, Israel Office, 2005, p. 35. https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/israel/04093.pdf

Methodology

OBJECTIVES

The purpose of this study is to identify lessons learned about cost effectiveness for P2P peacebuilding programmes in Israel/Palestine in order to inform DFID's future programme design.

To this end, there are two objectives, each with their own key questions:

1. To identify the peacebuilding models, target groups, entry points, and methodologies that will have the greatest effect on key conflict dynamics at the community level in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza.
   a. What are the key local conflict dynamics that recent peacebuilding programmes have tried to influence, both in the short and long term?
   b. What are the models being used in P2P peacebuilding programmes? What are the delivery models, target groups, entry points, and approaches used for each?
   c. What is the overall measurable (quantifiable) impact of these programmes? Which programme models have had the greatest and least effect on these key local conflict dynamics, and why?
   d. What are the key similarities and differences between programmes in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza?

2. To conduct a cost-effectiveness analysis of selected P2P peacebuilding programmes to identify the greatest VfM for international donors.
   a. How do the most effective peacebuilding models compare in terms of economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of programming?
   b. Do investments made in different places in the conflict system create ripple effects throughout the system? If so, how is this done?
   c. To what extent does the impact of peacebuilding programmes on conflict dynamics affect poverty reduction? Which investments have a direct effect on poverty reduction (e.g. lower unemployment, increase in income, etc.)? Which investments have an indirect effect on poverty reduction (e.g. job-relevant skills, business opportunities, professional networks, etc.)?
   d. What are the recommendations for future donors investing in peacebuilding programmes to achieve the greatest overall VfM, particularly when weigh-

ing alternatives to P2P programming in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza?
   i. Which programme investments are highly effective and low cost?
   ii. How to reduce costs related to highly effective and high cost programme investments?
   iii. What low cost programmes would become significantly more effective with marginal additional investments?

As a pilot study, this report draws attention to patterns and nascent data that should be used to inform future research regarding the above objectives. Future research should make use of programme proposals, monitoring and evaluation data, programme budgets (projected and actual), and a more thorough literature review including macro-evaluations of P2P programmes in Israel/Palestine, P2P practitioner guides, and field-wide scholarship about evaluation in peacebuilding.

DATA COLLECTION & ANALYSIS

Data collection was informed by a literature review of over 30 academic articles and four meta-evaluations of P2P peacebuilding efforts in Israel-Palestine. The literature review laid out the main theoretical foundations of P2P peacebuilding and gave an overview of P2P efforts applied to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, especially but not exclusively within the framework of the 1995 Oslo Agreement. It also included an examination of two P2P programmatic evaluations and one follow-up alumni survey, which was however limited by the general lack of availability of and access to rigorous, complete programme evaluations. Overall, the literature review outlined the state of research on the different P2P models, the main conflict dynamics they seek to influence, and their impact on these dynamics as well as on the key measurable consequences and costs of conflict.

During the analysis phase, the report author first mapped questions from the interview protocol against the objectives and central research questions for the study. Subsequently, the literature review and interview responses were read and used to code data for the most common responses according to each research question. The focus of this approach was to draw lessons and patterns based on the memory recall of interviewees. Coded data was then used to write up responses for each question, which are answered in varying degrees of completeness.

Table 2 below provides an overview of the sector(s) targeted by organisations implementing P2P initiatives, their main programmatic activities and the locations(s) where such activities are implemented.

Based on collected qualitative data, the report author outlined quantitative indicators for which to survey the population in a randomised household survey. The survey, which includes questions on knowledge of and past participation in P2P programming, can be found in Annex II.

Figure 1. Repartition of survey respondents by age

Figure 2. Repartition of survey respondents by employment

The survey was originally intended to be conducted both with a population of 1) a sample of both current and past P2P participants and 2) a control sample of both Jewish and Arab populations living in Israel, East Jerusalem, and the West Bank. However, due to a lack of access to P2P participants, the survey was adapted.

Table 1. Respondents' participation in P2P programmes

		Total sample		# who did not participate in P2P programme	# who participated in P2P programme
Palestinians	West Bank	105		98	7
	Jerusalem	51		50	1
Israeli Arabs		151		130	21
Israeli Jews		145		130	15
Total		452		408	44

Third party data collection was utilised in order to minimize bias. Specifically, two public polling firms administered the quantitative survey, one surveyed Palestinians in the West Bank and Jerusalem, and the other surveyed Israelis. The firms administered the survey online and collected data from a representative sample of 452 respondents, including 234 men (51.7%) and 218 women (48.3%). Among these 452 respondents, 40 took part in some P2P activities, which allowed to draw tentative conclusions on the impact of P2P programmes on individual perceptions of the "other" side.

Quantitative surveys were originally planned to be administered to the current and past participants of P2P organisations involved in the study. However, researchers experienced multiple sensitivity concerns with allowing researchers to meet with participants, as well as repeated logistical issues in organising activities for data collection, that precluded access to a sufficient sample size of both Israeli and Palestinian participants from different types of local NGOs within the data collection timeline. To address these challenges while including an equal representation of the perspectives between Jewish Israelis, Arab Israelis, and Palestinians in the West Bank, the third-party polling firms created random samples of nearly equal numbers of anonymous, volunteer respondents, contacted from their respective research networks in these three communities. This sample included a diverse range of geographic locations, ages, genders, political affiliations, and experience with P2P programmes.

For the systems mapping, the researchers analyzed the effects of conflict dynamics on Israelis and Palestinians reported by different sources in the literature review phase. Dynamics were broken down and categorized into social, economic, and political factors with linkages drawn between how they impact both groups. During the qualitative interviews, questions were asked to gather participants' feedback on these and other linkages, categories, and dynamics from their experiences. Quantitative survey responses were also reviewed to provide additional input and confirm the relevance of these dynamics and their effects. All data sources were reviewed to finalize the systems map after completing the study's findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

LIMITATIONS

In its analysis of cost-effectiveness of P2P peacebuilding programmes, this study does not directly review any programme data or budgets, primarily due to lack of access to such information.[15] The study, data collection surveys and interviews, and outreach with participating NGOs included questions to obtain programme budgets and financial costs. However, most data collectors noted that almost all organisations felt uncomfortable releasing this information for the study, and those who did provided widely varying forms of financial information. These factors limited comparative analysis between the VfM of different types of NGOs. After the rounds of quantitative and qualitative data collection, analysis was done based on available programme information and participant responses to generate the report's conclusions and recommendations.

Of the organisations interviewed, representatives from only three referenced that their organisations complete regular programme evaluations. These evaluations are described as focusing primarily on identifying immediate programme outcomes (primarily attitude change) at the individual level and whether they are sustained in the short to medium term after a programme has been completed. Outside of this, representatives from the remaining 12 organisations discussed ad-hoc, output based monitoring strategies as their methodology of assessing effectiveness or impact and shared little information about financial assessment practices. With this in mind, the conclusions are based on subjective, memory-based, qualitative information that may not be a representative sample of the P2P field in Israel/Palestine.

Additionally, it is only possible to draw limited conclusions based on the quantitative data collected through the randomised household survey. The original survey instrument included questions on topics including: demographics; individual's experience with P2P programming; individual's participation in activities with someone from the "other" side; individual's skills and experience with solving conflict with someone from the "other" side; and individual's perception of their and the "other" side's interests, rights, living conditions, and necessary steps towards a long-term solution to the conflict. Two different public polling agencies collected data for Palestinian and Israeli respondents, respectively.

Upon review of the survey instrument, the firm collecting data from Palestinian respondents determined that some of the questions were too sensitive to ask given political context at the time (February - March 2020). In consultation with members of the research team, the polling firm agreed on a version of the survey that rephrased questions and removed others. In the final survey instrument used by the polling agency in the West Bank, questions related to demographics; experience with P2P programming; and the ability and degree of ease in solving problems with someone from the "other" side were maintained. The language of questions related to the respondents' perception of their and the "other" side's interests, rights, living conditions, and necessary steps towards a long-term solution to the conflict side were rephrased for a set of less explicit questions discussing the perception of both official and grassroots communication efforts with the "other" side. This divergence from the survey instrument reduced opportunities for comparison and analysis on general attitudes towards the "other" side and on perceptions of P2P peacebuilding efforts among respondents.

As a consequence of these methodological limitations, the content of this report cannot be used to draw definitive conclusions about impact, effectiveness, or efficiency. This report is best understood as a pilot study and should be utilised as a tool for identifying further areas and methods for research into P2P programming.

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[15]Most organisations in the peacebuilding field consider evaluation data and financial data to be proprietary or sensitive, and there is limited data that is publicly available.

Findings

OBJECTIVE 1: IMPACT

Objective 1: To identify the peacebuilding models, target groups, entry points, and methodologies that will have the greatest effect on key conflict dynamics at the community level in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza.

This section focuses on comparing P2P programme models and their various impacts on conflict dynamics. "Impact" is understood here as "positive and negative, primary and secondary long-term effects produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended".[16] This definition draws emphasis to changes that operate within a long time horizon, and in the context of peacebuilding, suggest changes at the broader level of the conflict, also known as peace writ large.

Attributing the effect of any given programme model in peacebuilding is extremely difficult. People and societies are influenced by a host of complex and interacting factors in the social, political, cultural, and economic realm, and defining the meaning of, and progress towards, "peace" in any given context is highly subjective. The conflict in Israel and Palestine presents a particularly difficult case to study programme impact, given that it is deeply tied to geopolitics that are largely outside the sphere of influence for P2P programming and other peacebuilding initiatives.

With these challenges in mind, plus those discussed in the "Limitations" section, this study does not make definitive conclusions about programme "impact". Instead, it seeks to offer a meaningful perspective about how P2P practitioners think about their own programmes and impact as well as indications of where further research would be informative.

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1. What are the key local conflict dynamics that recent peacebuilding programmes have tried to influence, both in the short and long term?

"Short-term" is interpreted here as the average length of

a peacebuilding programme, ranging from six months to approximately three years. "Long-term" is understood as generally greater than three years but, more importantly, changes that are sustained for multiple years after a P2P participant has ceased his or her direct involvement in the programme. "Local conflict dynamics" encompasses trends identified in the "Systems of Instability and Poverty" (see Appendices) systems map.

Addressing the physical and social isolation between Israelis and Palestinians was the most heavily targeted conflict dynamic and was discussed by 18 of the interviewees. Interviewees were widely influenced by contact theory, and made heavy use of strategies to expose groups to one another and increase information about "the other", including shared dialogues, travel programmes, joint projects, and educational programming. For example, one initiative brought together representatives from health ministries in Jordan, Israel, and Palestine, noting that "germs do not stop at checkpoints." At least eight interviewees (six organisations) explicitly viewed physical and social isolation as closely associated with the lack of information about the other, dehumanization, and intergroup antipathy, and sought to address them jointly. This belief is supported by the literature on the contact hypothesis, which has documented the various positive effects of intergroup contact on reducing prejudice, both through face-to-face and indirect contact.[17]

Seventeen interviewees believed that P2P could broadly address a variety of indicators, including empathy, stronger relationships, capacities to act constructively, and the confidence to take action supportive of peace. This belief is corroborated by the quantitative survey data. Indeed, Israeli Jews within our sample who participated in P2P programmes are, on average, almost two times more likely to say that they are willing to compromise in order to prevent future conflict than those who did not. Without access to data before their participation in P2P programmes, it is unclear if this can be attributed to the impact of P2P programmes, or if those willing to participate in these programmes are more likely to have these types of characteristics beforehand.

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[16]Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management, 2002. http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/29/21/2754804.pdf

[17]See notably (1) T. Tam, M. Hewstone, E. Cairns, N. Tausch, G. Maio and J. Kenworthy, "The impact of intergroup emotions on forgiveness." Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 10 (2007): 119–136. (2) T.F. Pettigrew, and L.R. Tropp, "A meta-analytic test of intergroup contact theory". Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 90 (5) (2006): 751–783. (3) Loris Vezzali, Mlles Hewstone, Dora Capozza, Dino Giovanni and Ralf Wolfer, "Improving intergroup relations with extended and vicarious forms of indirect contact". European Review of Social Psychology 25(2014): 314–389

Table 2. P2P programme sectors, activities, and location(s) as described by interviewees

Sector	Activities	Location(s)
Health	Joint training and research on disaster and crisis management with Israeli and Palestinian health professionals	
Intergroup dialogue and reconciliation; leadership	Intergroup dialogue workshops with Jewish and Bedouin communities in the Negev desert	Israel
Intergroup dialogue and reconciliation; advocacy; media	Yearly Israeli-Palestinian Memorial Ceremony; activist demonstrations to challenge the occupation and promote Palestinians' rights	Israel West Bank
Education; environment	Cross-border youth education programme on environmental issues, based on the WaterCare curriculum prepared jointly by Jordanians, Israeli, and Palestinian educational writers	Israel, West Bank
Intergroup dialogue and reconciliation	Video meetings between Israeli and Palestinians children; youth leadership trainings; social media outreach and media publications	Gaza
Education; media; advocacy	Seminars, conferences, and meetings with influential Israeli and Palestinian leaders promoting a two-state solution; lobbying and media publications	Israel, West Bank
Intergroup dialogue and reconciliation	3 weeks trip to the US with Israelis, Palestinians citizens of Israel and West Bank Palestinians between 15-16 years old	Israel, West Bank
Intergroup dialogue and reconciliation; leadership	Healing hatred programme (trauma healing, intergroup dialogue and leadership development) with Israeli and Palestinian community leaders and university students	West Bank
Intergroup dialogue and reconciliation; education; leadership	Weekly youth meetings over 6 years, promoting interfaith dialogue and reconciliation; yearly summer camp	Israel, West Bank
Intergroup dialogue and reconciliation; education; leadership	Multi-day in-country youth encounters; change agent courses with professionals such as local politicians and community leaders, health professionals, environmentalists, urban planners	Israel
Intergroup dialogue and reconciliation; education; advocacy	Public protests, conferences, and seminars, intergroup dialogue between Gaza youth and Israeli communities on Skype (drama, dance, music lessons)	Israel, Gaza
Health; business; intergroup dialogue and reconciliation	Self-refereed sports games for children, including a girls league; start-up accelerator based on mentorship of a high-level Israeli tech leader for 6 Palestinian graduates; transportation and treatment of Palestinians in Israeli hospitals; training of Palestinians health professionnals in Israeli hospitals	Israel
Health, advocacy	Transportation and treatment of critically and chronically-ill children from the West Bank and Gaza to Israeli hospitals; training of Palestinians health professionals in Israel to improve healthcare in Palestinian communities; legal support for human rights activists	Israel, West Bank
Intergroup dialogue and reconciliation; leadership	3.5 weeks peace camp in Maine in the United States focusing on youth leadership and intergroup dialogue	Israel, West Bank
Intergroup dialogue and reconciliation; education; leadership; health; media	Collaborative project between Jordanians, Israeli, and Palestinians health professionals; trip to Northern Ireland with 35 Jews and Muslims participants, learning about the Catholic/Protestant conflict and promoting interfaith dialogue and youth leadership	Israel, West Bank
Leadership; intergroup dialogue and reconciliation; media; advocacy	Leadership/activism incubator; development of political solutions; intergroup dialogue (Politics Cafe); women's empowerment	West Bank

Figure 3. Belief in the statement, "In order to achieve a long-term solution, I am willing to equally compromise if it will prevent future conflict," disaggregated by participation


Figure 4. Belief that Palestians meetings with Israelis are "Normalizers" that should be taken to court, since they harm Palestinian interests, disaggregated by participation

Similarly, Palestinians within our sample who took part in P2P programmes are less likely to consider that Palestinians which communicate with Israeli are "normalizers" who should be taken to court for harming Palestinians interests. Without access to data before their participation in P2P programmes, it is unclear if this can be attributed to the impact of P2P programmes, or if those willing to participate in these programmes are more likely to have these types of characteristics beforehand.

REGARDING OTHER DYNAMICS:
- Three interviewees mentioned trying to address the lack of opportunities for interpersonal cooperation, primarily through the execution of joint projects, such as those that focus on the environment.
- Five of the interviewees, representing two organisations discussed ways in which P2P programmes that they have been involved in address the way in which children are socialised to view the "other" as the "enemy", a feature described in the literature as contributing to the extreme complexity of the Israeli-Palestine conflict.[18]
- Only one interviewee focused on addressing uninational narratives of historical suffering by hosting joint public memorials for Israelis and Palestians who have died in the conflict, although this "siege mentality" is identified as a defining feature of the conflict in the literature.[19]

One interviewee also explicitly mentioned that P2P programmes in which they had been involved address - both directly and indirectly - power inequities between Israelis and Palestinians. This person discussed their process in detail, sharing:

"Addressing the conflict and its power imbalances directly are the center focus of our activities. Knowing this is painful, takes time, and is more difficult, we design our activities to lead participants to bring who they are and where they come from into the discussions. At first, this leads to Israelis feeling defensive and losing power when confronted by stories from Palestinians. Then, they jockey for power to get it back and position themselves as more humane and 'not as bad as the Arabs.' A back and forth continues until the Israelis begin feeling responsible for their actions and how they play a part in the larger system, and can no longer hide as 'liberals.' Then, Palestinians begin to feel empowered to really speak and grow their voices, and a more equal discussion begins."

A small number of other interviewees, particularly those who identify as Palestinians, voiced support for approaches that address power inequities and felt that addressing the on the ground situation of Palestinians as well as the political realities that drive occupation are essential for peacebuilding programmes to be meaningful.

Importantly, when most interviewees discussed target dynamics, it was usually within the context of short term change at the level of the individual. Many mentioned that they hoped that their programme alumni would go on to lead change at the local, national, or regional

[18]Juliana Schroeder and Jane L. Risen, "Befriending the enemy: Outgroup friendship longitudinally predicts intergroup attitudes in a coexistence program for Israelis and Palestinians." Group Processes & Intergroup Relations Vol. 19 (1) (2016): 72 –93.
[19]D. Bar-Tal, and D. Antebi, "Beliefs about negative intentions of the world: A study of the Israeli siege mentality." Political Psychology 13 (1992): 633–645.

level in the name of peace, but none explicitly discussed programme design choices or P2P models that they had chosen for the purpose of achieving a set of long term changes. This is representative of a broader tendency observed across almost all interviewees for long term changes to appear outside the scope of what they consider or plan for when designing and implementing programmes. This trend, discussed below in greater detail, has previously been highlighted in the literature, which stresses that the impact of P2P programmes has so far been primarily evaluated in terms of individual attitudinal change among participants.[20]

Conclusion: P2P peacebuilding practitioners interviewed for this study have tried to influence a wide variety of local conflict dynamics in the short term, including power inequities, the socialization of children to view the other side as enemies, uninational narratives of historical suffering, and above all, physical and social isolation. However, interviewees in general do not focus on or assess whether any of these effects continue long term.

2. What are the models being used in P2P peacebuilding programmes? What are the delivery models, target groups, entry points, and approaches used for each?

MODELS

As discussed above in the section on Background Information, the literature on P2P programmes identifies four basic models for change: the Coexistence Model, the Joint Projects Model, the Confrontational Model, and the Narrative Model.

While interviewees were encouraged to discuss specific programmatic approaches used by their organisations, they were not given specific context on the above categorisation or asked to reflect on which model would best correspond to their own programming for two reasons: first, it was possible to categorise organisational models based on publicly available information gathered during the literature review; and second, while academics had drawn conclusions related to different models, the degree to which these models was meaningful to practitioners and informed programme design was not clear.

To the later point, in discussing their work, interviewees

generally did not offer clear or comprehensive descriptions of the P2P programmes they worked on or had participated in. A large number of organisations appeared to use blended models and did not articulate strong preferences for why one approach should be used over another or how and why models should be used in concert. These most often included designing P2P programmes that focused primarily on dialogue activities utilizing the "Coexistence Model", but also involved some element of joint projects or narrative storytelling.

At least seven organisations subscribe to the "Coexistence Model" directly, though almost all utilize programme models in which bringing together participants from both sides of the conflict is hoped to somehow improve joint attitudes or relationships. At one end of the spectrum, one organisation leads peace camps built around dialogue activities for Israeli and Palestinian youth, while another has organized ad-hoc conferences and dialogue sessions connecting Gazans and non-Gazans for broadly defined interpersonal exchange.

Seven organisations utilise activities that fall under the "Joint Projects Model". In this case, "joint projects" is broadly interpreted to include both community service focused activities, which for instance engage youth in joint environmental projects, as well as those that are focused on service delivery or professional coordination, such as training Palestinian doctors in Israeli hospitals or organizing cross-border meetings of urban planners. The use of the "Joint Projects Model" appears as the primary activity of some P2P programmes, while in other cases it is one element of a programme otherwise focused on dialogue activities or the exchange of professional services. Interestingly, the "Joint Project Model" was described by USAID's field study of P2P in Israel-Palestine as being "more legitimate and relevant than dialogue and relationship-building for its own sake."[21] Supporting this approach, 61% of Israeli Arabs and 57% of Israelis Jews surveyed considered joint projects between the two sides of the conflict to be necessary to move towards a solution.

Regarding the "Confrontational Model", representatives of four organisations discussed the importance of confronting the power inequities between Israelis and Palestinians in line with the theory behind this model. Two additional interviewees who work heavily in Gaza focused

[20]See (1) Ned Lazarus, A Future for Israeli-Palestinian Peacebuilding. Britain Israel Communications and Research Centre (BICOM), 2017, p. 51. http://www.bicom.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/A-future-for-Israeli-Palestinian-peacebuilding-FINAL.pdf (2) USAID, Evaluative Learning Review Synthesis Report: USAID/CMM's People-to-People Reconciliation Fund, Annual Program Statement (APS), Social Impact, 2014, p. 5.
[21]USAID, Evaluative Learning Review Synthesis Report: USAID/CMM's People-to-People Reconciliation Fund, Annual Program Statement (APS), Social Impact, 2014, p.6. https://www.dmeforpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/CMM20Evaluative20Learning20Review_Synthesis20Report20Final20March202014_US-AID_040714.pdf

on the importance of having peacebuilding programmes address the economic and political realities that shape Gazan's everyday lives. In accordance with the history of this model, the majority of the interviewees who spoke about the need to address power dynamics and the lived realities of Palestinians under occupation were either Palestinian themselves or worked primarily with communities in Gaza.

Finally, representatives of two organisations referenced utilising narrative or storytelling approaches, though this also is broadly interpreted. One organisation conducts public memorial services that appear aimed at addressing historical narratives of unilateral suffering, while another utilises storytelling as part of dialogue projects that otherwise focus on trauma healing as well as improved intergroup attitudes and relationships.

Conclusion: The organisations interviewed for this study utilised all four P2P models, though the Coexistence Model and Joint Projects Model appeared to be most heavily utilised. It was common for organisations to blend different models, though they did not offer clear rationales for how and why the models should be utilised together. Importantly, several interviewees who focus primarily on Palestinian (typically Gazan) communities or who are Palestinian themselves shared criticisms of coexistence focused approaches and stressed the importance of addressing the lived realities and power inequities experienced by Palestinians in order to make meaningful progress toward peace. Future inquiry into this area should include a review of programme documentation, evaluations, organisational websites, and interview questionnaires more focused on identifying the timeframe, scale, and theories of change for leading programmes run by each NGO.

TARGET GROUPS

P2P programmes discussed by interviewees target a broad range of groups, including children, youth/high school students, professionals, and leaders. Nine organisations reported targeting children or youth. Seven organisations reported targeting professionals, most commonly in the medical field. Six organisations explicitly referenced recruiting participants who are leaders or demonstrate leadership potential.

The interviews also demonstrated patterns between an organisation's choice of target group and programme model. Programmes targeting children made primary use of the Coexistence Model, while those targeting youth or high school students engaged in joint projects and coexistence focused activities. At least three organisations targeted professionals in combined coexistence/joint

projects efforts, most frequently with participants working in healthcare.

The organisations targeting "leaders" broadly defined this group in terms of both organisational, community, and political status, often with overlap to professional groups. Interviewees explained that their organisation targets "activists", "force multipliers", while others more specifically emphasised engagement with key individuals in government, education, agriculture, and other professions. One organisation in particular explicitly connects its programme design and selection of participants with perceived leadership potential to its desired impact at the conflict level. Others target leaders with less defined parameters for leadership and theory of change.

"We arrange meetings, joint activities, and conversations that we select participants according to criteria. We select those that we think will have the potential to make a difference, top-down and bottom-up. The topic is always connected to the political situation, to the conflict or ways to solve, not the day-to-day life. I would define our work as joint Israeli-Palestinian effort to increase the chances of reaching a permanent agreement, focused on how to promote a solution, two-state solution and not focused on creating relationships or anything like that."

"We think it is important to bring in the right people, to the right place, at the right time. We use a people-focused approach focused on those in need."

"Activists should become decision makers that we train to address the leadership crisis, this is our first priority, they run for office and win to become decision makers to make the change instead of making pressure on other leaders."

"Our leadership programme targets impact multipliers, whatever that means. People who we think will become leaders who we can give them the value to go in that direction. We don't target a specific demographic, obviously we take care to make sure there is representation but don't include or exclude anyone ahead of time beyond the age and personal characteristics we are looking for."

In contrast, some organisations target leaders, but do so with the intention that the outcome of these efforts make a tangible improvement in communities where these professionals work, and that the professionals themselves will experience positive attitude changes.

"The key fundamental result is changes in attitudes. To what extent, I can speak to as much as I've experienced.

When you bring people together, there is always a positive attitude. Evaluation is new, before, we could not assess this to a high degree. Now, we have 30 years of projects and this is happening more. For Project Rozana, we have thousands of people getting treatment in Israeli hospitals. This has a positive effect on patients and their families as well as a smaller effect, I would say, on their immediate communities."

As discussed in the literature review, P2P evolved as a peacebuilding model after the failure of peace initiatives that targeted high level leaders in governments, the military, and political movements[22] as part of a broader focus on state-centric peacebuilding. The efforts had little impact, as grassroots communities continued to live with damaged or severed relationships across dividing lines. The quantitative survey data highlight the perceived value of peacebuilding efforts in the current context that

Figure 5. Palestinian respondents' perception of peacebuilding efforts, disaggregated by type of interaction

■ Grassroots-level interaction
■ Official-level interaction

Will promote the interests of both Palestinians and Israelis

Will promote exclusively the interests of the israelis

target grassroots communities: on average, Palestinians believe that grassroots-level interactions (20.5%) are more likely than official level interaction (12.2%) to serve the interest of **both** the Israelis and the Palestinians, and that grassroots-level communication (53.2%) is less likely than

official level communication (59.6%) to **promote exclusively** the interests of the Israelis.

Another issue discussed in the literature, and by interviewees, is the exclusion of certain demographics from P2P programmes in preference for elites and those who speak English. A 2014 study of USAID P2P programmes in the West Bank and Gaza identified that "peace'' tended to be associated with certain socio-political demographics from which participants were recruited, to the general exclusion of politically conservative groups, traditional and religious communities, and the socioeconomically disadvantaged.[23]

This trend was highlighted by five organisations, whose representatives shared that P2P programmes heavily target the elite, or middle/upper class individuals, at the expense of those who have less education or economic means. Only three interviewees mentioned that their organisations intentionally work to recruit participants from disadvantaged backgrounds. It is unclear whether the targeting of elites is broadly intentional, as a way to engage those with strategic leadership potential, or an accidental byproduct of recruitment strategies. Language is often a compounding factor - Israelis and Palestinians are often discouraged from learning one anothers' languages, and at least one interviewee indicated that had been a barrier to involvement in his past history as a programme participant.

"The biggest group that is eliminated from these programmes are those who do not speak English, to execute the programme you generally target the elite who go to school speaking English. If you don't, you won't be there. When I joined OneVoice, my English was not great just like many others. In my case, I spent a year learning English until I was able to speak the language and then went to meetings and on those trips with our partners."

"I think the first thing in terms of non-impact, when you bring Israelis and Palestinians together, it's difficult to either do it in Hebrew or Arabic because of the limited cross-language learning between them (Palestinians from the West Bank speaking Hebrew and Jewish Israelis speaking Hebrew is low), so English becomes the default group. That means you skew your target group towards middle or upper classes as lower classes are most likely to only speak their native language."

[22]The following initiatives are referenced as examples in the literature review: 1949 Armistice Agreements (1949); Allon Plan (1967-8); Rogers Plan (1969); Geneva Conference (1973); Camp David Accords (1978)
[23]Ned Lazarus, Ayse Kadayifci-Orellana, Maya Kahanoff, and Fakhira Halloun, "Evaluative Learning Review: Field Study USAID/West Bank Gaza People-to-People Reconciliation Annual programme Statement Grants," Evaluative Learning Review Synthesis Report: USAID/CMM's People-to-People Reconciliation Fund, Annual programme Statement (APS), Social Impact, 2014, p.7 https://www.dmeforpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/CMM20Evaluative20Learning20Review_Synthesis20Report20Final20March202014_USAID_040714.pdf

The degree to which English is a barrier to engagement across the field would be a meaningful subject for further inquiry, particularly the degree to which it parallels the exclusion of non-elites.

Conclusion: P2P programmes target a broad range of participant groups, including children, youth, professionals, and leaders. Regarding leaders, organisations target grassroots individuals seen as having potential to enact change as well as those with established positions in public and private leadership. Programmes working with professionals are most concentrated in the health sector, but also work in the environment, law, business, and urban planning. P2P programmes may also be more likely to engage participants from higher socio-economic backgrounds and those who speak English.

ENTRY POINTS

Existing research shows that sequencing of activities can be vital. Successful programmes usually begin with intra-group training or preparation before intergroup encounters, and later intra-group processing.[24] This broadly maps onto approaches taken by three organisations which all utilise uni-national dialogue and training sessions ahead of cross-border encounters. The remainder of organisations either strongly agreed that sequencing mattered at a conceptual level, but did not offer examples (five organisations), or did not answer as to whether sequencing mattered (14 organisations).

While it is not possible to definitively conclude why this is the case, it is noteworthy that three organisations appear to manage primarily one-off activities, rather than sustained programmes where target participants have a specific entry point. One organisation, for example, hosts a large annual memorial ceremony in Israel to commemorate losses on both sides of the conflict, and in parallel, leads advocacy work, activists demonstrations, and school visits. Similarly, another focuses on publishing media about Gaza, social media activism, teaching English, doing leadership programming for youth, and hosting some video meetings between participants on both sides of the conflict, though it's unclear whether or how these activities operate in concert. Finally, another interviewee mentioned that their organisation hosts conferences, demonstrations, and helps secure travel permits for Palestinians, but did not mention a broader connection or theory of change between activities.

Finally, even when interviewees did not talk in detail

about the order of activities, five stressed the importance of building empathy as a first step in P2P programmes:

"Starting with empathy should be very clear and taking action … should be perhaps the last step."

"Without showing empathy, you cannot move forward to the other indicators."

"It's also important to note that impact on relationships and early empathy grows at first but then hits a peak and crashes back down when they realize they are only a few number of people in their societies and don't know what to do. You keep working and it's a cycle that goes back up and down."

Conclusion: Despite evidence in the literature that sequencing of activities can be vital, only three organisations offered examples of utilizing sequencing strategies. These organisations all articulated that uni-national dialogue efforts should proceed bi-national/cross-border encounters.

APPROACHES

While the concept of "models" is understood to broadly overlap with a project's central theory of change, "approaches" is interpreted in this section as a more granular focus on activity design and thematic focus.

P2P programmes focus on a wide range of sectors. These include "civil society activism, dialogue, economic development, education, empowerment of youth, women and minorities, environmental peacebuilding, human rights and issue advocacy, media, psychosocial work and trauma healing, research, sports, and technological cooperation."[25] This observation holds true for the organisations in this study, which work in both multiple sectors and use a variety of programme approaches. Table 1 (above) provides an overview of the organisations interviewed in this study, the sector(s) they target and approaches or activities they adopt.

Ten interviewees mentioned personal or professional involvement in projects that include travel learning. There were three broad sub-genres under this approach. The first involves programmes where participants travel to a location outside of Israel/Palestine for an intensive humanisation and bonding experience. This approach is exemplified by one organisation which brings youth from both sides of the conflict to spend a number of weeks at a

[24]Lazarus et. al. p. 136-137, 147-150
[25]Ibid p. 131.

summer camp in the United States. The second focuses on learning from the experiences of other conflicts, as with a programme that brought participants to Northern Ireland to learn from the experience of Catholics and Protestants on forging a shared future. The third involves regional travel, such as having participants visit refugee camps or settlement sites, or alternatively facilitating cross-border professional services, with the direct or indirect intention of increasing participants' knowledge and exposure to how the "other side" lives. These efforts engage youth, professionals, and broadly defined "leaders", depending on their specific format and theory of change.

Travel learning is suggestive of various theories of change not included in the primary four "models" of P2P engagement. Some programmes aim to leverage an open mindedness that is assumed to come from stepping outside of one's regular family and community environment. Others, such as the programmatic trip to Northern Ireland, intend that participants learn from the experiences of other conflicts through an immersive learning trip. Finally, organized cross-border trips and site visits within Israel and Palestine are generally intended to reduce the lack of knowledge and exposure to the "other" community's lived experiences. In most cases, measures of success are anecdotal and rely heavily on observed attitude changes and new relationships among participants, though two organisations do use longitudinal surveys to track the sustainability of attitude changes over time. Interestingly, one organisation highlighted that while travel learning plays a crucial role in shifting the attitudes of participants, it is actually participation in post-travel programming that most critically influences long-term involvement of alumni in Israeli-Palestinian peacebuilding.[26]

While most organisations (13 of 15) utilised some form of intergroup dialogue activities, interviewees demonstrated important divisions about whether or not they believed that dialogue activities should address group-level conflict dynamics (occupation, a two state solution, patterns of violence, etc.), or focus on topics that are either neutral or explicitly personal. Interviewees from three organisations believed openly discussing conflict dynamics was essential, while representatives from four other organisations felt that the latter approach created the safe space necessary for attitude change and relationship building to occur. Interestingly, the interviewees who are supportive of programme approaches that address power inequities between the two sides are the same as those who believe

that dialogue should address conflict dynamics.

"We do not go into political discussion because in our experience most Israeli and Palestinian dialogue on politics will result in fighting to prove who is right and wrong, we try to go deep into personal stories about how each other feels about the "other". Then, participants start on deep conversations about pain and fear and get more into deep discussions to form relationships by listening and feeling the other's feelings. They stay the whole day and overnight together, do cultural activities like food and music to create friendship and relationship on mutual interests they find. We do personal questionnaires going deep into what they like, childhood, and stories where others find similarities and mutual hobbies to become closer to each other."

"We have a programme called politics cafe discussing these issues by daring to talk to the people in our societies about what is taboo. You talk about interaction between Israelis and Palestinians but there are 22% of Israeli community that are Arab and thousands of Palestinians work and eat or buy things in Israel. There is so much interaction, the problem is not to create interaction but what will this interaction lead to? Political discussions are how we are going to implement those solutions."

One interview in particular offered a compelling perspective on how avoiding political discussions can both support and inhibit programme impact:

"The same thing that creates impact is holding us back— our approach to more or less kind of tip-toe around specific subjects and maneuver between hotspots to be objective on difficult things. This allowed us in many ways to have impact when you accept everyone and everything to encourage more personal change because many different types of people can be part of this to have a change and can lead to inspiring and impressive people today. That approach also prevents us from having a deeper and meaningful impact because we are not dealing with the difficult issues and not stating what we think about what is happening here. If you look at the larger picture, which I think is important, I wouldn't say we are having an impact there or if at all."

"It depends on how you define results and outcome, are you willing to go with international consensus or take the challenge that people don't agree. As a Palestinian who

lives here and wants to see change happening, I don't see any organisations paying attention to the needs of the place."

These comments are representative of Maoz's assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of non-confrontational as opposed to confrontational models.[27] Indeed, as discussed in the literature review, while non-confrontational models such as Coexistence and Joint Project Models are effective at attracting individuals who are more nationalist and less supportive of peacebuilding efforts among each group, they also tend to perpetuate existing asymmetric power relations.

Still others felt that either approach could be successful or alienating of participants, as all individuals have their own preference:

"We did a project in East Jerusalem with a Palestinian NGO. We created a double layer process including two groups, one of Israeli West Jerusalemites and one East Palestinian Jerusalemites...It was very difficult, we had the first joint meeting of 30 participants. By the end of the 7th or 8th, we had three or four participants. People started to get out and not come back, some because we talked too much about politics, some because we did not talk enough about politics and the conflict; some because we did not talk enough about working on something practical together and others because we talked too much about working together practically out of fear of being involved publicly working with the other and others who felt nothing is achievable because of the political situation. The result was disappointing."

The quantitative survey data reinforces the idea that the perspectives of who specifically is engaged in political discussions within a programme can have a significant impact on outcomes: Israeli Arabs within our sample are more likely (52%) than Israeli Jews (35%) to agree that they have to take responsibility for the harm done to the "other" side in order for a long-term solution to the conflict to be found. Like with past Israeli P2P participants, the data could reflect that participating in P2P programmes has this effect, or that participants who feel this way are more likely to participate in these types of activities. This data suggests that who is in the room, and the degree to which they believe "their" side needs to take responsibility for the harm done to the "other" side from the outset of a

programme, will have an impact on programme outcomes.

The qualitative interviews demonstrate that there remains strong division among P2P practitioners about the relative value of programmatic approaches that address or avoid conflict dynamics as well as power inequities between both sides of the conflict, while the quantitative data sheds some light as to why such divisions remain.

Conclusion: P2P programmes operate in a large number of sectors, most predominantly intergroup dialogue, but also leadership training, health, advocacy, education, and the environment. Interviewees had divergent experiences and opinions as to whether dialogue activities should directly address conflict dynamics or avoid controversial topics. Finally, many organisations utilise travel learning, often internationally, to enable a change in knowledge, attitude, and relationships among participants.

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3. What is the overall measurable (quantifiable) impact of these programmes? Which programme models have had the greatest and least effect on these key local conflict dynamics, and why?

IMPACT

Evaluating impact across the peacebuilding field faces a wide range of recurring challenges, including the political nature of peace processes, unclear goals and theories of change, the beliefs and emotions of practitioners, and variant understanding of what constitutes "peacebuilding" across times and contexts.[28] Bearing this in mind, and while few interviewees explicitly linked P2P models with theories of change or impact indicators, it is possible to identify several types of indicators that are broadly used to identify programmatic success. Table 3 provides an overview of the linkages between P2P models, TOCs, and impact indicators. For the Coexistence and Joint Project models, the author relied on programme evaluations provided by two organisations, which clearly outlined both programme TOCs and impact indicators. For the Confrontational and Narrative model, the author did not have access to such evaluations, and therefore relied instead on the qualitative interviews conducted with representatives from three other organisations to provide a tentative reconstitution of these linkages.

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[27]Ifat Maoz, "Does contact work in protracted asymmetrical conflict? Appraising 20 years of reconciliation-aimed encounters between Israeli Jews and Palestinians." Journal of Peace Research 48(1) (2011).

Table 3. P2P models, related Theories of Change and impact indicators

P2P models	Theory of Change	Impact Indicators
Coexistence Model	If participants develop positive interpersonal relations across lines of conflict, and if they experience an individual change in attitudes, values, skills, and perceptions, then participants will leverage their unique relationships and skills to effect economic, social, and political change in ways that transform conflict[29]	% of participants who report having personal, positive relationships with someone from the other side[30] % of participants who exhibit significant attitudinal shifts in terms of positivity, empathy, humanization, etc[31] % of alumni who report that they are transforming conflict through economic or socio-political change in either their professional or personal endeavours[32]
Joint Project Model	If communities have increased awareness of the necessity of cross-border cooperation to achieve practical economic, social, and political change, and if communities work together to successfully address these practical issues, then peaceful relationships of trust and cooperation will be sustained between Israelis and Palestinians[33]	% of participants who demonstrate an acquired knowledge of a given issue and its independent nature[34] # of successful cross-border joint activities % of participants who demonstrate a more positive attitude towards people from the "other side"[35]
Confrontational Model	If participants' awareness of intergroup power dynamics and of their own role in the larger conflict is increased, and if participants are trained and empowered to become leaders, agents of change, then participants will advocate for and/or implement economic, social, and political solution that will transform conflict	% of participants who demonstrate an acquired knowledge of the political situation and of intergroup conflict dynamics % of participants who demonstrate increased confidence to take action to support peace # of activists who run for positions # of activists who become decision-makers and implement solutions which challenge the political situation # of Israeli politicians who will vote on a specific legislation as a result of joint advocacy efforts
Narrative Model	If participants share their personal experiences of conflict, and if participants acknowledge the suffering of the other side and recognise the other side's humanity, then participants will be more able work together across divides to transform the conflict	# of participants in binational meetings in which personal stories are shared % of participants who exhibit significant attitudinal shifts in terms of positivity, empathy, humanisation, etc # of people participating in joint advocacy initiatives # of people reached by joint advocacy efforts

[28]Mary B. Anderson, Diana Chigas, Peter Woodrow, Encouraging Effective Evaluation of Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities: Towards DAC Guidance, 2007, p. 6 https://www.cdacollaborative.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/An-Approach-to-DAC-Guidance-for-Evaluating-Conflict-Prevention-and-Peacebuilding-Activities-1.pdf
[29][Organisational Learning Report], May 2019, p.3
[30]Ibid, p.8
[31]Ibid, p.8
[32]Ibid, p.10
[33][Organisational External Evaluation], August 2014, p. 9-10
[34]Ibid, p.21
[35]Ibid, p.22

It is interesting to underline that while P2P programmes have been criticised in the literature for focusing exclusively on individual cognitive transformation, and for failing to produce actual structural change in the social and political change,[36] at least two of the TOCs outlined above explicitly expect P2P participants to effect social, economic, or political change that will transform the conflict as a result of their participation. While the extent to which these TOCs are actually accomplished remains mostly unknown, this is an interesting area for further research on P2P programmes's capacity to create structural change.

Looking at programmatic approaches rather than models, projects fostering dialogue, education, and leadership are most strongly associated with impact (rather than project level outcomes). These projects typically have theories of change in which participant "encounters will enhance the motivation and capacity of participants to become 'agents of change'...in their communities."[37]

With "activation of 'agents of change'" as the main identified indicator of *potential* impact on the conflict itself (note that working to enact change does not guarantee success or longevity of the change over time), even in the literature there are only a handful of examples of leading peace activists who attribute their activism to P2P programmes. These include 14 individuals identified by Lazarus.[38] Other researchers assert that P2P programmes overall have limited potential, as they ultimately transform a relatively small number of individuals into leaders, far fewer than the critical mass needed to enact change at the conflict level.[39] Beyond this, peacebuilding evaluations in general often do not adhere to standards of feasibility, utility, propriety, and accuracy that are seen as central to quality across the evaluation field.[40]

The paucity of supportive impact data, in regard to agents of change, maps broadly onto the 15 organisations surveyed. Of these, only two described explicit activities to engage alumni in long term change efforts,

design P2P programmes with this level of change in mind, and are now working to better measure and understand impact at this level. In an external evaluation of an environmental education and cooperation project, one organisation also recommended the creation of an alumni program to favour long-term work with the communities.[41] A fourth organisation referenced that community action by alumni is an important indicator of long term impact, but did not offer more information as to whether that is designed for or measured.

The data collected through the quantitative survey provides support to the ability of P2P programmes to encourage participants to act as "agents of change". Among Palestinians as well as Israeli Arabs and Israeli Jewish respondents, individuals who had participated in P2P programmes were more likely to report that they had created solutions with someone from the "other" side than people who never participated in P2P programmes. More specifically, individuals who participated in P2P programmes focused on intergroup dialogue and reconciliation, or in programmes that targeted multiple sectors, are more likely to report that they have created solutions with someone from the "other" side than those who participated in P2P programmes targeting other sectors (education, leadership, health, business, and entrepreneurship, etc.). Considering the size of our sample (n=40), these observations should not be considered as definitive conclusions, but rather as leads for more in-depth investigation.

While only two organisations appear to design for and measure change taken by alumni, this means of impact is widely aspired towards among surveyed organisations. Five other organisations expressed an intention that their programmes would create "agents of change". Three organisations shared specific anecdotes of individuals who had demonstrated this behavior but did not reference designing programmes with this change in mind. Many interviewees also mentioned that P2P participants' ability to act as agents of change, and to have an impact on the conflict, was strongly limited by backlash in their home

[36]Ifat Maoz, "Does contact work in protracted asymmetrical conflict? Appraising 20 years of reconciliation-aimed encounters between Israeli Jews and Palestinians." Journal of Peace Research 48(1) (2011): 123
[37]Ned Lazarus, A Future for Israeli-Palestinian Peacebuilding. Britain Israel Communications and Research Centre (BICOM), 2017, p. 40. http://www.bicom.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/A-future-for-Israeli-Palestinian-peacebuilding-FINAL.pdf
[38]Ibid.
[39]Shira Herzog and Avivit Hai, "The Power of Possibility: The Role of People-to-People programmes in the Current Israeli-Palestinian Reality," Freidrich Ebert Stiftung, Israel Office, 2005, p. 31.
https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/israel/04093.pdf
[40]Cheyanne Sharbatke-Church, Evaluating Peacebuilding: Not Yet All It Could Be, Berghof Foundation, Berlin, 2011, p. 465-467
https://www.berghof-foundation.org/fileadmin/redaktion/Publications/Handbook/Articles/scharbatke_church_handbook.pdf
[41][Organisational External Evaluation], August 2014.

Figure 6. Participant belief that they have created solutions with someone from the "other" side, disaggregated by participation and nationality/citizenship

societies, family, and peer pressure, as well as political pressure. USAID's field study of P2P efforts in Israel-Palestine indeed underlines that delegitimization campaigns against P2P have been particularly emboldened by the failure of the Oslo peace process and subsequent pessimism towards peacebuilding of Israeli and Palestinians publics.[42]

"One capacity they work on after starting to talk about trauma and healing is leadership, how they can become good leaders sharing and speaking out, raising awareness, recruiting others, and doing things in their work and daily lives. We see actions they do like writing letters and appeals or posting on Facebook against news that is happening, recruiting others to join programmes, and going to protests."

"Our entire programme is designed to help young people grow in terms of their ability to become leaders of change, that starts with the summer programme design. It starts with intentionally building programming around dialogue sessions which create opportunities for them to expand their minds, begin to make room for the other's narratives, and listen. Lectures that present different narratives, tours in Israel and Palestine to see different facets of the struggles they have together - these help build communication and leave participants coming back

with even more questions. They go home and experience things that they want to bring back with us. Continuing to critically evaluate their environments and societies and media and schools and families to become critical thinkers."

"One of the key indicators of real impact is to assess how individual participants change their attitudes and then influence their communities."

The degree to which organisations think about, and measure, long-term change is critical to understanding if P2P programmes contribute to peace writ large. Yet of the three organisations who think about long-term impact with regard to change agents, only one shared data about how this impact is measured. While this representative pointed out that this data is self-reported, and lacks independent validation, the collection of such data is an important step toward evaluating the impact of P2P in Israel/Palestine. The representative also referenced a large number of anecdotes of former programme participants taking leadership roles in their communities, and occasionally, in political dynamics at the conflict level, which may corroborate the Alumni Survey findings. However, what percentage of alumni actually become change agents, and for those that do, whether any meaningful socio-political impacts have been observed, was refer-

[42]USAID, Evaluative Learning Review Synthesis Report: USAID/CMM's People-to-People Reconciliation Fund, Annual Program Statement (APS), Social Impact, 2014, p. 5. https://www.dmeforpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/CMM20Evaluative20Learning20Review_Synthesis20Report20Final20March202014_US-AID_040714.pdf

enced as a new area of research that had yet to yield substantive data. This demonstrates that even for one of the most established P2P programmes targeting Israelis and Palestinians, there is little impact data on which to draw conclusions about model effectiveness over the long-term.

"Some of our Jewish alumni in positions of power have taken the lead fostering equality for all in Israel. As we speak, a bill of law on the "Equal rights for Muslims" is now in discussion in Parliament."

"I think that on the individual level we have a real immediate impact on all levels, some more than others for different people. In the long term, we see some examples but we have not made a strict evaluation on results after 10 years, so I am not confident telling you what happened with all of them afterwards. One person I have not been in touch with I found on Facebook and she said one specific workshop changed her life and career and whole way of looking at the conflict dynamics and power relationships. She became a leader in a major P2P organisation for many years and moved on recently but is still very involved in peace related activities."

Several issues discussed by interviewees may offer some insight regarding the gap between impact that is intended, impact that is designed for, and impact that is measured. Nine interviewees highlighted that short funding cycles, preferred by donors, limited their timeframe for impact, and four interviewees noted that donor reluctance to fund staffing and overhead costs limited organisational capacity for impactful work. Five interviewees recognised that there is a strong need to better understand long-term impact, and believed that donors should either investigate this themselves or provide more funds for NGOs to do it.

Seven interviewees also believed that a lack of coordination across NGOs missed important opportunities to build off of one another's work to achieve long-term impact. Outside of the "change agent" mechanism for impact, when asked about programme results or impact, most of the remaining 12 organisations either discuss changes at the programmatic level, or do not speak about long-term changes resulting from their programmes at all. One, for

example, focused on the number of people who attend their annual memorial events (an output), while two other organisations identified numbers of doctors trained (an output) and patients treated in health related exchange programmes (outcome).

Conclusion: Both the literature on P2P programmes in Israel/Palestine, and organisations surveyed, see programme alumni becoming agents of change as the most plausible pathway for long-term impact. While the data collected in the quantitative survey provides some support to this hypothesis, there is a broad lack of investment in evaluation in this area, so the validity of the hypothesis, or the extent of impact achieved, is relatively unknown. Instead, most interviewees described "impact" in terms of programme level output and outcome, rather than long term change at the level of the conflict.

PROGRAMMATIC APPROACHES AND IMPACT ON CONFLICT DYNAMICS

At the programme design level, scholars and interviewees offer additional commentary that sheds light on the relative benefits of various programme approaches. Past researchers' efforts of P2P programmes in Israel-Palestine suggest that the effectiveness of different models is affected by several key dynamics,[43] a number of which are corroborated by interviewees.

Of the above, the reference to long-term activities with tangible actions highlights an important gap. Eight interviewees talked about the importance of long-term engagement, but acknowledged that their programmes did not provide for it. Only three referenced organising alumni follow up activities, but the extent of these efforts was unclear from the interview. This gap is noteworthy because the long term activation of "agents of change" implementing concrete actions at the conflict level was how many of the organisations, especially those whose programmes focused on interpersonal dialogue and attitude change, intended to eventually have a sustained impact at the level of the conflict.

Conclusion: The academic literature on P2P as well as organisations surveyed identified four dynamics seen as key to programme success: full equality and recognition

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[43]See notably (1) Daniel Bar-Tal, "The elusive nature of peace education." In: Gavriel Salomon and Baruch Nevo, (eds), Peace Education: The Concept, Principles and Practices around the World. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2002, pp. 27-36; (2) Daniel Bar-Tal, "Nature, rationale, and effectiveness of education for coexistence." Journal of Social Issues 60(2) (2004): 253-271; (3) Muhamad Abu-Nimer, "Education for coexistence and Arab-Jewish encounters in Israel: Potential and challenges." Journal of Social Issues 60(2) (2004): 405-422; and (4) Rabah Halabi and Nava Sonnenschein, "The Jewish-Palestinian encounter in a time of crisis." Journal of Social Issues 60 (2) (2004): 375-387.

Table 4. Programme dynamics influencing the effectiveness of P2P programmes

Academic Research	Interviews
Full equality and recognition of legitimacy for both groups	3 organisations
Recognition or awareness of imbalances of power between the superior (Jews) and weaker (Arabs) groups	6 organisations "[It] is essential to confront the imbalance of power, otherwise participants (as we found in the `80s) are unable to connect their experiences as individuals with the larger context (and continue thinking those who we met are not like the rest)."
Short-term activities that generate positive intergroup contact and relationships combined with long-term activities with tangible, sustainable action	2 organisations "Because they have a long experience and formative relationships, they tend to be eager to keep working and have it manifest tangibly with their families, community, and school. Our local staff work with them on that as well as working with local organisations and activism as well."
Trained and multi-partial facilitation that ensures equal participation (including in translation, opportunities, and space), adequate preparation that provides confidence to all groups	6 organisations "You have to understand, before you meet the other side, you must prepare, it's very important. You have to know [the relationship] is asymmetric beforehand." "There is stigma around learning each other's language" "Language is a symptom for the larger macro-level context where speaking Hebrew is the norm but Arabic is labelled 'extremist'"
Incorporation of building skills in open communication, structural analysis, and self-awareness and critique	8 organisations

of legitimacy between groups; recognition or awareness of imbalances of power between the superior (Jews) and weaker (Arabs) groups; short-term activities that generate positive intergroup contact and relationships combined with long-term activities with tangible, sustainable action; and trained and multi-partial facilitation that ensures equal participation (including in translation, opportunities, and space), adequate preparation that provides confidence to all groups. Of these criteria, long-term engagement was seen as critical by many interviewees, though they acknowledge that their programmes were not structured for it.

LOCAL DYNAMICS
Finally, while interviewees believed that P2P programmes

could influence conflict dynamics, they also believed that the opposite was true. Allport, the original author of the contact hypothesis, identifies "support from laws, customs, or authorities for their shared interaction" as one of four prerequisite criteria for the success of P2P programmes.[44] Similarly, USAID's field study stressed the importance of engaging authorities and institutions in order to maintain sufficient societal legitimacy and to operate effectively across the divide.[45] Of those interviewed, 17 individuals cited anti-normalisation among Palestinians, and the pressure not to engage with perceived "terrorists" among Israelis, as an important factor that both limited participant's desire to engage in P2P programmes as well as their ability to become change agents upon programme completion. This challenge is partly corroborated by the

[44] G.W. Allport, The nature of prejudice. Cambridge, MA: Perseus Books, 1954.
[45] USAID, Evaluative Learning Review Synthesis Report: USAID/CMM's People-to-People Reconciliation Fund, Annual Program Statement (APS), Social Impact, 2014, p. 6. https://www.dmeforpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/CMM20Evaluative20Learning20Review_Synthesis20Report20Final20March202014_USAID_040714.pdf

quantitative survey data: 62% of Palestinian respondents believe that meeting with Israelis, either on the official or the grass-root level, represents a form of "treason", and that Palestinians meetings with Israelis, also known as "normalizers", should be taken to court for harming Palestinians interests. Palestinians living in the West Bank tend to agree with this opinion more often and more strongly than Palestinians living in Jerusalem. This difference in beliefs lends some support to the prerequisite criteria for the contact hypothesis, as it may suggest that Palestinians living in Jerusalem have more shared interaction under more similar laws, customs, and authorities than Palestinians living in the West Bank.

Half of interviewees referenced the lack of tangible improvement in living conditions for Palestinians, especially with lack of infrastructure and employment opportunities, as a major limitation. Four specifically mentioned public and political pressure tied to Hamas as inhibiting participation from Palestinians, and four also referenced discriminatory legislation and legislation limiting movement. Several also mentioned political shifts at the national and regional level as a cause for disruption, particularly the U.S. decision to move its embassy to Jerusalem, and statements by politicians against the possibility of a two state solution.

Conclusion: Anti-normalisation, the pressure on Israeli's not to engage with perceived "terrorists", and both national and international political dynamics are seen as limiting the positive effects of P2P programmes.

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4. What are the key similarities and differences between programmes in Israel, the West Bank and Gaza?

In interviews, few people spoke directly about where their programmes take place. Additionally, organisations drew participants from different locations at different points in time. It is therefore difficult to meaningfully identify differences and similarities across programmes. The location information included in Table 5 (below) represents the author's best rendering of where each organisation historically or currently operates, based on references in their descriptions of their Fwork.

Table 5. Location of P2P programmes

Programme Location	Manages P2P Programmes
Israel	11 organisations
West Bank	9 organisations
Gaza	3 organisations

Despite a general lack of geographic information on programmes, six interviewees mentioned the imbalance of funding between programmes in Israel and the other two locations, particularly Gaza.

"There are so many resources that Palestinians cannot get that Israelis can get."

"Trying to get projects and find places to meet has become much more difficult just to get permits even for conferences. There are those for the West Bank, but I feel as though I have to represent the voice for Gazans. I'm not sure how to get the funds or how large of a factor funding is versus political issues."

"No one is funding this work in Gaza, I don't know why. We submit proposals but get nothing in return…[Donors] don't seem to care. They just focus on the money and pictures but we continue working here."

"Israeli organisations are always the ones submitting the proposals [not Palestinian organisations]. It is part of the occupation, creating a dependency on the Israeli side; funds go disproportionately to Israeli NGOs and even Palestinian partners get peanuts comparatively and lack the resources, knowledge, and capacities of their counterparts."

The location where programmes are funded may be one of the factors which explains the imbalance of participation in P2P programmes between Palestinians and Israelis reflected in the quantitative survey: only 5% of surveyed Palestinians (most of them living in the West Bank) report having participated in P2P programmes, compared with 13% of Israeli Arabs and 10% of Israeli Jews.

Conclusion: Interviews offer limited comparative information across programme locations, though several interviewees mentioned a lack of resources and programming in the West Bank, and more seriously, Gaza.

OBJECTIVE 2: COST EFFECTIVENESS

Objective 2: To conduct a cost-effectiveness analysis of selected P2P peacebuilding programmes to identify the greatest VfM for international donors.

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1. How do the most effective peacebuilding models compare in terms of economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of programming?

This report uses DFID's 3E's Framework to define "economy" as whether there are inputs of the appropriate quality secured at the right price, "efficiency" as how well inputs are converted into outputs, and "effectiveness" as how well the outputs from an intervention achieve a desired outcome.[46]

ECONOMY & EFFICIENCY

Sixteen interviewees were asked directly either how their organisation thinks about cost-effectiveness, or how their organisation thinks about effectiveness in the context of VfM or cost-effective programming. When asked what approaches their organisations use to maximize cost-effectiveness, twelve interviewees responded with examples of multitasking or marginal cost adjustments to account for limited budgets (economy). Discussed strategies including hosting events in free spaces, sharing costs with partners, reliance on volunteers, and outsourcing activities like accounting.

"We did a restructuring last year to keep costs to 33% of the past while doubling the number of activities. We started depending on resources from within. Most organisations apply for grants which we do. We also look at what else can be done. We partnered with [another organisation], they like what we do, and said they like what we do, and will pay for our venues and transport. "That's how we doubled activities to 20 per month, four in the West Bank, one in Gaza, by cooperating with other local partners that we work with in every city. In Jenin, we work with another local partner. This saves money on venues and coordination. We also outsource many services like accounting, auditing, IT, and designing and producing social media were outsourced, and this saves us a lot of cost. We moved to a smaller office saving like a thousand dollars. That's how we cut the budget 33% while doubling activities."

Almost none of the 16 interviewees mentioned the issue of budget or finances directly, nor did they offer any specific references to practices within their organisation of assessing what level of financial investment was appropriate for the achievement of a certain level of outputs (efficiency). Common responses included:

"Usually, we make sure that every penny goes in the right place that is efficient and doing what it is supposed to be doing. To make sure we are doing the right thing, we base our budgets on mutual team judgments doing the budget, then we make evaluation, and we have strict measurements of accountability on procurement and recruitment and management of financial assets."

"If you look at it financially, how you best spend the money...Once you have the philosophy and concepts right, it is easier to say this is what I want to do, this is how I can do it with the amount of money that I have. Once you know you have to report and there is someone checking you, the responsibility is much bigger. We constantly check ourselves. I want the donors to know I am spending the money well."

"If you have a good programme, it has to be cost-effective. You always have your original goals and you can ask, "did we achieve that" and then you can look and maybe find better ways to achieve it. Go back and not lose the forest through the trees, really go back and see if you achieved what you intended, not just looking at the indicators."

"We look at outcomes/results with regard to initial plans & goals...I think that for cost-effectiveness, the focus should be on the relations between initial budget and real cost; initial, mid-term, and final internal evaluations, external evaluations."

These responses broadly indicate that interviewees care about how well their programmes are doing, but commonly conflate efficiency with effectiveness, and/or do not think about cost effectiveness in terms of VfM. This trend parallels the general lack of comprehensive evaluation practices discussed among surveyed organisations, and may or may not be related to general thinking and focus at the level of project activities.

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[46]Department for International Development, "DFID's Approach to Value for Money (VfM)," July 2011,
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/67479/DFID-approach-value-money.pdf.

Conclusion: It is not possible to directly assess economy and efficiency, both because interviewees generally did not speak directly about how their financial investments are evaluated in terms of programmatic achievement, and also because a review of programme evaluation data was not included in this study. Interviewees widely demonstrated an understanding of efficiency in terms of utilising opportunities for marginal cost savings or in terms of the achievement of project objectives, but not in terms of the relative financial value of different P2P models.

EFFECTIVENESS

Of the 16 interviewees asked about cost-effectiveness, or how their organisation thinks about effectiveness in the context of VfM or cost-effective programming, eight interviewees made general references to looking at the achievement of project level or organisational goals. The above section on "Approaches" discusses differences of opinion across organisations as to whether intergroup dialogue programmes should openly discuss conflict issues. However, across the spectrum of opinions, the majority of organisations did not discuss concrete data at either the level of project outcomes, or as detailed above, long-term impact. This is representative of a general lack of systematic research comparing the effectiveness of the different existing P2P models.[47] While several referenced evaluations, academic research partnerships, and annual results publications, without a more thorough review of these materials than was possible for this study, it is not possible to draw accurate or independent conclusions about what programme models or organisations are more effective.

In the absence of comprehensive programme and impact level data, interviewees shared their own assessments of what programme models and approaches were more effective and why. In addition to varied opinions regarding the contact hypothesis/Coexistence Model, interviewees had different perspectives about the effectiveness and efficiency of travel learning programmes.

"It is expensive to bring people together, transportation locally and internationally which take up a massive amount of cost, housing for long-term stay at camp, the factors that bring them together. Once people are in the same space, the costs are not high. You just want the space to be together. Once they are together, costs decrease. Uni-national work is significant and needed in both com-

munities to enable them to see and do work with each other. High costs even uni-nationally in Palestine are high. The costs go down and are low once they are in the same space."

"Having an extended encounter outside the region away from society, home, and families solely focused on learning and creating relationships with freedom of movement and interaction which they don't have at home, despite this being expensive although not relative to other fields like defense. We believe that is the foundation for our high levels of impact metric success. Making sure relationships can be sustained. Making sure attitudinal change is linked to hope."

"When I look at our goals of building relationships and trust, a summer camp is more effective keeping them there overnight socialization in a concentrated amount of time. You would reach kids more effectively that way. Camps are very powerful, we only do one a year because they are expensive. International trip experiences are also concentrated impact. Seeing that it's possible to create change is powerful and makes you think that you don't have to live in the way you live now."

"[Donors] want to go on retreats in the desert or play sports games or travel to the US with Israelis and Palestinians. For us, we do not do such activities. These do not transform and heal the Israelis and Palestinians from trauma and fear... I have been to other activities with peace retreats with other Israelis and Palestinians in Sweden, we went to a 5-star hotel and spoke about the conflict and had everything paid for (tickets, food, etc.) but I found no relationships with them, we just tried to prove who is right or wrong. They will not build relationships if you do not go deep into personal feelings and trauma."

Conclusion: Interviewees demonstrated differences of opinion as to the effectiveness of programmes using the most common P2P model, the Coexistence Model, which is built around the contact hypothesis. There is also some debate as to the effectiveness of travel related programmes, but it is possible that these programmes are both high cost and high impact. Future research to compare model effectiveness need access to programme evaluations and long-term impact data, recognising there may be gaps given the difficulty and lack of common standards in measuring peacebuilding impact.

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[47]Ifat Maoz, "Does contact work in protracted asymmetrical conflict? Appraising 20 years of reconciliation-aimed encounters between Israeli Jews and Palestinians." Journal of Peace Research 48(1) (2011): 118

2. Do investments made in different places in the conflict system create ripple effects throughout the system? If so, how is this done?

Multiple interviewees referenced instances in which their programmes had ripple effects. As described above, this was primarily through alumni who used the knowledge, skills, and attitudes they gained by participating in P2P programmes to enact change at the community or political level. While these changes are not well studied, or long lasting enough to be considered impact, they do suggest places where individual ripple effects are possible. Examples include:

- Jewish alumni of a Northern Ireland programming trip have taken the lead on fostering equality for all in Israel, leading to a current discussion in Parliament on a bill of law on "Equal Rights for Muslims";
- One P2P alumnus was an advisor to a high-level politician involved in peace talks;
- A former P2P workshop participant who worked in civil administration in IDF in the West Bank helped facilitate work with Palestinians;
- An older Jewish alumnus from another organisation became a journalist for an international news agency and stated that she was inspired to a career in journalism to help the public not lose sight of addressing the conflict;
- Palestinian mothers in a WhatsApp group created by some P2P participants used their newfound connection to take each other's children to treatments or fill-in for childcare for others. This was cited as a highly significant change, due to a Palestinian taboo against speaking about children who are ill.

These examples broadly lend some validity to ripple effects achieved by individual change agents, though there are no clear patterns of data that show predictability. In a number of cases, the idea of ripple effects, like long term impact, was referenced as a hoped-for outcome but not something well understood or designed for. One interviewee, when asked what factors can increase impact, answered "It is kind of like emptying the ocean with a teaspoon."

A further review of programme evaluations, particularly those focusing on identifying unintended impacts, could shed further light on questions of ripple effects created by P2P programmes.

Conclusion: Interviewees most commonly saw their programmes having ripple effects through the individual work

of programme alumni across a variety of professional sectors.

3. To what extent does the impact of peacebuilding programmes on conflict dynamics affect poverty reduction? Which investments have a direct effect on poverty reduction (e.g. lower unemployment, increase in income, etc.)? Which investments have an indirect effect on poverty reduction (e.g. job-relevant skills, business opportunities, professional networks, etc.)?

Poverty is an important dynamic in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It is not only a byproduct of the physical isolation between Israelis and Palestinians, but also continues to fuel a lack of economic interdependence and shape harsh material realities that, particularly for Palestinians, contribute to a sense of fatalism toward the possibility of peace. The quantitative survey data also suggest that a nearly a majority of Israelis are not aware of the living conditions of Palestinians: 48% of Israelis Jews agree that people from the "other" side have access to public services, security, and human rights protection that they need. Among interviewees, representatives from one organization, for example, responded that Palestinians remain pessimistic after living under occupation for many years, and the way that Israelis are increasingly walled off from Palestinians is driving a reduced urgency to change. Importantly, interviewees who work heavily in Gaza, or with Gazan participants, stressed the benefits of working to improve Gazan's material realities, such as paying for exam fees, teaching English, job opportunities, and improving access to education, even when they did not offer a connection between these issues and the broader level conflict.

"You can't be silent after coming here, anything can help. I can't get more specific than that because there is so much neglect. Hamas are using the people, the schools, the hospitals, and so people cannot say no to them because they provide food and money for these places. We are trying to give the people the independence to build their own lives. We are trying to connect people with culture to rebuild our society that can say no to war and yes to peace."

Most often, however, P2P programmes in Israel/Palestine focus on strengthening attitudes and relationships between Israelis and Palestinians instead of addressing the economic realities of the conflict. This is representative of a broader trend identified in the literature, which under-

lines the limitations of most P2P programmes in bringing about lasting change in the non-egalitarian distribution of resources between Israel and Palestine.[48] During interviews, nine organisational representatives were asked directly if P2P programmes affected participants' professional lives and economies of their communities. Three were unsure, and six answered loosely in the affirmative: three made references to P2P teaching skills with potential employment value, one spoke generally about helping to provide education, and one referenced that P2P programmes should explicitly address economic needs (but did not explain exactly how they did).

Two of the six organisations went further, offering specific examples of alumni helping to improve economic life. Several P2P alumni hold various leadership positions in business, and were discussed in terms of leveraging skills and thinking about how economic life can be used to facilitate conflict transformation. Meanwhile, another organisational representative shared examples of mayors who had been involved in their programmes doing joint projects for the benefit of Palestinian cities, such as addressing checkpoint issues that are a hindrance to business.

Under a broader interpretation of "poverty reduction", programmes working in the health sector or on building interpersonal relationships may be seen as improving people's physical and material wellbeing. Two organisations, for instance, help support Palestinians in receiving medical treatment in Israel, while another helps to train Palestinian medical professionals in Israel. Some organisations are focused on developing professional or social networks, which could at some point be leveraged for economic change. One in particular funds an economic incubator programme for Palestinian entrepreneurs, though the impact of this effort was not discussed.

More often, interviewees turned the question of economic impact back to the issue of identity and politics, which were seen to more heavily shape conflict dynamics. Several interviewees referenced the importance of shifting zero-sum mentalities between Israelis and Palestinians; yet, among the quantitative survey respondents, over 60% of both Israeli Arab and Israeli Jewish respondents agree that a long-term solution to the conflict would benefit the economy of both sides of the conflict.

"When we see they need and can't work or earn enough money, we can provide what we can, but that's why they need support and ways to access more opportunities to get out and move upward, including things like school, exam fees, etc. I don't think P2P can change the political leadership but can give them improvements in their standards by moving upwards and not being crushed, which would improve the economy as more people are engaged, motivated, and have their basic needs met so they can have the energy to take their lives in their hands and do things for themselves. These kinds of activities give them the build-up to be able to take the next steps to try to think about and start doing these things."

Conclusion: Interviewees do not believe that P2P programmes strongly impact poverty reduction, when poverty reduction is understood in strictly economic terms such as lower unemployment and increased income. However, P2P programmes have demonstrated some influence of alumni change agents in the sectors of health, education, business, and politics, which can and do affect the material well-being of Israelis and Palestinians, and may have long term effects on poverty.

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4. What are the recommendations for future donors investing in peacebuilding programmes to achieve the greatest overall VfM, particularly when weighing alternatives to P2P programming in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza:

As described previously, without more concrete programme data or review of evaluations, it is not possible to make independent conclusions about programme effectiveness or VfM in regard to P2P programme models. The conclusions below are based on the opinions of interviewees, which often diverge, and should be viewed as themes for further investigation.

a. Which programme investments are highly effective and low cost?

Interviewees did not discuss any programmes in the context of being low cost. However, at least three organisations appeared to rely heavily on the use of volunteers to account for operating under limited financial resources.

Conclusion: There is insufficient data to identify which programme investments are highly effective and low cost.

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[48]Ifat Maoz, "Does contact work in protracted asymmetrical conflict? Appraising 20 years of reconciliation-aimed encounters between Israeli Jews and Palestinians." Journal of Peace Research 48(1) (2011): 118

b. How to reduce costs related to highly effective and high cost programme investments?

The only example where the question of highly effective/high cost programming was discussed in interviews was the travel learning visit for Israelis and Palestinians to Northern Ireland. The organiser realised at one point that the trip's projected cost was far higher than the available budget. The organiser first considered halving the number of participants, but felt that this was unwise given the careful investment in participant selection. Instead, the organisation made arrangements for the 35 participants to be hosted by peace NGOs instead of at hotels, and negotiated cheap airline tickets for international travel. The interviewee believed that as a result, the participants strengthened positive attitudes and relationships across communities - an effect that likely would have been reduced with fewer participants.

While this example does not confirm or challenge the validity of travel learning overall, it highlights that there can be instances where expensive travel programming may indeed yield meaningful results. It also shows that organisations have employed creative cost saving measures, like hosting participants with partner organisations, as a way to reduce overall expenses. Beyond this, there were no discussions in interviews of instances where adjustments had been made to the programme design itself in a way that had an impact (positive or negative) on overall programme effectiveness.

Conclusion: Programmes involving international travel learning may be both highly effective and high cost. Further research using programme budgets and evaluations will yield stronger conclusions.

c. What low cost programmes would become significantly more effective with marginal additional investments?

As discussed under Question 4 in the Objective 1 section, multiple interviewees stressed the importance of doing more to improve the painful realities of living under occupation, particularly in Gaza, where getting funding is more difficult. They believed that more funding was key to improving everyday lives and possibilities for peace, though this was not in particular reference to marginal or substantive investments, but rather than any change would be important and positive.

"Inside myself, sometimes I feel like I have to ask what I can do, and I want to finish dealing with money, because it is really bad. So much needs to be done but we don't know what to do or how to do it. Sending specific proposals with specific English and details and pictures to make them believe us, but then they just say "no we cannot fund you", and it makes us not want to try again. I will find other solutions because it is really not good. Everything is so complicated. I want the world to support us because we are all responsible and the neglect is so real here. I want others who can be responsible and help us in this."

Outside of these three questions, interviewees did share opinions about the types of programmes where donors should invest more in general:
- 2 interviewees believed that donors should invest more in health programmes;
- 2 interviewees believed that donors should invest more in experimental programming;
- 3 interviewees believed that donors should invest more in trauma healing;
- 4 interviewees believed that donors should invest in programmes that follow the Coexistence Model (dialogue activities, building empathy, etc.);
- 5 interviewees believed that donors should invest more in programmes on education and/or for youth;
- 5 interviewees believed that donors should invest more in alumni programming and network-building.

This final point about alumni programming is especially noteworthy, as it is where the majority of interviewees indicated that their programmes may eventually demonstrate long-term impact on overarching conflict dynamics. Interviewees also had strong views about donor approaches in funding P2P programmes.
Nine interviewees asked that donors fund programmes for longer time horizons, both in order to increase the likelihood of achieving impact, particularly by engaging programme alumni, and to reduce fundraising pressures on NGO staff. Along these lines, five asked specifically that donors invest in further research, learning, and evaluation, echoing USAID's own observations on the necessity to improve monitoring, evaluation, and reporting standards in the field in order to increase learning and adaptive implementation.[49]

Five interviewees also encouraged donors to reduce the complexity and amount of bureaucratic processes for grant attributions, and two indicated that donors could

[49]USAID, Evaluative Learning Review Synthesis Report: USAID/CMM's People-to-People Reconciliation Fund, Annual Program Statement (APS), Social Impact, 2014, p. 4. https://www.dmeforpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/CMM20Evaluative20Learning20Review_Synthesis20Report20Final20March202014_US-AID_040714.pdf

be more flexible. These interviewees broadly believed that donors should focus instead on cultivating long-term, trusting relationships with organisational partners to have confidence that their funds are put to good use. At least one interviewee referenced that donors were generally open minded but were less flexible when NGOs needed to adjust plans and expenses midway. Another interviewee discussed how their organisation had moved away from project based funding, which had forced staff to spend most of their time implementing programmes in strict accordance with the proposal and on reporting, rather than using staff judgement and experience to adapt and invest time in programme effectiveness.

"The amount of restraints and bureaucracy involved in meeting grant requirements is enormous. There is a lot of influence from donors on the identity and perception of people to people programming. There is also a desire to see concrete metrics and outcomes that are real. Adding the political situation deterioration, it is very hard to make the case that dollars are useful now and in this moment and are being well spent. It is a huge challenge to get M&E funds to get NGOs money to do learning and know what is working. A lot could be done to narrow the gap between donors and NGOs. We are lucky to have lots of positive funding partnerships, but the gap is very real on the ground from what NGOs are doing and what donors are funding."

"I would say instead of rushing and going fast to enroll participants to support the organisational capacity of the NGO to develop some projects and create monitoring and evaluation that are not just checking how many participants came and check if they signed or did not sign participation tables but checking what are the rationale and experiential goals of each activity and whether they have been met or not."

Beyond this, six interviewees asked donors to invest more in funding programme overhead, staffing, and the general professional development of peacebuilding organisations. Several referenced the importance of hiring qualified staff, facilitators, and counselors as essential to achieving effectiveness in their P2P work. Others discussed the pressures of constantly fundraising, or having to scramble ways to pay for organisational needs rather than focusing on programme outcomes when funding was low.

"We were previously concerned about donations going to salaries or other similar costs, so we did not do this for 10

years or so. We recently realized without a full-time paid staff, there are certain things you just cannot do (meetings, fundraising, project planning, activities, conferences, partnerships with other NGOs to work together, etc.). At the moment, we think that is money we have to spend, and other NGOs need to know that there's only so much you can do with 100% volunteers. Voluntary work is good and promising but has a limit. You also have to be careful to go too far the other way and have too many staff."

"It is very difficult to convince donors to fund your programmes. You have office expenses and organisational costs, and these donors want to only finance the real work of meeting between the people. But, people who are more in the business understand some money should go to structure. Generally, people are too detailed. Yes, they should look at records, but to bring accountants more than just the annual financial report required by law to show you are a legitimate NGO managing your money properly is too detailed. Most of us are volunteers, most of the work is done in the field for our cause. If you support this cause, come see how things are going, but some of the controls and compliance issues require an entire staff person just for these things just to prove that we really made expenses and keep all original documents like an income tax. Donors interested in our work should be less detailed, just come see what we're doing with your eyes instead of on paperwork, and there are donors who do that."

Three interviewees asked donors for greater feedback and communication. They mentioned that they valued this interaction and input, but in many cases did not receive information beyond a general approval of programme reports. Those that did reference hearing donor feedback said it increased their sense of confidence and standing as a non-profit organisation.

One final topic of discussion was the need for NGOs to cooperate more. Several interviewees mentioned that this should be a greater area of focus, and help many potential benefits including combining forces for cost savings, exchanging lessons learned, leveraging organisational expertise, and maximising impact by targeting alumni. One interviewee mentioned that donors had a unique role to play in helping convene grantees, and/or compel them to work together. Not everyone agreed with this statement, and preferred greater consolidation of NGO efforts to avoid duplication.

"There is a huge expectation to see joint projects and

collaboration from donors because people doing this work are working day and night and not paid enough and then want us to find time to work together. There needs to be less of the same groups trying to do the same things and goals but stronger and bigger organisations with larger impact and louder voices. organisations like ours need to have louder voices and opinions instead of putting people together in the same room. The cuteness phase is over."

"Donors have a unique role in bringing us together, they should do it much more often. Some donors do and I think they bring a lot of value when they do. They should organize learning sessions on issues that affect us all and leave a lot of time for us to talk and mingle and find ways to cooperate. Donors are the perfect entity to do that. We have two donors who do that kind of thing, one does an annual convening of all their grantees, another around specific issues, and it's always extremely helpful to see the other organisations, to talk and to meet them. More donors should do this much more, that should be a role that they take on, to facilitate those connections, to facilitate that knowledge sharing."

Conclusion: Interviewees ask that donors invest in a wide range of programme sectors. Of these, alumni programming overlaps most strongly with how organisations view P2P programmes as able to have an impact on long term conflict dynamics. Donors are also asked to fund programmes over longer time horizons and with reduced reporting requirements; instead, donors should develop long term, trusting relationships with NGOs and funding more evaluation. Finally, interviewees insisted that donors invest in the long-term stability and professionalism of their organisations by funding more costs for overhead and staffing.

Annex I. Interview Protocols

INTERVIEW GUIDE & QUALITATIVE QUESTIONNAIRES

Date: _____ Location: _____ Interviewer Initials: _____

PURPOSE & CONSENT

[Organization] on People-to-People (P2P) peacebuilding programmes in Israel and Palestine from 2000 to to-day. The goal of the study is to provide donors with a clearer understanding of the impact of P2P and the value for money (VfM) or cost-effectiveness of funding these programmes.

Your participation in this interview is completely voluntary. You have the right to answer the questions as you choose. Feel free to ask for clarifications, to skip the questions you are uncomfortable with or to stop the interview at any time. Your responses and information will be kept confidential. It will be used anonymously unless you give us your express consent and permission to mention your name and/or cite your words in our final report.

	YES	NO
Do you agree to be interviewed?		
Do you agree to have your name mentioned in this study?		
Do you agree to be quoted in this study?		

DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

For statistical analysis purposes, we have a few questions related to demographic information.

Names (if appropriate): _____

Or Initials: _____ or preferred nickname: _____

Age range (prompt: one answer)

< 25	26 – 60	> 65

Sex: (prompt: one answer)

	Check Box
Male	
Female	

Nationality: (prompt: one answer)

	Check Box
Israeli	
Palestinian	
Other (please specify):	

Employment (prompt: one answer)

	Check Box
Public sector (Government)	
Private sector	
NGO	
Self-employed	
Unemployed / underemployed	
Other (Please Specify):	

A. THE IMPACT OF P2P PEACEBUILDING PROGRAMMES

We are interested in the impact of P2P programmes on individual participants, on communities, and on society, broadly. First, we would like to hear your perspective on the results of P2P programmes. Then we would like to hear your perspective on the impact of P2P programmes.

1. What is your experience with P2P programmes?

2. What key results have you seen from P2P programmes?
Follow-on: What results have been intended? Have you seen unintended results?

3. In your experience, how much time does it take to see the results of P2P programmes?

Now, shifting to the impact of P2P programmes:
4.What approaches do you use to maximize impact? Do you have any particular examples from past projects?

5. Which factors can increase the impact of P2P programmes?
Follow-up: Which of these factors are most important?

Interviewer note: Probe for programme design considerations, participant selection, activities. Alternative: Thinking of your programming, could you describe some of the steps your team takes to increase the impact of the programme?

6. Which factors can decrease the impact of P2P programmes?
Follow-up: Which of these factors are most important?

Interviewer note: Probe for programme design considerations, participant selection, activities. Alternative: What steps do you take to address these factors in your programming?

7. In your experience, are there specific groups or communities (gender, age, social sector, economic class, geographic, etc.) who are impacted most by P2P programmes? Are there specific groups who have not been impacted as much from P2P programmes as others?

Our initial research suggests that the following can be important factors related to impact of P2P programming: 1) empathy and perceptions of the "other"; 2) relationships across dividing lines; 3) capacities to constructively respond to conflict dynamics; 4) confidence to take action to support peace.

8.In your experience, are these the important indicators related to the success of P2P programming?
Follow-up: Are there other indicators that are more important?

What do these indicators look like in practice?

9. How has your organisation made progress towards each of the following indicators:
a) empathy?
b) relationships?
c) capacities?
d) confidence to take action?

Follow-up: Why? How are these indicators related? Is sequencing necessary?

10. How has your organisation faced challenges towards progress for each of the following indicators:
a) empathy?
b) relationships?
c) capacities?
d) confidence to take action?

Follow-up: Why? How are these indicators related? Is sequencing necessary?

11. For which of the indicators do you see the greatest potential for P2P results? the least?

12. In your experience, how does the political context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict affect participant's professional lives and the economies of their communities--directly? indirectly?

13. In your experience, can P2P programmes affect participants' professional lives and the economies of their communities directly? If so, how?

Interviewer note: Probe for connections between connections between example and professional life (individuals) and economic life (communities)

14.In your experience, can P2P programmes affect participants' professional lives and the economies of their communities indirectly? If so, how?

B. VFM OF P2P PROGRAMMES

The questions in this section target project or financial directors/managers of P2P programmes to gain information about how organisations make decisions related to cost-effective programming as well as VfM. The first set of questions focuses on organisational perspectives on cost-effectiveness.

15. How does your organisation think about effectiveness?

16.What approaches does your organisation use to maximize cost-effectiveness? Do you have any particular examples from past projects?

17.What factors most affect the cost-effectiveness of P2P programmes? Which factors increase cost-effectiveness? What factors decrease cost-effectiveness?

The next set of questions focuses on the relationship between implementing organisations and donors and how such relationships affect VfM.

18. What's your experience with the process of receiving P2P funds?
Follow-up: Were the funds provided sufficient to achieve your desired impact? Were the funds disbursed on time?

19. To what extent were donors receptive to your views and concerns throughout the planning and implementation of your P2P programming?

20.How useful were the comments/exchanges/feedback, if any, from donors on your programming?

C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR P2P PEACEBUILDING PROGRAMMES AND DONORS

21.What recommendations do you have for P2P programmes in order to maximize their future impact?

22. What recommendations do you have for donors to maximize future impact of P2P programmes?

23. If there was additional funding for P2P programmes, where do you think it should be spent?

24.Do you have specific recommendations about funding P2P programmes in Israel, The West Bank, and Gaza?

25. Are there any more comments or recommendations you would like to add?

26.We are trying to ensure that we speak to as diverse a group of people as possible across programme implementers, programme participants, community leaders, donor officials, while also considering religious and political affiliation, age, gender, geography, etc. Could you suggest two other people who we should interview for this research to help us include diverse perspectives?

Those are all of the questions I have for you. Thank you very much for sharing your views and comments!

INTERVIEWER NOTES

استبيان: وضع البرامج بهدف إنشاء التواصل بين المجموعات البشرية في إسرائيل وفلسطين

يجري [Organization] دراسة بحثية حول البرامج التي تجمع الأفر اد
الذين ينتمون إلى مجموعات أو "أطراف" مختلفة معا)برامج التواصل بين المجموعات البشرية أو برامج (P2P
في إسرائيل وفلسطين من 2000 حتى الوً قت الراهن. وتهدف الدراسة إلى الوصول إلى فهم أكثر وضوحا ألثر تلك البرامج
وكذا القيمة مقابل المال أو فعالية التكلفة لتمويل مثل تلك البرامج .

ُستخد م دون
ً مشاركتك في هذه الدراسة البحثية اختيارية تماما. سيتم المحافظة على سرية ردودك ومعلوماتك. وسو ف ت
اإلفصاح عن هويتك ما لم تمنحنا موافقتك وإذنك الصريحين على ذكر اسمك و/أو االستشهاد بكالمك في تقريرنا النهائي.

هل توافق على المشاركة في هذا الاستبيان؟
☐ نعم
☐ لا

اسم المؤسسة التي قامت بربطك بهذه الدراسة:

_____

النطاق العمري:
☐ 5 – 9
☐ 10 – 14
☐ 15 – 19
☐ 20 – 24
☐ 25 – 29
☐ 30 – 34
☐ 35 – 39
☐ 40 – 44
☐ 45 – 49
☐ 50 – 54
☐ 55 – 59
☐ 60 فأكثر

الجنس:
☐ أنثى
☐ ذكر
☐ غير ذلك: _____

الجنسية:
☐ إسرائيلي

التوظيف:

☐ القطاع العام (الحكومة)

☐ القطاع الخاص

☐ مؤسسة أهلية

☐ موظف يعمل لحسابه الخاص

☐ عاطل عن العمل / عاطل جزئيًا

☐ غير ذلك: _____

ما هي خبرتك مع البرامج التي تجمع الأفراد من مختلف المجموعات أو "الأطراف" معًا في إسرائيل-فلسطين:

☐ لم أشارك مطلقًا أو شاركت لمرة واحدة (0-1 شهر)

☐ بدأت المشاركة مؤخرًا (2-6 أشهر)

☐ شاركت لفترة قصيرة (7-12 شهرًا)

☐ شاركت لفترة (1-5 سنوات)

☐ شاركت لفترة طويلة (أكثر من 5 سنوات)

☐ غير ذلك: _____

أنواع البرامج التي شاركت فيها مع شخص من الطرف "الآخر" (حدد كل ما ينطبق):

☐ لا يوجد

☐ الحوار / المصالحة

☐ التعليم

☐ القيادة

☐ الصحة

☐ الأعمال أو ريادة الأعمال

☐ الإعلام

☐ الدعم

☐ البيئة

☐ غير ذلك: _____

الدور (الأدوار) في البرامج السابقة التي تجمع الأفراد الذين ينتمون لمختلف المجموعات أو "الأطراف" في إسرائيل-فلسطين (حدد كل ما ينطبق):

☐ لا يوجد

☐ مشارك

☐ متطوع

☐ عضو في فريق العمل

☐ أكاديمي

☐ مانح

☐ غير ذلك: _____

خلال العام الماضي، كم مرة شاركت في الأنواع التالية من الأنشطة مع شخص من الطرف"الآخر"؟

	دائمًا	دائمًا إلى حد ما	غالباً	أحيانًا	نادرًا	مطلقًا	غير متأكد
تحية أخوية:							

							تبادل أرقام الهواتف:
							التقابل لاحتساء القهوة أو تناول الغداء:
							الدراسة أو العمل معًا:
							تكوين صداقة جديدة:
							مناقشة المشكلات داخل مجتمعاتنا أو بينها:
							الذهاب إلى منزلهم / استضافتهم في منزلي:

إلى أي مدى تعكس العبارات التالية وجهة نظرك أو رأيك:

غير موافق بشدة	غير موافق	غير موافق إلى حد ما	محايد	موافق إلى حد ما	موافق	موافق بشدة	
							أمتلك المهارات لتحديد المشكلات مع شخص من الطرف"الآخر".
							أشعر بالارتياح في تحديد المشكلات مع شخص من الطرف "الآخر".
							حددت المشكلات مع شخص من الطرف "الآخر".
							أمتلك المهارات لإيجاد حلول للمشكلات مع شخص من الطرف "الآخر".
							أشعر بالارتياح في إيجاد حلول للمشكلات مع شخص من الطرف "الآخر".
							أوجدت حلولاً للمشكلات مع شخص من الطرف "الآخر".

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							أمتلك المهارات لقيادة المناقشات في مجتمعي بشأن المشكلات التي تؤثر على الطرف "الآخر".
							أشعر بالارتياح في قيادة المناقشات داخل مجتمعي بشأن المشكلات التي تؤثر على الطرف "الآخر".
							قمت بقيادة مناقشات داخل مجتمعي بشأن المشكلات التي تؤثر على الطرف "الآخر".
							أمتلك المهارات لتنفيذ خطة عمل مع شخص من الطرف "الآخر".
							أشعر بالارتياح في تنفيذ خطة عمل مع شخص من الطرف "الآخر".
							قمت بتنفيذ خطة عمل مع شخص من الطرف "الآخر".

إلى أي حد توافق على العبارات التالية:

غير موافق بشدة	غير موافق	غير موافق إلى حد ما	محايد	موافق إلى حد ما	موافق	موافق بشدة	
							لدي اهتمامات مشتركة مع أشخاص من الطرف "الآخر".
							الأشخاص من الطرف "الآخر" لديهم وصول إلى الخدمات العامة والأمن وسُبل حماية حقوق

							الإنسان التي يحتاجونها.
							عندما يخبرني شخص من الطرف "الآخر" بأن الصراع يجعلهم يخشون على سلامتهم، فإنني أصدقهم.
							الناس من جانبي ومن الطرف "الآخر" يحظون بحقوق متساوية للعيش في إسرائيل-فلسطين.
							المشروعات المشتركة مع الطرف "الآخر" ضرورية للانتقال إلى حل للصراع الحالي.
							سوف يحتاج جانبي إلى تحمل المسؤولية عن الضرر الذي لحق بالطرف "الآخر" من أجل إنجاز حل طويل الأجل.
							في سبيل إنجاز حل طويل الأجل، فإنني لدي الرغبة في تقديم تنازلات متساوية إذا كان ذلك سوف يحل الصراع المستقبلي.
							التوصل إلى حل طويل الأجل للصراع سوف يفيد الاقتصاد في جانبي.
							الحل طويل الأجل للصراع سوف يخلق فرصًا

							اقتصادية لكلا الطرفين.
							الحل طويل الأجل للصراع ممكن خلال حياتي.

هل لديك أي خبرات أو تعليقات أو توصيات تود مشاركتها معنا؟

שאלון תכנית אנשים לאנשים בישראל ובפלשתין

המקרבות בין אנשים מקבוצות או "צדדים" שונים (תכניות אנשים-למען-אנשים או P2P) בישראל ובפלשתין מאז שנת 2000 ועד היום. מטרת המחקר היא להגיע להבנה ברורה יותר של ההשפעה של תכניות כאלה וכן התמורה עבור הכסף או עלות התועלת של מימון תכניות כאלה.
השתתפותך בראיון היא מרצונך החופשי לחלוטין. תשובותיך והמידע שלך יישארו חסויים. נשתמש בהם באופן אנונימי אלא אם כן תיתן את הסכמתך ואישורך לציין את שמך ו/או לצטט את דבריך בדוח הסופי.

האם אתה מסכים להשתתף בסקר זה?
☐ כן
☐ לא

שם הארגון שקישר אותך למחקר זה:
_____

טווח גילים:
☐ 9 – 5
☐ 14 – 10
☐ 19 – 15
☐ 24 – 20
☐ 29 – 25
☐ 34 – 30
☐ 39 – 35
☐ 44 – 40
☐ 49 – 45
☐ 54 – 50
☐ 59 – 55
☐ 14 – 60

מין:
☐ נקבה
☐ זכר
☐ אחר: _____

לאום:
☐ ישראלי
☐ פלשתיני
☐ אחר: _____

תעסוקה:
☐ הסקטור הציבורי (ממשלה)
☐ הסקטור הפרטי
☐ ארגון לא-ממשלתי

☐ עצמאי

☐ מובטל / מועסק חלקית בלבד

☐ אחר: _____

מהו ניסיונך עם תכניות המקרבות בין אנשים מקבוצות או "צדדים" שונים בישראל-פלשתין:

☐ מעולם לא השתתפתי או פעם ראשונה (0-1 חודשים)

☐ התחלתי להשתתף לאחרונה (2-6 חודשים)

☐ משתתף מזה זמן קצר (7-12 חודשים)

☐ משתתף מזה זמן מה (1-5 שנים)

☐ משתתף מזה זמן רב (5 פלוס שנים)

☐ אחר: _____

סוגי תכניות שבהן היית מעורב עם מישהו מהצד ה"שני" (סמן את כל מה שרלוונטי):

☐ אף אחת

☐ דו-שיח / פיוס

☐ חינוך

☐ הנהגה

☐ בריאות

☐ עסקים או יזמות

☐ תקשורת

☐ תמיכה/סנגוריה

☐ תכנית סביבתית

☐ אחר: _____

תפקיד(ים) בתכניות קודמות המקרבות בין אנשים מקבוצות או "צדדים" שונים בישראל-פלשתין (סמן את כל מה שרלוונטי):

☐ אף תפקיד

☐ משתתף

☐ מתנדב

☐ חבר סגל

☐ אקדמאי

☐ תורם

☐ אחר: _____

בשנה האחרונה, באיזו תדירות השתתפת בסוגי הפעילויות הבאים עם מישהו מהצד ה"שני"?

	תמיד	כמעט תמיד	בתדירות גבוהה	לפעמים	כמעט אף פעם לא	אף פעם	לא בטוח
ברכת שלום חמה:							
החלפנו מספרי טלפון:							
נפגשנו לקפה או ארוחת צהריים:							

							למדנו או עבדנו יחד:
							הכרתי חבר חדש:
							שוחחנו על סוגיות בקהילות או בין הקהילות שלנו:
							ביקרתי בביתם / אירחתי אותם בביתי:

עד כמה ההצהרות הבאות משקפות את דעותיך:

מתנגד לחלוטין	איני מסכים	איני מסכים במידה מסוימת	ניטרלי	מסכים באופן חלקי	מסכים	מסכים מאוד	
							יש לי את הכישורים לזהות בעיות אצל מישהו מהצד ה"שני".
							אני מרגיש נוח לזהות בעיות אצל מישהו מהצד ה"שני".
							זיהיתי בעיות אצל מישהו מהצד ה"שני".
							יש לי כלים ליצור פתרונות לבעיות אצל מישהו מהצד ה"שני".
							אני מרגיש נוח ליצור פתרונות לבעיות אצל מישהו מהצד ה"שני".
							יצרתי פתרונות לבעיות אצל מישהו מהצד ה"שני".
							יש לי כלים להוביל דיונים בקהילה שלי סביב בעיות

							המשפיעות על הצד ה"שני".
							אני מרגיש נוח להוביל דיונים בקהילה שלי סביב בעיות המשפיעות על הצד ה"שני".
							הובלתי דיונים בקהילה שלי סביב בעיות המשפיעות על הצד ה"שני".
							יש לי את הכישורים ליישם תכנית פעולה עם מישהו מהצד ה"שני".
							אני מרגיש נוח ליישם תכנית פעולה עם מישהו מהצד ה"שני".
							יישמתי תכנית פעולה עם מישהו מהצד ה"שני".

עד כמה אתה מסכים עם ההצהרות הבאות:

מתנגד מאוד	איני מסכים	איני מסכים במידה מסוימת	ניטרלי	מסכים באופן חלקי	מסכים	מסכים מאוד	
							יש לי תחומי עניין משותפים עם אנשים בצד ה"שני".
							לאנשים מהצד ה"שני" יש גישה לשירותים ציבוריים, בטחון והגנת זכויות האדם שהם זקוקים להם.
							כאשר מישהו מהצד ה"שני" אומר לי שהקונפליקט

							גורם להם לחשוש לביטחונם, אני מאמין להם.
							לצד שלי ולאנשים בצד ה"שני" יש זכויות שוות לחיות בישראל-פלשתין.
							פרויקטים משותפים עם הצד ה"שני" נחוצים לצורך מציאת פתרון לקונפליקט הנוכחי.
							כדי להגיע לפתרון ארוך-טווח, הצד שלי יצטרך ליטול אחריות על הנזק שנעשה לצד ה"שני".
							כדי להגיע לפתרון ארוך-טווח, אני מוכן להתפשר אם הדבר ימנע קונפליקט עתידי.
							פתרון ארוך טווח לקונפליקט יועיל לכלכלה של הצד שלי.
							פתרון ארוך טווח לקונפליקט ייצור הזדמנויות כלכליות לשני הצדדים.
							פתרון ארוך טווח לקונפליקט אפשרי במשך תקופת חיי.

האם יש לך חוויות, הערות או המלצות שברצונך לשתף עמנו?

Annex III. Literature Review

INTRODUCTION

Building on this anecdote, this literature review aims to account for the knowledge (or lack thereof) available in the literature with regard to the impact and cost-effectiveness of the people-to-people (P2P) efforts that have been devoted to helping Israelis and Palestinians 'forswear war and ... creat[e] prosperity that all could enjoy.' We begin with a brief overview of the conceptual framework and major categories of P2P models. In section two, we survey different aspects of P2P programming that have been designed and implemented by organisations to date, with an emphasis on the period 2000-present. We conclude with insights about key findings from the literature as well as gaps in the literature that need to be addressed through further research.

Historical and Theoretical Framework
The phrase "people-to-people" as an approach to peace was first articulated by U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower in a speech on 11 September 1956 in which he laid the foundation of a new vision of peacebuilding, stating: "If we are going to take advantage of the assumption that all people want peace, then the problem is for people to get together and to leap governments - if necessary to evade governments - to work out not one method but thousands of methods by which people can gradually learn a little bit more of each other."[50] This vision translated into a specific initiative known as the people-to-people program whose overall aim was to 'build the road to enduring peace' by 'creating understanding between people.'[51]

Within academic theory, P2P approach is grounded in Allport's *contact hypothesis*,[52] or *intergroup contact theory.*

According to this theory, properly managed contact between groups lead to better interactions and understanding by reducing problems of stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination which are commonly occurring between rival groups. For the contact to cure conflict, Allport puts forth four 'optimal conditions' that need to be met:

- Equal status (both groups must engage equally in the relationship despite differences in their backgrounds and power);
- Common goals/interpersonal cooperation (groups work together by pooling their efforts and resources towards superordinate goals);
- Support of authorities, law, or customs (rival groups must acknowledge some authority, norms or principles that support the contact and interactions between the groups); and,
- Personal interaction (members of the conflicting groups need to mingle with one another in order to learn about each other and build cross-group friendships).

Over the last half-century, several psychological processes have been hypothesized to explain how and why intergroup contact help reduce prejudice and improve intergroup relations. Key among these processes include how learning about others helps reduce the fear and anxiety people have when interacting with outsiders, which in turn reduces their negative evaluations of the outgroup.[53] Extensive literature also suggests strong correlation between intergroup contact and several change dynamics including increased knowledge about the outgroup,[54] individuation of the out-group,[55] reduction of intergroup anxiety,[56] reduction in realistic and symbolic threats,[57] increased perspective-taking and empathy,[58] increased

[50]Ike Eisenhower Foundation, "The People to People Program." Available at https://www.dwightdeisenhower.com/399/People-to-People-Program.

[51]Ibid.

[52]G.W. Allport, The nature of prejudice. Cambridge, MA: Perseus Books, 1954. W.G. Stephan and C.W. Stephan, "Intergroup anxiety". Journal of Social Issues. 41 (3) (1985): 157–175.

[53]W.G. Stephan and C.W. Stephan, "Intergroup anxiety". Journal of Social Issues. 41 (3) (1985): 157–175.

[54]For support, see notably Allport, The Nature of Prejudice; and A. Eller, D. Abrams, and A. Gómez. "When the direct route is blocked: The extended contact pathway to improving intergroup relations." International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 36 (2012): 637–646. For criticism, see G.W. Stephan and C.W. Stephan, "The role of ignorance in intergroup relations." In N. Miller & M. B. Brewer (Eds.), Groups in contact: The psychology of desegregation. Orlando, FL: Academic Press, 1984, pp. 229–255.

[55]N. Miller, "Personalization and the promise of contact theory." Journal of Social Issues, 58 (2002): 387–41

[56]K. Greenland and R. Brown, "Categorization and intergroup anxiety in contact between British and Japanese nationals." European Journal of Social Psychology, 29(1999): 503–522. See also M.R. Islam and M. Hewstone, "Dimensions of contact as predictors of intergroup anxiety, perceived outgroup variability, and outgroup attitude: An integrative model." Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 19 (1993): 700–710

[57]W.G. Stephan and C.L. Renfro, "The role of threat in intergroup relations." In D. M. McNatt and E. R. Smith (Eds.), From prejudice to intergroup emotions: Differentiated reactions to social groups. New York, NY: Psychology Press, 2003, pp. 191–207.

[58]A.D. Galinsky and G.B. Moskowitz, Perspective taking: Decreasing stereotype expression, stereotype accessibility, and in-group favoritism. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 784 (2000): 708–724.

self-disclosure,[59] as well as changes in other positive and negative emotions.[60] Among other social scientists who documented positive effects of intergroup contact across field, experimental, and correlational studies, Pettigrew and Tropp found that the more face-to-face contact groups had, the less prejudice they reported.[61]

Other studies emphasize the value of various forms of contact. For instance, Wright et al. established *the extended contact hypothesis*, according to which knowing that a member of one's own group has a close relationship with an outsider member can lead to more positive attitudes towards that outgroup.[62] Additionally, a recent survey identified over 100 studies whose findings validate the positive effect of extended contact on prejudice reduction, independent of direct friendship with outgroup members.[63]

Despite its popularity, the contact hypothesis has attracted criticism as well. For instance, Dixon et al. voices skepticism about the likelihood of contact's optimal conditions occurring in concert.[64] Others call into question the generalizability of correlational research and lab studies.[65] Still others, notably Paolini et al., demonstrate that intergroup contact may have more negative than positive effects on prejudice in contexts where it makes outgroup members' social group more salient during encounters.[66] Recent research on this phenomenon referred to in the literature

as the *negative contact hypothesis*[67] suggests that "if an intergroup situation contains a mix of both positive and negative experiences, the negative experiences will have the most influence on attitudes about the group, leading to more prejudice, not less."[68] All being considered however, "recent evidence suggests that although negative intergroup contact is more influential than positive intergroup contact, it is also less common than positive contact in real world intergroup encounters."[69]

The contact hypothesis has been a subject of extensive studies and debates in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Skepticism abounds about the likelihood of establishing fruitful intergroup contact in this context because of the uniquely extreme complexity of the defining features of the conflict at issue:

● The Israeli- Palestine conflict is widely considered one of the most profound and protracted conflicts of the 20th century.[70]

● Children from the Palestinian and Israeli cultures are often indoctrinated from birth to consider the "other side" of their conflict as the enemy.[71]

● Several characteristics of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict may make it especially susceptible to intergroup antipathy and dehumanization.[72]

● Both groups perceive themselves as the exclusively indigenous people of the land, mutually denying the other's rights.[73]

[59]T.F. Pettigrew, "Generalized intergroup contact effects on prejudice." Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 23 (1997): 173–185. See also T.F. Pettigrew, "Intergroup contact theory." Annual Review of Psychology, 49 (1998): 65–85.

[60]T. Tam, M. Hewstone, E. Cairns, N. Tausch, G. Maio and J. Kenworthy, "The impact of intergroup emotions on forgiveness." Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 10 (2007): 119–136.

[61]T.F. Pettigrew, and L.R. Tropp, "A meta-analytic test of intergroup contact theory". Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 90 (5) (2006): 751–783.

[62]S.C. Wright, A. Aron, T. McLaughlin-Volpe and S.A. Ropp, "The extended contact effect: Knowledge of cross-group friendships and prejudice". Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 73 (1997): 73–90.

[63]Loris Vezzali, MIles Hewstone, Dora Capozza, Dino Giovanni and Ralf Wolfer, "Improving intergroup relations with extended and vicarious forms of indirect contact". European Review of Social Psychology 25(2014): 314–389

[64]John Dixon, Kevin Durrheim and Colin Tredoux, "Beyond the optimal contact strategy: A reality check for the contact hypothesis". American Psychologist. 60 (7) (2005): 697–711.

[65]See Marianne Bertrand, and Esther Duflo,"Field Experiments on Discrimination." In Handbook of Economic Field Experiments 1 (2017): 309. See also Dominic Abrams, "Processes of prejudice: Theory, evidence and intervention". Human Rights 68 (2010).

[66]S. Paolini, J. Harwood and M. Rubin, "Negative intergroup contact makes group memberships salient: Explaining why intergroup conflict endures". Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 36 (12) (2010): 1723–1738.

[67]See notably (1) Paolini and Rubin, 'Negative intergroup contact makes group memberships salient'; (2) F.K. Barlow, S. Paolini, A. Pedersen, M.J. Hornsey, H.R. Radke, J. Harwood, M. Rubin and C.G. Sibley, "The contact caveat: Negative contact predicts increased prejudice more than positive contact predicts reduced prejudice." Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 38(2012): 1629-1643; (3) S. Graf, S. Paolini and M. Rubin, "Negative intergroup contact is more influential, but positive intergroup contact is more common: Assessing contact prominence and contact prevalence in five Central European countries." European Journal of Social Psychology 44 (2014): 536-547; (4) S. Paolini, J. Harwood, M. Rubin, S. Husnu, N. Joyce, and M. Hewstone, "Positive and extensive intergroup contact in the past buffers against the disproportionate impact of negative contact in the present." European Journal of Social Psychology 44 (2014): 548-562.

[68]M. Rubin, "The Disproportionate Influence of Negative Encounters with Out-Group Members on Prejudice." https://sites.google.com/site/markrubinsocialpsychresearch/positive-and-negative-experiences-with-members-of-other-groups

[69]S. Paolini et al. , 'Positive and extensive intergroup contact',

[70]A. Shlaim, The Middle East: The origins of Arab–Israeli wars. In N. Woods (Ed.), Explaining international relations since 1945. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1996, pp. 219–240.

[71]Juliana Schroeder and Jane L. Risen, "Befriending the enemy: Outgroup friendship longitudinally predicts intergroup attitudes in a coexistence program for Israelis and Palestinians." Group Processes & Intergroup Relations Vol. 19 (1) (2016): 72 –93.

[72]I. Maoz, and C. McCauley, "Threat, dehumanization and support for retaliatory-aggressive policies in asymmetric conflict." Journal of Conflict Resolution 52(1) (2008): 93–116.

[73]H.C. Kelman, "Israelis and Palestinians: Psychological prerequisites for mutual acceptance." International Security 3 (1978): 162–186.

- Both groups bring to the conflict a national history of persecution and destruction, producing a "siege mentality."[74]
- The power relations in the conflict are complex; there exists a double asymmetry perception of power such that Israel considers itself less powerful compared to the Arab world, but Palestinians consider themselves less powerful compared to Israelis.[75]
- In many situations where contacts were established, evidence suggests that significant attitude change from pre-intervention to post-intervention ended up reversing back to pre-intervention levels within a couple of months of the end of the intervention.[76]

It thus comes as no surprise that many peace initiatives to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have largely focused on establishing contacts between powerful actors including governments, military forces, and individual leaders,[77] a trend which is heavily embedded in the dominant state-centered peacebuilding practices which focus on the struggles for 'power and peace among nations' in the tradition of Morganthau.[78]

However, such state-centric peacebuilding efforts proved to have little impact at the grass-root levels precisely because Israeli and Palestinians belong to "those communities where elites or other societal forces have damaged or severed the relationships connecting individuals and groups of differing ethnic, political, religious, or other identities."[79]

It was in response to these unfavorable conditions and the resulting barriers to intergroup contact that scholars and practitioners have embraced more creative P2P approaches meant to build intergroup positive relationships by helping ordinary people from both sides to come together and find peacefully negotiated solutions to their common challenges. The latter are the subject of this study.

OVERVIEW OF P2P MODELS APPLIED TO THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT

The art of building inter-group relations comes in many forms. In the context of Israeli and Palestine, four major P2P models have received attention: the Coexistence Model, the Joint Projects Model, the Confrontational Model, and the Narrative/Story-telling Model.

The Coexistence Model is a set of initiatives brought to Israel from the USA in the 1980s, seeking to promote mutual understanding and tolerance between Jews and Arabs.[80] The focus was on reducing stereotypes, fostering positive intergroup attitudes, and advancing other goals and interests in the spirit of the contact hypothesis.[81] This hypothesis purports that intergroup contact reduces prejudice, under four optimal conditions:

- **Equal status.** Both groups must engage equally in the relationship.
- **Common goals**. Both groups must work on a problem/task and share this as a common goal
- **Intergroup cooperation.** Both groups must work together for their common goals without competition.
- **Support of authorities, law, or customs.** Both groups must acknowledge some authority that supports the contact and interactions between the groups.

The Joint Projects Model emerged in the mid-1980s as a prominent model based on the assumption that joint projects involving both Jews and Arabs would help reduce intergroup hostilities, increase positive attitudes and cooperation, and thus cement a common, transcendental identity.[82] Joint project types that became very popular include theater projects, choirs and orchestras, joint study groups and scientific projects, mixed soccer teams, and joint curricula programs.[83]

The Confrontational Model developed in the 1990s in response to the needs and demands of Palestinians who

[74]D. Bar-Tal, and D. Antebi, "Beliefs about negative intentions of the world: A study of the Israeli siege mentality." Political Psychology 13 (1992): 633–645.

[75]N. Rouhana and S. Fiske, "Perception of power, threat, and conflict intensity in asymmetric intergroup conflict: Arab and Jewish citizens of Israel." Journal of Conflict Resolution 39(1995): 49–81.

[76]I. Bar-Natan, Meeting between adversaries: Does liking the other individuals generalize to their groups? (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). University of Haifa, Israel [Hebrew]. See also Rosen, 2006

[77]Notable initiatives and the resulting peace treaties include: 1949 Armistice Agreements (1949); Allon Plan (1967-8); Rogers Plan (1969); Geneva Conference (1973); Camp David Accords (1978); Egypt–Israel Peace Treaty (1979); Madrid Conference (1991); Oslo Accords (1993); Israel–Jordan peace treaty (1994); Camp David Summit (2000); Clinton's "Parameters" (2000); Taba talks (2002); Beirut Summit (2002); The Road Map for Peace (2002); Abbas' Peace Plan (2014); and, Trump's "Deal of the Century" peace initiative (2017).

[78]Hans Morganthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973.

[79]USAID, People-to-People Peacebuilding: Program Guide. Washington, DC: USAID/DCHA/CMM, 2011, p.5

[80]Ifat Maoz, "Does contact work in protracted asymmetrical conflict? Appraising 20 years of reconciliation-aimed encounters between Israeli Jews and Palestinians." Journal of Peace Research 48(1) (2011): 118

[81]Allport, The nature of prejudice.

[82]Muzafer Sherif, In Common Predicament: Social Psychology of Intergroup Conflict and Cooperation. Boston, MA: Houghton-Mifflin, 1966.

[83]Ifat Maoz, "Does contact work in protracted asymmetrical conflict? Appraising 20 years of reconciliation-aimed encounters between Israeli Jews and Palestinians." Journal of Peace Research 48(1) (2011)

were not satisfied with the dominant Coexistence and Joint Projects models. Driven by discrimination towards the Palestinian citizens of Israel, this model, also referred to as the Group Identity Model, frames the Palestinians as a weaker, minority group that needs to be empowered to confront directly the Jews seen as a dominant or oppressive group. The intended confrontation is meant to be direct, but non-violent engagement through discussions of national identities, civil aspiration, asymmetric powers, and discrimination.[84]

The Narrative Model, or the Story-telling Model, arose in the late 1990s as a synthesis combining coexistence and confrontational aspects of relationships between Israeli and Palestinians. Prominent theorists who pioneered this model include Bar-On who has demonstrated that 'storytelling' spaces provided individuals and communities with 'a way to work through political and collective hostilities.'[85] By the same token, Albeck has underscored the power of 'dialogue groups' in the process of 'working through intractable conflicts by personal story-telling.'

Put together, the four models encompass a variety of P2P efforts and experiences whose combined impact has been the focus of several studies. Overall, three waves of impact assessment are documented in the literature on P2P approaches in the context of Israeli- Palestinian conflict. The first wave comprises extensive research devoted to explicating the conditions of contact and assessing the efficacy of such contact in improving intergroup relations.[86] The second wave emerged recently as a response to the gaps in the dominant literature regarding the effectiveness of P2P approaches in situations of 'protracted asymmetrical ethnopolitical conflicts.'[87] The third wave builds on the precedent one to take 'a step towards defining and appraising models and mechanisms of intergroup contact that may be effective in bringing about reconciliation and in improving intergroup relations in protracted asymmetrical conflict.'[88]

The point of departure in this endeavor is a 2011 comprehensive review of the available literature on the Israel-Palestinian conflict by Ifat Maoz, a professor at Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Maoz's findings from a rich body of empirical data (155 interviews and 250 written materials) covering the period 1988-2008 shed light on the strengths and limitations of the above-mentioned four P2P models as summed up below.

After reflecting on different periods and types of P2P programs in Israel and Palestine, past researchers suggest that the effectiveness of different models and approaches are affected by several key dynamics. While there are varying opinions on how to apply and contextualize these, and when it is appropriate to explicitly or indirectly incorporate them into programs, several studies[89] emphasize that several aspects of P2P design are critical to success in Israel Palestine, including:

● Full equality and recognition of legitimacy for both groups;
● Recognition or awareness of imbalances of power between the superior (Jews) and weaker (Arabs) groups;
● Short-term activities that generate positive intergroup contact and relationships combined with long-term activities with tangible, sustainable action;
● Trained and multi-partial facilitation that ensures equal participation (including in translation, opportunities, and space), adequate preparation that provides confidence to all groups; and
● Incorporation of building skills in open communication, structural analysis, and self-awareness and critique.

While P2P theory has evolved since its origins in the 1950s, many aspects of P2P models and activities remain remarkably similar today. Successive P2P models have built on each other, integrating elements of preceding models into subsequent ones. For example, joint projects are still common today as are projects that fit the narrative mod-

[84]For detailed discussion, see (1) Halabi and Sonnenschein, 'The Jewish-Palestinian encounter'; (2) Ifat Maoz, "Coexistence is in the eye of the beholder: Evaluating intergroup encounter interventions between Jews and Arabs in Israel." Journal of Social Issues 60 (2004): 437-452; and (3) Nava Sonnenschein, Rabah Halabi and Ariela Friedman, "Legitimization of national identity and the change in power relationships in workshops dealing with the Israeli/Palestinian Conflict." In: Eugene Weiner (ed.), The Handbook of Interethnic Coexistence. New York: Continuum (an Abraham Fund publication), 1998, pp. 600-614.
[85]Dan Bar-On, (ed), Bridging the Gap: Storytelling as a Way to Work Through Political and Collective Hostilities. Hamburg: edition Korber-Stiftung, 2000.
[86]See notably T. Pettigrew and L. R. Tropp (Eds.), When groups meet: The dynamics of intergroup contact (Essays in social psychology). New York, NY: Psychology Press, 2011.
[87]Proponents of this school include John Dixon, Kevin Durrheim and Colin Tredoux "Beyond the optimal strategy: A 'reality check' for the contact hypothesis." American Psychologist 60 (2005): 697-711. See also John Dixon, Kevin Durrheim and Colin Tredoux, "Contact and attitudes towards the principle and practice of racial equality." Psychological Science 18: 867-872; (3).
[88]Maoz, 'Does contact work'
[89]See notably (1) Daniel Bar-Tal, "The elusive nature of peace education." In: Gavriel Salomon and Baruch Nevo, (eds), Peace Education: The Concept, Principles and Practices around the World. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2002, pp. 27-36; (2) Daniel Bar-Tal, "Nature, rationale, and effectiveness of education for coexistence." Journal of Social Issues 60(2) (2004): 253-271; (3) Muhamad Abu-Nimer, "Education for coexistence and Arab-Jewish encounters in Israel: Potential and challenges." Journal of Social Issues 60(2) (2004): 405-422; and (4) Rabah Halabi and Nava Sonnenschein, "The Jewish-Palestinian encounter in a time of crisis." Journal of Social Issues 60 (2) (2004): 375-387.

Table 1: Findings on the Strengths & Limitations of Major P2P Models (1988-2008)

P2P Model	Strengths	Limitations
Coexistence Model	● Emphasis on shared and non-controversial commonalities ● Successful coexistence, notably for kindergarten and elementary school students. ● Favorable conditions for consensual and apolitical encounters of participants from different backgrounds	● High expectations, false hopes, disappointments ● Perpetuation of asymmetric relations ● Ignoring collective & institutionalized bases of discrimination
Joint Project Model	● Improving intergroup relations ● Reducing intergroup hostilities ● Reinforcing the sense of interdependency	● Ignoring conflict-related issues ● Accumulating deleterious effects of failed joint projects
Confrontational Model	● Direct & explicit discussion of fundamental issues ● Deeper awareness & understanding of the conflict and its implications.	● Alienation, distrust and stereotypes reinforced ● Boundaries blurred between confrontation and verbal violence.
Narrative Model	● Providing group dialogue spaces ● Creating trust and empathy towards outgroup members	● Double-edged nature of story-telling: Some stories can heal, others can hurt.

el. Although projects that fit the Confrontation Model are less prevalent, many P2P highlight the need to recognize power asymmetries between Israelis, Arab citizens of Israel, and Palestinians, a core feature of the Confrontation Model. Specific activities, projects, and programmes are explored further below.

P2P IN PRACTICE: DIFFERENT APPROACHES AND VARIED RESULTS

In Israel and Palestine, P2P programmes have been designed to target specific sectors, groups of beneficiaries, and entry points. P2P programming in Israel-Palestine commonly is associated with in the Oslo II Agreement, one aspect of which was that Israel and the PLO agreed to create a People-to-People Program with the support of the Government of Norway.[90] Under the formal P2P Program, there were 130 NGO projects funded between 1996 and mid-2000 through four public calls for proposals.[91] P2P expanded significantly beyond the formal P2P Program and has become a field in which many organisations are active in Israel and Palestine. One study

identified almost 200 Israeli, Palestinian, and joint non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that implemented P2P activities from 1993-2000.[92] Many organisations have since closed, new organisations have entered the field, and some organisations continue to implement P2P. A list of select organisations that have implemented P2P activities in the past or are currently running P2P programmes is available in Annex 1.

P2P programmes include a wide range of sectors intended to attract participants and support joint activities in personal and professional areas of society where there are opportunities and overlapping interests between Israelis, Israeli Arabs, and Palestinians. The formal People-to-People Program organized its NGO cooperative projects into a set of categories: 1) youth; 2) adult dialogue and seminars; 3) culture; 4) environment; and 5) media and communication.[93] In 1998, after a number of youth projects were not successful, a school twinning and education category replaced the media and communication category.[94] Beyond the sectors covered by the

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[90]Lena C. Endresen, "Contact and Cooperation: The Israeli-Palestinian People-to-People Program," Fafo Institute for Applied Social Science, 2001, p. 8. https://www.fafo.no/images/pub/2001/659.pdf

[91]Endresen, "Contact and Cooperation," p. 12.

[92]Shira Herzog and Avivit Hai, "The Power of Possibility: The Role of People-to-People Programs in the Current Israeli-Palestinian Reality," Freidrich Ebert Stiftung, Israel Office, 2005, p. 35. https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/israel/04093.pdf

[93]Endresen, "Contact and Cooperation," p. 12.

[94]Ibid.

formal P2P Program, P2P currently encompasses a broad range of sectors including "civil society activism, dialogue, economic development, education, empowerment of youth, women and minorities, environmental peacebuilding, human rights and issue advocacy, media, psychosocial work and trauma healing, research, sports, and technological cooperation."[95]

Depending on the programme, **target groups** are mostly selected based on a range of participant geographies, age, gender, professions, and hobbies. However, in their field study of USAID /West Bank Gaza People-to-People Reconciliation Annual Program Statement Grants from 2014, Lazarus et. al note that P2P programmes and "peace" tend to be associated with certain sociopolitical demographics. P2P participants were recruited from these demographics and thus were not reflective of the diversity of Israeli and Palestinian societies. Specific demographics largely absent from P2P programmes included traditional and religious, politically conservative, and socioeconomically disadvantaged. Additionally, programme implementers reported difficulty achieving balanced levels of recruitment from demographics including Israeli Jews, Arab citizens of Israel, and Palestinians. Lazarus et al. observe that the impact of P2P programmes may be limited to the specific groups that participate in them.[96]

Participant **entry points** are determined by their first engagement in activities. Such activities take place in in-country or international locations and may start with cooperative projects; relationship-building or reflective exercises; personal or professional contexts; and many others. Research has found that sequencing of activities is critical to the success of P2P programmes. Successful programmes typically follow a pattern of intra-group or uninational preparation activities in advance of inter-group or binational encounters followed by intra-group or uninational processing activities.[97]

Analyzing P2P programmes funded by USAID, researchers found that programmes from different sectors could be grouped by **success indicators**, as defined by programme implementers.

Table 2. P2P indicators of success by project type[98]

Project Types (Sector)	Indicators of Success
Dialogue, education, and leadership	● Participants empowered to become peacebuilders and activists
Advocacy and media initiatives	● Shifts in public discourse generated by focused campaigns ● Institutional policy generated by focused campaigns
Environmental initiatives	● Infrastructure built ● Awareness raised ● Potential environmental hazards mitigated or prevented

Notably, USAID's Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM) used "changing perceptions" as a "universal indicator" of P2P programmes, but a number of implementers did not primarily measure their impact in this way.[99]

The strongest evidence of **impact** in the literature is related to dialogue, education, and leadership projects. Typically, the theory of change related such projects is a form of the statement: "encounters will enhance the motivation and capacity of participants to become 'agents of change'...in their communities,"[100] which ties to the success indicator above. In the study "A future for Israeli-Palestinian peacebuilding" for the Britain Israel Communications and Research Centre, Lazarus documents 14 leading peace activist from different sides of the conflict who participated in P2P programmes in their youth. Six of these leaders attributed their activism to participation, specifically, with other leaders spoke to their participation in other dialogue and education programmes.[101] Despite such demonstrated impact, other researchers assert that the potential impact of P2P programmes on the whole is limited to "a small number of individuals--not enough of a

[95]Ned Lazarus, Ayse Kadayifci-Orellana, Maya Kahanoff, and Fakhira Halloun, "Evaluative Learning Review: Field Study USAID/West Bank Gaza People-to-People Reconciliation Annual Program Statement Grants," Evaluative Learning Review Synthesis Report: USAID/CMM's People-to-People Reconciliation Fund, Annual Program Statement (APS), Social Impact, 2014, p. 131. https://www.dmeforpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/CMM20Evaluative20Learning20Review_Synthesis20Report20Final20March202014_USAID_040714.pdf
[96]Ibid. p. 136-137, 147-150.
[97]Ibid. p. 167. See also Herzog and Hai, "The Power of Possibility," p. 39 for a discussion of the emergence of uninational activities within P2P programs.
[98]Ibid. p. 7.
[99]Ibid.
[100]Ned Lazarus, A Future for Israeli-Palestinian Peacebuilding. Britain Israel Communications and Research Centre (BICOM), 2017, p. 40. http://www.bicom.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/A-future-for-Israeli-Palestinian-peacebuilding-FINAL.pdf
[101]Ibid.

critical mass to carry the burden of powerful change."[102]

An earlier study of 12 Israeli NGOs implementing P2P initiatives found that evidence of impact could be documented in two additional ways: "1) people-to-people activities have the ability to shape or reframe perceptions of the relationship between people and 2) people-to-people taps into a myriad of motivations or needs — political, professional, and economical — of the populations and individuals who take part."[103] However, data documenting such impacts was not provided.

There is limited data on P2P programme cost in the literature, although some aggregate data is available. The average project size under the formal P2P Program was USD $20,000, but there were three larger, multi-sectoral projects funded: 1) Peace Index, 2) The Israeli-Palestinian Business Forum, and 3) Cross-Border Classrooms: A School to School Program.[104] In terms of funding for the broader P2P field, one study estimates that donors spent between USD $25-$35 million throughout the 1990s.[105]

The U.S. and the EU have funded P2P programmes in Israel and Palestine from the late 1990s to the present. As of 2012, U.S. Government expenditures through CMM's Annual Program Statement in the Israel/West Bank/Gaza region totaled "$42.7 million worth of grants since 2004, to fund 60 P2P projects implemented by 42 different organisations, reaching tens of thousands of beneficiaries."[106] The EU Peacebuilding Initiative is another major donor. Established in 1998,[107] it has dedicated 5 million Euro annually which supports 10-12 grantees.[108] It may be possible to disaggregate this cost data from individual project reports, and cost data will be solicited from select organisations.

CONCLUSION

While P2P theory has evolved since its origins in the 1950s, many aspects of P2P models and activities remain remarkably similar today. P2P programmes in Israel and Palestine can be classified into four models: the Coexistence Model, the Joint Project Model, the Confrontation Model, and the Narrative Model. Successive P2P models have built on each other, integrating elements of preceding models into subsequent ones. Today, there is programming that fits the Joint Project Model as well as the Narrative Model,

and a core tenet of the Confrontation Model--that there are power asymmetries between Israelis, Israeli Arabs, and Palestinians that should be acknowledged-- continues to inform P2P programmes.

While studies have traced applications of P2P in Israel and Palestine to the 1980s, P2P is commonly associated with the Oslo II period because Israel, the PLO, and Norway established a formal P2P Program as part of the Agreement. In practice, P2P expanded significantly beyond the projects associated with the formal P2P Program and today encompass a wide range of sectors. Irrespective of program sector or entry point, the literature highlights that the sequencing of P2P activities is critical. Specifically, successful programs typically follow a pattern of intra-group or uninational preparation activities in advance of inter-group or binational encounters followed by intra-group or uninational processing activities.

In terms of impact, there is the most concrete evidence from dialogue, education, and leadership projects. Such projects usually have a theory of change that is a form of the statement: "encounters will enhance the motivation and capacity of participants to become 'agents of change'...in their communities,"[109] and evaluate success based on their ability to empower participants to become peacebuilders and activists.[110] While there are other metrics of impact available in the literature, there is limited data documenting evidence of impact.

A few key gaps emerge from the literature. First, although there is some aggregate cost data available, specific project or program level cost data is absent. However, the literature highlights key funders of P2P programmes in Israel and Palestine so that between public government documents and requests for information to specific organisations, project and programme level cost data may be collected through further research. Second, there is significantly less information in the literature on P2P programs in Gaza than programs in the West Bank and Israel. This gap in the literature was expected given the restrictions on access in Gaza since 2007. Deeper examination specifically of past P2P projects and programmes from 2000-2007 may help fill this gap, although there will be less information on P2P in Gaza given the operational context.

[102]Herzog and Hai, "The Power of Possibility," p. 31.
[103]Endresen, "Contact and Cooperation," p. 23.
[104]Ibid., p. 12.
[105]Herzog and Hai, "The Power of Possibility," p. 31.
[106]Lazarus et al., "Evaluative Learning Review," p. 131.

[107]While the first funding disbursement occurred in 1998, the second disbursement of funding did not occur until 2001 because of internal EU corruption scandals. Herzog and Hai, "The Power of Possibility," p. 30.
[108]Lazarus, "A Future for Israeli-Palestinian Peacebuilding," p. 54.
[109]Ibid. p. 40.
[110]Lazarus et al., "Evaluative Learning Review," p. 7.

PPC RESEARCH

System of Instability and Poverty

Annex V. List of Interviewed Organisations

1. Search for Common Ground (2 interviewees)

2. Peres Centre (1 interviewee)

3. Combatants for Peace (1 interviewee)

4. Project Rozana (1 interviewee)

5. Kids for Peace (2 interviewees)

6. Seeds of Peace (3 interviewees)

7. Other Voice (2 interviewees)

8. Geneva Initiative (1 interviewee)

9. Holy Land Trust (1 interviewee)

10. Zimam (2 interviewees)

11. EcoPeace (1 interviewee)

12. Neve Shalom (2 interviewees)

13. Hand of Peace (1 interviewee)

14. A New Dawn in the Negev (1 interviewee)

15. Gaza Youth Committee (1 interviewee)

16. 1 academic interviewee

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